



Finstrides

Sample Web Application (version 1.2.3)

Penetration Testing Report

Prepared by:

Security Consultant

Reviewed by:

Lead Security Consultant

Justin Surman (justin.surman@finstrides.com)

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Document Details

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Project Staff	<NAME SURNAME> – Offensive Security Lead (OSCP OS-111-12345) <NAME SURNAME> – Offensive Security Engineer (eWPTX v2.0 - 1234567) Justin Surman – Project Manager
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Executive Summary

Financial Strides engaged DataArt to perform a penetration testing project of the Sample Web application (version 1.2.3) and associated server-side components. The application allows users to conduct [appropriate activities within the application].

The primary goal of the penetration testing project was to identify any potential areas of concern associated with the application in its current state and determine the extent to which the system may be breached by an attacker possessing a particular skill and motivation.

The assessment was performed in accordance with the “best-in-class” practices as defined by the Open Web Application Security Project Testing Guide ([OWASP Testing Guide](#)), the Penetration Test Guidance for [PCI DSS Standard](#), and the NIST Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment ([NIST SP 800-115](#)).

DataArt conducted the penetration testing during the period of September 2 – 12, 2025. All testing activities were performed on the pre-production environment using the latest version of the application and completely isolated against production data. While performing the testing activities, DataArt emulated an external attacker without prior knowledge of the environment. To test the user-authenticated area and privilege escalation vulnerabilities, Financial Strides supplied DataArt credentials for several registered accounts having different permissions within the application. The assessment did not attempt any active network-based DoS attacks.

The tested solution was accessible via the following pre-production URLs:


- <https://web.customer.com> [192.168.0.1]
- <https://api.customer.com> [192.168.0.2]
- <https://notify.customer.com> [192.168.0.3]
- <https://admin.customer.com> [192.168.0.4]
- <https://img.customer.com> [192.168.0.5]

During the course of this assessment, **DataArt identified [several high-risk security vulnerabilities](#):**

1. The application backend provided the ability of the execution of arbitrary HTTP requests to any Internet address and/or to the internal network. Using such vulnerability, a malefactor could utilize the application as a proxy for external attacks against other organizations and/or for probing the internal network.
2. User's password hash/salt combinations were returned back to the client. A hacker could intercept such a response and try to compute plain text passwords.
3. A malicious user without appropriate permissions could access sensitive data of the organization.
4. A malefactor could send to any registered user the bogus password recovery email containing a redirect link to any site. Such vulnerability could be used for phishing attacks.
5. The server allowed caching of all responses including the ones with sensitive information. The malefactor could crack the intermediate proxy and steal such information from the cache.
6. New user's credentials were sent within a URL meaning that they are stored in a large number of places (server logs, proxies, browser history, etc.).
7. A vulnerability in the chatbot application allows JavaScript execution via anchor tag injection in rendered markdown, potentially enabling attackers to exfiltrate conversation history or steal authentication tokens from LocalStorage.

Additionally, DataArt found [a number of medium severity vulnerabilities](#) and [low severity security issues](#) which should be also taken into account to improve overall security posture of the tested application.

This report summarizes what DataArt believes are the most important issues to address in the tested application. The chart below outlines the issues identified that are grouped by risk factor. Note that the risk ratings were given to help assist in prioritizing remediation efforts. True risk can only be calculated by an in-depth understanding of business processes and data, as well as the likelihood of exploitation.



The potential attack vectors combining the exploitation of multiple vulnerabilities in order to achieve the specific goal are described in the [“Attack Vectors”](#) section.

The table below summarizes the findings for [OWASP Top 10](#) list for web application vulnerabilities. OWASP Top 10 represents the list of the most critical web application security flaws, which are accompanied by OWASP security experts from around the world. The list provides a powerful awareness document for web application security and is utilized within many security standards:

Category	Discovered
A01:2025 - Broken Access Control	YES
A02:2025 - Security Misconfiguration	YES
A03:2025 - Software Supply Chain Failures	NO
A04:2025 - Cryptographic Failures	YES
A05:2025 - Injection	YES
A06:2025 - Insecure Design	YES
A07:2025 - Authentication Failures	YES
A08:2025 - Software or Data Integrity Failures	NO
A09:2025 - Security Logging and Alerting Failures	NO
A10:2025 - Mishandling of Exceptional Conditions	NO

The table below provides a summary of the LLM-related findings based on [OWASP LLM Top 10](#).

Category	Discovered
LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection	YES
LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure	YES
LLM03:2025 Supply Chain	NO
LLM04:2025 Data and Model Poisoning	NO
LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling	NO
LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency	NO
LLM07:2025 System Prompt Leakage	YES

LLM08:2025 Vector and Embedding Weaknesses	NO
LLM09:2025 Misinformation	NO
LLM10:2025 Unbounded Consumption	NO

DataArt recommends that <CUSTOMER> addresses the findings contained in this report to minimize the attack surface available to an attacker and to ensure the overall security of the application.

DataArt can re-verify the <CUSTOMER> remediated issues found during this penetration test within 60 working days of this report delivery.

Assessment Methodology

For security assessment projects, DataArt utilized a proprietary penetration testing methodology based on the most well-known and established penetration testing guides such as the Open Web Application Security Project Testing Guide ([OWASP Testing Guide](#)), Open Source Security Testing Methodology Manual ([OSSTMM](#)), Penetration Test Guidance for [PCI DSS Standard](#) and NIST Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment ([NIST SP 800-115](#)).

The methodology incorporated the following five phases: planning project activities, information gathering, vulnerability discovery and analysis, exploitation of identified vulnerabilities, and the delivery of a final report.

Note: this section represents the shortened version of the utilized methodology. The full version can be provided separately by a request.

Planning

During the planning phase, DataArt experts worked closely with the client to clearly define and document the assessment's objectives, scope, and rules of engagement. DataArt conducted several interviews to gain a thorough understanding of the client's goals and needs, security and compliance requirements, business risks, and other related factors.

Information Gathering

During the information gathering phase, DataArt collected and examined key information about the application and related infrastructure: application functionality, use cases, user roles, architecture, security mechanisms, security-critical areas, hosting environment, and more. The collected information allowed DataArt to properly target automated scanning software, better focus the manual testing process, and investigate possible attack vectors.

Vulnerability Discovery and Analysis

During the discovery phase, DataArt tried to identify possible security issues that can lead to a compromise of sensitive information or unauthorized access to the functionality of the targeted application. For the analysis, DataArt utilized both manual and automated approaches. All issues identified were carefully validated to minimize possible false positive and/or irrelevant results.

The scope of the activities included both unauthenticated and authenticated areas of the application. The selected approach helped to investigate possible attack vectors available for malefactors with different levels of access to the application (for instance an external attacker or a malicious internal user).

The unauthenticated testing scenario was designed to mimic an attacker without credentials for the targeted application. In this scenario, one of the main goals of the attacker was to get unauthorized access to the application. Other activities included attempts to interfere with application users or impact the system in another negative way.

In the authenticated testing scenario, the attacker already had user-level access to the application. In this case, it might be a malicious employee or the usage of previously compromised credentials of a legitimate user. One of the major vectors of research within the scenario was horizontal and vertical privilege escalation (i.e., attempts to access information or functionality of other users, including an administrator).

The list of possible security checks included to testing activities fully covered but was not limited to the [OWASP TOP 10](#) list:

- SQL and command injection
- Cross-site scripting
- Cross-site request forgery
- Authentication and authorization implementation defects
- Access control issues and privilege elevation
- Session management/hijacking
- Parameter overflow and handling
- HTTP/URL manipulation
- Application logic defects
- Improper web server configuration
- Information leakage
- SSL and transport layer weaknesses
- and others

Large Language Model Testing

During the discovery phase, DataArt tries to identify possible security issues that can lead to a compromise of sensitive information or unauthorized access to the functionality of the targeted system. DataArt assesses various aspects, including input manipulation, prompt injection, and plugin vulnerabilities, to uncover weaknesses in the LLM's functionality. All issues identified are carefully validated to minimize possible false positive and/or irrelevant results.

DataArt leverages guidance from the [OWASP GenAI Project](#) and the [OWASP AI Security Verification Standard \(AISVS\)](#) as reference frameworks when assessing LLM-based solutions. The AISVS provides a structured verification checklist for developers, architects, and security professionals to systematically validate the security posture of AI-driven applications.

The security testing primarily focuses on the following vulnerabilities within LLMs fully covered but not limited to the [OWASP Top 10 LLM](#) list:

- Prompt injections
- Insecure output handling
- Training data poisoning
- Supply chain
- Permission issues
- Data leakage
- Excessive agency
- Insecure plugins and agents
- and others

Exploitation

As the last step of the active phase of testing, any potential security issues found were manually investigated and researched, and an attempt was made to exploit the vulnerability. During the exploitation, DataArt made an attempt to either gain unauthorized access to the target system, or extract sensitive data from it. The

exploitation was considered successful if DataArt was able to achieve either of these objectives. The exploitation phase did not include active network-based DoS attacks.

Any actions taken during the exploitation phase were conducted within the prescribed scope and authorized boundaries. Each compromised system was examined for the existence of critical data and files.

As an additional task, DataArt also attempted to combine identified security issues with so-called “attack vectors”. An attack vector is a consistent exploitation of related vulnerabilities aimed at achieving a specific goal.

Reporting

DataArt performed an intelligent analysis to determine and assign a risk rating to each issue identified.

The table below outlines the risk ratings used:

Risk Rating	Description
CRITICAL (CVSS: 9-10)	The exploitation of the issue does not require meeting any additional conditions or interactions with the victim. In case of success, an attacker can gain unauthorized access to the entire system and/or related backend server. <u>Examples</u> of Critical-Risk issues could be remote execution of OS commands, SQL-injections attacks, or remote files inclusion vulnerabilities.
HIGH (CVSS: 7-8.9)	These issues identify conditions that could directly result in the compromise of or unauthorized access to a network, system, application, or sensitive information. However, the area of the issue’s applicability is limited and requires additional efforts for exploitation (for instance interactions with the victim). <u>Examples</u> of High-Risk issues include Cross-Site Scripting attacks, broken access controls, or Cross-Site Request Forgery attacks.
MEDIUM (CVSS: 4-6.9)	These issues identify conditions that do not immediately or directly result in the compromise of or unauthorized access to a network, system, application, or information, but do provide a capability or information that could, in combination with other capabilities or information, result in the compromise or unauthorized access to a network, application, or information. <u>Examples</u> of Medium Risk issues include directory browsing, partial access to files on the system, disclosure of security mechanisms, or unauthorized use of services.
LOW (CVSS: 0-3.9)	These issues identify conditions that do not immediately or directly result in compromise of a network, system, application, or information, but do provide information that could be used in combination with other information to gain insight into how to compromise or gain unauthorized access to a network, system, application or information.
INFO	These findings should not be considered vulnerabilities or issues right now, However, they should be taken into account to improve the overall security of a setup or environment in the future.
REMEDIATED	The issue has been successfully remediated since the previous round of security assessment

PARTLY REMEDIED	The issue was partly remediated since the previous round of security assessment
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Assessment Findings

Summary

The table below outlines a summary of findings identified during the assessment:

Finding Description	Status
High Risk Findings	
H1. Execution of external HTTP requests on behalf of the server	HIGH
H2. Password hashes and salts are returned back to a client	HIGH
H3. Missing function-level access control	HIGH
H4. Unvalidated external redirect within password recovery email	HIGH
H5. Cacheable server responses containing sensitive data	HIGH
H6. Credentials are sent via GET parameters	HIGH
H7. The chatbot is vulnerable to Markdown Injection leading to Stored XSS	HIGH
Medium Risk Findings	
M1. Uploaded images for custom items are accessible without authorization	MEDIUM
M2. Access token is sent as a GET parameter	MEDIUM
M3. Weak password quality control	MEDIUM
M4. The session token is not invalidated after user logs out	MEDIUM
M5. Web application is vulnerable to password brute-force attacks	MEDIUM
M6. Verbose error messages	MEDIUM
M7. Enumeration of registered emails	MEDIUM
M8. Insecure versions of TLS protocol are supported	MEDIUM
M9. Weak authentication in insurance claim chatbot	MEDIUM
Low Risk Findings	
L1. A user is not notified in case his password has been changed	LOW
L2. Using the component with known vulnerabilities	LOW
L3. SSH protocol allows weak encryption algorithms	LOW
L4. The insecure way of password reset functionality in the admin area	LOW
L5. Support of weak Diffie-Hellman key exchange parameters	LOW
L6. Strict-Transport-Security header is not used	LOW
L7. Security headers misconfiguration	LOW
L8. Static pages containing sensitive info are available without authorization	LOW
L9. System prompt leakage	LOW
Info Findings	

IN1. Object identifiers enumeration	INFO
IN2. Easy predictable identifiers of system objects	INFO
IN3. Platform information is disclosed in server responses	INFO
IN4. Cross-domain access is allowed from any domain	INFO

Critical Risk Findings

DataArt found **no** critical-severity security issues.

High Risk Findings

DataArt found **seven** high-severity security issues, as described below.

H1. Execution of external HTTP requests on behalf of the server

Risk Rating	HIGH
Remediation Efforts	MEDIUM
CVSS	5.0 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N)

Summary

During analysis of available functionality, DataArt noticed that the application provided the ability of execution of batch requests to itself. However, DataArt noticed that the server-side did not validate destination and type of the request allowing a potential malefactor to execute an arbitrary request to any external/internal resource. Moreover, it was identified that the server allowed requests to any server located within the internal subnet that was not accessible from the Internet. Using such behavior of the application, an attacker can use the affected server as a jump-server for attacks against other servers located within the internal network. Alternatively, the server could be used as a proxy for attacks against other external applications.

Affected Functionality


The issue affected the following endpoint:


- **POST** <http://api.customer.com/api/v2/batch>

Proof of Concept

The images below show the examples of possible attacks:

1. An attacker executes a request to google.com:





Recommendations

DataArt strongly recommends to not provide to end users the ability of execution of custom HTTP requests to an arbitrary server. In case such functionality is required from business perspective, the server side should allow the usage only the limited set of domains/methods/endpoints described in the permitted list. All other destinations should be prohibited.

H2. Password hashes and salts are returned back to a client

Risk Rating	HIGH
Remediation Efforts	LOW
CVSS	7.2 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)

Summary

DataArt identified that the administration application returned hash and salt of user passwords back to the client. Despite the fact that all communication with the backend server used encrypted HTTPS protocol, returned hashes could still be disclosed to unauthorized parties if the application would handle them in an unsafe manner (for instance, enabled caching). Alternatively, in case a malicious user gained the access to admin's active session, he could collect all user hash/salt combinations and try to guess plain text passwords offline.


Affected Functionality

The issue affected the following functionality:

- GET <https://admin.customer.com/api/v1/portalusers?skip=0&limit=15>

Proof of Concept

The image below provides the example of the server response containing the user's hash and the related salt:



Recommendations

DataArt recommends to retain all passwords as secure as possible. An application must never return cleartext passwords, hashes or any other type of sensitive information back to a client.

In case an admin user should have the ability to reset user's password, the application should utilize the approach similar to password recovery functionality, i.e., when the admin simply triggers an email sent to the user that contains a link to the password reset functionality.

H3. Missing function-level access control

Risk Rating	HIGH
Remediation Efforts	HIGH
CVSS	6.3 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L)

Summary

During the assessment, DataArt identified that the application did not properly implement function-level access controls for a part of functionality. Some of exposed operations did not properly verify (or did not verify at all) that passed parameters belonged to objects of the current user as well as the requested functionality was allowed for execution within granted permissions. For example, by exploiting this vulnerability, a malicious user without appropriate permissions was able to obtain sensitive data of any organization by means of substituting object identifiers in requests.

Affected Functionality

The issue affected the following functionality:


- Any authorized user can execute method 1:
GET [https://api.customer.com/api/v2/method1/\[ID\]?param_id=\[paramID\]](https://api.customer.com/api/v2/method1/[ID]?param_id=[paramID])
- Any authorized user can execute method 2:
PUT [https://api.customer.com/api/v2/method2/\[ID\]](https://api.customer.com/api/v2/method2/[ID])
- Any authorized user can execute method 3:
GET <https://api.customer.com/api/v2/method3/>

4. [<.>]


Proof of Concept

The workflow below describes the steps showing how a malicious user can send a feedback email on behalf of any other user:


1. Login as the user from one partner (id: *user*):



2. Send the feedback message containing the identifier of another user from another partner (id: *user2*):



3. Receive the bogus email on behalf of another user from another partner:



Recommendations

To minimize the possible security risks connected with improper handling of user permissions, DataArt recommends introducing proper access controls to all application resources and functionality. Effective access control mechanisms should follow the best practices listed below:

- Use a central application component to check access controls.
- Process every client request via this component to validate that the user making the request is permitted to access the functionality and resources being requested.
- Use programmatic techniques to ensure that there are no exceptions to the previous point: developers must be forced to explicitly embed access control logic into every page and resource.
- Access to all functionalities and resources available in the system should be denied by default.

Detailed information about the issue can be found in the articles below:

- <https://owasp.org/www-project-proactive-controls/v3/en/c7-enforce-access-controls>
- https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Access_Control_Cheat_Sheet.html
- <https://www.packetlabs.net/broken-access-control/>

H4. Unvalidated external redirect within password recovery email

Risk Rating	HIGH
Remediation Efforts	MEDIUM
CVSS	7.1 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L)

Summary

During the assessment, DataArt noticed that a user was able to change the “*redirect_url*” parameter used in password recovery functionality. A potential malefactor could request a password reset email for a victim using a custom value of the “*redirect_url*” parameter leading to a phishing site completely mimicking the page of

the password changing functionality from the legitimate one. As soon as the victim enters his credentials into the fake site, they will be stolen by the malefactor.

Affected Functionality

The issue affects all responses from the following endpoints:


- **PUT**

https://api.customer.com/api/v2/forgotpassword?app_id=app&app_secret=secret&email=email&redirect_url=https:%2F%2Fgoogle.com/%23


Proof of Concept

The workflow below describes possible steps which can be used for successful exploitation of the issue:


1. An attacker requests the password recovery email for the victim but sends the redirect to [google.com](https://www.google.com) as the redirect link:



2. The victim receives the recovery email and click on the link:



3. The server redirects the victim to the attacker's site:



Recommendations

DataArt recommends the following potential countermeasures which could protect against unvalidated redirects and forwards:

- The most secure approach would be prohibiting the input of the redirect URLs from the client side. In case such functionality is not critical for application business workflows, it should be disabled at all.
- In case the application logic allows redirects only within the site itself, user's input should be validated against existence of protocol/domains. Only a URN path (like "/child") of the provided URI (like "<https://domain.com/child>") and concatenated with application's root URL should be utilized for subsequent redirect.
- The server side should maintain a list of all URLs that are permitted for redirection. Instead of passing the target URL as a parameter to the redirector, an identifier from the list should be used.
- If the application has to allow redirection to any external resources, before the redirection a user should be forcibly moved to the page notifying him that he is leaving the original application. For redirection to the web site specified previously, the user has to provide his confirmation.

Detailed information regarding the issue can be found via the articles below:

- <https://www.acunetix.com/blog/web-security-zone/unvalidated-redirects-and-forwards/>
- https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Unvalidated_Redirects_and_Forwards_Cheat_Sheet.html
- <https://hdivsecurity.com/owasp-unvalidated-redirects-and-forwards>

H5. Cacheable server responses containing sensitive data

Risk Rating	HIGH
Remediation Efforts	LOW
CVSS	3.8 (AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L)

Summary

During the analysis of server responses, DataArt noticed that the web server did not implement proper cache-control directives.

According to the server configuration (the absence of any cache control directives), all server's responses can be cached on any layers of communications (intermediate proxies, local cache servers, browser's cache). If an attacker compromises victim's workplace or intermediate proxy server, he can easily obtain a saved copy of any response containing sensitive information.

Note: due to the fact that a part of responses contained sensitive data (hashes/salts of user passwords), the severity of the issue should be considered as **HIGH**.


Affected Functionality

The issue affects all responses from the following applications:

1. <https://admin.customer.com>
2. <https://api.customer.com>
3. <https://img.customer.com>
4. <https://web.customer.com>

Proof of Concept

The following screenshot demonstrates the example of a response of one of the affected applications returning sensitive information (a user's password hash) and that does not contain any cache-control headers:



Recommendations

The applications should use suitable cache control directives to prevent sensitive data from being stored by browsers or intermediate proxies. The following combination of server headers prevents caching in all browsers:

- Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate (applicable for all modern browsers);
- Pragma: no-cache (required for outdated browsers compatibility);
- Expires: 0 (required for outdated browsers compatibility).

Please refer to the following links for more details:

- <https://stackoverflow.com/questions/1046966/whats-the-difference-between-cache-control-max-age-0-and-no-cache>
- <https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Cache-Control>
- <https://stackoverflow.com/questions/49547/how-to-control-web-page-caching-across-all-browsers/2068407#2068407>

H6. Credentials are sent via GET parameters

Risk Rating	HIGH
Remediation Efforts	MEDIUM
CVSS	7.0 (AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)

Summary

During the assessment, DataArt noticed that in some cases the application sent credentials as a GET parameter. The utilized approach should be considered as vulnerable because requested URLs (with all GET parameters) can be retained in plenty places such as intermediate proxies, application logs, browser cache and history and others. A potential malefactor who has gained the access to affected servers, can easily disclose such information and gain the access to victim's account.

Affected Functionality

The issues affected the following endpoints:

1. PUT


[https://api.customer.com/api/v2/changepassword?access_token=\[access_token\]&newpassword=\[newPassword\]&oldpassword=\[oldPassword\]](https://api.customer.com/api/v2/changepassword?access_token=[access_token]&newpassword=[newPassword]&oldpassword=[oldPassword])

2. PUT

[https://api.customer.com/api/v2/resetpassword/\[hash\]?app_id=\[appID\]&app_secret=\[appPass\]&new_password=\[newPassword\]](https://api.customer.com/api/v2/resetpassword/[hash]?app_id=[appID]&app_secret=[appPass]&new_password=[newPassword])

Proof of Concept

The images below show the password-changing request containing the new credentials in URL:



Recommendations

DataArt recommends utilizing in-body (POST) parameters for transferring sensitive information such as user passwords, private or financial data. Alternatively, specialized HTTP headers could be considered (like the "Authorization" one). Suggested approaches should minimize potential security risks connected with unauthorized storage of transmitted data and its subsequent theft by an attacker.

H7. The chatbot is vulnerable to Markdown Injection leading to Stored XSS

Risk Rating	HIGH
Remediation Efforts	MEDIUM
CVSS	8.7 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N)

Summary

During the assessment, DataArt identified a vulnerability in the chatbot application, which could lead to data exfiltration through anchor tag injection that executes JavaScript. This vulnerability occurs when the LLM returns a markdown element that is automatically rendered as HTML tag and retrieved by the application. Through this behavior, a potential attacker could create a malicious payload to exfiltrate the history of the current conversation, or steal authentication tokens present in the LocalStorage which would then be sent to a remote server.


Affected Functionality

The issue affected the application chatbot functionality.


Proof of Concept

The screenshots below show an example of a conversation with the AI model in which the malicious payload executes the alert function:


1. As the pentestuser2 user create and send to the chatbot the payload with the anchor tag, observe it is rendered as html tag in the dev tools:



2. Now, log in as the admin user and observe you have access to the conversation that contains the XSS payload ("hello123"):



3. Inside the chat history observe that there is a link "Click Me!" that upon clicking it executes alert function with XSS message:



Recommendations

DataArt strongly recommends avoiding rendering images or clickable hyperlinks that originate from arbitrary domains. It is recommended to implement robust input sanitization mechanisms to filter out or escape any Markdown or HTML tags provided by users. Additionally, consider permitting only specific Markdown elements that are considered safe for use within chat messages, such as basic formatting like bold and italic, while restricting potentially harmful elements like scripts or links.

Detailed information about the issue as well as possible ways of its remediation can be found in the articles below:

- <https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm01-prompt-injection/>
- <https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm02-insecure-output-handling/>
- <https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2023/anthropic-fixes-claude-data-exfiltration-via-images/>
- <https://portswigger.net/web-security/cross-site-scripting>

- https://owasp.org/www-community/Types_of_Cross-Site_Scripting
- https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross_Site_Scripting_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html
- https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/DOM_based_XSS_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html
- <https://www.acunetix.com/websecurity/cross-site-scripting/>

Medium Risk Findings

DataArt found **nine** medium-severity security issues, as described below.

M1. Uploaded images for custom items are accessible without authorization

Risk Rating	MEDIUM
Remediation Efforts	MEDIUM
CVSS	4.3 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N)

Summary

During discovering of application functionality, DataArt noticed that the application provided to a user the ability to create a custom item that must be accessible only for a creator and to upload a new image to that. However, it was also noticed that all uploaded images were accessible without authorization via direct URLs. Using such behavior of the application, an attacker can try to enumerate and download all images belonging to other users.

Affected Functionality


The issue affected links to images for all custom items:

- **GET** [https://s3.amazonaws.com/path/m_\[itemID\].JPG](https://s3.amazonaws.com/path/m_[itemID].JPG)


Proof of Concept

The steps below provide the evidence how a custom image can be downloaded without authorization:

1. Copy the link to the image of any custom item:



2. Open the link in a fresh browser's session:



Recommendations

DataArt strongly recommends protecting all application's resources by existing access control mechanisms. The application should properly validate user's permissions before providing the access to sensitive data. In case the user who has requested the resource does not have appropriate permissions for that the application should return a unified message about a non-existing object.

Additionally, it is strongly recommended to utilize randomly generated names for uploaded files. Such behavior could protect uploaded files from filename enumeration attacks.

In the context of S3 AWS buckets, the presigned URLs approach should be considered as a possible solution:

- <https://medium.com/@aidan.hallett/securing-aws-s3-uploads-using-presigned-urls-aa821c13ae8d>

M2. Access token is sent as a GET parameter

Risk Rating	MEDIUM
Remediation Efforts	MEDIUM
CVSS	7.0 (AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)

Summary

During the analysis of client requests, DataArt noticed that for some requests the session token used for authorization was being transferred as an ordinary GET parameter within the request URL. The utilized approach should be considered insecure since all information located within the request URL could be potentially intercepted and stored in various locations including a user's browser history, web server logs and any forward or reverse proxy servers between user/server.

Additionally, requested URLs could be also displayed on-screen, bookmarked or emailed around by users. Also, the URL could be disclosed to third parties via the "Referer" header when any off-site links are followed.

Affected Functionality


The issues affected the following cases:

1. All requests executed from the user application send the access token as a GET parameter:
<https://api.customer.com/api/v2>

2. Single request to admin API contains the access token in the URL:
GET [https://admin.customer.com/api/v2/get-by-keys?&access_token=\[accessToken\]&keys\[0\]=partner_texts&keys\[1\]=promo_space_images](https://admin.customer.com/api/v2/get-by-keys?&access_token=[accessToken]&keys[0]=partner_texts&keys[1]=promo_space_images)
3. All requests to the image processing server:
<https://img.customer.com/api/v2>

Proof of Concept

The image below shows the example of the request to the application's API that contains the access token as the GET parameter:



Recommendations

DataArt strongly recommends using an alternative mechanism for transmitting session tokens such as HTTP cookies, custom headers or hidden fields in forms that are submitted using the POST method. In case it is required to use request's URL for session delivery (for instance after the redirect from an identity provider containing the link with the session token), the application should utilize [hash-properties](#). In this case, the browser will not send to the server the part of URL located after the `#` symbol. Such approach could minimize security risks connected with the leakage of sensitive information located in URL.

Additional information about the issue can be found via the following links:

- <https://www.acunetix.com/blog/web-security-zone/session-token-in-url-vulnerability/>
- https://owasp.org/www-community/vulnerabilities/Information_exposure_through_query_strings_in_url
- https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Session_Management_Cheat_Sheet.html

M3. Weak password quality control

Risk Rating	MEDIUM
Remediation Efforts	MEDIUM
CVSS	N/A

Summary

During the assessment, DataArt noticed that the application employed weak controls over the quality of users' passwords. As far as it was identified, for all activities required interaction with user passwords (for instance setting a new password, updating the existing one, password reset, etc.), the application implemented the only password complexity restriction (password length should be at least 6 symbols). According to such an approach, it is highly likely that an application that does not enforce strong password standards will contain a large number of user accounts with weak passwords set (like "123456"). Using publicly available dictionaries containing the most popular passwords, an attacker can easily guess these accounts via brute-force attacks, getting unauthorized access to the application.

Affected Functionality

The issue affected all interactions with user's password:

1. Password changing:

- **PUT**
[https://api.customer.com/api/v2/changepassword?access_token=\[token\]newpassword=\[pass\]&oldpassword=\[pass\]](https://api.customer.com/api/v2/changepassword?access_token=[token]newpassword=[pass]&oldpassword=[pass])
- **POST** <https://admin.customer.com/api/v1/resetpassword>
- **PUT** [https://admin.customer.com/api/v2/userRole1/\[userID\]/changepassword/](https://admin.customer.com/api/v2/userRole1/[userID]/changepassword/)
- **PUT** [https://admin.customer.com/api/v2/userRole2/\[userID\]](https://admin.customer.com/api/v2/userRole2/[userID])

2. Forgot password:


- **PUT**
[https://api.customer.com/api/v2/resetpassword/\[token\]?app_id=\[appID\]&app_secret=\[appSecret\]&new_password=\[pass\]](https://api.customer.com/api/v2/resetpassword/[token]?app_id=[appID]&app_secret=[appSecret]&new_password=[pass])

3. Registration:

- **POST**
[https://api.customer.com/api/v2/signup?app_id=\[appID\]&app_secret=\[appSecret\]](https://api.customer.com/api/v2/signup?app_id=[appID]&app_secret=[appSecret])

Proof of Concept

The following request successfully changes the user's password to "username1":



Recommendations

DataArt recommends enforcing the following minimum set of password quality requirements:

- Password minimum length: at least eight (8) characters long.
- Password complexity: at least 3 combinations of the following – digits, lowercase and uppercase letters, digits and/or special characters.
- Password matching: at least not equal or contain username; should optionally be checked against common dictionary words and names.

As an additional countermeasure, the application could display graphical controls which should reflect complexity of the currently typed password. Such controls should motivate users to create strong passwords.

The detailed information can be found via the following links:

- https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Authentication_Cheat_Sheet.html#implement-proper-password-strength-controls
- <https://www.diwebsity.com/2019/08/10/password-security-standards/>
- <https://specopssoft.com/blog/nist-password-standards/>

M4. The session token is not invalidated after user logs out

Risk Rating	MEDIUM
Remediation Efforts	MEDIUM
CVSS	N/A

Summary

During analysis of the session management area, DataArt noticed that after the user logout, his active session was not invalidated on the server side. Using such behavior of the application, it was possible to continue the usage of the active session in direct requests to the server. From a security perspective, if a potential malefactor gains the access to victim's session, he will have significant time for malicious activities as well as the victim will not have possible ways to forcibly invalidate this session.

Additionally, it was identified that the user session lifetime was more than a day that quite a big time range for potential malicious activities.

Affected Functionality


The following applications did not invalidate session token after user log out:

1. The customer application:
<https://api.customer.com>
2. The administrator application:
<https://admin.customer.com>


Proof of Concept

The workflow below shows the evidence that the session is not invalidated after log out:


1. A user logs in to the application and opens the main page:



2. The user logs out from the application:



3. The user gets information about his conversations using the previously issued access token:



Recommendations

Session termination is an important part of session management. One of the main security risks within session management area is connected with the case when an active session of a user has been hijacked by a malefactor (by means of XSS, man-in-the-middle, or any other successful attack). Minimization of session lifetime reduces the harm that theft of an active session could potentially cause to the system. With the goal of mitigating such risks, the server-side logic of the application should not accept the authentication token after a user has logged out from the application or in case of its expiration. Such an approach should decrease the time window for potential attacks in case the session is compromised.

Additional information regarding the issue can be found via the following link:

- https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Session_Management_Cheat_Sheet.html#session-expiration

M5. Web application is vulnerable to password brute-force attacks

Risk Rating	MEDIUM
Remediation Efforts	MEDIUM
CVSS	7.3 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L)

Summary

While testing authentication functionality, DataArt observed that the application did not utilize any account lockout policy upon failed login attempts to the application. DataArt performed more than 30 failed login attempts to the test account without receiving any lock messages and after that could successfully login to the application using the valid password on behalf of the same account.

The absence of account lockout ability could provide an attacker with an infinite number of attempts to enter guesses of the current password to achieve a valid variant (known as "brute-force" attack). An attacker can use publicly available scripts/tools to automate this type of attack and obtain a valid password in a reasonable amount of time.

Affected Functionality


The issue affected the following functionality:

1. Login:
 - **POST** [https://api.customer.com/api/v2/login?app_id=\[appID\]&app_secret=\[appSecret\]](https://api.customer.com/api/v2/login?app_id=[appID]&app_secret=[appSecret])
 - **POST** <https://admin.customer.com/api/v1/login>
2. Password changing:
 - **PUT** [https://api.customer.com/api/v2/changepassword?access_token=\[token\]newpassword=\[pass\]&oldpassword=\[pass\]](https://api.customer.com/api/v2/changepassword?access_token=[token]newpassword=[pass]&oldpassword=[pass])


Proof of Concept

The workflow below provides the example of the brute-force attack against the login form:


1. The user can successfully login to the application:



2. Logout the user and then try to login with the same login but a wrong password multiple times:



3. Now enter the valid password. As the result, the user has been successfully logged in again:



Recommendations

DataArt advises employing password lockout mechanisms that temporarily lock out an account if more than a preset number of unsuccessful login attempts are made. This approach significantly slows down attackers, while allowing the accounts to be open for legitimate users. The most secure approach for implementation of account locking functionality assumes notifying the blocked user about the blocking only via a third-party channel (for instance via email or mobile phone). In this way, the malicious user trying to guess the valid password will not be able to know that the account is locked and all his further attempts will be unsuccessful.

An alternative to the account-locking approach is the use of CAPTCHA services which should force the user to input additional information provided in only human understandable format. Such an approach significantly sophisticates conducting the attack but nonetheless, it cannot be considered a silver bullet for the issue (for instance due to the existence of many online services proposing manual recognition of CAPTCHA)

Additionally, DataArt strongly recommends implementing similar security mechanisms for each functionality working with user passwords (for instance for password changing functionality in case it requires input of the current password). The additional information can be found in the following article:

- https://owasp.org/www-community/controls/Blocking_Brute_Force_Attacks

M6. Verbose error messages

Risk Rating	MEDIUM
Remediation Efforts	LOW
CVSS	N/A

Summary

During the assessment, DataArt noticed that in case of an error occurred the application returned verbose information about the system including stack-trace details, internal paths and names of affected tables/columns/keys of the database. The disclosed information could be useful for understanding the internal logic and structure of the application during preparation of further attacks (for instance during exploitation of possible SQL injection vulnerability or path traversal attacks).


Affected Functionality

The issue affected all malformed requests (for instance, a syntax error within a POST body).


Proof of Concept

The images below provide the examples of verbose error messages containing sensitive information:

1. Execute the modified request for modification of user's favorites (set the "status" parameter with bad syntax):



2. Send the request for execution of favorites search including the malicious input in the `'search_text'` parameter:



Recommendations

The application should never return internal information, verbose error messages or debug information back to a user. When an unexpected event occurs, the application should return the same generic message informing the user that an error occurred. In case debug information is required for proper investigation of the

root of the error, all auxiliary data should be collected and stored on the backend side. Only randomly generated identifiers linked to this data should be returned to the client.

M7. Enumeration of registered emails

Risk Rating	MEDIUM
Remediation Efforts	MEDIUM
CVSS	N/A

Summary

DataArt identified that in some cases the application clearly notified a user about the existence/absence in the system of the entered email address. Such a behavior of the application provides the ability to a potential malefactor to enumerate all emails registered in the system. Once the attacker has obtained a list of valid email addresses, they can use them for further attacks such as phishing or spamming. This type of attack can be used to gain unauthorized access to personal or confidential information stored on the website, or to gain access to the accounts of registered users.


Affected Functionality

The issue affected the following functionalities:

1. Forgot-password (user):
 - **POST** [https://api.customer.com/api/v2/forgotpassword?app_id=\[appID\]&app_secret=\[appSecret\]&email=\[email\]&redirect_url=\[URL\]](https://api.customer.com/api/v2/forgotpassword?app_id=[appID]&app_secret=[appSecret]&email=[email]&redirect_url=[URL])
2. Forgot-password (admin):
 - **POST** <https://admin.customer.com/api/v1/forgotpassword>
3. Creation of a new user:
 - **POST** [https://api.customer.com/api/v2/add-user?access_token=\[accessToken\]&partner_id=\[partnerID\]&app_id=\[appID\]&app_secret=\[appSecret\]](https://api.customer.com/api/v2/add-user?access_token=[accessToken]&partner_id=[partnerID]&app_id=[appID]&app_secret=[appSecret])

Proof of Concept

The image below shows the example of server's response in case the entered email already exists in the system:



Recommendations

DataArt recommends considering the following techniques as potential countermeasures against automated enumeration of valid emails/usernames/accounts/etc.:

- The application should not provide detailed information about the reason for the failed attempt. In both cases (incorrect password or login), the application should return a generic error message notifying that provided information is incorrect.
- CAPTCHA challenge should be required after the series of failed attempts.
- For all possible cases of the action (incorrect login or username), the application server should respond within the same amount of time. Such an approach should protect against time-based enumeration attacks during which the existence of the entity is verified via the difference in the response time between existing and non-existing cases.
- For the "forgot password" functionality, the application should return a generic message that password recovery information has been sent to the specified email address.

Detailed information can be found in the articles below:

- https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Authentication_Cheat_Sheet.html#authentication-and-error-messages
- <https://blog.rapid7.com/2017/06/15/about-user-enumeration/>

M8. Insecure versions of TLS protocol are supported

Risk Rating	MEDIUM
Remediation Efforts	LOW
CVSS	4.8 (AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N)

Summary

During testing, DataArt determined that some application servers supported early versions of TLS protocols (versions 1.0 and 1.1). Such versions under certain circumstances could be affected by multiple cryptographic flaws (such as [POODLE](#) or [BEAST](#)). A potential attacker can try to exploit them to conduct man-in-the-middle attacks or to decrypt communications between the server and clients.


Affected Functionality

The issue affected the following web server:

- web.customer.com:443:
 - TLS 1.0;
 - TLS 1.1.

Proof of Concept

The image below provides information about all cipher suites allowed by the affected server. The weak ones are marked red:



Supported Server Cipher(s):			
Preferred	TLSv1.2	256 bits	ECDSA-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 Curve P-256 DHE 256
Accepted	TLSv1.2	256 bits	ECDSA-RSA-AES256-SHA384 Curve P-256 DHE 256
Accepted	TLSv1.2	256 bits	ECDSA-RSA-AES256-SHA Curve P-256 DHE 256
Accepted	TLSv1.2	256 bits	DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 DHE 1024 bits
Accepted	TLSv1.2	256 bits	DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256 DHE 1024 bits
Accepted	TLSv1.2	256 bits	DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA DHE 1024 bits
Accepted	TLSv1.2	256 bits	DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA DHE 1024 bits
Accepted	TLSv1.2	256 bits	AES256-GCM-SHA384
Accepted	TLSv1.2	256 bits	AES256-SHA256
Accepted	TLSv1.2	256 bits	AES256-SHA
Accepted	TLSv1.2	256 bits	CAMELLIA256-SHA
Accepted	TLSv1.2	128 bits	ECDSA-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 Curve P-256 DHE 256
Accepted	TLSv1.2	128 bits	ECDSA-RSA-AES128-SHA256 Curve P-256 DHE 256
Accepted	TLSv1.2	128 bits	ECDSA-RSA-AES128-SHA Curve P-256 DHE 256
Accepted	TLSv1.2	128 bits	DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 DHE 1024 bits
Accepted	TLSv1.2	128 bits	DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 DHE 1024 bits
Accepted	TLSv1.2	128 bits	DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA DHE 1024 bits
Accepted	TLSv1.2	128 bits	DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA DHE 1024 bits
Accepted	TLSv1.2	128 bits	AES128-GCM-SHA256
Accepted	TLSv1.2	128 bits	AES128-SHA256
Accepted	TLSv1.2	128 bits	AES128-SHA
Accepted	TLSv1.2	128 bits	CAMELLIA128-SHA
Preferred	TLSv1.1	256 bits	ECDSA-RSA-AES256-SHA Curve P-256 DHE 256
Accepted	TLSv1.1	256 bits	DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA DHE 1024 bits
Accepted	TLSv1.1	256 bits	DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA DHE 1024 bits
Accepted	TLSv1.1	256 bits	AES256-SHA
Accepted	TLSv1.1	256 bits	CAMELLIA256-SHA
Accepted	TLSv1.1	128 bits	ECDSA-RSA-AES128-SHA Curve P-256 DHE 256
Accepted	TLSv1.1	128 bits	DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA DHE 1024 bits
Accepted	TLSv1.1	128 bits	DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA DHE 1024 bits
Accepted	TLSv1.1	128 bits	AES128-SHA
Accepted	TLSv1.1	128 bits	CAMELLIA128-SHA
Preferred	TLSv1.0	256 bits	ECDSA-RSA-AES256-SHA Curve P-256 DHE 256
Accepted	TLSv1.0	256 bits	DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA DHE 1024 bits
Accepted	TLSv1.0	256 bits	DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA DHE 1024 bits
Accepted	TLSv1.0	256 bits	AES256-SHA
Accepted	TLSv1.0	256 bits	CAMELLIA256-SHA
Accepted	TLSv1.0	128 bits	ECDSA-RSA-AES128-SHA Curve P-256 DHE 256
Accepted	TLSv1.0	128 bits	DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA DHE 1024 bits
Accepted	TLSv1.0	128 bits	DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA DHE 1024 bits
Accepted	TLSv1.0	128 bits	AES128-SHA
Accepted	TLSv1.0	128 bits	CAMELLIA128-SHA

Recommendations

Due to possible CBC Chaining and Padding Oracle attacks, it is recommended to disable utilization of these obsolete versions of the TLS protocol (TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1) and allow utilization of only the latest ones such as TLS v1.2 and v1.3.

It should be noted that both TLS v1.0 and TLS v1.1 versions are currently considered deprecated:

- <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8996/>

Detailed information about the issue can be found in the supporting links below:

- <https://www.acunetix.com/blog/articles/tls-vulnerabilities-attacks-final-part/>
- <https://www.keycdn.com/blog/deprecating-tls-1-0-and-1-1>

M9. Weak authentication in insurance claim chatbot

Risk Rating	MEDIUM
Remediation Efforts	LOW
CVSS	4.1 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N)

Summary


During the security assessment of the insurance claim chatbot, DataArt discovered an inadequate authentication check within the insurance claim filing process facilitated by an AI-driven digital assistant. The process currently allows for the initiation and filing of an insurance claim based solely on knowledge of a vehicle's registration number. This lack of robust authentication controls could potentially be exploited to file fraudulent insurance claims, leading to financial losses and legal complications.

Affected Functionality

The vulnerability affects the insurance claim process via the AI-driven chatbot interface.

Proof of Concept

The vulnerability can be exploited by interacting with the digital assistant and providing a known vehicle registration number, which is insufficient as the sole method of authentication. The chatbot proceeds with the claim process without requiring additional verification, such as a policy number or personal identification:



Hi, I'm Sarah, your insurance digital assistant. So that I can direct you, what are you calling about today?

I had an accident and I want to issue a claim.

I'm sorry to hear about your accident. Do you require any emergency assistance?

No, I don't.

That's great to hear!

Great, can you please provide me with your Policy Number so we can start your insurance claim?

Don't have it, however my number plates are B54432.

I understand that you might not have your policy number with you. Can you provide me then your car's registration number?

B54432

Thank you, I was able to authenticate your account. Is your vehicle a 2022 Toyota Ranger?

Yes

Thank you for confirming. Let's move forward with your claim. Could you please provide me with the details of the accident? Specifically, where the accident occurred, the details of the other driver, whether the police were called, and the extent of the damages.

Recommendations

DataArt recommends the immediate implementation of better authentication and authorization mechanisms, including but not limited to multi-factor authentication (MFA), to ensure that claim initiation is securely gated and that only verified policyholders can proceed with filing a claim.

Low Risk Findings

DataArt found **nine** low-severity security issues, as described below.

L1. A user is not notified in case his password has been changed

Risk Rating	LOW
Remediation Efforts	MEDIUM
CVSS	N/A

Summary

During the testing of password changing functionality, DataArt noticed that users were not notified about the password change event via any 3rd party channel (like email, SMS). Based on the application's behavior, if an attacker successfully changes the victim's password, the victim will not become aware of this attack until they attempt to log in again. This situation grants the attacker a significant time window to engage in malicious activities.

Affected Functionality

The issue affected the password changing functionality:

1. **PUT** [https://api.customer.com/api/v2/changepassword?access_token=\[token\]&newpassword=\[pass\]&oldpassword=\[pass\]](https://api.customer.com/api/v2/changepassword?access_token=[token]&newpassword=[pass]&oldpassword=[pass])
2. **POST** <https://admin.customer.com/api/v1/resetpassword>
3. **PUT** [https://api.customer.com/api/v2/changepassword?user_id=\[userID\]](https://api.customer.com/api/v2/changepassword?user_id=[userID])

Recommendations

DataArt recommends notifying users every time their password is changed. Such notification should be sent via an out-of-band channel (such as email, SMS, etc.) set up by the user during the registration. The sent message should contain a simple notification about the password changing attempt without either user's old or new credentials. The suggested approach should prevent an imperceptible theft of the account in case a hacker gains access to password changing functionality (for instance via a hijacked active session or a CSRF attack).

L2. Using the component with known vulnerabilities

Risk Rating	LOW
Remediation Efforts	LOW
CVSS	N/A

Summary

During the testing DataArt identified that one of the servers hosted the outdated version of OpenSSH server. This utilized version had publicly disclosed security issues which were remediated in the latest releases. A potential malefactor can try to exploit known vulnerabilities to attack a targeted host via a vulnerable component.

Detailed information about the known issues for the utilized version can be found via the following links:

- <https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html>
- https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-97/product_id-585/version_id-188831/Openbsd-Openssh-6.6.html


Affected Functionality

The following server used outdated version of the OpenSSH server:

- [web.customer.com:22](#)
 - The utilized version: 6.6.1p1;
 - The latest version: 8.4/8.4p.

Proof of Concept

The image below provides information about the version of OpenSSH server installed on one of the hosts:



```
Starting Nmap 7.50 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2017-08-07 16:31 Russia TZ 2 Standard Time
Nmap scan report for web.customer.com
Host is up (0.13s latency).
rDNS record for web.customer.com: web.customer.com
Not shown: 94 filtered ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh      OpenSSH 6.6.1p1 Ubuntu 2ubuntu2.8 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
25/tcp    closed smtp
80/tcp    open  http     nginx 1.4.6 (Ubuntu)
443/tcp   open  ssl/http nginx 1.4.6 (Ubuntu)
8443/tcp   closed https-alt
10000/tcp closed snet-sensor-mgmt
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 26.97 seconds
```

Recommendations

DataArt recommends implementing a security policy requiring monitoring and patching of all software components within a suitable period of time. Such an approach could help to protect the system against the exploitation of publicly known vulnerabilities.

L3. SSH protocol allows weak encryption algorithms

Risk Rating	LOW
Remediation Efforts	LOW
CVSS	3.1 (AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N)

Summary

DataArt determined that weak cipher suites were supported as possible options to negotiate an encrypted SSH session to the server. In this situation, a suitably positioned attacker may be able to perform an attack to downgrade or decipher the communications of an administrative user, gaining access to his/her sensitive data.

Affected Functionality

The issue affected the following server and appropriate encryption algorithms:

- [web.customer.com:22:](#)
 - arcfour
 - arcfour128
 - arcfour256

Proof of Concept

The image below provides information about all cipher suites allowed by the SSH server. The weak ones are marked red:

```
Nmap scan report for [redacted]
Host is up (0.072s latency).
rDNS record for [redacted]:
Not shown: 993 filtered ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
22/tcp    open  ssh
| ssh2-enum-algos:
|   kex_algorithms: (8)
|       curve25519-sha256@libssh.org
|       ecdh-sha2-nistp256
|       ecdh-sha2-nistp384
|       ecdh-sha2-nistp521
|       diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256
|       diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1
|       diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
|       diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
|   server_host_key_algorithms: (4)
|       ssh-rsa
|       ssh-dss
|       ecdsa-sha2-nistp256
|       ssh-ed25519
|   encryption_algorithms: (16)
|       aes128-ctr
|       aes192-ctr
|       aes256-ctr
|       arcfour256
|       arcfour128
|       aes128-gcm@openssh.com
|       aes256-gcm@openssh.com
|       chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
|       aes128-cbc
|       3des-cbc
|       blowfish-cbc
|       cast128-cbc
|       aes192-cbc
|       aes256-cbc
|       arcfour
|       rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se
|   mac_algorithms: (19)
|       hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com
|       hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com
|       umac-64-etm@openssh.com
|       umac-128-etm@openssh.com
|       hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com
|       hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com
|       hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com
|       hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com
|       hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com
|       hmac-md5
|       hmac-sha1
|       umac-64@openssh.com
|       umac-128@openssh.com
|       hmac-sha2-256
|       hmac-sha2-512
|       hmac-ripemd160
|       hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com
|       hmac-sha1-96
|       hmac-md5-96
|   compression_algorithms: (2)
|       none
|       zlib@openssh.com
```

Recommendations

DataArt recommends reconfiguring the affected system to allow the use of only high-grade ciphers and algorithms.

Detailed information about the issue can be found by the links below:

- https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Transport_Layer_Protection_Cheat_Sheet#Server_Protocol_and_Cipher_Configuration
- <https://www.rc4nomore.com>
- <https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/180544/is-there-a-list-of-weak-ssh-ciphers>
- <https://sshcheck.com/>

L4. The insecure way of password reset functionality in the admin area

Risk Rating	LOW
Remediation Efforts	MEDIUM
CVSS	7.2 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)

Summary

During the analysis of the administration area, DataArt noticed that an admin user was able to directly specify a new password for any user or another admin. Such a practice should be considered insecure since an attacker who gained the unauthorized access over the admin's session could easily change the password of

any user thereby getting permanent access to the account. Additionally, such behavior of the application could be exploited in combination with other potential security issues (for instance with possible CSRF vulnerability) united within a solid attack vector.


Affected Functionality

The following endpoints can be used for changing a password of any user:

1. PUT [https://admin.customer.com/api/v1/userRole1/\[ID\]](https://admin.customer.com/api/v1/userRole1/[ID])
2. PUT [https://admin.customer.com/api/v2/userRole2/\[ID\]/change-password/](https://admin.customer.com/api/v2/userRole2/[ID]/change-password/)
3. PUT [https://admin.customer.com/api/v2/userRole3/\[ID\]](https://admin.customer.com/api/v2/userRole3/[ID])

Proof of Concept

The following screenshot demonstrates that an admin user can directly change the password of any user:



Recommendations

From a security perspective, it is not recommended to provide application administrators the ability to directly change the user's password to a new one. A more robust implementation assumes the utilization of the same approach that should be used for a properly implemented password recovery functionality, i.e., in the case where an admin wishes to change a user's password, he should simply have an ability to directly trigger password recovery feature for this user. Such approach should protect user's data in the case an admin account is compromised by a malefactor.

Detailed information describing the security part of password recovery process can be found in the articles below:

- https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Forgot_Password_Cheat_Sheet.html
- <https://postmarkapp.com/guides/password-reset-email-best-practices>

L5. Support of weak Diffie-Hellman key exchange parameters

Risk Rating	LOW
Remediation Efforts	LOW
CVSS	3.7 (AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N)

Summary

During analysis of available cipher suites required for encrypted communications, DataArt noticed that one of the affected servers allowed usage of weak cipher suites supported 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman groups.

The Diffie-Hellman groups are some big numbers that are used as the base for Diffie-Hellman computations during the SSL/TLS handshake. The security of the final secret depends on the size of these parameters. The groups' sizes could be 512, 768, 1024, and 2048 bits. At the current moment, Diffie-Hellman groups up to 1024 bits are considered practically breakable by an attacker having very significant resources.

In the case of a successful attack, an attacker who can intercept and modify the connection between the client and the server will be able to decrypt transmitted encrypted data.

Affected Functionality

The issue affected the following server and appropriate cipher suites:

- <https://web.customer.com:443>:
 - TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
 - TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
 - TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 - TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
 - TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
 - TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
 - TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 - TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA

Proof of Concept

The image below provides information about all cipher suites allowed by the affected server. The weak ones are marked red:

Supported Server Cipher(s):					
Preferred	TLSv1.2	256 bits	ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384	Curve P-256	DHE 256
Accepted	TLSv1.2	256 bits	ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384	Curve P-256	DHE 256
Accepted	TLSv1.2	256 bits	ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA	Curve P-256	DHE 256
Accepted	TLSv1.2	256 bits	DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384	DHE 1024 bits	
Accepted	TLSv1.2	256 bits	DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256	DHE 1024 bits	
Accepted	TLSv1.2	256 bits	DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA	DHE 1024 bits	
Accepted	TLSv1.2	256 bits	DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA	DHE 1024 bits	
Accepted	TLSv1.2	256 bits	AES256-GCM-SHA384		
Accepted	TLSv1.2	256 bits	AES256-SHA256		
Accepted	TLSv1.2	256 bits	AES256-SHA		
Accepted	TLSv1.2	256 bits	CAMELLIA256-SHA		
Accepted	TLSv1.2	128 bits	ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256	Curve P-256	DHE 256
Accepted	TLSv1.2	128 bits	ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256	Curve P-256	DHE 256
Accepted	TLSv1.2	128 bits	ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA	Curve P-256	DHE 256
Accepted	TLSv1.2	128 bits	DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256	DHE 1024 bits	
Accepted	TLSv1.2	128 bits	DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256	DHE 1024 bits	
Accepted	TLSv1.2	128 bits	DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA	DHE 1024 bits	
Accepted	TLSv1.2	128 bits	DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA	DHE 1024 bits	
Accepted	TLSv1.2	128 bits	AES128-GCM-SHA256		
Accepted	TLSv1.2	128 bits	AES128-SHA256		
Accepted	TLSv1.2	128 bits	AES128-SHA		
Accepted	TLSv1.2	128 bits	CAMELLIA128-SHA		
Preferred	TLSv1.1	256 bits	ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA	Curve P-256	DHE 256
Accepted	TLSv1.1	256 bits	DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA	DHE 1024 bits	
Accepted	TLSv1.1	256 bits	DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA	DHE 1024 bits	
Accepted	TLSv1.1	256 bits	AES256-SHA		
Accepted	TLSv1.1	256 bits	CAMELLIA256-SHA		
Accepted	TLSv1.1	128 bits	ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA	Curve P-256	DHE 256
Accepted	TLSv1.1	128 bits	DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA	DHE 1024 bits	
Accepted	TLSv1.1	128 bits	DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA	DHE 1024 bits	
Accepted	TLSv1.1	128 bits	AES128-SHA		
Accepted	TLSv1.1	128 bits	CAMELLIA128-SHA		
Preferred	TLSv1.0	256 bits	ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA	Curve P-256	DHE 256
Accepted	TLSv1.0	256 bits	DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA	DHE 1024 bits	
Accepted	TLSv1.0	256 bits	DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA	DHE 1024 bits	
Accepted	TLSv1.0	256 bits	AES256-SHA		
Accepted	TLSv1.0	256 bits	CAMELLIA256-SHA		
Accepted	TLSv1.0	128 bits	ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA	Curve P-256	DHE 256
Accepted	TLSv1.0	128 bits	DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA	DHE 1024 bits	
Accepted	TLSv1.0	128 bits	DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA	DHE 1024 bits	
Accepted	TLSv1.0	128 bits	AES128-SHA		
Accepted	TLSv1.0	128 bits	CAMELLIA128-SHA		

Recommendations

DataArt recommends configuring the server to support only 2048-bit Diffie-Hellman groups. As an additional security countermeasure, it is recommended to utilize Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman instead of DHE because modern versions of Chrome, Safari, and Firefox do not support DHE by default. The cipher preference of these browsers includes only the ECC version (ECDHE) for Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) support.

The detailed information could be found via the links below:

- <https://weakdh.org>
- <https://www.comparitech.com/blog/information-security/diffie-hellman-key-exchange/>

L6. Strict-Transport-Security header is not used

Risk Rating	LOW
Remediation Efforts	LOW
CVSS	N/A

Summary

DataArt noticed that the web server did not utilize the "Strict-Transport-Security" header for encrypted communication. The aforementioned header forces browsers to use only an encrypted channel for communication with the server even in case the potential malefactor tries to downgrade the communication to an unsafe HTTP connection.

Without the Strict Transport Security policy, the application may be vulnerable to several attacks:

- If the web application mixes the usage of HTTP and HTTPS, an attacker can manipulate pages in the unsecured area of the application or change redirection targets in a manner that the switch to the secured page is not performed or done in a manner, that the attacker remains between client and server.

- If there is no HTTP server, an attacker in the same network could simulate an HTTP server and trick the user to click on a prepared URL by using a social engineering attack.


Affected Functionality

The issue affected all responses from the following applications:

1. <https://admin.customer.com>
2. <https://api.customer.com>
3. <https://img.customer.com>
4. <https://notify.customer.com>
5. <https://web.customer.com>

Proof of Concept

The example of the response of one of the affected applications without the required STS header is shown below:



Recommendations

The application should instruct web browsers to only access the application using an encrypted HTTPS channel. For that, HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) should be enabled by adding a response header with the name **'Strict-Transport-Security'** and the value **'max-age=expireTime'**, where **expireTime** is the time in seconds that browsers should remember that the site should only be accessed using HTTPS.

To apply the policy to all subdomains, the **'includeSubDomains'** flag could be also utilized. As an additional security measure, the domain should be submitted to an HSTS preload service.

Detailed information can be found via the following links below:

- <https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Strict-Transport-Security#syntax>
- https://github.com/OWASP/CheatSheetSeries/blob/master/cheatsheets/HTTP_Strict_Transport_Security_Cheat_Sheet.md
- <https://hstspreload.org/>

L7. Security headers misconfiguration

Risk Rating	LOW
Remediation Efforts	LOW
CVSS	N/A

Summary

DataArt found out that the application server did not include a part of specialized security headers which should be used in HTTP responses for protection against multiple types of potential vulnerabilities:


- The ["X-Content-Type-Options" header](#) is a marker used by the server to indicate that the MIME types advertised in the Content-Type headers should not be changed. As a result, the header forbids an attacker to make a user's browser request a non-JavaScript file from a site and run it as JavaScript.
- The ["Content-Security-Policy" header](#) is an added layer of security that helps to detect and mitigate certain types of attacks, including Cross-Site Scripting and data injection attacks. CSP header makes it possible for server administrators to reduce or eliminate the vectors by which XSS can occur by specifying the domains that the browser should consider to be valid sources of executable scripts. In addition to restricting the domains from which content can be loaded, the server can specify which protocols are allowed to be used; for example, a server can specify that all content must be loaded using HTTPS. Additionally, CSP directives can be used as an IDS system by setting report-URI to fetch [incoming violation reports](#).
- The ["Referrer-Policy" header](#) governs which referrer information sent in the "Referrer" request header should be included with requests made.

Affected Functionality

The issue affected all responses from all applications included to the scope of the testing.

Proof of Concept

The following screenshot demonstrates the example of the response without the mentioned headers of one of the affected applications:



Recommendations

DataArt strongly recommends using these specialized security headers in server's responses to force browsers to use embedded security protection, especially for the "text/html" content-type pages.

Additional information about useful security-related HTTP headers can be found in the following links below:

- <https://owasp.org/www-project-secure-headers/>

- https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Content_Security_Policy_Cheat_Sheet.html
- <https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Referrer-Policy>
- <https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/X-Content-Type-Options>
- <https://cspvalidator.org/>
- <https://securityheaders.com/>

L8. Static pages containing sensitive info are available without authorization

Risk Rating **LOW**

Remediation Efforts **MEDIUM**

CVSS **N/A**

Summary

DataArt identified that all static pages required by administrator functionality were accessible without authorization for anonymous user. Despite the fact that such pages do not provide any critical information and contain only HTML body used as a template of the application UI, a malicious user could analyze source code of the pages for uncovering related functionalities and utilized obtained information for fine tuning of further attacks. As a possible attack vector, a malefactor could detect admin functionality from available pages and try to leverage possible access control issues.


Affected Functionality

The issue affected all pages within the administrative area of the application:

- **GET** https://admin.customer.com/src/*

Proof of Concept

The image below provides an example of the request to the static resource within the administrative area that does not require the authorized session:



Recommendations

It is strongly recommended to prohibit public access to all authorized areas of the application. Proper access control mechanisms should be implemented for all resources used within the application. Such an approach

should limit the amount of information that could be analyzed and used by a malefactor within attacks against the application.

L9. System prompt leakage

Risk Rating	LOW
Remediation Efforts	MEDIUM
CVSS	N/A

Summary


During the assessment, DataArt identified that when questioned about the rules it should follow, the chatbot disclosed sensitive information about its internal prompt configuration. This behavior exposes details about the system's architecture and design, which could be leveraged by an attacker to identify weaknesses or design more targeted attacks. By revealing internal configurations, the chatbot inadvertently increases the risk of adversaries understanding its limitations, behaviors, and potential bypass mechanisms, thereby facilitating more sophisticated attacks in the future.

Affected Functionality

The issue affected the chatbot functionality.

Proof of Concept

The screenshot below shows the example of a conversation with the AI model, in which the model provides information about its internal configuration and rules it should follow:



Recommendations

DataArt recommends setting up explicit rules for the model, which ensure that no sensitive information is provided, or to skip such questions altogether. In no case should the model provide information about its configuration or rules set by the developers.

More information can be found in the article below:

- <https://genai.owasp.org/llmrisk/llm072025-system-prompt-leakage/>

Info Findings

DataArt would like to share the following security recommendations.

IN1. Object identifiers enumeration

Risk Rating **INFO**

Remediation Efforts **MEDIUM**

Summary


DataArt identified that the application returned different responses in case of specifying existing and non-existing entity identifiers. Using such behavior of the application, a malicious user could enumerate identifiers of all objects existing in the system. Collected information could be used during other attacks against the application (for instance during exploitation of possible access control vulnerabilities).

Affected Functionality

The issues affected all requests containing identifiers of the system's elements.

Proof of Concept

The response in case the entered ID does not exist in the system:




```
Request
Raw Params Headers Hex
GET /api/v2/[REDACTED]/(5707250010011298)messages?access_token=nUchy5e1hkpqjM8gOlr2DUSbAsFugVNBdu3dxUinYObVcLNAg9-xWvongkPQPa3Qy3VKiulBik~&filter=no_empty_message&get_total_count=true HTTP/1.1
Host: [REDACTED]
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:54.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/54.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: [REDACTED]
Origin: [REDACTED]
Connection: close

Response
Raw Headers Hex JSON Decoder
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Date: Thu, 03 Aug 2017 08:04:28 GMT
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 94
Connection: close
Server: nginx/1.13.3
X-Powered-By: Express
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: [REDACTED]
Access-Control-Max-Age: 31536000
ETag: "-531174317"
Vary: Accept-Encoding

{
  "meta": {
    "code": "400",
    "message": [
      "Invalid conversation id."
    ]
  }
}
```

The response in case the entered ID exists but the user does not have permission for interaction with it:



```
Request
Raw Params Headers Hex
GET /api/v2/[REDACTED]/(5707250010011298)messages?access_token=nUchy5e1hkpqjM8gOlr2DUSbAsFugVNBdu3dxUinYObVcLNAg9-xWvongkPQPa3Qy3VKiulBik~&filter=no_empty_message&get_total_count=true HTTP/1.1
Host: [REDACTED]
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:54.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/54.0
Accept: application/json, text/plain, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Referer: [REDACTED]
Origin: [REDACTED]
Connection: close

Response
Raw Headers Hex JSON Decoder
HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Date: Thu, 03 Aug 2017 08:03:35 GMT
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 115
Connection: close
Server: nginx/1.13.3
X-Powered-By: Express
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: [REDACTED]
Access-Control-Max-Age: 31536000
ETag: "-833343874"
Vary: Accept-Encoding

{
  "meta": {
    "code": "400",
    "message": [
      "Provided conversation does not belong to you."
    ]
  }
}
```

Recommendations

For both cases if the requested object does not exist in the system or the current user does not have appropriate permissions for interaction with the object, DataArt recommends implementing equal server-side logic returning a generic message that in its turn should inform a user about the requested object does not exist in the system. Such countermeasures could help to prevent possible enumeration of internal data existing in the system.

IN2. Easy predictable identifiers of system objects

Risk Rating	INFO
Remediation Efforts	HIGH

Summary

During the assessment, DataArt noticed that the application utilized easily predictable identifiers of all system objects. Such an approach should be considered insecure due to the fact that easily predictable identifiers could significantly facilitate the exploitation of many types of vulnerabilities potentially existing in the system.

For instance, consider the case when the tested system is vulnerable to [a potential access control security issue](#) that allows a user without appropriate permissions to view the data of another user via the direct call to the server by specifying the desired identifier of the requested object. Using an understanding of how identifiers are being created, the attacker could easily enumerate all objects existing in the system and obtain the private data of other users.

Affected Functionality

The issue affected all system object identifiers represented as incremental integer numbers.


Proof of Concept

A typical object identifier consisted of the following components:

yy + mm + dd + hh + MM+ ss + ms

where:

- **yy** – two last numbers of the year at the moment of creation of the identifier,
- **mm** – the month (with leading zero) at the moment of creation of the identifier,
- **dd** – the day (with leading zero) at the moment of creation of the identifier,
- **hh** – the hour (with leading zero) at the moment of creation of the identifier,
- **MM** – minutes (with leading zero) at the moment of creation of the identifier,
- **ss** – seconds (with leading zero) at the moment of creation of the identifier,
- **ms** – milliseconds (4 numbers) at the moment of creation of the identifier.



Recommendations

DataArt recommends utilizing a randomly generated unpredictable identifiers for each system entity. One of the popular approaches is usage of the [GUID identifiers](#). Alternatively, it is also possible to use a custom way of identifier generation complied with the necessary entropy to adequately provide for randomness and predictability.

Additional information regarding the issue can be found via the articles below:

- <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/331.html>
- https://owasp.org/www-community/vulnerabilities/Insufficient_Session-ID_Length

IN3. Platform information is disclosed in server responses

Risk Rating	INFO
Remediation Efforts	LOW

Summary

During the assessment, DataArt noticed that in some cases, the application provided detailed information about the utilized web server type and version. An attacker can often use this type of information to target the system more effectively.

A typical scenario is an attacker accesses the application and discovers information about used services by viewing the HTTP response headers. The attacker then looks up publicly known vulnerabilities applicable to the used version of the software and tries to exploit the unpatched ones.


Affected Functionality

The issue affected the following web servers and the appropriate response headers:

- <https://admin.customer.com>
 - Server: nginx/1.13.3
 - X-Powered-By: Express
- <https://web.customer.com>
 - Server: nginx/1.4.6 (Ubuntu)
- <https://notify.customer.com>
 - Server: nginx/1.13.3
- <https://img.customer.com>
 - Server: nginx/1.13.3
 - X-Powered-By: Express
- <https://api.customer.com>
 - Server: nginx/1.13.3
 - X-Powered-By: Express

Proof of Concept

The images below show the example the response of one of the affected servers that discloses the detailed version of the utilized web server:



Recommendations

DataArt urges removing any platform-related information from the headers and bodies of server responses, including web server type and version. Such an approach should limit the portion of internal information that could be potentially used by a malefactor.

The standard security solution for the Nginx server is modifying the `'server_tokens off;'` line in the configuration file. However, from a security perspective, the best approach would be to remove the `"Server"` header completely using the [ngx_security_headers](#) module.

Additional information can be found within the following article:

- <https://blog.rapid7.com/2019/12/06/hidden-helpers-security-focused-http-headers-to-protect-against-vulnerabilities/>

IN4. Cross-domain access is allowed from any domain

Risk Rating	INFO
Remediation Efforts	LOW

Summary

During the assessment, DataArt found that the application server allowed the execution of cross-domain requests using the HTML5 cross-origin resource sharing (CORS) feature. However, it was also noticed that the server did not restrict a list of origins that allowed for interaction with the server thus allowing CORS functionality for any domain. Trusting arbitrary origins disables the default same-origin policy, allowing two-way interaction by third-party websites. In the case where server's responses contain sensitive data, this policy is likely to present a security risk.

If another domain is allowed by the policy, then that domain can potentially attack users of the application. If a user is logged in to the application and visits a domain allowed by the policy, then any malicious content running on that domain can potentially retrieve content from the application, and sometimes carry out actions within the security context of the logged-in user. Even if an allowed domain is not overtly malicious in itself, security vulnerabilities within that domain could potentially be leveraged by an attacker to exploit the trust relationship and attack the application that allows cross-domain access.

Note: due to the fact that the utilized policy did not allow transmission of user credentials (cookie values with a session identifier) and no available attack vectors were identified, the issue should be considered as a security recommendation (INFO).


Affected Functionality

The following servers allowed cross-domain requests from any domain:

1. <https://admin.customer.com/api/v2/>
2. <https://api.customer.com/>

Proof of Concept

The example of the server's response below shows that the application server allows communication from any domain:



Recommendations

DataArt strongly recommends setting the scope of allowed domains and permissions to be as restrictive as possible. From a security perspective, the best approach would be the utilization of a white list of allowed

origins for which cross-domain access is allowed. In the case where cross-domain interactions are not required for application functionality, it should be fully disabled on the webserver.

Detailed information about the issue can be found in the articles below:

- <https://portswigger.net/web-security/cors>
- https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTML5_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html#cross-origin-resource-sharing
- <https://www.tenable.com/blog/understanding-cross-origin-resource-sharing-vulnerabilities>
- <https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Glossary/CORS>

Attack Vectors

Attackers typically combine multiple vulnerabilities and weaknesses into so-called “attack vectors” to achieve a specific objective. An attack vector represents a sequence of related actions and exploits that an attacker can use to move from an initial point of access toward a desired outcome.

Potential objectives may include gaining access to sensitive data stored in databases, obtaining access to internal infrastructure, performing fraudulent activities, or compromising the environment to facilitate further attacks against third-party organizations.

DataArt provides the following examples of attack vectors that could realistically be used by an attacker based on the vulnerabilities and security weaknesses identified during the assessment.

AV1. The hidden access over the administrator functionality

The Ultimate Goal

Gain the full access to an admin account.

Utilized Vulnerabilities

M4. The session token is not invalidated after user logs out

L4. The insecure way of password reset functionality in the admin area

L6. Strict-Transport-Security header is not used

Steps for Reproduction

An attacker could set up a rogue Wi-Fi access point and trick a victim into connecting to it. Since the backend allows unencrypted connections to the server (**L6**), the attacker could downgrade the application's HTTPS communication to plain-text HTTP, allowing the traffic to be intercepted.

The attacker could then wait for the victim to log in to the administrator application and capture the administrator's access token from the intercepted traffic. Due to the lack of an effective token expiration mechanism (**M4**), the stolen token could remain valid for an extended period, allowing the attacker to perform actions on behalf of the administrator.

For example, the attacker could use the stolen token to change the passwords of existing users (**L4**), potentially resulting in unauthorized access to their accounts and further compromise of the application.

Consequences

The full control over the admin account, imperceptible to a legitimate user.

AV2. Theft of a user account

The Ultimate Goal

Gain the full access to a user account.

Utilized Vulnerabilities

H4. Unvalidated external redirect within password recovery email

M7. Enumeration of registered emails

L1. A user is not notified in case his password has been changed

Steps for Reproduction

An attacker could first enumerate valid email addresses registered in the system (M7). The attacker could then send fraudulent password recovery emails to selected users, including a link to a phishing website (H4) designed to closely resemble the legitimate password reset form.

If a victim enters their credentials on the phishing site, the attacker could use the obtained credentials to access the legitimate application on the victim's behalf. The attacker could then change the victim's password to a new value (L1), preventing the legitimate user from accessing their account and potentially taking control of it.

Consequences

The full control over the account. Blocking the access for the legitimate user.

Conclusion

DataArt completed penetration testing of the Sample App web application (version 1.2.3). This testing was based on the technologies and known threats as of the date of this document. All the security issues discovered during that exercise were analyzed and described in this report. DataArt recommends that all modifications suggested in this document be performed in order to ensure the overall security of the application.

Please note that as technologies and risks change over time, the vulnerabilities associated with the operation of systems described in this report, as well as the actions necessary to reduce the exposure to such vulnerabilities, will also change.