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Hedging sanctions risk: Cryptocurrency in central bank reserves☆

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HIGHLIGHTS

- The paper simulates the returns of Bitcoin and other reserve assets.
- The simulations balance expected return, volatility, and sanctions risk.
- In the presence of sanctions, there is no completely safe asset.
- The model shows that cryptocurrency can act as a form of insurance.
- Sanctions risk may propel broader diversification in central bank reserves.

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ABSTRACT

Central banks may shift their international reserve holdings in order to protect themselves ex-ante against the risk of financial sanctions by fiat reserve currency issuers. For example, from 2016 to 2021, countries facing a higher risk of US sanctions increased the gold share of their reserves more than countries facing a lower risk of US sanctions. This paper explores the potential for Bitcoin to serve as an alternative hedging asset. I describe a dynamic Bayesian copula model to simulate the joint returns of Bitcoin and other reserve assets under a wide range of plausible sanctions probabilities, quantifying the extent to which varying levels of sanctions risk increase optimal gold, renminbi, and Bitcoin allocations. I conclude that sanctions risk may diminish the appeal of US Treasuries, propel broader diversification in central bank reserves, and bolster the long-run fundamental value of both cryptocurrency and gold.

1. Introduction

As cryptocurrencies have become increasingly mainstream vehicles for investing and transferring wealth, governments have begun to explore potential applications of the technology. Most prominently, El Salvador began adding Bitcoin to its reserves in September 2021, accumulating over 5,867 Bitcoin worth $315 million as of September 2024. El Salvador's Bitcoin holdings comprise about 10 % of El Salvador's international reserves. And in February 2022, Ukraine began accepting cryptocurrency donations to fund its military and purchase humanitarian aid during Ukraine's war with Russia, ultimately receiving $100 million from supporters across the globe.

The global financial sanctions enforced against Russia following its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine are unprecedented in their scope. Never before has an economy the size of Russia's–the 11th largest in the world–been subjected to such a comprehensive, coordinated sanctions effort. Russia's central bank found its assets frozen by the US, EU, UK, Switzerland, Japan, Canada, Australia,

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and South Korea. Ultimately, these major and minor reserve currency issuers froze approximately $300 billion of Russia's assets, roughly half of Russia's international reserves.

The ability of fiat reserve issuers to freeze transactions, which constitutes a form of *de facto* default on the underlying obligations, calls into question fiat reserve currencies' status as safe haven assets. Therefore, it is timely to explore the question of how, and to what extent, the risk of financial sanctions may motivate changes in central bank reserve composition.

I adopt a unique econometric approach to modeling cryptocurrency. Rather than assuming that the high realized returns of Bitcoin are likely to persist, I estimate a Bayesian model with an informative prior, in order to reduce the expected compound returns of Bitcoin. I use simulations from the model to compute optimal portfolios as a function of risk aversion, using the common value at risk criterion. Unlike most of the sanctions literature, which estimates the effects of sanctions ex-post, this paper focuses on understanding the ex-ante effect of sanctions risk. The model captures a key tradeoff among expected returns, volatility, and the level of sanctions risk on each asset.

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes financial sanctions and related literature. Section 3 discusses evidence that fear of sanctions may motivate central bank gold holdings. Section 4 outlines features of cryptocurrency and its resistance to sanctions. Section 5 details the time series model to simulate the returns of Bitcoin and reserve assets, and Section 6 benchmarks the performance of the model. Section 7 uses the simulations to demonstrate the effect of sanctions on reserve allocations under a range of plausible assumptions, and Section 8 concludes.

2. Overview of financial sanctions

The history of economic sanctions dates back to the blockades of World War I, following which the League of Nations began employing sanctions in support of foreign policy objectives as an alternative to war. Mulder (2022) describes the usage of economic sanctions as a coercive tool in the interwar period. Economic sanctions encompass both trade sanctions (tariffs and embargoes) as well as financial sanctions. In the digital commerce era, financial sanctions have assumed greater prominence because of the degree of centralization in the global financial system and the immediacy with which electronic banking services can be disabled. Zarate (2013) details the expansion of the US Treasury Department's financial sanctions programs to assist counterterrorism efforts following the 9/11 attacks. Hufbauer and Jung (2020) update Schott et al. (2009) and describe more recent developments in economic sanctions, including the Iran nuclear agreement and Trump tariffs. McDowell (2021) describes several case studies in which sanctions risk increases the expected costs of future dollar use, motivating de-dollarization efforts.

In the United States, financial sanctions can be implemented through a legislative or presidential procedure. In the legislative procedure, Congress passes a law specifying sanctions, and either the President signs the law or Congress overrides the President's veto. In the presidential procedure, the President issues an executive order declaring a state of emergency concerning a particular country, region, or topic, which empowers the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to issue sanctions. All US persons must comply with OFAC sanctions, including all persons and entities within the United States, all US incorporated entities and their foreign branches. If a US person identifies property belonging to an OFAC-sanctioned entity, the US person must "block" (freeze) the property–prohibiting transfers or dealings of any kind with regard to the property–unless OFAC grants an exception or lifts the specific sanction.[1] Penalties for failing to comply with OFAC sanctions can be significant. Fines can reach millions of dollars, and individuals can face jail time. In April 2022, a researcher received a 63-month sentence, along with a $100,000 fine, for delivering a presentation about cryptocurrency technology in North Korea.[2] Foreign entities beyond the reach of US law enforcement may face "secondary sanctions" for conducting business with sanctioned entities.

Other governing bodies implement various procedures for issuing sanctions. The European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy Council may impose sanctions if all EU members consent to the proposal. The United Nations Security Council may approve sanctions if nine out of the fifteen members vote in favor, but any permanent member (China, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) may veto the proposal. Perhaps because of the relative ease of implementing sanctions through unilateral executive action, the US has sanctioned far more entities than the UN or EU. As of September 2019, the OFAC list included 8,755 entities, compared with 2,136 for the EU and 1,057 for the UN.[3] Partly due to concerns about the overuse of sanctions and unintended effects on vulnerable groups, the Biden Administration announced in October 2021 that it intended to limit its usage of sanctions.[4] Yet, the Biden Administration followed that announcement with a record number of sanctions on Russia.

Empirical evidence concerning the effectiveness of sanctions programs is mixed. Felbermayr et al. (2020) compile a global database and find that sanctions are increasingly used over time; the share of financial sanctions is rising; the main objectives of sanctions are increasingly related to democracy or human rights; and the success rate of sanctions has fallen since 1995, averaging 30 % across policy objectives. In a firm-level comparison of sanctioned to unsanctioned Russian firms, Ahn and Ludema (2020) show that the 2014 sanctions caused significant losses in operating revenue, asset values, and employees, but the Russian government shielded some strategic firms from the full effects of the Western sanctions.

Several central banks currently face or have faced US sanctions. As of 2024, the central banks of Russia, Iran, Syria, Cuba, North Korea, and Venezuela are under US sanctions. Additionally, after the 2021 Taliban takeover, the Biden administration froze the New

[1] OFAC operates several types of sanctions programs. This paper studies the effect of full blocking sanctions under OFAC's Specially Designated Nationals And Blocked Persons List ("SDN List").

[2] https://www.wsj.com/articles/cryptocurrency-guru-sentenced-to-more-than-five-years-in-prison-over-north-korea-trip-11649789150

[3] https://www.tradefinanceglobal.com/wire/accuity-data-reveals-increased-complexity-of-sanctions-compliance-and-implications-for-global-trade/

[4] https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-administration-to-trim-use-of-sanctions-in-a-foreign-policy-shift-11634600029



Fig. 1. The quantity of gold in international reserves up to Q1 2024. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)

Source: World Gold Council

York Fed account belonging to the central bank of Afghanistan, ultimately expropriating the funds to divide them equally between a trust for the people of Afghanistan and victims of the 9/11 attacks.[5] Previously, the US froze the reserves of Iraq following its 1990 invasion of Kuwait (which President Bush subsequently expropriated in 2003[6]) and temporarily suspended Iraq's cash withdrawals in 2015 over concerns that cash was being transported to terrorist groups and sanctioned Iranian banks.[7] In 2008[8] and 2020,[9] the US threatened to freeze Iraq's reserves if Iraq expelled US troops from the country.

The countries described above face sanctions for a variety of reasons including launching external wars, sponsoring terrorism, developing nuclear weapons, repressing protests, refusing to accept the outcome of elections, and seizing power from a previous government. Therefore, a central bank cannot preclude the possibility of facing US sanctions if the country in question simply avoids a particular type of activity. Moreover, there is no expiration date for US financial sanctions. Some sanctions against Iran have been in place since 1979.

3. Sanctions and central bank gold allocations

Empirical evidence regarding the ex-ante effect of sanctions risk on central bank gold holdings is helpful in motivating the subsequent discussion of cryptocurrency as a potential reserve asset.

The primary non-fiat reserve asset is gold. Gold reserves under the physical control of a central bank are largely beyond the reach of financial sanctions by third parties. For example, despite facing US financial sanctions, the Central Bank of Venezuela chartered Russian aircraft to sell its gold reserves in Africa.[10] Therefore, a desire to hedge against financial sanctions risk by fiat reserve currency issuers is potentially one reason why central banks may accumulate gold reserves.

Since the Great Recession, central banks have steadily added gold to their reserves, as illustrated in Fig. 1. In Q1 2024, the gold share of international reserves reached a 25-year high of 16.1 %.

The distribution of gold shares across central banks is heterogeneous. Fig. 2 displays the distribution conditional on a non-zero gold share, as of Q1 2024. The heterogeneity in gold allocations across central banks suggests that political and logistical considerations–such as the cost of transporting and securing physical gold–are as important as a central bank's risk tolerance in determining its portfolio composition. Indeed, Aizenman and Inoue (2012) find that central bank gold holdings are correlated with "global power" such as the history of being an empire, the geographic size of the country, and the country's centrality to the international financial system.

It is also informative to study the changes in gold shares across central banks, and relate those changes to a variable that could proxy for financial sanctions risk. Military import deals evince political alignment and require a real commitment of financial and political capital.[11] Relating the gold share of reserves to military imports is similar to one of the specifications in Iancu et al. (2020), who find evidence of a relationship between military imports and fiat reserve currency shares among emerging market economies.

I obtain annual data from 2017 to 2021 on military imports and exports from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)—a period that precedes Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and is therefore useful to examine whether central banks anticipated the subsequent explosive growth in sanctions. The financial terms of arms trade agreements are often undisclosed, so SIPRI

[5] https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/11/us/politics/taliban-afghanistan-911-families-frozen-funds.html

[6] https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/03/21/us-seizes-14-billion-in-frozen-iraqi-assets/98cbb395-ec84-422e-b825-7a864eea340d/

[7] https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-cut-cash-to-iraq-on-iran-isis-fears-1446526799

[8] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/us-issues-threat-to-iraq-s-50bn-foreign-reserves-in-military-deal-841407.html

[9] https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-warns-iraq-it-risks-losing-access-to-key-bank-account-if-troops-told-to-leave-11578759629

[10] https://wwwwsj.com/articles/how-7-4-tons-of-venezuelas-gold-landed-in-africaand-vanished-11560867792

[11] I eschew using United Nations voting records, which are commonly used to measure political alignment among countries, because they are not obviously connected to sanctions risk and often constitute cheap talk.



Fig. 2. The distribution of gold shares across central banks that own gold as of Q1 2024. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)

Source: World Gold Council

computes a Trend Indicator Value (TIV) based on unit production costs and weapon characteristics that represent the military value of the items being traded.

Countries that import valuable military equipment from geopolitical rivals of the United States, particularly China and Russia, plausibly face a heightened risk of U.S. sanctions. In 2017, President Trump signed the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, providing for sanctions on entities that transact with the Russian defense sector. In 2020, President Trump issued Executive Order 13959, establishing financial sanctions against certain Chinese military companies. As previously discussed, entities that transact with sanctioned entities face the risk of secondary sanctions, so importing military goods from China or Russia raises the importer's sanctions risk.

I obtain a sample of central bank gold shares from the World Gold Council. I filter the sample by discarding countries that do not own any gold, or whose TIV military imports from the US, China, and Russia were zero from 2017 to 2021 inclusive, resulting in 81 countries. For each country, I define a measure of political alignment, mil_import_diff, in Eq. (1). The result is a metric ranging from -100 to 100 that indicates the extent of a country's military-political alignment with the US (100) or rivals of the US (-100). Averaging over a 5-year period in Eq. (2) helps account for the fact that some military trade deals require multiple years to plan and execute.

$$\text{mil\_import\_diff}_{i,t} = \frac{100(\text{TIV}_{\text{USA}\rightarrow\text{i;t}} - \text{TIV}_{\text{China + Russia}\rightarrow\text{i;t}})}{\text{TIV}_{\text{USA + China + Russia}\rightarrow\text{i;t}}} \tag{1}$$

$$\text{mil\_import\_diff}_{i} = \sum_{t=\text{Q4 2016}}^{T=\text{Q4 2021}} \text{mil\_import\_diff}_{i,t}/5 \tag{2}$$

Then, I run the following regression. I choose the log ratio of the gold share as the outcome variable, rather than the percentage point difference, because of the heterogeneity in the level of gold shares illustrated in Fig. 2.

$$ln\left(\frac{\text{gold\_share}_{i,\text{Q4 2021}}}{\text{gold\_share}_{i,\text{Q4 2016}}}\right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{mil\_import\_diff}_i) + \gamma(\text{controls}_i) \tag{3}$$

Without including any controls, Fig. 3 displays a scatterplot illustrating the regression line and its confidence interval.

More detailed regression results are available in Table 1. I compute standard errors using the heteroskedasticity robust Eicker-Huber-White estimator. Control variables include groupings based on geographic location and GDP per capita. Regardless of the choice of controls, the origin of a country's military imports retains statistically significant explanatory power over changes in its central bank gold shares from Q4 2016 to Q4 2021. The relatively low R^2 values are consistent with Arslanalp et al. (2023a), who find that financial sanctions are a minor determinant of changes in gold shares. Table 2, which varies the start and end dates of the regression with both economic and geographic controls, shows that the statistical significance of the military imports variable is robust to beginning the regression in Q4 2015, but the military imports coefficient is not significant in earlier time periods.

These results are broadly consistent with the findings of Arslanalp et al. (2023b), who show that the imposition of financial sanctions by the West is associated with an increase in the share of central bank reserves held in gold. Although these regressions do not establish a causal link between sanctions risk and gold allocations, this analysis of central bank gold shares does demonstrate robust demand for a non-fiat reserve asset, especially among countries that may be less trusting of the Western fiat reserve issuers. Cryptocurrencies may be of particular interest to countries with political or economic disagreements with fiat reserve issuers.



Fig. 3. The origin of military imports explains changes in central bank gold shares from Q4 2016 to Q4 2021. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Source: SIPRI, World Gold Council, author's calculations

Table 1
Gold share regression results.

Economic controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Geographic controls	No	No	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.07	0.13	0.22	0.26
mil_import_diff Coefficient (P-value)	−0.0016 (0.009)**	−0.0019 (0.008)**	−0.0021 (0.004)**	−0.0024 (0.006)**

Table 2
Gold share regressions: rolling periods.

Start date	End date	mil_import_diff Coefficient (×200)	P-value
2011 Q4	2016 Q4	−0.089	0.734
2012 Q4	2017 Q4	−0.301	0.177
2013 Q4	2018 Q4	−0.289	0.194
2014 Q4	2019 Q4	−0.435	0.086
2015 Q4	2020 Q4	−0.498	0.007**
2016 Q4	2021 Q4	−0.476	0.006**

4. Characteristics of cryptocurrency

Cryptocurrencies are fungible digital tokens, the history of which is stored on a digital ledger secured by cryptography. The largest and oldest cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, began use in 2009; since then, people have created thousands of different cryptocurrencies employing different digital architectures. A detailed history and technical description of cryptocurrency are beyond the scope of this paper, but Hardle et al. (2020) and Halaburda et al. (2022) provide an overview.

A central tenet of Bitcoin is the immutable public decentralized system, called a blockchain, through which tokens are created and transactions are authenticated. The blockchain is pseudo-anonymous in that transactions between wallets are public knowledge,[12] while the identities of the wallets' owners are generally not revealed (but sometimes can be inferred based on transaction patterns and other external information). Bitcoin operates a "proof-of-work" process for authenticating transactions, in which groups of miners ("mining pools") operating specialized computing equipment compete to confirm new blocks of transactions. The odds of winning the competition are proportional to the computing power expended on the task, and the winner receives both transaction fees and a quantity of newly minted cryptocurrency.

Although proponents of cryptocurrency cite its "trustlessness" as an advantage over fiat currencies, Bratspies (2018) points out that cryptocurrencies require different forms of trust. Specifically, users must trust that the cryptocurrency software itself is secure, that miners will not collude to attack the integrity of the blockchain, and that the governance process will not approve a "hard fork" that fundamentally alters the blockchain itself or other parameters of the cryptocurrency.

[12] Some cryptocurrencies, such as Monero, employ additional measures that obscure transactions.



Fig. 4. The proportion of Bitcoin mining by country. China officially banned Bitcoin mining in June 2021, but mining operations continued, often via VPN's that mask the miners' locations. The shares for Germany and Ireland are likely inflated due to VPN services that route traffic through those countries.
Source: Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance

Decentralized cryptocurrencies are resistant to governmental financial sanctions. A fiat currency issuer can impose sanctions against particular cryptocurrency wallets, making it illegal for holders of fiat currency to assist the owners of the sanctioned wallets with converting their cryptocurrency into fiat currency. Sanctioned individuals may not be able to use large cryptocurrency exchanges, which are required to comply with sanctions programs if the exchanges want to continue converting cryptocurrency into fiat currency. But as long as the issuers of fiat currency do not control the blockchain itself, sanctioned individuals can continue to send cryptocurrency from one wallet to another. Additionally, sanctioned individuals could participate in "off-chain" transactions by providing the private keys to their cryptocurrency wallet in exchange for goods, services, or other forms of currency, as discussed in Luckner et al. (2021). For example, in April 2022, North Korean hackers continued to launder $600 million of the cryptocurrency Ether stolen during a hack of the video game Axie Infinity, eight days after the US Treasury sanctioned the digital wallet used in the hack.[13] In 2018, Iran began issuing licenses to cryptocurrency miners, who were required to sell their tokens to the central bank to facilitate sanctions evasion.[14] A discussion regarding stablecoins, which are inherently more centralized than Bitcoin and therefore less suitable for evading sanctions, can be found in Appendix A.

Under a proof-of-work system, the ability to censor transactions on the blockchain requires achieving "majority hash power," meaning that the censor must control at least 51 % of the computing power employed by all miners. Achieving such a status is not feasible due to the sheer quantity of computing power dedicated to Bitcoin mining, as well as the amount of electricity required to power the mining chips. Furthermore, the structure of the Bitcoin network incentivizes Bitcoin owners to oppose any individual's acquisition of majority hash power by purchasing or producing their own mining chips, because majority hash power also enables a "double spending attack" that results in the duplication of Bitcoin, which would likely destroy confidence in the cryptocurrency. In 2014, the Bitcoin mining pool Ghash.io briefly acquired majority hash power,[15] and faced a combination of public criticism, cyberattacks, and abandonment by miners that quickly reduced its market share below 50 %. No mining pool has ever acquired majority hash power in Bitcoin since then. The impossibility of implementing a successful attack against Bitcoin contributes to Bitcoin's status as the most valuable cryptocurrency. Moreover, the proof-of-work mechanism establishes a barrier to the large-scale adoption of an alternative to Bitcoin. Rival-proof-of-work currencies tend to face difficulty attracting miners, since prospective miners could mine Bitcoin and other established currencies more profitably. This creates a feedback cycle wherein small proof-of-work currencies are not valuable enough to attract many miners, and therefore remain vulnerable to majority hash attacks, a risk which prevents the small proof-of-work currencies from becoming more valuable. Indeed, many smaller cryptocurrencies that operate based on the proof-of-work mechanism have faced majority hash attacks, as described in Shanaev et al. (2020).

Bitcoin miners generally do not comply with sanctions regarding the wallets whose transactions the miners are validating. One Bitcoin mining pool, Marathon, announced in May 2021 that it would not validate transactions involving wallets that appeared on the OFAC sanctions list.[16] Facing criticism, Marathon reversed its decision one month later, noting that its mining income was far lower than that of its peers. Theoretically, a sanctioned individual could offer higher transaction fees if necessary to motivate miners to process the individual's transactions. The distribution of Bitcoin mining is well diversified and mobile across countries, as illustrated in Fig. 4, complicating efforts by any individual country to censor the blockchain by regulating Bitcoin mining.

[13] https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2022/04/23/north-korea-hack-crypto-access/
[14] https://techcrunch.com/2022/06/19/iran-to-cut-electricity-to-authorized-crypto-miners-report/
[15] https://www.extremetech.com/extreme/184427-one-bitcoin-group-now-controls-51-of-total-mining-power-threatening-entire-currencys-safety
[16] https://www.Theblock.co/linked/106865/marathon-ofac-bitcoin-mining-pool-taproot

The amount of electricity consumed by Bitcoin mining results in a significant negative environmental externality. According to the International Energy Agency and the Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance, Bitcoin mining alone consumes approximately 0.5 % of world energy production as of July 2022. A central bank that purchases significant quantities of Bitcoin will promote additional Bitcoin mining by increasing the price of Bitcoin, resulting in additional environmental harm. The environmental externalities of Bitcoin can be thought of as the cost of decentralization. Countries that are worried about the possibility of US or EU sanctions will likely find the environmental costs of Bitcoin mining to be an acceptable tradeoff in return for the benefit of hedging their reserves against sanctions risk.

Appendix B discusses Bitcoin's liquidity and role as a store of value, noting a "flight to safety" effect that appeared in February 2022 following the global sanctions against the Central Bank of Russia, as well as in March 2023 following the failure of Silicon Valley Bank. Reaching the opposite conclusion as Smales (2019), I argue that Bitcoin meets the minimum requirements to be considered a store of value.

5. Reserve assets model

In order to solve portfolio optimization problems including Bitcoin and other reserve assets, I require a means of generating samples from a plausible joint distribution of future returns of those assets. A major challenge is that the historical returns of Bitcoin are likely to severely overstate Bitcoin's forward-looking expected returns. Between July 1, 2012 and July 1, 2022 the compound annual return of Bitcoin exceeded 100 % per year. It is simply not realistic to expect such high returns to continue indefinitely, because they are not based upon the economic fundamentals of cryptocurrency as it exists today.[17] Bitcoin's high returns were realized by early adopters, who made a highly risky investment (consisting of computing equipment and electricity) into a brand new digital payment system whose usefulness and longevity were both unclear.[18] Today, cryptocurrencies are far more mainstream; there is no reason to expect Bitcoin's future returns to beat optimistic forecasts of the stock market by an entire order of magnitude.[19]

Any statistical technique based on bootstrapping, maximum likelihood, or moment-matching will produce draws from a distribution of Bitcoin returns that resemble Bitcoin's historical returns, and likely overstate Bitcoin's future returns. Therefore, I employ a Bayesian approach, in which I use an informative prior to adjust Bitcoin's expected returns to a more reasonable level. I do not claim to have particular knowledge about the expected returns of any asset, including Bitcoin. I provide a framework for portfolio optimization in the context of sanctions where the end-user can explore optimal allocations by encoding his or her own beliefs. Such beliefs may be derived from principles of economics or other background knowledge available to the investor.

Although DCC-MGARCH models are almost always solved via the maximum likelihood technique, a small literature takes a Bayesian approach similar to this paper. Fioruci et al. (2014) developed an R software package to estimate Bayesian DCC-MGARCH models using a handful of skewed and heavy-tailed error distributions. Shiferaw (2019) uses a Bayesian DCC-MGARCH model to study the correlation between energy and agricultural commodity prices. Tang and Aruga (2022) use a Bayesian DCC-MGARCH model to investigate relationships among the fossil fuel, clean energy stocks, gold, and Bitcoin markets.

5.1. Time series model

This model combines the AGARCH specification of Engle and Ng (1993) with the DCC framework of Engle (2002), thereby capturing several important features of financial time series. The model specification is outlined below.

5.1.1. Univariate equations

In Eq. (4), I model the log returns of each asset. I assume the mean return is not time varying; accordingly, I do not capture low-frequency features of financial data such as long-horizon mean reversion. Such effects are difficult to discern from noise at the daily frequency.

$$r_{i,t} = ln(p_{i,t}/p_{i,t-1}) = \mu_i + \epsilon_{i,t}, \quad i = 1, 2, \dots N. \quad \text{(returns of } i\text{th asset)} \tag{4}$$

In Eq. (5), I model the volatility of returns as having a conditional Student-t distribution, allowing for heavy-tailed returns. When estimating the model, I further constrain $\nu_i > 3$ so that the first three moments of the error distribution are finite. While finite moments are not a prerequisite for Bayesian inference, at least the first two moments must be finite in order for the covariance matrix to be estimable.

$$\epsilon_{i,t} | \vec{r_1}, \vec{r_2}, \dots \vec{r_{t-1}} \sim \text{Student-t} \left(0, \sqrt{\sigma^2_{i,t}(\nu_i - 2)/\nu_i}, \nu_i\right) \quad \text{(innovations for } i\text{th asset)} \tag{5}$$

In Eq. (6), I employ a standard GARCH(1,1) specification for modeling the time-varying volatility. The GARCH component produces heavy-tailed returns and volatility clustering. The AGARCH δ_i term allows for asymmetric news impact effects: negative shocks increase volatility more so than positive shocks. Several different potential specifications capture this effect (EGARCH, GJR-GARCH,

[17] The concept that expected returns fall as asset prices rise is well documented in the context of the stock market. For example, after a stock joins the list of the top 10 largest US stocks, its 10-year expected return is 1.5 % below the market return. See https://www.dimensional.com/us-en/insights/large-and-in-charge-giant-firms-atop-market-is-nothing-new

[18] To emphasize the riskiness of an early-stage investment into Bitcoin, consider the thousands of cryptocurrencies that are nearly worthless today.

[19] A combination of high realized returns and declining expected returns could be explained by a declining rare disaster risk associated with Bitcoin, due to Bitcoin's increasing rate of adoption and increasing hashrate, both of which reduce the likelihood of a sudden collapse or a successful attack.

APARCH) but only the AGARCH specification is differentiable over its entire domain, which is helpful for the Hamiltonian Monte Carlo sampling procedure.

$$\sigma_{i,t}^2 = \omega_i + \alpha_i(\epsilon_{i,t-1} - \delta_i)^2 + \beta_i\sigma_{i,t-1}^2 \quad \text{(variance of } i\text{th asset)} \tag{6}$$

5.1.2. Multivariate equations

In Eqs. (7)–(9), I compute the standardized residuals, the dynamic conditional covariance, and the dynamic conditional correlation respectively. The DCC component of the model allows the correlations to vary over time in a mean-reverting fashion, with clustered periods of high and low correlation.

$$\vec{\eta_t} = diag(\vec{\sigma_t})^{-1}(\vec{r_t} - \vec{\mu}) \quad \text{(standardized residuals)} \tag{7}$$

$$\boldsymbol{Q}_t = \boldsymbol{S} + a(\vec{\eta_{t-1}}\vec{\eta_{t-1}}^T - \boldsymbol{S}) + b(\boldsymbol{Q}_{t-1} - \boldsymbol{S}) \quad \text{(covariance)} \tag{8}$$

$$\boldsymbol{R}_t = diag(\boldsymbol{Q}_t)^{-0.5}\boldsymbol{Q}_t diag(\boldsymbol{Q}_t)^{-0.5} \quad \text{(dynamic correlation)} \tag{9}$$

Rather than modeling the GARCH error term using a multivariate distribution, I use a copula to correlate the univariate marginal distributions of each asset. The theory of copulas was originally developed by Sklar (1959) and Sklar (1973), who proved that any continuous joint distribution can be modeled by linking its marginal distributions with a unique copula. Copula models are commonly used for risk management in finance; Patton (2012) provides a recent overview. The copula approach provides flexibility to model the marginal distributions and the manner of their correlation separately. There are many copulas that produce a wide variety of dependence structures. Two popular copulas are the Gaussian copula, which does not feature tail dependence, and the Student-t copula, in which the joint probability of extreme values is higher than that of the Gaussian copula. Nguyen et al. (2020) find that the Student-t copula provides the best fit when applying a GJR-GARCH model to a set of reserve currencies and gold. Accordingly, I use the Student-t copula, whose density is given in Eq. (10).

$$\vec{\epsilon_t} \sim \frac{t_{\boldsymbol{R_t},\lambda}\left(T_\lambda^{-1}(F(\epsilon_{1,t})), T_\lambda^{-1}(F(\epsilon_{2,t})), \ldots, T_\lambda^{-1}(F(\epsilon_{n,t}))\right)}{\prod_{i=1}^{N} t_\lambda\left(T_\lambda^{-1}(F(\epsilon_{i,t}))\right)} \quad \text{(Student-t copula density)} \tag{10}$$

Specifically, $t_{\boldsymbol{R_t},\lambda}$ refers to the multivariate Student-t density with correlation matrix[20] $\boldsymbol{R_t}$ and degrees of freedom λ, t_λ refers to the univariate Student-t density, T_λ^{-1} refers to the inverse Student-t distribution function, and $F(\cdot)$ refers to the marginal cumulative distribution for each asset (given in Eq. 5).

When estimating this model, I include six assets: Bitcoin, gold, 5-year US Treasury bonds, 5-year Euro bonds (measured in USD), 5-year renminbi bonds (measured in USD), and a global market capitalization-weighted stock index. I do not separately model Ether because of the high correlation between Bitcoin and Ether. However, the subsequent discussion regarding Bitcoin could be extrapolated to a market capitalization-weighted portfolio of Bitcoin, Ether, and other smaller non-stablecoin cryptocurrencies.

In adopting a dynamic Bayesian copula approach, this paper is most closely related to So and Yeung (2014), who also adopt a dynamic conditional correlation approach for a variety of copula functions, using a more granular vine copula structure that estimates the parameters of a separate copula function for each pair of assets. However, So and Yeung (2014) estimate their models using maximum likelihood, not a Bayesian approach. In this setting, vine copulas would introduce significantly more computational complexity without much additional benefit compared to a multivariate copula, because the estimated correlations across asset classes are moderate-to-low and the estimated tail-dependence coefficients[21] are all well below 0.1. Bayesian approaches that utilize vine copulas are more appropriate when modeling a collection of similar assets, and often involve approximations to the posterior distribution, as in Kreuzer and Czado (2019).

Because this model features a small number of assets, I avoid the curse of dimensionality, described by Pakel et al. (2021), which would hinder a Bayesian approach to modeling a large set of assets. Specifically, the number of parameters in this model grows proportionally to the square of the number of assets. Although central banks have been diversifying their reserves away from US dollars and euros in the last two decades, as documented in Arslanalp et al. (2022), high-quality US dollar bonds, euro bonds, public equities, and gold still comprise over 80 % of global reserves. Moreover, one could approximate the performance of many other assets, such as corporate bonds, by forming linear combinations of Treasuries and stocks. Therefore, this model captures the set of investment options available to central banks.

5.2. Priors

I use uninformative priors for the volatility and correlation processes, operating on the assumption that historical volatility relationships among these assets are representative of the future.

However, I set informative priors for the mean returns of the assets. I considered several factors in selecting the Bitcoin prior. As described in Section 4, Bitcoin is a real asset in finite supply, so its long-run return should be related to the rate of inflation. Indeed,

[20] Formally, the correlation matrix is given by $\frac{\lambda}{\lambda-2}\boldsymbol{R_t}$, but as described in Demarta and McNeil (2005), the Student-t copula is invariant to a strictly increasing transformation of its components. So the Student-t dispersion matrix may be interpreted as a correlation matrix, provided that $\lambda > 2$.

[21] A measure of the probability that the return of one asset exceeds a particular quantile, conditional on another asset exceeding the same quantile, as the quantile approaches 1 or 0. Tail dependence coefficients vary between 0 and 1; for a Gaussian copula, tail dependence is equal to 0.

Table 3
Priors on model parameters in estimation.

Parameter	Prior	Notes
$\vec{\mu}$	(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)	The model is estimated on de-meaned returns, then simulations are drawn with appropriate means
$\vec{\omega}$	Cauchy(0, 0.1) constrained within the interval [0,1]	Gelman (2006) suggests the half-Cauchy distribution as a prior for variance parameters
$\vec{\alpha}$	Uniform(0, 1)	Constraints that the variance process is mean-reverting
$\vec{\beta}$	Uniform(0, $1-\vec{\alpha}$)	Constraints ensure that the variance process is mean-reverting
$\vec{\delta}$	Cauchy(0, 0.1), constrained within the interval [0,1]	Ensures that negative shocks have a stronger impact on the variance at time t than positive shocks
$\boldsymbol{S}$	Lewandowski-Kurowicka-Joe(1)	Uniform prior over the set of correlation matrices
a	Uniform(0,1)	Constraints ensure that the correlation process is mean-reverting
b	Uniform(0,$1-a$)	Constraints ensure that the correlation process is mean-reverting
$\vec{\nu}$	$\vec{\nu}-3 \sim$ Gamma(2,0.1)	Juarez and Steel (2010) suggest this Gamma prior for Student-t degrees of freedom. $\vec{\nu} > 3$ ensures that the first three moments of the marginal distributions are finite
λ	$\lambda - 2 \sim$ Gamma(2,0.1)	Juarez and Steel (2010) suggest this Gamma prior for Student-t degrees of freedom. $\lambda > 2$ ensures that the covariance of the multivariate copula is finite

this is precisely what academic researchers have found. Blau et al. (2021) found that changes in the price of Bitcoin tend to predict changes in expected inflation. Benigno and Rosa (2023) showed that the price of Bitcoin is unrelated to all types of macroeconomic news except news related to inflation. Choi and Shin (2022) demonstrate that Bitcoin prices appreciate in response to increases in an online price index.

In fact, there is one reason to believe that Bitcoin's returns might exceed inflation in the long run, making my assumption conservative. Unlike gold, the effective supply of Bitcoin actually shrinks over time, since Bitcoin can be rendered permanently inaccessible when owners lose, forget, or discard their private keys. The blockchain analysis firm Chainalysis found that about 20 % of Bitcoin had not been touched in over 5 years, as of June 2020.[22] In the long run, perhaps 1 % of Bitcoin will be permanently lost each year, boosting Bitcoin's expected return above that of inflation.

In summary, I set the expected returns of Treasuries, renminbi bonds, and Euro bonds equal to their current yields as of September 18, 2024; I set the expected returns of gold and Bitcoin equal to the 5-year expected inflation rate; and I set the expected return of world stock equal to 4 % above the average yield of Treasuries and Euro bonds. Because I estimate the model using log returns, these priors pertain to the long-run compound return. The short-run expected return will be higher, especially for Bitcoin, whose high volatility implies that Bitcoin's short-run expected return is substantially larger than Bitcoin's long-run compounded return. In order to implement the informative priors on mean returns, I estimate the model using de-meaned returns, and I add the appropriate means when drawing simulations. Table 3 contains a complete list of priors used in estimation.

5.3. Data

I obtain daily historical Bitcoin prices, 5-year Chinese Government bond yields, and gold prices at the close of each business day from investing.com. I obtain 5-year US Treasury yields from the St. Louis Federal Reserve, and 5-year Euro bond yields from the European Central Bank.[23] For world stocks, I obtain the daily returns of the Vanguard Total World Stock Index ETF which tracks the FTSE Global All Cap Index.

Bitcoin's early history–when it was regarded more so as a science experiment than a legitimate asset class–is likely to be less informative of Bitcoin's future returns compared to Bitcoin's modern history. Indeed, Wainwright (2024) finds that Bitcoin's volatility has gradually declined over time. Therefore, I begin my sample on July 1, 2016, after the hack of the early cryptocurrency exchange Mt. Gox in early 2014, but before Bitcoin first reached $20,000 in December 2017. I continue my sample until September 18, 2024.

5.4. Computation

I sample from the posterior distribution over the parameter set $\{\vec{\omega}, \vec{\alpha}, \vec{\beta}, \vec{\gamma}, \boldsymbol{S}, \vec{a}, \vec{b}, \vec{\nu}, \lambda\}$ using the Bayesian modeling software Stan developed by Carpenter et al. (2017). Stan implements a No-U-Turn sampler, a variant of Hamiltonian Monte Carlo. When running the sampler, I use 6 chains, with 1084 samples per chain, including 250 warmup iterations per chain that I discard.

In order to speed up the computation of this model, I implement an approximation to the inverse Student-t distribution, which must be computed many times as part of the multivariate Student-t copula in Eq. (10). Computing the inverse Student-t distribution using root-finding procedures, such as the inverse regularized beta function, is about 2×–3× slower. The approximation, which combines two power series, achieves a maximum error of 0.15 % for all degrees of freedom and all quantiles between 0.00001 and 0.99999. A description of the approximation can be found in Appendix C.

It is informative to examine the distribution of $\boldsymbol{S}$, the long-run correlations across assets. Table 4 shows that Bitcoin is mostly uncorrelated with all reserve assets, except the stock market, with which Bitcoin has a moderate positive correlation.[24]

[22] https://blog.chainalysis.com/reports/bitcoin-market-data-exchanges-trading/

[23] I convert bond yields into prices using the discounted cash flows formula.

[24] The median posterior correlations for the non-Bitcoin assets are all within 0.2 of their sample values from June 2008 to January 2023.

Table 4
Median posterior long-run correlations.

	Bitcoin	Gold	Treasuries	Euro bonds	World stock	Rmb bonds
Bitcoin	1					
Gold	0.04	1				
Treasuries	−0.03	0.40	1			
Euro bonds	0.10	0.47	0.27	1		
World stock	0.17	0.17	−0.14	0.27	1	
Rmb bonds	0.04	0.02	−0.29	−0.03	0.11	1

6. Model validation

Gelman et al. (2013) describe posterior predictive checks as a means of validating Bayesian models by simulating draws from the posterior distribution, and comparing those draws to the observed data. Because I perform portfolio choice optimization over simulated 3-month periods, I simulate 3 months of returns (63 trading days) from the posterior distribution and compare the simulations to rolling 3-month periods from the data in various ways.

The subsequent sections illustrate several posterior predictive checks for Bitcoin.

6.1. Gross return

Fig. 5 shows that the simulated returns are significantly more pessimistic than the rolling 3-month periods in the sample. This is an intended consequence of the informative prior over the expected returns.

6.2. Standard deviation

Fig. 6 shows that the standard deviation of Bitcoin's log returns in the simulations aligns well with rolling periods in-sample, in that the simulations generate a plausible unimodal representation of the in-sample values. The standard deviation of the simulations has a long right tail. Fig. 7 shows that a credible interval for the standard deviation of width x generated from the model simulations actually includes slightly more than x fraction of standard deviations calculated from rolling 3-month periods. Therefore, the simulations encompass a broader range of possible values for the Bitcoin standard deviation than the sample periods.

6.3. Skewness

Fig. 8 demonstrates that the skewness in the Bitcoin simulations is centered at zero, because of the symmetric Student-t distribution of the error term. The simulations assign less mass to the left tail of the skewness distribution, compared to the sample.

While GARCH models are often estimated using skewed distributions for the error term, doing so is not practical with an informative prior on the mean return. If the mean return is time-invariant, then the location parameter of the skewed distribution must shift every time period as a function of the skewness and variance, which is not computationally feasible. In my model, although the log returns are unskewed, the gross returns are positively skewed (as a result of the exponential transformation) consistent with the findings of Farago and Hjalmarsson (2019).



Fig. 5. A comparison of gross returns from the model simulations, and gross returns from rolling 3-month periods in the data.



Fig. 6. A comparison of the standard deviation of Bitcoin from the model simulations, and the same standard deviation from rolling 3-month periods in the data.



Fig. 7. The proportion of rolling 3-month period standard deviations that fall within a given credible interval centered around the posterior median standard deviation. The simulations match the data more precisely the closer they match the diagonal line.



Fig. 8. A comparison of the skewness of Bitcoin from the model simulations, and the same skewness from rolling 3-month periods in the data.

6.4. Excess kurtosis

Fig. 9 shows that the simulations match the kurtosis of Bitcoin quite well. It is plausible that the tail risk posed by Bitcoin has gradually declined over time as Bitcoin's adoption has grown, so that the kurtosis in-sample overstates Bitcoin's tail risk as measured today.



Fig. 9. A comparison of the excess kurtosis of Bitcoin from the model simulations, and the same excess kurtosis from rolling 3-month periods in the data.

7. Portfolio choice optimization

According to the International Monetary Fund Guidelines for Foreign Exchange Reserve Management (2005), central banks tend to review the performance of their reserves quarterly. Therefore, I simulate quarters of returns (63 trading days) from the statistical model. I assume no leverage and no shorting.

After drawing 250,000 simulations from the dynamic Bayesian model, I employ a rejection sampling procedure designed to ensure that the samples are plausible and the portfolio optimization process is numerically stable. It is likely that the heavy-tailed distributions used in my GARCH model overstate the amount of probability mass in the far tails of the distribution. Additionally, my model does not capture lower frequency mean reversion, which might reduce the variance over longer periods of time. To correct this misspecification, I compute the gross return of each asset for each quarterly sample, and I reject the sample if, for any asset, the corresponding cumulative log return is outside the interval $(63 * \mathbb{E}\mu_i - log(k), 63 * \mathbb{E}\mu_i + log(k))$. I compute the interval width k by calculating the square of the maximum gain or loss across all 3-month rolling periods in the data. For example, if Bitcoin's best performance across rolling periods in the sample was a 4× return, and its worst performance was a 0.5× return, I set $k = \max(4, 1/0.5)^2 = 16$. This rejection sampling results in discarding less than 0.5 % of the simulated data, but ensures that all accepted samples are economically plausible and the sample variances are numerically stable. Moreover, this procedure preserves the dynamic structure of returns and average compound return within accepted samples.

The portfolio optimization process only considers financial characteristics of the reserve assets. Of course, central banks face many other considerations when allocating their portfolios. In particular, central banks may prefer to align their reserve currency composition with the currency composition of their imports, external debts, and currency peg (if any). Modeling the connection between trade, debt, and reserve currency composition is a potential area for future research.

When modeling sanctions, I treat the sanctions probabilities as exogenous to the central bank's asset allocation decision. I am unaware of any instance where a central bank's actions provided the primary impetus for a third party to freeze the central bank's reserves. Rather, sanctions result from political decisions made by leaders external to the central bank, of which the central bank probably would not have advance notice. I assume that the US and EU may separately choose to apply sanctions to the central bank, resulting in the total loss of the central bank's US Treasuries or Euro bonds, but leaving the central bank's gold and Bitcoin untouched.[25] To highlight the difficulty of blocking transactions in physical gold, the Financial Times reported[26] that a Swiss commodity trader's subsidiary in Abu Dhabi has been buying tens of millions of dollars of Russian gold despite EU sanctions adopted by Switzerland designed to prohibit such transactions.

I assume that US sanctions result in a 2/3 loss in the value of the global stock holdings, while EU sanctions result in a 1/3 loss, and a total loss occurs if both US and EU sanctions are applied. I assume sanctions by China do not affect stocks.

In my base case, the probability of US issuing sanctions is 1/100, the probability of EU issuing sanctions is 1/200, and the probability of China issuing sanctions is 1/100. I implement the correlation across sanction probabilities with a Gaussian copula. I conduct sensitivity analysis by varying these parameters, as shown in Table 5. The "West" refers to both the US and the EU.

To the extent that China's economic and political objectives do not align with those of the US and EU, it is plausible that sanctions risk posed by the Chinese government is negatively correlated with that of the US and EU. This feature of the renminbi may boost its attractiveness as a reserve asset. Liao and McDowell (2016) show that countries that are less politically aligned with the US are more likely to add renminbi to their international reserves.

[25] In assuming that gold is not affected by sanctions, I implicitly assume that the central bank retains physical custody of its gold, rather than storing its gold within third-party custodians such as the vaults of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. I do not account for the cost of transporting or storing gold.

[26] https://www.ft.com/content/6d51fd1e-07b4-4aa6-95b0-e1634816bf3d

Table 5
Scenarios for portfolio optimization with sanctions.

Scenario	US sanction probability	EU sanction probability	China sanction probability	US & EU correlation	China & West correlation
Base Case	1/100	1/200	1/100	0.5	−0.5
High Risk	1/10	1/20	1/10	0.5	−0.5
Low Risk	1/1000	1/2000	1/1000	0.5	−0.5

7.1. Mean-value at risk optimization

Value at Risk is a measure of risk commonly used in portfolio stress testing, and therefore is suitable for this application. Value at Risk is defined as the loss attributable to the xth quantile of the distribution of returns, where x is usually chosen as 0.01, 0.05, or 0.10. I choose $x = 0.05$ and formulate the optimization problem as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} &\underset{\vec{w}}{\text{maximize}} \sum_{i=1}^{N_{sim}} \frac{x_i}{N_{sim}} - \psi(1 - Q_{0.05}(x_i)) \\ &\text{subject to} \quad w_i \geq 0, \ i = 0, \ldots, N_{assets}, \\ &\sum_{i=1}^{N_{assets}} w_i = 1. \end{aligned} \tag{11}$$

Here, $Q_\alpha(\cdot)$ is the quantile function, and ψ is the level of risk aversion. x_i is the geometric return resulting from the ith simulation, and $0 \leq \Omega_k \leq 1$ represents the extent of sanctions on asset k:

$$x_i(\vec{w}) = \left(\sum_{k=1}^{k=N_{assets}} \Omega_k w_k \prod_{t=1}^{T=63} exp(r_{i,k,t}) \right)^{1/63} - 1 \tag{12}$$

As discussed in Lwin et al. (2017), this optimization problem is non-convex and NP-hard, so it is much more computationally challenging than mean-variance optimization. I describe a gradient-free stochastic technique to solve this optimization problem in Appendix D.

Notably, I assume that the central bank does not rebalance across assets within the quarter. Chinn et al. (2021) find mixed evidence regarding whether central banks rebalance. By assuming no rebalancing, I avoid the necessity of accounting for transaction costs regarding to physical gold and Bitcoin, which are likely to be much more costly than transactions in fiat assets. Additionally, without rebalancing, the timing of sanctions within the quarter does not affect the final portfolio value, which simplifies the optimization procedure.

7.1.1. Without sanctions

Fig. 10 displays optimal shares without sanctions. The optimal Bitcoin share is fairly close to the stock share, suggesting some diversification benefit between Bitcoin and stock. The central bank does not hold Euro bonds, renminbi bonds, or gold, because these assets do not adequately reduce portfolio risk relative to their expected returns.

Optimal portfolio shares include small amounts of Bitcoin even if Bitcoin's expected return is negative. For example, with a risk aversion parameter of 0.1, and an expected compounded return of −27 %, the portfolio includes about 1 % in Bitcoin. If Bitcoin's expected return is negative, investors who purchase Bitcoin anyway are effectively paying a premium for insurance against a collapse in traditional financial assets. The model suggests that this premium is worthwhile, as long as Bitcoin's expected returns aren't too low.

7.1.2. With sanctions

Fig. 11 displays optimal portfolio shares in the base sanctions case. Depending on the central bank's risk tolerance, the central bank might diversify across all six assets. Treasuries are noticeably less appealing, compared to the scenario without sanctions, but renminbi bonds only appear in large quantities in the portfolio of the most risk-averse central bank as an alternative to gold and Bitcoin. This is because renminbi bonds currently offer a negative real return. Although the central bank holds roughly twice as much gold as Bitcoin, the central bank always holds gold and Bitcoin together in this portfolio.

As displayed in Fig. 12, the optimal Bitcoin share increases with the level of sanctions risk. A central bank at high risk of sanctions would hold as much as 10–25 % in Bitcoin.

Fig. 13 illustrates the optimal gold share as it relates to the level of sanctions risk. Clearly, gold is the preferred asset for hedging high levels of sanctions risk, with the high sanctions risk portfolio comprised almost entirely of gold and Bitcoin. The investor facing a low risk of sanctions holds minimal gold, because fiat assets provide positive real returns compared to gold's assumed zero real return.

7.1.3. With sanctions affecting bitcoin and gold

In this section, I relax my previous assumption that sanctions leave the central bank's gold and Bitcoin untouched. Rather, I now assume that the central bank must offer a discount to market price in order to entice buyers to violate sanctions and transact with the central bank. For example, Katinas and Rushwood (2024) show that Russia offered a discount relative to Brent crude to attract buyers of its oil following its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The discount has varied over time depending on the type of oil, but has ranged as high as 30 %.

In Fig. 14, I assume that US financial sanctions require a central bank to offer a 20 % discount to sell gold and Bitcoin, effectively reducing the value of the gold and Bitcoin by 20 %. I assume EU financial sanctions result in an additional 10 % discount, and



Fig. 10. Optimal asset shares with value at risk preferences.



Fig. 11. Optimal asset shares with value at risk preferences and base case sanctions probabilities.



Fig. 12. The optimal Bitcoin share with value at risk preferences and sanctions.



Fig. 13. The optimal gold share with value at risk preferences and sanctions. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)



Fig. 14. Optimal asset shares with value at risk preferences, base case sanctions probabilities, and sanctions partially affecting gold and Bitcoin. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)

Chinese financial sanctions also result in a further 10 % discount. A central bank sanctioned by all three entities would need to offer a 40 % discount to transact in gold and Bitcoin. In this scenario, renminbi bonds are more attractive, because renminbi bonds diversify against the risk of Western sanctions relatively better than gold and Bitcoin. Thus, Western policies that strictly enforce sanctions on gold and Bitcoin transactions could enhance the international appeal of the renminbi.

8. Conclusion

The risk of financial sanctions by major fiat reserve currency issuers has significant implications for central banks, some of which may not be able to count on US Treasuries or AAA-rated Euro bonds as safe assets. Indeed, in the presence of sanctions, there is no completely safe asset. Cryptocurrencies offer some protection against sanctions, but introduce the risk of high price volatility. The price of gold is also more volatile than that of Treasuries or Euro bonds. Although holding physical gold provides some protection against sanctions, gold is less liquid than fiat assets, and assuming physical custody of gold entails significant logistical and security costs.

The model in this paper highlights the extent to which the risk of sanctions can drive broader reserve diversification away from Treasuries toward Bitcoin, gold, and RMB. The model also emphasizes the tradeoff among sanctions risk, volatility, and expected return. In particular, the model shows how Bitcoin, gold, and RMB can provide insurance against Western sanctions, with Bitcoin complementing gold and RMB. Indeed, the model suggests that a country's decision to embrace cryptocurrency could boost its resilience to geopolitical economic shocks.

If a central bank does decide to purchase cryptocurrency, the central bank faces a choice of whether to publicly reveal that decision. Concealing the central bank's Bitcoin allocation might further stymie external attempts to freeze the central bank's assets. Ferranti (2022) discusses the fact that many central banks do not disclose their fiat reserve currency composition. Revealing the central bank's cryptocurrency wallets enables public verification of the central bank's assets, but requires the central bank to accept scrutiny regarding its choice to invest in a highly volatile asset. Aizenman and Inoue (2012) find that central banks tend to underreport their gold holdings to avoid criticism when the price of gold declines.

There are several avenues for further research. The objective function could be modified in many other ways, such as to express loss aversion or liquidity preferences. The sanctions model could be expanded to incorporate the risk of sovereign default, with an

assumed recovery rate on the bonds in question. A model featuring rebalancing and portfolio adjustment costs might also be more realistic, at the expense of introducing additional parameters. The outputs of this model–optimal portfolio shares as a function of risk aversion and sanctions risk–could be aggregated across a distribution of countries to form demand curves for each asset, creating a general equilibrium model that could provide an estimate of the implicit cost of US financial sanctions in terms of their effect on US or EU interest rates.

CRediT authorship contribution statement

Matthew Ferranti: Writing – original draft, Supervision, Funding acquisition, Visualization, Software, Methodology, Project administration, Investigation, Data curation, Writing – review & editing, Validation, Formal analysis, Resources, Conceptualization.

Appendix A. Stablecoins

Stablecoins are a different type of cryptocurrency that attempt to maintain a fixed exchange rate against an external quantity, often the US dollar. Stablecoins attempt to do so primarily in two different ways. First, some stablecoin issuers hold US dollar collateral, such as Treasury bills or commercial paper. Second, some stablecoin issuers accept other cryptocurrencies as collateral (including other stablecoins), usually over-collateralizing their US dollar obligations to account for the high price volatility of cryptocurrency. Executing a stablecoin trade over the Ethereum network requires paying a small quantity of Ether as a transaction ("gas") fee. Because stablecoin issuers need to hold and transact in collateral, stablecoins are inherently more centralized than Bitcoin. In fact, the two largest stablecoin issuers, Circle (which issues US Dollar Coin) and Tether (which issues Tether) retain the ability to block cryptocurrency wallets containing their stablecoins, freezing the stablecoins. As of July 28, 2022, Circle has blocked 48 Ethereum wallets[27] and Tether has blocked 692 Ethereum wallets.[28] No stablecoin currently exists which is resistant to sanctions, backed by sufficient collateral to preclude the risk of losing its peg, and sufficiently liquid to accommodate a central bank's transactions (billions of US dollars).

A stablecoin that is sufficiently decentralized such that its issuer could not block transactions probably would need to rely heavily on algorithms for its implementation—introducing various security risks—and exclusively accept other cryptocurrencies as collateral. However, the track record of so-called "algorithmic" stablecoins that are backed by other cryptocurrencies is mixed. In May 2022, the $19 billion stablecoin TerraUSD collapsed when the value of its collateral, another cryptocurrency called Luna, cratered. Many other algorithmic stablecoins, including Basis Cash, Iron Finance, SafeCoin, BitUSD, DigitalDollar, NuBits, and CK USD have also failed.[29] Klages-Mundt and Minca (2021) provide a stochastic model that captures the deflationary deleveraging that the algorithmic stablecoin Dai experienced in March 2020. Speculators who exchanged other cryptocurrencies for Dai were forced to repurchase Dai as their collateral dropped in value, in some cases facing forced liquidation of their collateral at a price of zero due to Ethereum network congestion and illiquidity. As a result, Dai became undercapitalized, while its price rose as high as $1.13. To address this crisis, the Dai governance community (holders of the MKR token) issued additional equity-like MKR tokens to recapitalize Dai, and voted to begin accepting US dollar-backed stablecoins as collateral in order to stabilize the price of Dai.

But Dai's usage of other stablecoins as collateral means that Dai is only as stable as the stablecoins are. In March 2023, Dai temporarily dropped to $0.97 when its US Dollar Coin collateral de-pegged due to the potential for losses on US Dollar Coin's reserves held at the failed Silicon Valley Bank. Dai is currently the largest stablecoin whose governance process is sufficiently decentralized that Dai tokens cannot be blocked or frozen. However, if Dai became widely used as a means of evading sanctions, it would be vulnerable to having its stablecoin collateral frozen, potentially precipitating a collapse in the value of Dai.

Any investor that holds an algorithmic stablecoin backed exclusively by decentralized collateral necessarily assumes intermediation risk. It may be impossible to develop an algorithmic stablecoin that is both resistant to sanctions and capable of maintaining a $1.00 soft peg without directly or indirectly holding fiat collateral. Stablecoins will likely remain an active domain for financial innovation, but they do not appear to provide benefits as reserve assets.

Appendix B. Market characteristics of bitcoin

B.1. Liquidity

In order to be suitable for institutional investment, such as by central banks, it must be possible to transact in billions of dollars of Bitcoin without incurring extravagant costs. Indeed, the average daily trading volume of Bitcoin is also on par with other major reserve assets, as displayed in Fig. 15.

B.2. Flight to safety

As a risky asset, Bitcoin has historically not exhibited a flight to safety effect; Bitcoin's price tends to fall during periods of economic turmoil. Indeed, Fig. 16 shows that Bitcoin declined concurrently with Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. However, the figure also shows that Bitcoin sharply appreciated immediately following the US Treasury's sanctions against the Central Bank of

[27] https://dune.com/phabc/usdc-banned-addresses
[28] https://dune.com/phabc/usdt-banned-addresses
[29] https://indianexpress.com/article/technology/crypto/luna-terra-crash-a-brief-history-of-failed-algorithmic-stablecoins-7934293/



Fig. 15. Average daily trading volume of major reserve assets and cryptocurrencies, including stablecoins Tether and US Dollar Coin.
Source: World Gold Council, coinmarketcap.com

Russia. Therefore, the decentralized nature of Bitcoin may provide some insurance value against deglobalization shocks, such as the disruption caused by sanctions. This hypothesis is consistent with Aysan et al. (2019), who find that Bitcoin hedges geopolitical risks. Fig. 17 shows that Bitcoin appreciated sharply immediately following the failure of Silicon Valley Bank, suggesting that Bitcoin provides some insurance against systemic risk in the fiat financial system.

Fig. 16. The price returns of Bitcoin, normalized to $1 on February 24, 2022, the day Russia invaded Ukraine. The dashed line indicates 5:00 AM EST on February 28, 2022, when the US Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioned the Central Bank of Russia.
Source: investing.com



Fig. 17. The price returns of Bitcoin, normalized to $1 on March 10, 2023, the day financial regulators closed Silicon Valley Bank.
Source: investing.com

B.3. Store of value

Estimating the fundamental value of Bitcoin is an active area of research. One strand of literature argues that the fundamental value of Bitcoin is zero. For example, Cheah and Fry (2015) apply statistical tests to Bitcoin's early history and argue that Bitcoin prices constitute a speculative bubble. To the contrary, Biais et al. (2022) argue that Bitcoin should be valued based on its stream of net transactional benefits, including the evasion of government capital controls. Hayes (2019) find that the price of Bitcoin loosely corresponds to Bitcoin's marginal cost of production.

Indeed, there are several reasons to believe Bitcoin's fundamental value is positive (even if difficult to determine). First, Bitcoin is a resource for which there are no obvious substitutes. Bitcoin is the largest proof-of-work currency by nearly two orders of magnitude. Network effects in the world of cryptocurrency appear to be very strong; efforts to improve Bitcoin by altering aspects of the Bitcoin architecture (such as the 2017 hard fork that spawned "Bitcoin Cash," a version of Bitcoin that can process more on-chain transactions per second) have not seriously rivaled Bitcoin's popularity. Rather than altering the Bitcoin architecture itself, efforts to improve Bitcoin's functionality currently focus on designing methods to transact off-chain, such as the Lightning network, which offers faster transactions and reduced fees. Indeed, the development of the Lightning network presumes the robustness of Bitcoin to usurpation by clones or other rivals.

Second, the total quantity of Bitcoin is capped at approximately 21 million. After the last Bitcoin is mined in the year 2140, miners will compete to receive transaction fees for their services, but will not receive any newly minted Bitcoin. Although scarcity does not necessarily imply value, the quantity limit does effectively prevent Bitcoin from experiencing devaluation through hyperinflation.

Third, Bitcoin's volatility does not preclude its functioning as a store of value. Gold, a reserve asset widely regarded as a store of value, has also experienced significant real losses over prolonged periods of time. Harmson (1998) illustrates that gold tends to maintain its purchasing power over centuries, but the price of gold can experience significant fluctuations over 10- or 20-year periods. Indeed, Fig. 18 illustrates that the real price of gold experienced an 86 % decline over approximately a 21-year period beginning in 1980. Similarly, since Bitcoin's third "halving" event in July 2016 (which reduced the rate at which Bitcoin is mined), Bitcoin experienced a maximum real drawdown of 83 % from December 2017 to December 2018.[30] Superimposing the Bitcoin and gold price graphs reveals several similarities, including the concavity, the pattern of volatility clustering toward the beginning of the series, and the magnitude of the price decline.



Fig. 18. The real return of Bitcoin and gold, measured from peak to trough of gold's largest drawdown in the last 50 years, and Bitcoin's largest drawdown since July 2016 (the date of Bitcoin's third "halving" event, which reduces the mining rate of Bitcoin). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)

Source: investing.com

Appendix C. Inverse Student-t distribution approximation

The first four terms of the Cornish-Fisher approximation are given in Abramowitz and Stegun (1972). These terms expand the inverse Student-t distribution around the inverse Normal distribution, exploiting the fact that the t-distribution and Normal distribution are "close." The approximation error falls as the degrees of freedom rise, but the error rises in the tails of the Student-t distribution.

$$T_{\lambda}^{-1}(x) \approx z + \frac{z(z^2+1)}{4\lambda} + \frac{z(5\,z^4+16\,z^2+3)}{96\lambda^2} + \frac{z(3\,z^6+19\,z^4+17\,z^2-15)}{384\lambda^3} + \frac{z(79\,z^8+776\,z^6+1482\,z^4-1920\,z^2-945)}{92160\lambda^4}$$

[30] Earlier in its history, Bitcoin experienced a 94 % nominal drawdown in 2011, declining from $32 to $2. But Bitcoin was a riskier asset in 2011, since it was just two years old and much less widely adopted, making Bitcoin's future prospects in 2011 substantially more uncertain.



Fig. 19. The percent error in the combined inverse Student-t distribution approximation, switching between the Cornish-Fisher and tail series based on the fitted logistic function.

In order to improve this approximation, I also implement a power series expansion for the tails of the Student-t distribution, where the Cornish-Fisher expansion performs poorly. The tail series performs better when the degrees of freedom are small, making it a good pairing with the Cornish-Fisher expansion. Shaw (2006) gives the series expansion, where w is an auxiliary variable and $y_n(w,\lambda)$ is a series of polynomial terms, with n being the order of the expansion. I carry the expansion to six terms.

$$w(x,\lambda) = (1-x)\sqrt{\lambda\pi}\frac{\Gamma(\lambda/2)}{\Gamma((\lambda+1)/2))}$$

$$T_\lambda^{-1}(x) \approx \sqrt{\lambda}(w\sqrt{\lambda})^{-1.0/\lambda} * (1 + y_1(w,\lambda) + y_2(w,\lambda) + \cdots + y_n(w,\lambda))$$

I fit a logistic function, $q = \frac{1}{1+exp(k\lambda)}$ to estimate the crossover quantiles, as a function of the degrees of freedom, where the error in the Cornish-Fisher expansion equals that of the tail series. I find that $k = -1.09080618$. Fig. 19 shows that the error in the approximation is less than 0.2% for quantiles below 0.99999.

Appendix D. Mean-value at risk optimization procedure

The pseudo-code below describes an algorithm to solve the constrained non-convex optimization problem in 11, where I denote the objective function as $f(\cdot)$. The algorithm loosely resembles simulated annealing, except there is no temperature parameter: the algorithm proceeds until no proposed vector of currency shares is feasible or improves the objective function. Although there is no guarantee that the method locates the global optimum, repeated tests of this procedure suggest that its precision is within approximately 1 percentage point.

Algorithm 1 Optimization method.

```
Set the initial shares w ← (0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2)
Construct vectors of potential improvements to w, denoted z_i, i = 1, ..., N (see below)
Set an indicator variable k ← 0
while k = 0 do
  Randomly shuffle the potential improvements z_i
  for i = 1 to N do
    Set an indicator variable b ← 0 for the presence of a feasible improvement within z_i
    Compute x ← w + z_i, a potential improvement to the current decision variable
    if x > 0 and x < 1 and f(x) > f(w) then
      Store the feasible improvement w ← x
      Set the indicator b ← 1
    end if
    if i = N and b = 0 then
      Set the indicator k ← 1 (no feasible improvement located among all z_i)
    end if
  end for
end while
```

z_i consists of all unique permutations of the following vectors:
$(0.1, -0.1, 0, 0, 0, 0)$
$(0.1, -0.1, 0.1, -0.1, 0, 0)$

$(0.01, -0.01, 0, 0, 0, 0)$
$(0.01, -0.01, 0.01, -0.01, 0, 0)$
$(0.02, -0.02, 0, 0, 0, 0])$
$(0.02, -0.02, 0.02, -0.02, 0, 0)$
$(0.005, -0.005, 0, 0, 0, 0)$
$(0.0025, -0.0025, 0, 0, 0, 0)$
$(0.01, -0.0025, -0.0025, -0.0025, -0.0025, 0)$
$(-0.01, 0.0025, 0.0025, 0.0025, 0.0025, 0)$

In addition, I append to z_i a total of 10,000 samples from a Dirichlet (1000, 1000, 1000, 1000, 1000) random variable, subtracting 1/6 from each element to ensure that the potential improvements always sum to zero. Adding the unique permutations of the above vectors, the length of z_i is $N = 10,480$ possible improvements.

These Dirichlet variables each have a standard deviation of approximately 0.5 percentage points. The random Dirichlet variables provide flexibility in selecting potential improvements to the decision variables.

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