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tomb, they should collect and place the bones of Pythias, as she herself requested' (Aristotle, 332 BC).

Overall, the evidence of his will is that Aristotle was perfectly capable of following one set of ideas in his philosophical works about friendship with women and slaves, while actually living in line with quite another set of ideas. (It shows something similar about Aristotle and religion, too. The will's last lines tell us that Aristotle, despite the lofty necessitarian theology and the bizarrely self-absorbed deity of his *Metaphysics*, was a man who made petitionary prayers to the gods for others' safe-keeping on journeys, and sealed his prayers with a votary's oaths: 'Because Nicanor returned safely, he should put up stone statues four cubits high in Stagera to Zeus the Preserver and Athena the Preserver, in fulfilment of my vow' Aristotle, 332 BC.) Aristotle's will makes it very clear that he had close relationships, indeed friendships, not only with his wife and children, but with his wider family and even with at least some of his slaves. And all of these relationships were, as I have pointed out, well covered by the normal sense of the ancient Greek word *philia*.

It is only Aristotle's philosophical theory of *philia* that moves us away from these human realities, into a realm where cases of *philia* that are not intellectual friendships between very clever free adult men are at best secondary and derivative cases, and most of the time not even worthy of notice. Perhaps the moral is that we should, at least sometimes, give a little less weight to Aristotle's rather narrow and exclusive moral theory of *philia* and a little more weight to the much wider and more inclusive place that *philia* had in Aristotle's own life and ethical experience.

10 Friendship, Love, and Second-Personality

Aristotle's and C. S. Lewis's systematising theories of friendship both face some of the same objections, and two in particular. First, they treat what is really only local to their own social and historical contexts as if it were universal and natural. Secondly and connectedly, their own prejudices are all too visible in what they choose to centre, and what they choose to marginalise or ignore.

What Aristotle and Lewis are surely right about, on the other hand, is that friendship is indeed a kind of love. So maybe, at this point, it is worthwhile to think a bit about love.

Once upon a time love was something of a taboo subject in analytical philosophy – almost as if analytical philosophers were uncomfortable with anything that gets too personal. So, for example, Iris Murdoch begins her 1962 essay 'The Idea of Perfection' with the simple and, at the time, accurate complaint that 'though contemporary philosophers constantly talk of freedom they rarely talk of love' (1970, 1). And it is central to her project in her 1970 book *The Sovereignty of Good*, of which 'The Idea of Perfection' is the first third, to answer her own complaint by presenting a form of ethics that is centred on the notion of love.

Also in 1962 Peter Strawson wrote this, in his celebrated essay 'Freedom and Resentment':

We should think of the many different kinds of relationship which we can have with other people – as sharers of a common interest; as members of the same family; as colleagues; as friends; as lovers; as chance parties to an enormous range of transactions and encounters. Then we should think, in each of these connections in turn, and in others, of the kind of importance we attach to the attitudes and intentions towards us of those who stand in these relationships to us, and of the kinds of reactive attitudes and feelings to which we ourselves are prone. In general, we demand some degree of goodwill or regard on the part of those who stand in these relationships to us, though the forms we require it to take vary widely in different connections. The range and intensity of our reactive attitudes towards goodwill, its absence or its opposite vary no less widely. I have mentioned, specifically, resentment and gratitude; and they are a usefully opposed pair. But, of course, there is a whole continuum of reactive attitude and feeling stretching on both sides of these and – the most comfortable area – in between them. The object of these commonplaces is to try to keep before our minds something it is easy to forget when we are engaged in philosophy, especially in our cool, contemporary style, viz. what it is actually like to be involved in ordinary interpersonal relationships, ranging from the most intimate to the most casual. (1962, section 3)

It is interesting that Strawson includes here a remark in passing that seems to register a preparedness to distance himself from philosophy's 'cool, contemporary style' – of which he is himself, in other contexts, one of the chief exponents. At any rate, I am of course naturally disposed

to applaud his insistence on not letting high-faluting philosophical theory get the better of us, and on keeping ourselves in touch with 'what it is actually like' to be in relationships of various kinds.

Strawson's essay is centrally about free will, about freedom and responsibility. But one of his key ideas, as expressed in these words, is that it is a basic datum for us that our interactions with other persons are of a quite different kind from our interactions with anything else. What is it that makes the difference? Following some more recent philosophers, most notably Stephen Darwall, who have taken up the research programme that Strawson sketches in 'Freedom and Resentment', we may call it *second-personality*.

What is second-personality? To answer that, we may begin with Strawson's distinction between 'objective' and 'reactive' attitudes. Any interpersonal relationship worthy of the name, let alone any worth calling *love*, will necessarily involve a nexus of what Strawson calls reactive attitudes – gratitude, resentment, and the like – which characteristically involve my seeing and appraising, from my standpoint as a responsible being, the other person as someone who is simultaneously involved in so seeing and appraising *me*, from *her* standpoint as a responsible being.

Strawson's treatment of this theme in 'Freedom and Resentment' is likely to remind us, or at least those of us who have read around a bit in philosophy, of Paul Grice's (1957) thesis that linguistic meaning depends on recursively recognised intentions. Indeed Grice's work may well have been part of the background to Strawson's thinking. For

Strawson as for Grice, the idea is that reactive attitudes *reverberate*; they iterate, like a torch shining into a mirror set up opposite another mirror. That is how, for instance, it is when there are beliefs about beliefs, as in a famous line in Dante's *Inferno* (13.25): 'cred'io ch'ei credette ch'io credesse...'; 'I think he thought I thought...'

It may also remind many of us of themes that are central to the work of Iris Murdoch, who (in her decidedly *uncool*, and not entirely conventional, style of doing philosophy) often comes out with remarks like the following:

Love is knowledge of the individual.

When M is just and loving she sees D as she really is.

Love is the perception of individuals. Love is the extremely difficult realisation that something other than oneself is real. (1999, 321, 329, 215)

Strawson and Murdoch share a focus on the reality of people *as people*, people in just the same sense as I myself am a person. Together they give us the makings of a rich and perceptive account of any interpersonal relationship, including those that we would naturally describe in English as relationships of love or friendship. The account of love toward which Strawson and Murdoch are pointing us will be one that stresses the mutuality and interdependence of the persons involved in love, and the tendency of ideas and attitudes to 'reverberate' (as I put it) between them. Above all, in line with Strawson's main project of vindicating our pre-philosophical ideas of freedom and responsibility and Murdoch's main project of overcoming the 'fat relentless ego', it will be an account that stresses the absolutely

bedrock difference, for us, between encountering another person, and encountering, say, a rock or a rubber plant.

It is this difference between reactive and objective attitudes, as Strawson calls them, that utilitarianism seems to fail to make good sense of, leading it to become (as I argued in Chapter 2) a fundamentally solipsistic philosophy to which *I* and *the world* are fundamental, but *you* (or *we*) are not: a philosophy for which, at bottom, *all* attitudes are objective (attitudes to objects) and none of them are reactive (attitudes to persons, as such). Utilitarianism is all about benevolence – about my attempts to make the world a better place. But benevolence is not enough for love, because love is essentially second-personal.

In Chapter 3, I characterised friendship as benevolent companionship over time. 'Love' and 'friendship' are English words that we use in obviously different ways; there are other kinds of love besides friendship, and 'love' is generally used of more intense relationships than 'friendship'. (More about some of the differences in Chapters 11 ff.). Still, it is part of the usefulness of this chapter's foray into the philosophy of love that it seems more or less right to use this same characterisation of love too. Friendship is benevolent companionship over time, and love too is benevolent companionship over time.

This means, as I said in discussing C. S. Lewis's notion of *agape* in Chapter 8, that there is more to love and friendship than simple benevolence, for both involve two further ingredients alongside benevolence. One of these further ingredients is picked out by the word 'companionship'; we can call it *second-personality*. The other is picked out by

'over time'; we can call it *loyalty*. A little about these two ingredients in turn.

Second-personality shows up in love and friendship like this: love and friendship are *I-involving* and *you-involving*. The benevolent person is, to use Strawson's adjective, 'cool': she just disinterestedly wants things to go well. But the loving person cares that *she* should make things go well *for you*. For Jane to love John is not merely for her to want his well-being in the neutral way in which we might press a voting-button. It is for Jane to want that *she should bring about* John's well-being in an engaged and affective sense of wanting, a sense which has *longing* for his well-being at one end of the spectrum, and being pained if he does not get it, in a way which is far from 'disinterested', at most points along the spectrum. As such, love involves the emotions (and the risk of negative emotions) in ways that benevolence never does.

If Jane feels straightforward benevolence toward John, it cannot (or should not) matter to her whether it is *Jane* who brings about John's well-being, just as long as he does well. It is not part of *benevolence* toward John to feel pain about his missed well-being, however 'regrettable' (in benevolence's cool vocabulary) missing that well-being might have been, and however 'desirable' (also a cool usage: here *desire* in any affective sense is precisely *not* in question) that particular instance of well-being may be. Here the concern is like that prompted by a ringing phone in the workplace: the concern is merely that *someone* should respond. To love, by contrast, it typically does matter that it should be *me* who responds. The idea of jealous

benevolence, or of competition to be the one who does the good for John, is mildly absurd. The idea of jealous or competitive love is not absurd at all, but entirely familiar. In this sense the motivations of love recognise the importance of *my* involvement in what happens.

This I-involvingness and you-involvingness of love comes out in other ways too. For instance, when Jane loves John (again: not necessarily romantically), she wants to be with him; she wants her and John's minds to meet and their journeys to coincide. She wants John and herself to become an 'us', and she wants that us to share narratives, histories, a conversation, a trail of back-references and jokes and allusions. And (despite Emerson in Chapter 2) love, almost by definition and certainly by nature, demands reciprocity: what Jane wants concerning John, she wants John to want concerning her. Whereas there is nothing in the nature of benevolence that requires me to wish the object of my benevolence to wish me well back (unless of course I think that it will do him good to wish me well). Not only can I wish well-being on someone I have no positive desire to meet; I can wish well-being on people I hope to avoid entirely. Benevolence toward John and wanting to be *involved* with John are attitudes that float entirely free of each other.

This notion of 'becoming an us' brings us to the third ingredient of love, alongside benevolence and second-personality: loyalty or commitment.

It is not just that, *at* some time, John has Jane's just and truthful attention and her good will, and she his. It is also that, *over* time, Jane acts out of a disposition to keep

things that way, and to keep them that way relative to John in particular. Jane makes and maintains a standing choice to go on giving John her care and attention, and to make him particularly, perhaps even exclusively, the object of her care and attention. Her commitment to him is *selective*: there are plenty of other people whom Jane could, in principle, have loved just as easily and just as much as she loves John. But *as things are*, it is *John* she loves (whatever kind of love we may be talking about – not necessarily romance). Given the facts about her and his past history, chosen or unchosen, the two of them are together now, and live in the light of that shared history. And that means that, beyond a certain point, he and she *simply do not attend* to the loveliness of other people than Jane (in John's case) or John (in Jane's).

Comparisons might be available. For any good quality that Jane loves in John, there might be plenty of other chaps out there who have more of it. But that is beside the point – and *they* are beside the point. For – to use two phrases that *do* go specifically with romantic love – Jane and John are simply 'not on the market'; they have 'eyes only for each other'. What do they see in each other? Part of what they see in each other is someone who isn't always asking what they see in each other: someone who is prepared to stop 'looking for an upgrade', and settle for the person they've got. Precisely because it is a key part of love to set aside just that sort of question, love is not just benevolence plus second-personality; it is those two things plus *loyalty* – selective and sometimes even exclusive commitment. And though romantic love is a more intense thing than friendship, these remarks apply to both these kinds of love:

friendship may not (usually) be such a deep or exclusive commitment as romantic love, but it too involves loyalty.

As Troy Jollimore has shown in his wonderful book *Love's Vision* (2011), there are aspects of this selectiveness that fail to have any rational justification, not because they are irrational or unjustified so much as because they simply fall outside the scope of rational justification. The choice to select one other person only to love is characteristic above all of romantic love (at least in societies where monogamy has a central place). But it is not absent in other kinds of love: think of a mother's devotion to her child, or of the *particular* place, even if it is a relatively small place, that any individual friend will occupy in your world. For Jane to devote herself to John's charms is, among other things, a choice *not to respond to* (at times, not even to *see*) the charms of other men. No doubt it is not hard to provide a second-order justification of this first-order decision to blind herself to other men's charms for the sake of John's, and of his parallel decision in Jane's favour. At the first order, though, it is a decision of a kind to be unresponsive to certain sorts of reason. As we might also put it – deploying a nice distinction of Kate Abramson and Adam Leite's (2011) – it is a decision to let the reasons *of* love trump the reasons *for* love. That is, it is a choice for Jane to act on the presently powerful reasons that *derive from* her relationship with John, rather than on the original reasons that *led her to* that relationship, such as John's being charming, funny, kind, brilliant at both ping-pong and modal logic, smoking-hot in bed, and whatever else originally drew, and with any luck still draws, a girl like her to a boy like him.

For Jane to love John is for her, to one degree or another – most strongly if, as let us suppose, John is her lover – to be exclusive about John. Because she loves John, Jane focuses on him in a way that she focuses on no one else. Now there are reasons why John originally became her lover, why he attracted her ('reasons for love', in Abramson and Leite's (2011) terminology), and with any luck they will still apply: she will still burn the same flame for him tonight that she did the night their relationship began. But this does not create a 'trading-up' problem. No doubt it is true that she loves (or began to love) John because he has (had) qualities ABC. And no doubt any Tom, Dick, or Harry might come along with a greater quantity of ABC than John has. Yet it is not the case that Jane would be rationally obliged, or even rationally warranted, in trading in John for Tom, Dick, or Harry, should she meet them. Jane might meet them and it might *not even cross her mind* to do a trade-in, or even a comparison of their good qualities with John's. And this is because 'reasons of love' – reasons arising from within Jane's continuing commitment to John – have the form and the force to silence those 'reasons for love' of other men than John.

For similar reasons, neither does Jane's commitment to John on the basis of the reasons provided by his qualities ABC mean that she thinks everyone else should love John the way she does. Nor does it mean that, if other people display the valuable properties ABC to a similar extent to John, Jane is rationally obliged – or even warranted – in loving them too, just to the extent that they too display ABC. Jane focuses *exclusively* on John, because she is *exclusively* committed to him. That exclusive commitment silences, or blinds Jane to, certain sorts of reasons.

(Here, as Jollimore (2011) points out, is a good philosophical reason for agreeing that 'love is blind' – at the same time as being a matter of *vision*.) This chosen unresponsiveness to reasons is, as we may say, arational. It is not an *irrational* thing, but it is not a rational thing either. It's just a thing.

That is one way – deliberate selectiveness – in which love, including both friendship and romantic love, is arational. Another noteworthy way is *contingency*. If Jane and John's is a romantic love, then very likely – and setting aside the possibility of up-to-date dating agencies with complex couple-matching algorithms – it will be true to say that it was not a matter of rational calculation that they fell in love; they just did. They were not selected for each other, either by a website or by the guardians of some Platonic Republic; they just happened to meet. What is true here of marital love is, of course, even more obviously true of sibling love, or parent-child love, even of classmate friendship. By and large, we do not *pick* these relationships, *for reasons*. They just *come to us*: not irrationally, but certainly arationally, and – as I say – contingently.

The contingency of love, in this sense, can and should give us a certain sense of vertigo. If *love* is contingent – as we might well think, given its centrality in our lives – then everything is. Including, vertiginously enough, our own existence.

The Right Train

I've done some bad things and I've done some mad things.

I've done some things that got me in the stew.

Many of my options are not for sane adoption;

but I did a good thing when I married you.

Some people's choices are based on hearing voices.
Some read the stars, or the leaves in their Typhoo.
I treat life's junctions with minimal compunction;
but I took the right fork when I married you.

We have shared the sunlight, and the sudden-failed
umbrella.

We have sat out winters that stormed out of the blue.
Warmth drives branches upwards; cold pushes roots
deeper.

What would I have done, if I hadn't married you?

Life is all alternatives, but hopeless information.

Unmarked and unsignalled, and too many for clear view,
trains line every platform through the vastness of life's
station;

but I caught the right train the day I married you.

(Chappell 2021, poem 28)

It is a matter of – very often – bare-headed chance that we have the lovers, friends, and (of course) family that we do. To some extent at least, we did not choose them; at most, as particularly with lovers (in a liberal society with no arranged marriages), we chose them from a range of possible alternatives that came our way pretty much by chance. (Even if we tempered chance via a dating website, chance remains in the mix.) We might say that our fortunes in affairs of love are a matter of an *ethical trajectory*. We have lives going on, and they are *journeys*. Our choices are not made, as is imagined by some philosophers (including utilitarians again), on the basis of what Jollimore (2011, 76 ff.) calls 'a comprehensive

comparative survey', or what I have criticised as the option-range conception of ethical choice (Chappell 2001): we do not stand *outside* life evaluating and comparing the values *inside* it, and no creature that did that would be remotely like *us*. We have little or no choice over what choices we make; here too we are subject to contingency, and indeed to risk.

That sums up my account of love as benevolent companionship over time. It gives us at least some idea of what the difference is between simple benevolence, wanting things to go well for someone, and actual love, which is benevolence *plus second-personality plus loyalty*. Everything I have just said about love as benevolent companionship over time is also, I want to suggest, equally true of friendship as benevolent companionship over time.

But now, we can no longer avoid a question that I have been carefully postponing. What is the difference between love and friendship? How are we to distinguish the two?

Well, to begin with, of course, we don't always need to distinguish the two. It is not wrong to say that friendship is a kind of love; so at least some love *just is* friendship. And if we don't use the word friendship of the other kinds of love, such as parent-child or romantic love, that may often seem little more than an accident of language. Still, there are some clear differences in the semantic range of the two terms, and some of these differences are even philosophically interesting. One of the main differences is that, as a rule, love is an emphatic good, and friendship is an unemphatic good. Let me begin to explain this difference in Chapter 11.