> Teaching it could not constitute an ethical upbringing. If you wanted to bring someone up ethically while yet teaching him such a doctrine, you would have to teach it to him after having educated him ethically, representing it as a sort of incomprehensible mystery.

Though Wittgenstein had, as yet, no medical grounds for thinking so, he felt that his death might come soon. When Malcolm wrote asking about his financial situation, he replied that he had enough to live on for two years: 'What happens after that time I don't yet know. Maybe I won't live that long anyway.'

In April he left for Vienna to visit Mining on her death-bed. He stayed for three or four weeks, returning to Dublin on 16 May. From there he wrote to Malcolm that Mining was still alive, but that there was no hope of her recovering: 'While I was in Vienna I was hardly able to write at all. I felt so rotten myself.'

Soon after arriving back in Dublin, he went, on Drury's advice, to see the Professor of Medicine at Trinity College for a diagnosis of the intestine trouble and the general feeling of exhaustion that had dogged him since the beginning of the year. It was suspected that he might have a growth in his stomach, but after being admitted to hospital for a full investigation he was told that no such growth showed up on the X-ray, and the only findings made were that he had an atypical and unexplained anaemia. He was put on a treatment of iron and liver extract, and although he still found himself unable to concentrate on philosophy, his condition gradually improved.

He was anxious to overcome his anaemia quickly for two reasons. First, because he had at last decided to accept a long-standing invitation from Norman Malcolm to spend the summer at the Malcolms' home in Ithaca, USA (after first insisting in jest that, if he came, Malcolm was to introduce him to his favourite film star, Betty Hutton). He had booked a passage on the *Queen Mary*, sailing on 21 July. The second reason was that, before he left for America, he wanted to spend a few weeks in Cambridge preparing a final, polished typescript of the work with which he had been occupied since 1946.

During his period of recovery he remained in Dublin, and it was presumably during this time that he prepared the fair manuscript copy of what is now *Philosophical Investigations*, Part II. As a restful diversion from this work, Drury proposed giving him a record-player and

some records of his choice. Wittgenstein declined. It would never do, he said; it would be like giving him a box of chocolates: 'I wouldn't know when to stop eating.' On the other hand, Drury himself, he said, ought to listen to music when he was tired after his work. And so the next morning he had a radio set delivered to Drury's rooms. Shortly after this Drury remarked on the great improvement of recording techniques evident in the records he heard on the radio. This elicited from Wittgenstein a typically Spenglerian reflection:

> It is so characteristic that, just when the mechanics of reproduction are so vastly improved, there are fewer and fewer people who know how the music should be played.

On 13 June, Drury and Wittgenstein listened together to a radio discussion between A. J. Ayer and Father Copleston on 'The Existence of God'. Ayer, Wittgenstein said, 'has something to say, but he is incredibly shallow'. Copleston, on the other hand, 'contributed nothing at all to the discussion'. To attempt to justify the beliefs of Christianity with philosophical arguments was entirely to miss the point.

A week later he left Dublin. One senses that, in packing his large pile of notebooks, manuscripts and typescripts, he was not only winding up his affairs in Dublin, but also bringing to a close his entire contribution to philosophy. He told Drury of a letter he had received from Ludwig Hänsel in which Hänsel had expressed the hope that Wittgenstein's work would go well, if it should be God's will. 'Now that is all I want', he said, 'if it should be God's will':

> Bach wrote on the title page of his *Orgelbüchlein*, 'To the glory of the most high God, and that my neighbour may be benefited thereby.' That is what I would have liked to say about my work.

The use of the past tense here is telling; it indicates that he now considered his work to be all but over.

He spent the month before his journey to the United States staying alternately with von Wright in Cambridge and with Ben Richards in Uxbridge. Von Wright had just finished his first year as Wittgenstein's successor as Professor of Philosophy of Cambridge, and was living in a rented house ('Strathaird') in Lady Margaret Road. During his stay

there Wittgenstein occupied a separate apartment of two rooms and had his meals with the family (von Wright, his wife and their two children). 'There is one thing that I'm afraid of', he wrote to von Wright before he came to stay with him: 'I may not be able to discuss philosophy. Of course it's possible that things will have changed by then, but at present I'm quite incapable of even thinking of philosophical problems. My head is *completely* dull.'

His chief concern during these few weeks in Cambridge was to dictate to a typist the manuscript containing his final selection of the remarks written over the last three years, which now forms Part II of *Philosophical Investigations*. This is the last typescript that Wittgenstein is known to have prepared, and as such it represents the culmination of his attempts to arrange his remarks on psychological concepts into a publishable form.

It does not represent, however, the completion of that task: as he had told Elizabeth Anscombe in Dublin, he regarded this new selection as material to use in the revision of *Philosophical Investigations*, Part I. As he never carried out this work of revision himself, the book as we now have it has the rather unsatisfying two-part structure whereby the second 'part' is no more than material to be used in the revision of the first. Moreover, the work that was originally conceived of as the 'second part' – Wittgenstein's analysis of mathematical concepts – does not appear in the book at all. Wittgenstein's painstaking fastidiousness over the structure of his book has had the ironic result that his work has been published in a form very far removed from his original conception.

The longest section of this new typescript is that concerned with the problems of aspect-seeing, and is a distillation of the work, already discussed, that he had written on that topic over the previous three years. This section constitutes roughly half (thirty-six pages in the printed version) of the entire typescript. He told Rhees, however, that the section he was particularly satisfied with was that concerned with 'Moore's Paradox' (Section X). He was pleased, he said, to have condensed his many remarks on this paradox into such a relatively short section (three printed pages).

'Moore's Paradox' is the name Wittgenstein gave to the absurdity of stating a proposition and then saying that one does not believe it – for example: 'There is a fire in this room and I don't believe there is.' The

title 'Moore's Paradox' is perhaps a misnomer: Wittgenstein believed, probably erroneously, that Moore had discovered this type of absurdity. (Indeed, he once remarked to Malcolm that its discovery was the only work of Moore's that had greatly impressed him.) The interest Wittgenstein took in the Paradox arises from the fact that, although anybody who uttered such a statement would ordinarily be taken to be contradicting themselves, it is not formally a contradiction. That is, the two statements: 'There is a fire in this room' and: 'RM does not believe there is a fire in this room' do not contradict one another.

Wittgenstein first came across the Paradox in a paper by Moore given to the Moral Science Club in October 1944. He immediately wrote to Moore urging him to publish his 'discovery' and explaining why he considered it so important:

> You have said something about the *logic* of assertion. Viz: It makes sense to say 'Let's suppose: p is the case and I don't believe that p is the case', whereas it makes *no* sense to assert 'I-p is the case and I don't believe that p is the case.' This *assertion* has to be ruled out and *is* ruled out by 'common sense', just as a contradiction is. And this just shows that logic isn't as simple as logicians think it is. In particular: that contradiction isn't the *unique* thing people think it is. It isn't the *only* logically inadmissible form and it is, under certain circumstances, admissible. And to show that seems to me the chief merit of your paper.

This was not how Moore himself saw it. He was inclined to say that, as the Paradox did not issue in formal contradiction, it was an absurdity for psychological, rather than logical, reasons. This Wittgenstein vigorously rejected:

> If I ask someone 'Is there a fire in the next room?' and he answers 'I believe there is' I can't say: 'Don't be irrelevant. I asked you about the fire not about your state of mind!'

Any investigation into what it does and does not make sense to assert was, for Wittgenstein, a part of logic, and to point out that, in this sense: 'logic isn't as simple as logicians think it is' was one of the chief concerns of his own investigations. It was an aspect of Wittgenstein's later work that was noted early by Bertrand Russell, who in his

report to the Council of Trinity College of 1930 remarked that Wittgenstein's theories were 'novel, very original, and indubitably important'. But: 'Whether they are true, I do not know. As a logician, who likes simplicity, I should wish to think that they are not.'

'Moore's Paradox' interested Wittgenstein as an illustration that, contrary to the logician's desire for simplicity, the forms of our language cannot be squeezed without distortion into the pigeon-holes created for them by the categories of formal logic. The statement: 'I believe there is a fire in the next room' is used to assert, albeit hesitantly, that there is a fire in the next room; it is not used to assert a state of mind. ('Don't regard a hesitant assertion as an assertion of hesitancy.') This distinguishes it from the statements: 'I believed then that there was a fire in the next room'; and: 'He believes there is a fire in the next room' – both of which would ordinarily be taken to be about people's beliefs, rather than about fires. This feature of the logic of our language forbids us from constructing the convenient form: 'x believes/believed p' and thinking that the form remains unchanged whatever values are given to x and p: 'I believe there is a fire in the next room' is not the same kind of assertion as 'I believed there was a fire in the next room':

> 'But surely "I believed" must tell of just the same thing in the past as "I believe" in the present!' – Surely $\sqrt{-1}$ must mean just the same in relation to -1, as $\sqrt{1}$ means in relation to 1! This means nothing at all.

If we regard the form $\sqrt{x}$ as having a single meaning, whatever the value of x, we get into a hopeless tangle when we consider $\sqrt{-1}$. For, given our ordinary rules of multiplication, the square root of minus one can be neither a positive nor a negative number, and within the realm of 'real numbers' there is nothing left for it to be. And yet $\sqrt{-1}$ has a use: it is an essential notion in many important branches of pure and applied mathematics. But to give it a meaning it has been found necessary to construct different meanings of 'multiplication', 'square root' and even 'number' such that the square root of minus one is said to be, not a real number, but i, an 'imaginary number' (or, as it is sometimes called, an 'operator'). Given this revised framework, $i^2 = -1$, and the notion of the square root of minus one is not only unproblematic but is made the basis of a whole Theory of 'Complex

Numbers'. Wittgenstein was interested in the square root of minus one for exactly the same reason that he was interested in 'Moore's Paradox': it illustrates the fact that superficial similarities of form can disguise very important differences of meaning.

This latter idea is one of the main themes of the book, justifying Wittgenstein's suggestion to Drury that he might use the Earl of Kent's phrase: 'I'll teach you differences' as a motto, and it is particularly evident in the analysis of psychological concepts in *Philosophical Investigations*, Part II. Just as he wished to show that logic isn't as simple as logicians think it is, so he wished to show that psychological concepts and the sentences in which they are used, are not as uniform as philosophers and psychologists would wish them to be. In both cases the aim is to disencourage the 'craving for generality' – to encourage people to look before they think.

For example, the question: 'What does the sentence "I am afraid" mean?' does not have a single answer that would be adequate to cover all the occasions on which the sentence might be used. For, as in the case of the square roots of one and minus one, the differences between the various uses might be just as important as the similarities:

> We can imagine all sorts of things here, for example:
>
> 'No, no! I am afraid!'
> 'I am afraid. I am sorry to have to confess it.'
> 'I am still a bit afraid, but no longer as much as before.'
> 'At bottom I am afraid, though I won't confess it to myself.'
> 'I torment myself with all sorts of fears.'
> 'Now, just when I should be fearless, I am afraid!'
>
> To each of these sentences a special tone of voice is appropriate, and a different context. It would be possible to imagine people who as it were thought more definitely than we, and used different words where we use only one.

To understand what 'I am afraid' means on a particular occasion one might have to take into account the tone of voice and the context in which it is uttered. There is no reason to think that a general theory of fear would be much help here (still less a general theory of language). Far more to the point would be an alert and observant sensitivity to people's faces, voices and situations. This kind of sensitivity can be

gained only by experience – by attentive looking and listening to the people around us. Once, when Wittgenstein and Drury were walking together in the west of Ireland, they came across a five-year-old girl sitting outside a cottage. 'Drury, just look at the expression on that child's face', Wittgenstein implored, adding: 'You don't take enough notice of people's faces; it is a fault you ought to try to correct.' It is a piece of advice that is implicitly embodied in his philosophy of psychology: 'An inner process stands in need of outward criteria.' But those outward criteria stand in need of careful attention.

What is 'internal' is not hidden from us. To observe someone's outward behaviour – if we understand them – is to observe their state of mind. The understanding required can be more or less refined. At a basic level: 'If I see someone writhing in pain with evident cause I do not think: all the same, his feelings are hidden from me.' But at a deeper level some people, and even whole cultures, will always be an enigma to us:

> It is important for our view of things that someone may feel concerning certain people that their inner life will always be a mystery to him. That he will never understand them. (English-women in the eyes of Europeans.)

This is because the commonality of experience required to interpret the 'imponderable evidence', the 'subtleties of glance, gesture and tone', will be missing. This idea is summed up in one of Wittgenstein's most striking aphorisms: 'If a lion could talk, we could not understand him.'

The abstractions and generalities, the laws and principles, that result from theorizing can, on Wittgenstein's view, only hinder our attempts towards a better understanding of this 'imponderable evidence'. But how, in the absence of theory, are we to better our understanding, to deepen our insight?

Take, for example, one of the hardest and one of the most important distinctions to make concerning our understanding of people: the distinction between a genuine and an affected expression of feeling:

> Is there such a thing as 'expert judgment' about the genuineness of expressions of feeling? – Even here there are those whose judgment is 'better' and those whose judgment is 'worse'.

> Correcter prognoses will generally issue from the judgments of those with better knowledge of mankind.
>
> Can one learn this knowledge? Yes; some can. Not, however, by taking a course in it, but through '*experience*'. – Can someone else be a man's teacher in this? Certainly. From time to time he gives him the right *tip*. – This is what 'learning' and 'teaching' are like here. – What one acquires here is not a technique; one learns correct judgments. There are also rules, but they do not form a system, and only experienced people can apply them right. Unlike calculating rules.

An example of such a teacher might be the figure of Father Zossima in Dostoevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov*:

> It was said by many people about the elder Zossima that, by permitting everyone for so many years to come to bare their hearts and beg his advice and healing words, he had absorbed so many secrets, sorrows, and avowals into his soul that in the end he had acquired so fine a perception that he could tell at the first glance from the face of a stranger what he had come for, what he wanted and what kind of torment racked his conscience.

In describing Father Zossima, Dostoevsky is here describing Wittgenstein's ideal of psychological insight. When, after being persuaded by Wittgenstein to read *The Brothers Karamazov*, Drury reported that he had found the figure of Zossima very impressive, Wittgenstein replied: 'Yes, there really have been people like that, who could see directly into the souls of other people and advise them.'

Such people, Wittgenstein suggests, have more to teach us about understanding ourselves and other people than the experimental methods of the modern-day 'science' of psychology. This is not because the science is undeveloped but because the methods it employs are inappropriate to its task:

> The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a 'young science'; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for instance, in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of mathematics. Set Theory.) For in psychology there are experimental methods and *conceptual confusion*. (As in the other case

conceptual confusion and methods of proof.) The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by.

Philosophical Investigations, Part II, ends with a suggestion of what the second volume of Wittgenstein's book might have contained:

> An investigation is possible in connexion with mathematics which is entirely analogous to our investigation of psychology. It is just as little a mathematical investigation as the other is a psychological one. It will not contain calculations, so it is not for example logistic. It might deserve the name of an investigation of the 'foundations of mathematics'.

By 12 July the work of dictating this typescript was finished, and Wittgenstein left Cambridge to spend the week remaining before his trip to the United States with Ben Richards in Uxbridge. During the remaining two years of his life, although he continued to write philosophy, he made no further attempt to restructure his book in the way that he had intended. *Philosophical Investigations* has therefore reached us in the somewhat transitory state in which it was left in the summer of 1949.

26
A CITIZEN OF NO COMMUNITY

The last two years of Wittgenstein's life have about them something of the nature of an epilogue. The task of arranging his work for publication, though not complete, was now over – at least for him. He had by now accepted that his book – the work that had been the centre of his life for nearly twenty years – would not appear in his lifetime. The job of editing it and seeing to its posthumous publication was in the hands of others. And in other ways, too, he was dependent on other people in a way that he had not been since before the First World War. He had no income, no home of his own, and little taste for the solitariness and fierce independence that before he had craved. His last two years were spent living as a guest of his friends and disciples – with Malcolm in Ithaca, von Wright in Cambridge, and Elizabeth Anscombe in Oxford.

But his motives for living with others were not primarily financial. Indeed, there was actually no financial need for him to do so: as he had earlier told Malcolm, he had enough money saved from his salary at Cambridge to last another two years. The need to live with others was partly emotional, partly physical (he was increasingly ill and in need of attention), and also partly intellectual. So long as he lived, he wanted to live as a philosopher, and though he now felt, for the most part, unable to live alone and write, he did feel able to discuss philosophy. Thus we find, to a much greater extent than hitherto, the stimulus for his philosophical thinking being provided by the thoughts and problems of others. The work he wrote in his last two years, though naturally in many ways of a piece with the *Investigations*, is in another respect quite distinct from it; it is much more directed to the solution