

Yesterday, the Human was granted the Right to be here today

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Introduction.

The Right to be of the Human to come can be demonstrated in two different ways: either by questioning our will to protect, today, the presence of another in the future, or **by questioning the act that would have, yesterday, prevented someone from being here today.**

The Aside on the homepage of the website presents this other way of demonstrating this recognition — legal, but first and foremost human — of the Human to come:

Suppose that, ten years ago, an accident had prevented a young man from being here today.

And the reaction?

The interlocutor immediately agrees ***to condemn this accident in the name of the Right this young man already had, ten years ago, to be here today.***

We then point out that, ten years ago, ***this young man did not yet exist — he was yet to come.***

The Right to be of the Human to come has just been demonstrated.

It is then added that this young man was likewise yet to come twenty-one years ago.

The interlocutor naturally replies that, ***at that time, this young man already had this Right to be here today****. The questioner then points out that,* ***at that moment, the young man was only an embryo****.*

The Right of the Human to come has thus just been applied to the case of the embryo.

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The following pages develop this argument at greater length, justifying **the value that already belonged to the one who stands before us today, back when he was only an embryo.**

Two versions follow: the first deals with **the Right this young man already had, yesterday, to be here today** (Part 1), the second with **the gravity of the act that would have, yesterday, prevented this young man from being here today** (Part 2).

It should be noted that, throughout these exchanges, **the Right of the Human to come is established without the expression "Human to come" ever being used.** Indeed, to acknowledge that the Human had, yesterday, the Right to be here today is implicitly to acknowledge that the Human to come has the Right to be, since the Human who is here today was, yesterday, yet to come.

❦

01 The same Right granted to the Human at two different moments in time:



10 years ago

Right to be



17 years ago

Right to be



21 years ago

No Right to be

Does that make sense?

The Human is to be protected solely because he is Human.

↓

If this young man was to be protected seventeen years ago, then he was just as much to be protected twenty-one years ago.

Different moments: same Human > same Right

At this moment or at that other moment:
Same Human and enjoyment of the same benefit
(Human to come and the moment of life to come) ***>***
Same joyful fact >
Same protection of this fact, same Right *(Right to be and enjoy the moment of life to come)****.***

— Three days ago, would you have accepted that this young man be killed in an accident?
— Not at all!
— Why?
— Because then he would not be here today, living this moment of his life, enjoying this sunset.
— So you're saying that, **three days ago, he had the Right to be here today and to live this moment of his life?**
— Indeed!

— And likewise, three weeks ago, would you have accepted that this young man be killed in an accident?
— Certainly not!
— Why?
— For the reason just given.
— **Three weeks ago, then, this young man likewise had the Right to be here today and to live this moment of his life?**
— Of course!

— **And** three months ago, or even further back — three years, ten, eleven, twelve, seventeen, **twenty-one years ago — would you have accepted that he be killed in an accident?**
— Again, not at all! And still for the same reason.
— So you're saying that **he** likewise **had this Right to be here today at these different moments**?
— Of course!
— Yet, **twenty-one years ago, this young man was only an embryo.**
— Ah!...

— Ah? Meaning?
— Er... well...
— Go on.
— Such a conclusion means that a Right must be respected in the case of an embryo.
— Indeed. And?
— Is it not possible to think that, in the specific case of the embryo, no Right is to be respected?

— How could this be justified? **If the accident had occurred at this moment or at that other moment, would it not be the same young man who would have been prevented from being here today?**
— **Yes**, of course!
— **Can we discriminate against the same Human depending on the moment, protecting him at one moment and not protecting him at another?**
— No, **not at all!**
— **Why, then, recognize this Right at this moment and not at that other one?**
(Silence)

— Indeed. A person's Right depends solely on his human nature. And **this young man is someone independently of what he was yesterday.** So, **if yesterday this young man possessed the Right to be here today, then he possessed it at every moment of his past.**

— What conclusion, then?
— **There is undeniably a Right to be respected when the Human is only at the embryonic stage.**

❦

02

The same condemnable fact at two different moments in time:



10 years ago

Condemnable



17 years ago

Condemnable



21 years ago

Not condemnable

Does it make sense?

The same harm done to the same Human cannot be judged differently.

↓

If seventeen years ago it was condemnable to prevent this young man from being here today, then it was just as condemnable twenty-one years ago.

Different moments: same harm to the same Human > same condemnable fact

At this moment or at that other moment:
Same Human and harm to the enjoyment of the same benefit *(Harm to the Human to come in the enjoyment of the moment of life)* ***>***
Same condemnable fact >
Same condemnation of this fact, in the name of the same Right *(Right to be and enjoy the moment of life).*

— Three days ago, would you have accepted that this young man be killed in an accident?
— Not at all!
— Why?
— Because then he would not be here today enjoying this moment of his existence. He would not be here today contemplating this sunset.
— So **you're saying that it would have been condemnable, three days ago, to prevent him from being here today and from living this moment of his life?**
— **Obviously!**

— And three weeks ago, would you have accepted that he be killed in an accident?
— Certainly not!
— Why?
— For the reason just given.
— **Three weeks ago,** then, **it would** likewise **have been condemnable to prevent this young man from being here today** and from living this moment of his life?

— Yes, **of course!**
— And three months ago, or even further back — three years, ten, fifteen, seventeen, **twenty-one years ago — would you have accepted that he be killed in an accident?**
— Again, **not at all!** And still for the same reason.
— So it would likewise have been condemnable to prevent him from being here today at these different moments?
— Of course! It's obvious.
— **Yet twenty-one years ago, this young man was only an embryo.**
— Ah…

— Ah? What do you mean?
— Uh… at that moment, he was only an embryo.
— And?
— Surely it would not have been condemnable if it had happened when he was only an embryo?
— That's for you to answer: what makes an act condemnable?
— **An act is condemnable if it constitutes harm to another, if it deprives another of the enjoyment of a benefit.**

— So let us examine the case at hand: if the accident had occurred **twenty-one years ago, would this young man** (*he pointed at the young man*) **— who would not be here today — be any less human than this young man** (*he pointed at him again*) — **who would not be here today had the accident occurred three days ago, three years ago, or ten years ago?**
— That's **absurd!** Even though, twenty-one years ago, he was only an embryo, that fact has no bearing whatsoever on the human nature of the young man who would not be here today.

— Let us continue our analysis, then.
— Tell me.

— If the accident had occurred ten years ago or twenty-one years ago, would the consequences of this accident for this young man have been any different?
— Not at all! In either case, this young man would not be living this moment of his life today (*he was watching the young man delighting in the sunset*).
— So **if the accident had occurred at this moment or at that other one, the same Human would have been deprived of the enjoyment of the same moment of life, of the same benefit**?
— Indeed.

— And **since this accident** would have had the same outcome, since it **would have harmed this Human in exactly the same way whether it had occurred at this moment or at that other one, why then regard it as condemnable if it had occurred at this moment, and no longer regard it as such if it had occurred at that other moment?**

(*A moment of silence. A silence that betrayed a moment of doubt.*)
— **You're right.** I can't deny it. It makes no sense at all.

— What conclusion, then?
— I have just acknowledged that **killing an embryo is just as condemnable as killing anyone, because of the person these acts prevent from being here tomorrow and from enjoying the moments of his existence** (*and he was looking, with a somber, pensive gaze, at the young man before him, contemplating, in the most perfect innocence, the sun setting far off on the everlasting line of the horizon*).

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Movement for the Recognition of the Human to Come.