Building the Trust Fabric for AI Agents

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Google Deepmind

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Agenda

- **Model Context Protocol** (*MCP*)
- **Trusted MCP**
- **Demo**

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MCP

Model Context Protocol

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Model Context Protocol (MCP)



- **Standardized interface** for agents to access external resources:
  - *Tools, data, prompts, etc*
- Dynamic tool **discovery** and **subscription**
- Solves "**N x M**" integration problem
  - ***N** models*
  - ***M** tools*
  - ***N x M** implementations*

Data Leakage



Attack

- Agent sends user's **private data** to the tool
- Tool correctly responds to the agent
- But leaks the data to the attacker

Challenges

- How can agents remotely verify that an MCP server doesn't leak data?
- Loss of control over data
  - *Once the data is sent, there is no guarantee it won't be exfiltrated later*

Credential Leakage



Attack

- MCP servers may provide access to multiple services
  - *And need user credentials*
- Agent sends **credentials** to use the tool
- The tool leaks credentials to the attacker

Challenges

- How can agents entrust MCP servers with credentials?
- Lack of granular access control

Tool Spoofing



Attack

- Server chooses tool names to **confuse** the agent
  - *Tool names are chosen to be the same as other legitimate tools*
- Attackers use prompt engineering to confuse the agent even more
- Agents have to **guess** which tool to use
  - *And may send private data to a malicious tool*

Challenges

- No central MCP registry
- Users are **not notified**

Tool Shadowing



Attack

- Change how other tools are used
  - *Tool description may influence other tools*
- Create **side effects** for calling other tools
  - *Agent may intentionally leak private data*

Challenges

- Hard to trace
  - *Because the agent chose to perform this action*
- “Sleeper Cells”
  - *Consequences happen much later*

Rug Pull



Attack

- MCP supports tool discovery
  - *Tool descriptions can update dynamically*
- Tool adds malicious prompts **after** the agent connected
- TOCTOU
  - *Time-of-check vs time-of-use*

Challenges

- Tool updates **don't notify** the user
- Updates happen **after** security review
- Note: this is only related to protocol-level attacks
  - *There are more ways to prompt inject agents*

Question

How can agents trust their tools?

Trusted MCP

Confidential Computing + Binary Transparency

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Project Oak



Research project aiming to make it possible for users to reason about **how their data will be used** by the server in ways verifiable by external reviewers

github.com/project-oak/oak

Trusted Tools



Confidential Computing

- Trusted Execution Environment (**TEE**)
  - *Hardware-level memory encryption*
  - *Measured boot*
- Remote attestation
  - *Remotely verify code identity and hardware integrity*
- End-to-end **encryption**
  - *Data is only decrypted inside a TEE*

Binary Transparency

- Transparent Release
  - *Binary transparency for agent components*
- Reproducibility
  - *Measurements correspond to open-source code*
- Auditability

Trusted MCP



Trust

- Trust in MCP URL is not enough
  - *Need remote attestation to verify server identity*
- **Open-source** code can be inspected

Threat Mitigation

- Server configuration is published to a **T-log**
  - *Security researchers can analyse configs*
- Mitigating **Rug Pull** attacks
  - *Tool update logic can be verified*
- Prevents **OAuth** token leakage
  - *Token usage is controlled by trusted code*

Oak Functions



Sandboxing

- WebAssembly (**Wasm**) sandbox
  - *Wasm module doesn't need to be trusted*
  - *Users trust the sandbox to prevent data leaks*
- **Isolation** between user requests
  - *Each request spawns a new sandbox*
- **No state is kept** between user sessions
  - *Runs stateless applications (i.e. pure functions)*

Private Information Retrieval

- **Read-only** database
  - *Key/value based retrieval*
  - *SQLite*
- In-memory database is **encrypted**
- Provider doesn't know which database entry was accessed

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Oak Proxy



TCP Proxy

- Encapsulates TCP packets in **Oak Session**
  - *Manages end-to-end encrypted sessions*
  - *Provides remote attestation*
- Works for most of the existing agentic protocols
  - *Supports any HTTP-based traffic*
  - *Oak Session supports UDP as well*

Lift-and-Shift

- Operates below the application layer
- Existing agents can connect **without code changes**
- Proxy handles complex **attestation logic**
  - *Both attestation generation and verification*

Demo

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Demo



Travel Agent

- Agent is connected to 3 external MCP services
  - *Leverages Oak Proxy*
- Agent **verifies** that services don't leak data using them
  - *Evaluates container image*
  - *Checks runtime environment*

Confidential Space

- TEEs are provided by Confidential Space
  - *docs.cloud.google.com/confidential-computing/confidential-space*

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Demo


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mcgrathp@mcgrathp-enclave:~$

Contact us!

Repo

github.com/project-oak/oak

Demo

github.com/project-oak/oak/tree/oc3-2026-demo/mcp/oc3_2026_demo

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