



SRI LANKA BAROMETER

OUR VOICES . OUR CHOICES

අපේ හඬ . අපේ තීරණ

எங்கள் குரல்கள் . எங்கள் தேர்வுகள்

RECONCILIATION, GOVERNANCE, AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN A TIME OF TRANSITION

SRI LANKA BAROMETER
NATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY ON RECONCILIATION 2025





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In loving memory of our dear colleague and friend Jan Hofmeyr,
whose warmth, integrity, and quiet strength continue to inspire us.
You are deeply missed.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CEPA	Centre for Poverty Analysis
CTUR	Commission for Truth, Unity, and Reconciliation
CAPI	Computer Aided Personal Interviewing
CPI	Corruption Perceptions Index
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
HRCSL	Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka
IJR	Institute for Justice and Reconciliation
ISTRM	Interim Secretariat for Truth and Reconciliation Mechanism
LLRC	Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission
NPC	National Peace Council
NPP	National People's Power
ONUR	Office for National Unity and Reconciliation
OR	Office for Reparations
OMP	Office on Missing Persons
PTA	Prevention of Terrorism Act
SLB	Sri Lanka Barometer
SRP	Strengthening Reconciliation Processes in Sri Lanka
SCOPE	Strengthening Social Cohesion and Peace in Sri Lanka
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Council



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



This report presents key findings from the 2025 Sri Lanka Barometer (SLB) National Public Opinion Survey on Reconciliation, offering insights into public perceptions of reconciliation, accountable governance, and active citizenship. Building on three earlier rounds of SLB data (2020, 2021, 2023), it provides a time series analysis that captures changing attitudes across a period of political and economic change.

Set against the backdrop of the country's pivotal political transition in 2024, the report examines Sri Lankans' opinions on where the country stands today in terms of reconciliation and related issues. It explores people's aspirations, expectations, needs, and priorities as they navigate a period of change and uncertainty. This contributes to a deeper understanding of both the evolving relationship between citizens and the state, and the prospects for inclusive and sustainable reconciliation in Sri Lanka. By capturing these perspectives through the survey, the SLB aims to inform policymaking, public discourse, and civil society efforts to advance reconciliation and social cohesion in the country.

The SLB Survey uses a quantitative, structured approach grounded in a conceptual framework developed through community and expert consultations. Instead of adopting a narrow definition of reconciliation, the framework captures it through eight interconnected dimensions: Dealing with the Past, Justice for All, Identity and Belonging, Trust, Equality of Opportunity, Active Citizenship, Accountable Governance, and Security and Wellbeing. These dimensions, along with their sub-dimensions and indicators, serve as the foundation for systematically measuring public perceptions and experiences related to reconciliation.

The 2025 survey sampled 3,876 Sri Lankans aged 18 and above, randomly selected using a nationally representative sampling frame, with a 95% confidence level and a 1.6% margin of error at the national level. Data collection took place in January and February 2025.

The SLB operates through a collaborative partnership between The Insights Initiative, the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), and the Strengthening Social Cohesion and Peace in Sri Lanka (SCOPE) programme, co-funded by the European Union and the German Federal Foreign Office and implemented by GIZ in collaboration with the Government of Sri Lanka.

Key findings from this report are summarised below. Findings are presented either as mean scores on a scale of 0–10, with higher scores representing greater sentiment towards the concept being measured, or as frequencies (percentage of the population).

Reconciliation Amid the Political Transition

This section explores how citizens understand and experience reconciliation amid the 2024/2025 political transition. It examines public demand and perceived progress of reconciliation, explores how reconciliation is understood by the public, sheds light on perceived barriers to its realisation, and identifies the actors and institutions that citizens believe bear primary responsibility for advancing it.

- While public *demand for reconciliation* has remained consistently high since 2020 (national mean score of 8.1 in 2025) perceived *progress* continues to lag (national mean score of 6.4 in 2025), highlighting a persistent reconciliation deficit. This deficit is most pronounced among Sri Lankan Tamils and Up-Country Tamils.
- Almost half of respondents (48.5%) understand the *meaning of reconciliation* as unity and positive relations between groups, marking an increasing convergence towards a relationship-based understanding of reconciliation.
- When considering who should bear the *greatest responsibility for reconciliation*, public opinion is split between political actors (50.7% citing the president, government, or politicians) and all people (40.5% citing collective societal responsibility). A gendered divergence emerges in that men look more to political institutions and actors, while women place more emphasis on shared public responsibility.
- Perceptions of political *barriers to reconciliation* have decreased significantly in 2025, particularly regarding a lack of political will (from 25.7% in 2020 to 10.4% in 2025) and divisive nationalist politics (from 37.5% in 2020 to 6.0% in 2025).
- *Reconciliation institutions* are viewed as important, indicated by a national mean score of 7.8, with even higher mean scores in the Northern and Eastern Provinces (8.3 and 8.2 respectively).

Systems, Structures, and Space for Reconciliation

This section examines how citizens perceive the country's governance structures and the civic spaces necessary for reconciliation. It focuses on public views of political trust, corruption, and personal freedoms, offering insight into the perceived integrity and effectiveness of institutions and the degree of openness in Sri Lanka's post-war democratic space.

- *Political trust* increased significantly across most provinces, reaching the highest levels recorded since 2020 (national mean score of 6.9 in 2025). However, this trend is not consistent across the entire country, with political trust declining in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.
- Perceptions of *corruption in the public sector* are moderately high (national mean score of 6.1). The Northern and Eastern Provinces report slightly higher levels of perceived corruption (mean scores of 6.5 and 6.4 respectively).
- More than a third of people (38.7%) believe the current government will be *effective or very effective in addressing corruption*, compared to only 12.5% who believe previous governments were effective or very effective in doing so.
- Perceptions of *personal freedom* rose sharply in 2025 to a national mean score of 7.4, up from 6.0 in 2023, marking the highest score in this indicator since SLB data collection commenced in 2020.

- National mean scores for perceived *community safety* are high (8.5 in 2025), with lower levels yet significant improvements reported in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

Civic Participation for Reconciliation

This section explores how Sri Lankans perceive their own role in driving change for reconciliation. It focuses on their confidence to participate in civic and political matters (internal political efficacy), sense of influence over political outcomes (political agency), views on state responsiveness (external political efficacy), and motivation to engage politically.

- *Internal political efficacy* has increased (national mean score of 6.1 in 2023 and 6.7 in 2025). However, gender disparities persist, with women reporting lower levels than men (mean scores of 6.4 and 7.0 respectively).
- The national mean score for *political agency* is moderately low (standing at 4.3 in 2025), with Up-Country Tamils reporting the lowest sense of agency (mean score of 3.8).
- Perceptions of *state responsiveness* have declined in most provinces in 2025. The Northern Province recorded the sharpest drop since 2023 (from a mean score of 8.5 to 7.5), while the Eastern Province shows the steepest overall decline since 2020 (from a mean score of 8.5 to 6.9).
- *Motivation to engage politically*, which peaked during the 2022 crisis, dipped in 2023 but recovered somewhat by 2025. Younger citizens aged 18 to 30 show more motivation to engage (39.8%), while people aged 61 and older report the most disengagement (63.2%).
- *Active citizenship* levels have increased since the last survey iteration (from a national mean score of 1.1 in 2023 to 2.1 in 2025), with the highest levels recorded in the Northern Province.

Concluding Observations

The results of the 2025 SLB Survey provide important and unique insights into how citizens perceive the current state of reconciliation amid the political transition; their views on governance systems, structures, and spaces as they relate to the advancement of reconciliation; and their assessments of their own capacity and influence in driving change for reconciliation.

Within these thematic areas and across the 2025 survey results, some areas of tension become apparent. These include contrasts between public optimism and persistent scepticism, shared priorities alongside disparate lived experiences, and renewed civic engagement tempered by doubts about institutional responsiveness. These observations point to a public that is expectant yet cautious, hopeful yet aware of long-standing political and systemic limitations.

Rather than offering closure or consensus, the findings suggest that reconciliation remains an evolving process shaped not only by formal mechanisms but by everyday interactions and the inclusiveness of political spaces. They reflect a society navigating political transition, in which Sri Lankans are renegotiating the terms of trust between state and citizenry. As expectations shift, the durability of this moment will depend on the credibility, responsiveness, and inclusivity of state actors and their actions over time.

මෙම වාර්තාව ශ්‍රී ලංකා බැරෝමීටරයේ (SLB) සංහිදියාව පිළිබඳ ජාතික මහජන අදහස් සමීක්ෂණය 2025 හි ප්‍රධාන සොයාගැනීම් ඉදිරිපත් කරන අතර, සංහිදියාව, වගවීමක් ඇති පාලනය සහ ක්‍රියාකාරී පුරවැසිභාවය ගැන මහජන සංජානනය පිළිබඳව අවබෝධයක් ලබා දෙයි. මින් පෙර වට තුනකදී ලබාගත් (2020, 2021, 2023) SLB දත්ත මත පදනම්ව, එය දේශපාලන හා ආර්ථික විපර්යාසයේ කාල පරිච්ඡේදයක් හරහා වෙනස් වන ආකල්ප ග්‍රහණය කර ගන්නා කාල ශ්‍රේණි විශ්ලේෂණයක් සපයයි.

2024 දී රටේ තීරණාත්මක දේශපාලනික සංක්‍රාන්තිය පසුබිම් කරගෙන සකස් කරන ලද මෙම වාර්තාව, සංහිදියාව සහ ඒ ආශ්‍රිත ගැටළු සම්බන්ධයෙන් රට අද සිටින්නේ කොතැනද යන්න පිළිබඳව ශ්‍රී ලාංකිකයන්ගේ මත පරීක්ෂා කරයි. එය වෙනස්කම් සහ අවිනිශ්චිතතාවයේ කාල පරිච්ඡේදයක් තුළ ජනතාවගේ අභිලාෂයන්, අපේක්ෂාවන්, අවශ්‍යතා සහ ප්‍රමුඛතා ගවේෂණය කරයි. මෙය පුරවැසියන් සහ රාජ්‍යය අතර විකාශනය වන සම්බන්ධතාවය සහ ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ ඇතුළත්කරණය වූ සහ තිරසාර සංහිදියාවක් සඳහා වන අපේක්ෂාවන් පිළිබඳ ගැඹුරු අවබෝධයක් ලබා ගැනීමට දායක වේ. සමීක්ෂණය හරහා මෙම දෘෂ්ටිකෝණ ග්‍රහණය කර ගැනීමෙන්, රට තුළ සංහිදියාව සහ සමාජ සහජීවනය ඉදිරියට ගෙන යාම සඳහා ප්‍රතිපත්ති සම්පාදනය, මහජන කතිකාව සහ සිවිල් සමාජය දරන උත්සාහයන් දැනුම් දීම SLB අරමුණුකොට ගෙන ඇත.

SLB සමීක්ෂණය ප්‍රජා සහ විශේෂඥ උපදේශන හරහා සංවර්ධනය කරන ලද සංකල්පීය රාමුවක් මත පදනම් වූ ප්‍රමාණාත්මක, ව්‍යුහගත ප්‍රවේශයක් භාවිතා කරයි. සංහිදියාව පිළිබඳ පටු අර්ථ දැක්වීමක් අනුගමනය කිරීම වෙනුවට, මෙම රාමුව අන්තර් සම්බන්ධිත මානයන් අටක් හරහා එය ග්‍රහණය කරයි: අතීතය සමඟ කටයුතු කිරීම, සැමට යුක්තිය සහතික කිරීම, අනන්‍යතාවය සහ අයත් වීම, විශ්වාසය, අවස්ථා සමානාත්මතාවය, ක්‍රියාකාරී පුරවැසිභාවය, වගවිය යුතු පාලනය සහ ආරක්ෂාව සහ යහපැවැත්වීම් මෙම මානයන්, ඒවායේ උපමානයන් සහ දර්ශක සමඟ, සංහිදියාවට අදාළ මහජන සංජානන සහ අත්දැකීම් ක්‍රමානුකූලව මැනීම සඳහා වන පදනම ලෙස කටයුතු කරයි.

2025 සමීක්ෂණය සඳහා වයස අවුරුදු 18 සහ ඊට වැඩි ශ්‍රී ලාංකිකයන් 3,876 දෙනෙකු නියැදි ගත් අතර, ජාතික නියෝජනයක් ඇති නියැදි රාමුවක් භාවිතයෙන් අනුමු ලෙස තෝරා ගන්නා ලද අතර, 95% විශ්වාසනීය මට්ටමක් සහ ජාතික මට්ටමින් 1.6% ක දෝෂ සීමාවක් ඇත. දත්ත රැස් කිරීම 2025 ජනවාරි සහ පෙබරවාරි මාසවලදී සිදු විය.

SLB ක්‍රියාත්මක වන්නේ The Insights Initiative, යුක්තිය සහ ප්‍රතිසන්ධානය පිළිබඳ ආයතනය (IJR) සහ ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ සමාජ සහජීවනය සහ සාමය ශක්තිමත් කිරීමේ වැඩසටහන (SCOPE) අතර සහයෝගී හවුල්කාරීත්වයක් හරහා වන අතර එය යුරෝපා සංගමය සහ ජර්මානු රොඩරල් විදේශ කාර්යාලය විසින් සම-මූල්‍ය අනුග්‍රහයෙන් ශ්‍රී ලංකා රජය සමඟ සහයෝගයෙන් GIZ විසින් ක්‍රියාත්මක කරනු ලැබේ.

මෙම වාර්තාවෙන් ලබාගත් ප්‍රධාන සොයාගැනීම් පහත සාරාංශගත කර ඇති සොයාගැනීම් සමහර අවස්ථාවල 0-10 පරිමාණයකින් මධ්‍යන්‍ය අගයන් ලෙස ඉදිරිපත් කර ඇති අතර, ඉහළ අගයන් මගින්, මනිනු ලබන සංකල්පය කෙරෙහි වැඩි ඇල්මක් නියෝජනය වේ තවත් ස්ථානවල සංකීර්ණ (ජනගහනයේ ප්‍රතිශතය) ලෙස, සොයාගැනීම් ඉදිරිපත් කෙරේ.

දේශපාලන සංක්‍රාන්තිය මධ්‍යයේ සංහිදියාව

2024/2025 දේශපාලන සංක්‍රාන්තිය මධ්‍යයේ පුරවැසියන් සංහිදියාව තේරුම් ගන්නා ආකාරය සහ අත්විඳින ආකාරය මෙම කොටස ගවේෂණය කරයි. එය සංහිදියාව සඳහා මහජන ඉල්ලුම සහ එහි ප්‍රගතිය පිළිබඳ සංජානනය පරීක්ෂා කිරීම, සංහිදියාව මහජනතාව විසින් තේරුම් ගන්නා ආකාරය ගවේෂණය කිරීම, එය සාක්ෂාත් කර ගැනීමට ඇති බාධක නිරාවරණය කිරීම, සහ එය ඉදිරියට ගෙන යාම සඳහා මූලික වගකීම දරන්නන් බවට පුරවැසියන් විශ්වාස කරන ක්‍රියාකාරීත්වය සහ ආයතන හඳුනා ගැනීම සිදුකරයි.

- 2020 සිට සංහිදියාව සඳහා මහජන ඉල්ලුම අඩුණ්ඩව ඉහළ මට්ටමක පැවතුනද (2025 දී ජාතික මධ්‍යන්‍ය අගය 8.1), ප්‍රගතිය පිළිබඳ සංජානනය දිගටම අඩු මට්ටමක පවතින බව (2025 දී ජාතික මධ්‍යන්‍ය අගය 6.4) පෙන්නුම් කරයි, එය අඩුණ්ඩ සංහිදියා උනතාවයක් ඉස්මතු කරයි. මෙම උනතාවය ශ්‍රී ලාංකික දෙමළ සහ උඩරට දෙමළ ජනතාව අතර වඩාත් කැපී පෙනේ.
- ප්‍රතිචාර දැක්වූවන්ගෙන් අඩක් පමණ (48.5%) සංහිදියාවේ අර්ථය කණ්ඩායම් අතර චක්‍රීයකම සහ ධනාත්මක සබඳතා ලෙස තේරුම් ගෙන ඇති අතර, මෙය සංහිදියාව පිළිබඳ සබඳතා මත පදනම් වූ අවබෝධයක් කරා චක්‍රීයතාවය වැඩිවීමක් සනිටුහන් කරයි.
- සංහිදියාව සඳහා විශාලතම වගකීම දැරිය යුත්තේ කවුරුන්ද යන්න සලකා බැලීමේදී, මහජන මතය දේශපාලන ක්‍රියාකාරීන් (ජනාධිපතිවරයා, රජය හෝ දේශපාලනඥයන් ආදීන්, 50.7%) සහ සියලු ජනතාව (සාමූහික සමාජ වගකීමක් ලෙස, 40.5%) අතර බෙදී යයි. පිරිමින් දේශපාලන ආයතන සහ ක්‍රියාකාරීන් කෙරෙහි වැඩි අවධානයක් යොමු කරන අතර කාන්තාවන් බෙදාගත් මහජන වගකීම කෙරෙහි වැඩි අවධානයක් යොමු කරන බැවින්, මෙහිදී සමාජභාවය මත පදනම් වූ වෙනස් වීමක් මතු වන්නේය.
- 2025 දී සංහිදියාවට ඇති දේශපාලන බාධක පිළිබඳ සංජානනය සැලකිය යුතු ලෙස අඩු වී ඇත. මෙය විශේෂයෙන් දේශපාලන අධිශ්ඨානය නොමැතිකම (2020 දී 25.7% සිට 2025 දී 10.4% දක්වා) සහ බෙදුම්වාදී ජාතිකවාදී දේශපාලනය (2020 දී 37.5% සිට 2025 දී 6.0% දක්වා) සම්බන්ධයෙන් පෙනී යයි.
- ප්‍රතිසන්ධාන ආයතන වැදගත් ලෙස සලකනු ලබන අතර, එය ජාතික මධ්‍යන්‍ය අගය 7.8 කින් පෙන්නුම් කෙරේ, උතුරු සහ නැගෙනහිර පළාත්වල එය ඊටත් වඩා ඉහළ මධ්‍යන්‍ය අගයන් (පිළිවෙලින් 8.3 සහ 8.2) පෙන්නුම් කරයි.

පද්ධති, ව්‍යුහයන් සහ සංහිදියාව සඳහා අවකාශය

මෙම කොටස මගින් පුරවැසියන් රටේ පාලන ව්‍යුහයන් සහ සංහිදියාව සඳහා අවශ්‍ය ප්‍රජා අවකාශයන් සංජානනය කරන අයුරු පරීක්ෂා කරයි. එය දේශපාලන විශ්වාසය, දූෂණය සහ පුද්ගලික නිදහස පිළිබඳ මහජන අදහස් කෙරෙහි අවධානය යොමු කරන අතර, ආයතනවල සංජානනීය අඩුණ්ඩතාව සහ ඵලදායිතාවය සහ ශ්‍රී ලංකාවේ පශ්චාත් යුධ ප්‍රජාතන්ත්‍රවාදී අවකාශයේ විවෘතභාවයේ මට්ටම පිළිබඳ අවබෝධයක් ලබා දෙයි.

- බොහෝ පළාත්වල දේශපාලන විශ්වාසය සැලකිය යුතු ලෙස වැඩි වී, 2020 සිට වාර්තා වූ ඉහළම මට්ටම් කරා ළඟා විය (2025 දී ජාතික මධ්‍යන්‍ය අගය 6.9) වනමුත්, මෙම ප්‍රවණතාවය මුළු රට පුරාම ස්ථාවර නොවන අතර, උතුරු සහ නැගෙනහිර පළාත්වල දේශපාලන විශ්වාසය අඩු වෙමින් පවතී.

- රාජ්‍ය අංශයේ දූෂණය පිළිබඳ සංජානනය මධ්‍යස්ථව ඉහළ ය (ජාතික මධ්‍යන්‍ය අගය 6.1). උතුරු සහ නැගෙනහිර පළාත්වල දූෂණ පිළිබඳ තරමක් ඉහළ සංජානනය මට්ටම් වාර්තා කරයි (පිළිවෙලින් මධ්‍යන්‍ය අගයන් 6.5 සහ 6.4).
- තුනෙන් එකකට වඩා ජනතාව (38.7%) වත්මන් රජය දූෂණයට එරෙහිව ඵලදායී හෝ ඉතා ඵලදායී වනු ඇතැයි විශ්වාස කරන අතර, පෙර රජයන් එසේ කිරීමේදී ඵලදායී හෝ ඉතා ඵලදායී වූයේ යැයි විශ්වාස කරන්නේ 12.5% ක් පමණක් වේ.
- පුද්ගලික නිදහස පිළිබඳ සංජානනය 2025 දී තියුනු ලෙස ඉහළ ගොස් ජාතික මධ්‍යන්‍ය අගය 7.4 ක් විය. එය 2023 මට්ටම වූ 6.0 සිට ඉහළ ගොස් ඇති අතර, 2020 දී SLB දත්ත රැස් කිරීම ආරම්භ කිරීමෙන් පසු මෙම දර්ශකයේ පෙන්නුම් කළ ඉහළම අගය වේ.
- ප්‍රජා ආරක්ෂාව පිළිබඳ සංජානනය සඳහා ජාතික මධ්‍යන්‍ය අගය ඉහළ මට්ටමක පවතී (2025 දී 8.5), සාපේක්ෂව පහළ මට්ටම් වුවත්, උතුරු සහ නැගෙනහිර පළාත්වල සැලකිය යුතු දියුණුවක් වාර්තා වී ඇත.

සංහිඳියාව සඳහා ප්‍රජා සහභාගීත්වය

සංහිඳියාව සඳහා වෙනසක් ඇති කිරීමේදී ශ්‍රී ලාංකිකයන් තමන්ගේම කාර්යභාරය සංජානනය කරන අයුරු මෙම කොටස ගවේෂණය කරයි. එය සිවිල් සහ දේශපාලන කටයුතුවලට සහභාගී වීමට ඔවුන්ගේ විශ්වාසය (අභ්‍යන්තර දේශපාලන කාර්යක්ෂමතාව), දේශපාලන ප්‍රතිඵල කෙරෙහි බලපෑම් කිරීමේ හැඟීම (දේශපාලන නියෝජ්‍යත්වය), රාජ්‍ය ප්‍රතිචාර දැක්වීම පිළිබඳ අදහස් (බාහිර දේශපාලන කාර්යක්ෂමතාව) සහ දේශපාලනිකව නියැලීමට පෙළඹවීම කෙරෙහි අවධානය යොමු කරයි.

- අභ්‍යන්තර දේශපාලන කාර්යක්ෂමතාව ඉහළ ගොස් ඇත (2023 දී ජාතික මධ්‍යන්‍ය අගය 6.1 සහ 2025 දී 6.7). කෙසේ වෙතත්, සමාජභාවී විෂමතා දිගටම පවතින අතර, කාන්තාවන් පිරිමින්ට වඩා අඩු මට්ටම් වාර්තා කරති (පිළිවෙලින් 6.4 සහ 7.0 මධ්‍යන්‍ය අගයන්).
- දේශපාලන නියෝජ්‍යත්වය සඳහා ජාතික මධ්‍යන්‍ය අගය මධ්‍යස්ථව අඩුය (2025 දී 4.3 ක් විය), තවද උඩරට දෙමළ ජනතාව නියෝජ්‍යත්වය පිළිබඳ අවම හැඟීම වාර්තා කරයි (මධ්‍යන්‍ය අගය 3.8).
- 2025 දී බොහෝ පළාත්වල රාජ්‍ය ප්‍රතිචාර දැක්වීම පිළිබඳ සංජානනය පහත වැටී ඇත. 2023 සිට උතුරු පළාතේ තියුණුම පහත වැටීමක් වාර්තා විය (මධ්‍යන්‍ය අගය 8.5 සිට 7.5 දක්වා), නැගෙනහිර පළාතේ සමස්ත වශයෙන් ගත්කළ 2020 සිට දැඩිම පහත වැටීමක් පෙන්නුම් කරයි (මධ්‍යන්‍ය අගය 8.5 සිට 6.9 දක්වා).
- 2022 අර්බුදය අතරතුර උච්චතම අවස්ථාවට පත් වූ දේශපාලනිකව නියැලීමට ඇති පෙළඹවීම 2023 දී අඩු වූ නමුත් 2025 වන විට තරමක් යථා තත්ත්වයට පත් විය. වයස අවුරුදු 18 සිට 30 දක්වා තරුණ පුරවැසියන් නියැලීමට වැඩි පෙළඹවීමක් පෙන්නුම් කරති (39.8%), වයස අවුරුදු 61 සහ ඊට වැඩි පුද්ගලයින් වැඩිපුරම නියැලීමෙන් අත්විම වීම වාර්තා කරයි (63.2%).
- පසුගිය සමීක්ෂණයේ සිට ක්‍රියාකාරී පුරවැසි මට්ටම් වැඩි වී ඇත (2023 දී ජාතික මධ්‍යන්‍ය අගය 1.1 සිට 2025 දී 2.1 දක්වා), ඉහළම මට්ටම් වාර්තා වී ඇත්තේ උතුරු පළාතේ ය.

අවසන් නිරීක්ෂණ

2025 SLB සමීක්ෂණයේ ප්‍රතිඵල මගින්, දේශපාලන සංක්‍රාන්තිය මධ්‍යයේ පුරවැසියන් වත්මන් සංහිඳියාවේ තත්ත්වය වටහා ගන්නා ආකාරය; සංහිඳියාවේ දියුණුවට අදාළව පාලන පද්ධති, ව්‍යුහයන් සහ අවකාශයන් පිළිබඳ ඔවුන්ගේ අදහස්; සහ සංහිඳියාව සඳහා වෙනසක් ඇති කිරීමේදී ඔවුන්ගේම ධාරිතාව සහ බලපෑම පිළිබඳ ඔවුන්ගේ තක්සේරු කිරීම් පිළිබඳ වැදගත් සහ අතිවිශිෂ්ට අවබෝධයක් ලබා දේ.

මෙම නේමාත්මක ක්ෂේත්‍ර තුළ සහ 2025 සමීක්ෂණ ප්‍රතිඵල පුරාවට, ආතතියක් පවතින සමහර ක්ෂේත්‍ර පැහැදිලිව පෙනේ. මේවාට මහජන ශූන්‍යවාදී බව සහ නොනවතින සැකය අතර වෙනස්කම්, අසමාන ජීවන අත්දැකීම් වලට සමගාමීව බෙදාගත් ප්‍රමුඛතා සහ ආයතනික ප්‍රතිචාර දැක්වීම පිළිබඳ සැකයන් වලට බඳුන් වන නැවත පණ ලබා ඇති ප්‍රජා සහභාගීත්වය ඇතුළත් වේ. මෙම නිරීක්ෂණ මගින් අපේක්ෂාවන් ඇති නමුත් ප්‍රවේශම් සහගත, බලාපොරොත්තු ඇතිමුත් දිගුකාලීන දේශපාලන හා පද්ධතිමය සීමාවන් පිළිබඳව දැනුවත්, මහජනතාවක් පෙන්නුම් කරයි.

සමාජිකයන් හෝ එකඟතාවක් ලබා දීමට වඩා, සංහිඳියාව යන්න විධිමත් යාන්ත්‍රණයන් මගින් පමණක් නොව විදිනෙදා අන්තර්ක්‍රියා සහ දේශපාලන අවකාශයන්හි ඇතුළත්කරණය මගින් හැඩගැසෙන, පරිණාමය වන ක්‍රියාවලියක් ලෙස පවතින බව සොයාගැනීම්වලින් පෙනී යයි. ඒවා දේශපාලන සංක්‍රාන්තියක් තුළින් ගමන් කරන සමාජයක් පිළිබිඹු කරන අතර, ඵල ශ්‍රී ලාංකිකයන් රාජ්‍යය සහ පුරවැසියන් අතර විශ්වාසයේ නියමයන් නැවත සාකච්ඡා කරමින් සිටිති. අපේක්ෂාවන් වෙනස් වන විට, මෙම මොහොතේ කල්පැවැත්ම රඳා පවතින්නේ රාජ්‍ය ක්‍රියාකාරීත්වයේ විශ්වසනීයත්වය, ප්‍රතිචාර දැක්වීම සහ ඇතුළත්කරණ හැකියාව සහ කාලයත් සමඟ ඔවුන්ගේ ක්‍රියාවන් මත ය.

நிறைவேற்றச் சுருக்கம்

இவ் அறிக்கையானது நல்லிணக்கம் தொடர்பில் SLBஇனால் நடாத்தப்பட்ட தேசியளவிலான பொதுமக்கள் கருத்துக்கணிப்பின் பிரதான கண்டுபிடிப்புகளை முன்வைக்கின்றது. இது நல்லிணக்கம், பொறுப்புக்கூறலுடன்கூடிய ஆட்சி மற்றும் செயல்முனைப்புள்ள குழுமக்கள் போன்றவிடங்களில் மக்களின் கண்ணோட்டங்கள் குறித்து கவனஞ்செலுத்தியுள்ளது. இவ் அறிக்கையானது SLBஇனால் முன்னர் மேற்கொள்ளப்பட்ட ஆய்வுகளிலிருந்து (2020,2021,2023) பெறப்பட்ட தரவுகளிலிருந்து அரசியல் மற்றும் பொருளாதார மற்றும் நிகழ்ந்த காலப்பகுதியில் ஏற்பட்ட மனப்பாங்கு மாற்றங்களைப் பிரதிபலிக்கும்வகையிலான காலமாற்றத்தினை மையப்படுத்திய பகுப்பாய்வினை வழங்குகின்றது.

2024ம் ஆண்டு நாட்டில் ஏற்பட்ட மிகமுக்கியமான அரசியல் மாற்றத்தின் பின்னணியில், இவ் அறிக்கையானது நல்லிணக்கம் மற்றும் அத்துடன் தொடர்புடைய விடயங்கள் தொடர்பில் இலங்கை தற்போது எத்தகைய நிலையில் உள்ளது என்பது தொடர்பில் இலங்கையர்களின் கருத்துக்களை ஆய்வுசெய்கின்றது. மாற்றம் நிகழும் ஒரு காலப்பகுதியையும், நிச்சயமாற்றத்தன்மையினையும் எதிர்கொள்கையில் மக்களின் அபிபிராயசுகள், எதிர்பார்ப்புகள், தேவைகள் மற்றும் முன்னுரிமைகளை ஆய்வுசெய்கின்றது. இது குழுமக்கள் மற்றும் அரசாங்கத்தையிலான மாற்றமடைந்துவரும் உறவினையும், இலங்கையில் உள்ளவாக்குதலுடன்கூடிய நிலைபேறான நல்லிணக்கத்தினை ஏற்படுத்துவதற்கான வாய்ப்புகளையும் ஆழமாகப் புரிந்துகொள்வதற்குப் பங்களிப்புச்செய்கின்றது. SLB இக்கருத்தாய்வினூடாக மக்களின் கண்ணோட்டங்களை இனங்காண்பதன்மூலம் நாட்டில் நல்லிணக்கத்தையும் சமூகஒருமைப்பாட்டினையும் மேம்படுத்துவதற்குத் தேவையான கொள்கையுருவாக்கம், பொதுக் கருத்தாடல்கள் மற்றும் சிவில்சமூக முனைப்புக்கள் போன்றவற்றிற்குரிய தகவல்களை வழங்குவதனை நோக்கமாகக்கொண்டுள்ளது.

SLB சமூகமட்டத்திலான மற்றும் நிபுணர்களின் ஆலோசனைகளைப் பெற்றுக்கொள்வதனுடாக உருவாக்கப்பட்டதும் கருத்தியல் அடிப்படையினைக்கொண்டதுமான அளவுதரர் கட்டமைப்புக்கொண்ட ஒரு அணுகுமுறையினைப் பயன்படுத்துகின்றது. நல்லிணக்கம் தொடர்பான வரையறுக்கப்பட்ட வரைவிலக்கணத்தினைப் பயன்படுத்துவதற்குப்பதிலாக இச்சட்டகமானது ஒன்றுடனொன்று தொடர்புடைய எட்டு பரிமாணங்களினூடாக அதனை ஆய்வுசெய்கின்றது: கடந்தகாலத்தினைக் கையாளுதல், அனைவருக்கும் நீதி, அடையாளம் மற்றும் உடைமையுணர்வு, நம்பிக்கை, சமத்துவமான வாய்ப்புக்கள், செயல்முனைப்புள்ள குழுமக்கள், பொறுப்புக்கூறலுடனான ஆட்சி, பாதுகாப்பு மற்றும் நல்வாழ்வு என்பவையே அவ் எட்டுப் பரிமாணங்களுமாகும். இப்பரிமாணங்களானவை அவற்றின் உட்பரிமாணங்கள் மற்றும் குறிகாட்டிகளுடன் இணைந்து நல்லிணக்கம் தொடர்பான பொதுமக்களின் கண்ணோட்டங்களை முறையானவிதத்தில் அளவிடுவதற்கான அடித்தளமாக அமைகின்றன.

2025ம் ஆண்டிற்கான கருத்தாய்வானது தேசியவிலான பிரதிநிதித்துவத்தினையுடைய மாதிரிச்சட்டகத்தினைப் பயன்படுத்தி எழுந்தமானவிதத்தில் தெரிவுசெய்யப்பட்ட 18 மற்றும் அதற்குமேற்பட்ட வயதுடைய 3,876 இலங்கையர்களின் மாதிரிகளைக் கொண்டிருந்ததுடன் இது தேசிய மட்டத்தில் 95% நம்பிக்கைத்தன்மையுடன் 1.6% வழுவினைக் கொண்டிருந்தது. 2025ம் ஆண்டின் ஜனவரி மற்றும் பெப்ரவரி மாதத்தில் இதற்கான தரவுச் சேகரிப்பு மேற்கொள்ளப்பட்டது.

SLBஆனது, த இன்சைட்ஸ் இனிசியேட்டிவ், நீதி மற்றும் நல்லிணக்கத்திற்கான நிறுவகம் (IJR), இலங்கையில் நல்லிணக்கத்தினையும் சமாதானத்தினையும் வலுப்படுத்தல் செயற்பாட்டம் (SCOPE) ஆகியவற்றுடனான ஒன்றிணைந்த பங்களிப்புடனும், ஐரோப்பிய ஒன்றியம் மற்றும் ஜேர்மன் சமஷ்டி வெளியுறவு அலுவலகம் ஆகியவற்றின் கூட்டு நிதியனுசரணையுடனும் இலங்கை அரசாங்கத்தின் ஆதரவுடன் ஜேர்மன் தொழில்நுட்ப கூட்டுறவினால் நடைமுறைப்படுத்தப்படுகின்றது.

இவ் அறிக்கையின் பிரதான கண்டடைவுகள் கீழே சுருக்கமாக வழங்கப்பட்டுள்ளன. கண்டடைவுகளானவை 1-10 வரையான அளவீட்டினைப் பயன்படுத்தி சராசரி அளவுகளில் வழங்கப்பட்டுள்ளன, உயர்ந்த அளவினைக் கொண்டிருப்பதென்பது கணிக்கப்படும் கருத்தியல் தொடர்பில் அதிகளவிலான உணர்வினைக் கொண்டிருப்பதனைப் பிரதிபலிக்கின்றது அல்லது (சனத்தொகையின் விகிதாசாரத்தில்) நிகழ்வென்களாகக் குறிப்பிடப்படுகின்றது.

அரசியல் மாற்றத்தின் மத்தியில் நல்லிணக்கம்

இப்பகுதியானது 2024/2025 காலப்பகுதிகளில் ஏற்பட்ட அரசியல் மாற்றத்தின் மத்தியில் மக்கள் நல்லிணக்கத்தினை எவ்வாறு புரிந்துகொள்கின்றார்கள், அதனை எவ்வாறு அனுபவிக்கின்றார்கள் என்பதனை ஆய்வுசெய்கின்றது. நல்லிணக்கத்துக்கான மக்களின் தேவை மற்றும் அதுதொடர்பில் உணரப்பட்ட முன்னேற்றம் என்பவற்றையும் ஆய்வுசெய்கிறது. மேலும் இப்பகுதியானது நல்லிணக்கம் என்பதனை மக்கள் எவ்வாறு புரிந்துகொள்கின்றார்கள்: நல்லிணக்கத்தினை ஏற்படுத்துவதில் உணரப்பட்ட தடைகள் யாவை: நல்லிணக்கத்தினை மேம்படுத்துவதற்கான பிரதான பொறுப்பினைக்கொண்டிருப்பதாக மக்கள் நம்புகின்ற நபர்கள், அமைப்புகள் யாவர் என்பன பற்றியும் ஆராய்கின்றது.

- 2020ம் ஆண்டுமுதல் நல்லிணக்கத்திற்கான பொதுமக்களின் கோரிக்கைகள் தொடர்ந்தும் உயர்வாக இருந்து வருகின்றபோதும் (2025இல் தேசியளவிலான சராசரி அளவு 8.1) நல்லிணக்கத்தினை மேம்படுத்துவதில் தொடர்ந்தும் தாமதங்கள் இருப்பதாகக் கருதப்படுகின்றது (2025இல் தேசியளவிலான சராசரி புள்ளி 6.4), இது நல்லிணக்கம் தொடர்பில் தொடர்ச்சியான குறைபாட்டினை எடுத்துக்காட்டுகின்றது. இக்குறைபாடானது இலங்கைத் தமிழர்கள் மற்றும் மலையகத் தமிழர்கள் மத்தியில் பெரும்பாலும் வெளிப்படுத்தப்படுகின்றது.
- பதிலளித்தோரில் ஏறக்குறைய அரைவாசிப்பேர் (48.5%) நல்லிணக்கம் என்பதனை ஒற்றமை மற்றும் குழுக்களுக்கிடையிலான சாதகமான உறவுகள் எனப் புரிந்துகொண்டிருக்கின்றனர், இது உறவுகளை அடிப்படையாகக்கொண்ட நல்லிணக்கம்பற்றிய புரிந்துணர்வு அதிகரிப்பதனைக் காட்டுகின்றது.
- நல்லிணக்கத்தினை ஏற்படுத்துவதற்கான பொறுப்பினை யார் அதிகளவில் கொண்டிருக்க வேண்டும் என்பதனைக் கருத்தில்கொள்கையில், பொதுமக்களில் ஒருசாரார் அரசியல்வாதிகள் (50.7%ஆனோர் ஜனாதிபதி, அரசாங்கம், அல்லது அரசியல்வாதிகள் போன்றோரைக் குறிப்பிட்டனர்) எனவும் இன்னொருசாரார் மக்கள் அனைவரும் (40.5%ஆனோர் சமூகக்கூட்டுப் பொறுப்பினைக் குறிப்பிட்டனர்) எனவும் கூறியிருந்தனர். பால்தலைப்பினை அடிப்படையாகக்கொண்டு பதில்களை அவதானிக்கையில், பெண்கள் சமூகக்கூட்டுப்பொறுப்பினை அதிகளவில் வலியுறுத்தியிருந்த அதேவேளை ஆண்கள் பெரும்பாலும் அரசியல் நிறுவனங்கள் மற்றும் அரசியல்வாதிகளைக் குறிப்பிட்டிருந்தனர்.
- நல்லிணக்கத்திற்கான அரசியல்ரீதியான தடைகள் பற்றிய கண்ணோட்டமானது 2025இல் குறிப்பிடத்தக்கவிதத்தில் குறைவடைந்திருக்கிறது. குறிப்பாக அரசியல் விரும்பின்மை (2020ம் ஆண்டில் 25.7% இலிருந்து 2025ம் ஆண்டில் 10.4% க்கு) மற்றும் பிளவுபடுத்தும் தேசியவாத அரசியல் (2020ம் ஆண்டில் 37.5% இலிருந்து 2025ம் ஆண்டில் 6.0% க்கு) ஆகியவற்றைத் தடைகளாக கருதும் கண்ணோட்டம் குறைவடைந்துள்ளது.
- நல்லிணக்கத்தினை ஏற்படுத்துவதற்கான நிறுவனங்கள் முக்கியமானவையாகப் பார்க்கப்பட்டமையானது தேசியளவிலான சராசரிப் புள்ளி 7.8இனால் சுட்டிக்காட்டப்பட்டிருந்தது. இதைவிட அதிகளவிலான சராசரி புள்ளிகள் வடக்கு மற்றும் கிழக்கு மாகாணங்களில் பெறப்பட்டிருந்தன (முறையே 8.3 மற்றும் 8.2).

நல்லிணக்கத்தினை ஏற்படுத்துவதற்கான பொறிமுறைகள், கட்டமைப்புக்கள் மற்றும் வெளி

இப்பகுதியானது நாட்டின் ஆட்சிக்கட்டமைப்புகளையும், நல்லிணக்கத்தினை ஏற்படுத்துவதற்குத் தேவையான சிவில் செயற்பாடுகளுக்கான வெளிகளையும் பிரணைகள் எவ்வாறு நோக்குகின்றார்கள் என்பதனை ஆய்வுசெய்கின்றது. இது அரசியல் நம்பகத்தன்மை, ஊழல், மற்றும் தனிப்பட்ட சுதந்திரங்கள் தொடர்பான மக்களின் கண்ணோட்டங்களில் கவனஞ்செலுத்துகின்றது. யுத்தத்திற்குப் பிந்திய குழுவில் இலங்கையிலுள்ள ஜனநாயக வெளி எந்தளவிற்கு வெளிப்படையானதாக இருக்கின்றது என்பதையும் அமைப்புக்கள் எந்தளவிற்கு உண்மைத்தன்மையும், வினைத்திறனும் கொண்டவையாகக் கருதப்படுகின்றன என்பது தொடர்பிலும் கவனஞ்செலுத்துகின்றது.

- அரசியல்மீதான நம்பிக்கையானது பெரும்பாலான மாகாணங்களில் குறிப்பிடத்தக்களவிற்கு அதிகரித்துள்ளதுடன் இது 2020இலிருந்து மேற்கொள்ளப்பட்ட பதிவுகளிலேயே மிகவும் அதிகளவிலான புள்ளிகளை அடைந்திருக்கின்றது (2025ஆம் ஆண்டில் தேசியளவிலான சராசரி 6.9). ஆயினும் இப்போக்கானது நாடு முழுவதும் ஒரே மாதிரியானதாகக் காணப்படவில்லை, வடக்கு மற்றும் கிழக்கு மாகாணங்களில் அரசியல்மீதான நம்பிக்கையானது வீழ்ச்சியடைந்திருக்கின்றது.
- அரசதிறைகளில் இடம்பெறும் ஊழல் தொடர்பான கண்ணோட்டங்கள் ஓரளவிற்கு அதிகரித்துக் காணப்படுகின்றன (தேசியளவிலான சராசரி அளவு 6.1). வடக்கு மற்றும் கிழக்கு மாகாணங்களில் ஊழல் தொடர்பான கண்ணோட்டங்கள் சற்று அதிகரித்திருப்பதனைக் காட்டுகின்றது. (தேசியளவிலான சராசரி அளவுகள் முறையே 6.5 மற்றும் 6.4)
- மூன்றில் ஒரு பங்கிற்கும் அதிகமானோர் (38.7%) தற்போதுள்ள அரசாங்கமானது ஊழலினை எதிர்கொள்வதில் வினைத்திறன்மிக்கதாக அல்லது மிகவும் வினைத்திறன்மிக்கதாக அமையும் என நம்புகின்றனர், இதனுடன் ஒப்பிடும்போது 12.5% ஆனோர் மட்டுமே முன்னைய அரசாங்கங்கள் ஊழலினை எதிர்கொள்வதில் வினைத்திறனாக அல்லது மிகவும் வினைத்திறன்மிக்கதாக செயற்பட்டதாக நம்புகின்றனர்
- தனிப்பட்ட சுதந்திரம் தொடர்பான கண்ணோட்டங்களின் தேசியளவிலான சராசரிப் புள்ளியானது 2023இல் 6.0இலிருந்து 2025இல் 7.4ஆக சடுதியான அதிகரிப்பினைக் காட்டுகின்றது. 2020 தொடக்கம் SLBஇன் தரவுச்சேகரிப்பு ஆரம்பித்ததிலிருந்து இக்குறிகாட்டிக்கு வழங்கப்பட்ட அதிகளவிலான புள்ளியாக இது அமைகின்றது.
- சமூகப்பாதுகாப்பு தொடர்பான கண்ணோட்டங்களின் தேசியளவிலான சராசரிப் புள்ளியானது உயர்ந்தளவில் உள்ளது (2025இல் 8.5), இது வடகிழக்கில் குறைந்த அளவுமட்டங்களில் இருப்பினும், குறிப்பிடத்தக்க முன்னேற்றத்தினையும் காட்டுகின்றது

நல்லிணக்கத்தில் மக்களின் பங்குபற்றுதல்

இப்பகுதி, இலங்கையர்கள் நல்லிணக்கத்தினை ஏற்படுத்துவதில் தமது பங்கினை எவ்வாறு புரிந்துகொள்கின்றார்கள் என்பதனை ஆய்வுசெய்கின்றது. இது சிவில் மற்றும் அரசியல் விடயங்களில் பங்குபற்றுவது தொடர்பில் மக்கள் எத்தனவிற்கு தன்னம்பிக்கையினைக் கொண்டிருக்கின்றார்கள் (உள்ளக அரசியல் வினைத்திறன்), அரசியல்ரீதியான முடிவுகளில் செல்வாக்குச்செலுத்தும் உணர்வு(அரசியல் செயலாண்மை), அரசின் பதிலளிக்கும்தன்மை தொடர்பான கண்ணோட்டங்கள் (வெளிப்புற அரசியல் வினைத்திறன்), மற்றும் அரசியல்ரீதியான ஈடுபாட்டினைக் கொண்டிருப்பதற்கான ஊக்கம் போன்றவற்றில் கவனஞ்செலுத்துகின்றது.

- உள்ளக அரசியல் வினைத்திறன் அதிகரித்திருக்கின்றது (2023இல் தேசியளவிலான சராசரிப் புள்ளி 6.1ஆகவும் 2025இல் 6.7ஆகவும் உள்ளது). ஆயினும் பால்நிலைரீதியான வேறுபாடுகள் காணப்படுகின்றன, பெண்கள் ஆண்களைவிடவும் குறைந்தளவான மட்டங்களையே கொண்டிருப்பதாக அறிக்கைகள் காட்டுகின்றன. (தேசியளவிலான சராசரிப் புள்ளி முறையே 6.4 மற்றும் 7.0)
- மலையக மக்கள் மிகவும் குறைந்தளவிலான அரசியல் செயலாண்மையினைக் கொண்டிருப்பதுடன் (சராசரிப் புள்ளி 3.8) அரசியல் செயலாண்மைக்கான தேசியளவிலான சராசரிப் புள்ளியும், ஓரளவிற்குக் குறைந்தே காணப்படுகின்றது (2025இல் 4.3இல் இருக்கின்றது)
- அரசின் பதிலளிக்கும்தன்மை பற்றிய கண்ணோட்டங்கள் பெரும்பாலான மாகாணங்களில் வீழ்ச்சியுற்றிருக்கின்றன. வடமாகாணமானது (தேசியளவிலான சராசரிப் புள்ளி 8.5இலிருந்து 7.5ஆக) 2023இலிருந்து தீவிர வீழ்ச்சியினைக் காட்டுகின்ற அதேவேளை கிழக்கு மாகாணமானது 2020ம் ஆண்டிலிருந்து ஒட்டுமொத்தமாக சடுதியான வீழ்ச்சியினைக் காட்டுகின்றது (தேசியளவிலான புள்ளி 8.5இலிருந்து 6.9ஆக)
- 2022ம் ஆண்டு நெருக்கடியின்போது அதிகரித்திருந்த அரசியல் ஈடுபாட்டிற்கான ஊக்கமானது 2023இல் குறைந்திருந்தபோதும் 2025இல் அது ஓரளவிற்கு மீண்டுள்ளது. 61 மற்றும் அதற்கு மேற்பட்ட வயதுடையோர் மிகவும் ஈடுபாடு குறைந்தநிலையினை (63.2%) வெளிப்படுத்தியிருக்கின்ற அதேவேளை, 18 தொடக்கம் 30 வயதுவரையான இளம்பிரஜைகள் அதிலேயான ஊக்கத்தினை வெளிப்படுத்தியிருக்கின்றனர் (39.8%).
- செயல்முறைப்பள்ள பிரஜைகளாக இருப்பதன் அளவு இறுதியாக மேற்கொள்ளப்பட்ட கருத்தாய்விலிருந்து அதிகரித்துள்ளதுடன் (2023இல் தேசியளவிலான சராசரிப் புள்ளி 1.1இலிருந்து 2025இல் 2.1ஆக), ஆகக்கூடியளவான புள்ளிகள் வடமாகாணத்தில் பதிவுசெய்யப்பட்டுள்ளன.

அவதானங்களின் முடிவு

SLBஇன் 2025ம் ஆண்டிற்கான கருத்தாய்வின் பெறுபேறுகளானவை அரசியல் மாற்றத்தின் மத்தியில் பிரஜைகள் தற்போது நல்லிணக்கத்தின் நிலையினை எவ்வாறு நோக்குகின்றார்கள், நல்லிணக்கத்தினை மேம்படுத்துவதுடன் தொடர்புபட்ட ஆட்சிச்சட்டகங்கள், கட்டமைப்புகள், மற்றும் வெளிகள் தொடர்பில் அவர்களின் பார்வைகள், நல்லிணக்கம் தொடர்பில் மாற்றத்தினை ஏற்படுத்துவதற்கான அவர்களின் இயலாமை மற்றும் செல்வாக்கு தொடர்பில் அவர்களது மதிப்பீடு என்பவைதொடர்பில் முக்கியமானதும் தனித்துவமானவைபுமான விடயங்களை வெளிப்படுத்துகின்றது.

இக்கருப்பொருட்பரப்புக்களுக்குள்ளும், 2025ம் ஆண்டிற்கான கருத்தாய்வின் பெறுபேறுகளுக்குமிடையில் சில விடயங்களில் குழப்பம்நிலவுவது தெளிவாகத் தெரிகின்றது. பொதுமக்களின் நம்பிக்கை மற்றும் தொடர்ச்சியான சந்தேகம் என்பவற்றுக்கிடையிலான முரண்கள், வேறுபட்ட வாழ்வியல் அனுபவங்களும் கூட்டான முன்னுரிமைகளும், நிறுவனங்களின் பதிலளிக்கும்தன்மை தொடர்பான சந்தேகங்களால் மட்டுப்படுத்தப்படும் புதுப்பிக்கப்பட்ட பொதுமக்கள் ஈடுபாடு போன்ற விடயங்களிலேயே குழப்பம் நிலவுகின்றது. இவ் அவதானங்கள் எதிர்பார்ப்புடைய அதேவேளை எச்சரிக்கையுடன்கூடிய, நம்பிக்கையினைக் கொண்டிருக்கின்ற அதேவேளை நீண்டகால அரசியல் மற்றும் கட்டமைப்புரீதியான மட்டுப்பாடுகள் தொடர்பில் அறிந்திருக்கின்ற மக்கள்தொகையினைச் சுட்டிக்காட்டுகின்றது.

இக்கண்டடைவுகளானவை முடிவு அல்லது இணக்கத்தினை தெரிவிப்பதைவிட, நல்லிணக்கம் என்பது முறைசார் பொறிமுறைகளால் மட்டுமல்லாது அன்றாட வாழ்வியல் தொடர்புகள் மற்றும் உள்வாங்குதலுடன்கூடிய அரசியல் வெளிகள் மூலமாகவும் வடிவமைக்கப்படுகின்ற ஒரு மாற்றமடையும் செயல்முறை என்பதைப் பரிந்துரைக்கின்றது. அரசியல் மாற்றத்திற்கு ஈடுகொடுக்கும் ஒரு சமூகத்தினை அது பிரதிபலிக்கின்றது, அதில் இலங்கையர்கள் அரசு மற்றும் பிரஜைகளுக்கிடையிலான நம்பிக்கையை ஏற்படுத்துவதற்கான விதிமுறைகளை மீள்சமரசம் செய்துகொள்கின்றனர். எதிர்பார்ப்புகள் மாற்றமடைவதனால், இத்தருணத்தின் நிடிக்கும் தன்மையானது நம்பகத்தன்மை, பதிலளிக்கும்தன்மை, அரசதரப்பினரின் உள்வாங்கும்தன்மை மற்றும் காலப்போக்கிலான அவர்களது செயற்பாடுகள் போன்றவற்றில் தங்கியிருக்கும்.



1. INTRODUCTION



This report presents key findings from the 2025 Sri Lanka Barometer (SLB) National Public Opinion Survey on Reconciliation, shedding light on the status of reconciliation in the country in 2025, with a particular focus on dimensions of accountable governance and active citizenship. The findings are situated within a time series analysis that also draws on the three previous SLB Surveys (2020, 2021, 2023), providing insights into evolving trends in public opinion over time.

Set against the backdrop of the country's pivotal political transition in 2024, the report examines Sri Lankans' perceptions of where the country stands today in terms of reconciliation and related issues. It explores people's aspirations, expectations, needs, and priorities as they navigate a period of change and uncertainty. This contributes to a deeper understanding of both the evolving relationship between citizens and the state, and the prospects for inclusive and sustainable reconciliation in Sri Lanka. By capturing these perspectives through the survey, the SLB aims to inform policymaking, public discourse, and civil society efforts to advance reconciliation and social cohesion in the country.

This opening section sets out the context, rationale, conceptual framework, and implementation approach of the 2025 SLB Survey, before Section 2 briefly outlines the survey methodology. Section 3 explores findings related to the status of *Reconciliation Amid the Political Transition*; Section 4 focuses on the *Systems, Structures, and Space for Reconciliation*; and Section 5 explores *Civic Participation as a Driver of Reconciliation*. Sections 3 to 5 conclude with short summaries, while Section 6 offers overall conclusions on trends emerging from the data. Policy recommendations based on the findings are outlined in Section 7.

1.1. CONTEXT: RECONCILIATION IN SRI LANKA

Since the end of the armed conflict between the Sri Lankan armed forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in 2009, post-war reconciliation has been a priority for a range of stakeholders. While attention has also shifted to other events impacting the country – such as the constitutional crisis in 2018, the Easter Sunday Attacks in 2019, the COVID pandemic in 2020/2021, and the economic crisis in 2022 – Sri Lanka has adopted several formal measures as part of the state's reconciliation agenda, marked by both national policy efforts and international commitments.

Initial momentum followed the establishment and adoption of a number of key instruments and institutions, including the 2011 Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC); the 2015 co-sponsorship of United Nations Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) Resolution 30/1 to promote reconciliation, accountability, and human rights in Sri Lanka; and the initiation of transitional justice mechanisms linked to the resolution, such as the Office for National Unity and Reconciliation (ONUR), the Office on Missing Persons (OMP), and the Office for Reparations (OR) (Yusuf, 2017). However, competing and changing political priorities as well as operational constraints have affected the continuity and impact of these efforts (Human Rights Watch, 2022; Dimuthu Kumari, 2024).

After co-sponsoring UNHRC Resolution 30/1 in 2015, Sri Lanka reversed course in 2020, withdrawing from the resolution on the grounds that it undermined national interests (European Commission, 2020; Amnesty International, 2020; Verité Research, 2024). While the government subsequently announced a domestic process, re-established ONUR through an act of parliament in 2024, and took initial steps toward creating a Commission for Truth, Unity, and Reconciliation (CTUR) (Parliament of Sri Lanka, 2024), these efforts were widely criticised. For instance, civil society groups from the North and East publicly rejected the CTUR in letters to the government, citing the absence of meaningful consultation with conflict-affected communities and concerns about its credibility (Daily FT, 2024).

Meanwhile, unresolved post-war grievances, such as land disputes, cases of missing persons, and demands for greater power sharing (Kodikara, 2023; CPA, 2024a; Akilan, 2024), continue to hinder confidence-building between citizens and the state. Instances of violence, including hate speech, riots targeting Muslims, and attacks on Christian and Hindu places of worship, further undermine reconciliation efforts (Verité Media, 2024; Sri Lanka Guardian, 2024). Ongoing economic hardship has added another layer of strain, complicating efforts to meaningfully advance reconciliation (see also Sri Lanka Barometer, 2024).

Efforts and setbacks related to reconciliation continue to unfold against the backdrop of substantial political and economic transitions, marked by, among other things, the emergence of the *Aragalaya* movement in 2022 and the landmark 2024 elections (Freedom House, 2022; Asia Foundation, 2022; CPA, 2023). The elections reflected this shift, highlighting the political agency of citizens who, for the first time in post-independence Sri Lanka, voted a leftist political party into power (Benerjee, 2024; Elis-Peterson, 2024; Amer, 2024; Silva, 2025).

This recent political transition marks a notable moment in Sri Lanka's reconciliation trajectory, with the new government articulating a strong commitment to national unity, reconciliation, and inclusive development. This is evident in its policy frameworks, leadership rhetoric, and electoral strategies (UN Sri Lanka, 2024; Hattotuwa, 2024; Dissanayake, 2025). The government's manifesto emphasises the need to involve all communities in national development, advocating for a production-oriented economy that ensures equitable distribution of benefits alongside principles of equality, democracy, and the devolution of power (NPP, 2024).

In his inaugural parliamentary address, President Anura Kumara Disanayake reinforced this vision by acknowledging the suffering of all communities affected by conflict and calling for a shift from divisive to inclusive political discourse (Perera, 2025). This orientation extends to economic policy, with targeted investments in the Northern and Eastern Provinces aimed at reducing regional disparities and promoting balanced growth (Sri Lanka Brief, 2025). In its first months in office, the government took initial steps such as reopening the Palaly-Achchuveli road in Jaffna after 34 years of military closure (Presidential Secretariat, 2024), shutting down the Paruthithurai military camp, and returning a small number of land plots to civilian owners (Madhav, 2024; Ministry of Defence, 2025). These actions were accompanied by reiterated commitments to reconciliation and acknowledgements of past institutional and systemic failures (UN Sri Lanka, 2024; Hattotuwa, 2024; Dissanayake, 2025). While the Interim Secretariat for Truth and Reconciliation Mechanism (ISTRM) – originally

1. INTRODUCTION

tasked with laying the groundwork for the CTUR – appears to have been discontinued, the new administration has also publicly reaffirmed its commitment to a credible and consultative truth and reconciliation mechanism to address historical injustices (NPP, 2024; Sri Lanka Brief, 2025).

Although these signals initially generated cautious optimism, the first half of 2025 has also brought growing scrutiny regarding the administration's ability to fulfil its reconciliation-related commitments in a timely and meaningful way (CPA, 2025a). Delays in repealing the controversial Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), its use by the new administration on several occasions (Human Rights Watch, 2024c), and the absence of a clear roadmap for transitional justice have raised concerns about the depth and durability of the government's commitment (CPA, 2025a).

At this current political juncture, Sri Lankans are navigating their agency within political, social, and economic spheres, and deliberating their expectations for systemic change. The 2025 SLB Survey captures public sentiment at this intersection of hopefulness and uncertainty, offering evidence-based insights into the evolving priorities, needs, and expectations at the heart of this critical moment of transition.

1.2. RATIONALE FOR THE SRI LANKA BAROMETER

In the aftermath of Sri Lanka's protracted civil war and amid ongoing political transition, the challenge of ensuring justice, promoting accountable governance, and addressing unresolved grievances remains central. While past efforts have laid important groundwork, their impact has often been shaped by shifting political priorities and uneven implementation. As the country moves through a period of political recalibration, there is also a sense of renewed opportunity – to rebuild trust, strengthen democratic accountability, and place citizens firmly at the centre of reconciliation efforts. Understanding how people across diverse communities perceive these processes is essential, not only to assess progress but to guide meaningful action. The SLB responds to this need by offering a robust, evidence-based tool to capture public opinion, systematically amplify citizens' voices in public discourse, and support more responsive and inclusive policymaking.

The term 'barometer' describes a tool in the social sciences used to measure societal issues across diverse contexts. Examples include the Eurobarometer (since 1973), the Latinobarómetro (since 1995), the Afrobarometer (since 1999), and the AmericasBarometer (since 2004). In conflict-affected contexts, barometers are used to measure reconciliation over time, for instance through the South African Reconciliation Barometer (since 2003), Australian Reconciliation Barometer (since 2008), and Canadian Reconciliation Barometer (since 2016). Barometer survey results inform decision-making processes, policies, and interventions, identify key societal issues, and monitor progress (Cole and Firchow, 2019). Grounded in the collection of public opinion data – primarily from individual respondents at the household level – they include a range of indicators that capture citizens' opinions, attitudes, behaviours, and relationships, focusing on their personal experiences within dynamic political, social, and economic contexts. Conducted periodically, they track trends over time, providing valuable insights and enabling analyses at specific points in time or over defined timelines (Cole and Firchow, 2019).

Building on these global efforts, the SLB conducts regular, nationally representative public opinion surveys (see also Section 2), providing comprehensive insights into how reconciliation is experienced and understood across communities. By making findings publicly accessible, the SLB aims to deepen the understanding of how Sri Lankans perceive reconciliation and its key dimensions, track progress, and ultimately inform public discourse and policymaking with robust data. Additionally, the SLB seeks to establish a repository of public opinion and experiences of reconciliation, serving as a public resource that provides relevant data to stakeholders in government, civil society, academia, and media.

In this way, the SLB aligns with both international good practice and calls from local stakeholders to place citizens at the centre of the reconciliation process. It enables stakeholders to better understand and systematically consider the needs and priorities of people across different communities and supports the development of inclusive, people-centred solutions – all of which are essential for reconciliation (Silva, 2018).

1.3. CONCEPTUALISING THE SRI LANKA BAROMETER

To serve its purpose meaningfully, the SLB could not simply replicate international models – it had to be firmly rooted in the Sri Lankan context. While it drew inspiration from global efforts, particularly the South African Reconciliation Barometer that has been implemented for over two decades by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR), the SLB has consistently prioritised local relevance, inclusivity, and legitimacy. With technical support and guidance from the IJR, the SLB adopted a consultative and participatory approach to root its design in the Sri Lankan context and align itself with citizens' aspirations for reconciliation.

The SLB's conceptual framework was developed through a series of expert and community consultations conducted between 2018 and 2019, drawing on the insights of over 250 individuals across the country, including researchers, peacebuilding practitioners, and community members. These exchanges were instrumental in ensuring that the SLB's conceptualisation reflected both the relevant academic discourse and the lived realities of Sri Lankans. They also highlighted that people's thoughts and experiences of reconciliation are diverse, dynamic, context-specific, subjective, and very personal.

This national consultative process facilitated the identification of eight dimensions of reconciliation relevant to Sri Lankans and the national context: Dealing with the Past, Justice for All, Identity and Belonging, Trust, Equality of Opportunity, Active Citizenship, Accountable Governance, and Security and Wellbeing (see also Annex 1). These dimensions formed the foundation of the SLB's conceptual framework and were treated as the thematic pillars around which people's everyday experiences of reconciliation could be meaningfully explored. Each conceptual dimension was subsequently further developed through a dedicated concept paper, offering insights into key concepts and debates on relevant themes. These papers helped define the indicators and questions used in the SLB Survey.

1. INTRODUCTION

Ongoing engagement through community outreach, as well as discussion forums with academics, practitioners, and civil society actors, continues to inform and refine the SLB's dimensions, indicators, and questionnaire design – ensuring that the tool remains grounded in Sri Lanka's evolving social, political, and economic context.

1.4. IMPLEMENTING THE SRI LANKA BAROMETER

The SLB was piloted under the Strengthening Reconciliation Processes in Sri Lanka (SRP) programme between 2018 and 2022 and is currently supported by the Strengthening Social Cohesion and Peace in Sri Lanka (SCOPE) programme. Both SRP and SCOPE are co-funded by the European Union and the German Federal Foreign Office and implemented by GIZ in partnership with the Government of Sri Lanka.

Operating through strategic partnerships with national and international entities, the SLB ensures that a broad range of perspectives and expertise enriches and informs its work. This collaborative setup not only enhances methodological robustness, but also safeguards the initiative's objectivity and impartiality. Current SLB partners include SCOPE, the IJR in South Africa, and The Insights Initiative.¹ The SLB has also collaborated with the Centre for Poverty Analysis (CEPA) on the Sri Lanka Barometer Young Researchers Programme, which mentored early-career researchers in reconciliation-focused research; with the National Peace Council (NPC) for community outreach initiatives; and with Verité Research for workshops with media professionals and student journalists on ethical journalism. In addition, the SLB collaborates with a growing network of academics, practitioners, and volunteers.

The SLB Baseline Survey was conducted in 2020 and followed by the 2021 SLB Survey, which marked the beginning of the regular biannual survey interval. The 2020, 2021, 2023, and 2025 SLB Surveys were all administered in the field by Survey Research Lanka. An interim 2022 Snapshot Survey of smaller scope, implemented by Verité Research, focused on exploring the impacts of the 2022 economic crisis on social cohesion.

In addition to the regular, biannual quantitative surveys, the SLB commissions complementary research, predominantly using qualitative methods, to further explore and understand selected findings identified from the survey. Between 2021 and 2025, ten additional research outputs were completed in partnership with local researchers. All SLB Surveys and other publications are available at: www.srilankabarometer.lk/publications.

The SLB also undertakes communications and outreach initiatives aimed at both disseminating findings among key stakeholders and the wider public, and at including local voices into the ongoing development of the SLB initiative and survey tool (see also Section 1.3). At the time of writing this report, over 6,000 individuals have participated in outreach events, engaging with SLB findings or exploring how the data can inform their work. Events are announced on the SLB's [website](#) as well as social media channels on [Facebook](#), [Instagram](#), and [X](#).

1.5. STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

While the SLB tracks a broad range of indicators across eight dimensions of reconciliation, this report focuses on a subset of indicators to explore selected issues in greater depth. A summary of trends in other core indicators is provided in the *2025 SLB Overview of Key Indicators* and more findings are accessible via the SLB's Online Data Analysis Tool. Full datasets for past iterations of the SLB Survey are available through the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

As stated, this report seeks to address the evolving dynamics of reconciliation in the context of the political transition of 2024 as well as its implications for governance and active citizenship. The analysis is structured around three principal research questions:

- *How do citizens perceive reconciliation amid the current political transition?* This section examines indicators that provide insight into the current state of reconciliation in Sri Lanka, including perceived demand, progress, barriers to reconciliation, and perspectives on who bears the greatest responsibility for advancing it (Section 3).
- *How do citizens perceive the governance systems, structures, and civic space required to advance reconciliation?* Focused on the dimension of Accountable Governance, this section analyses indicators such as political trust, perceptions of corruption, and personal freedoms to provide insights into how citizens perceive the responsiveness and accountability of existing governance systems and structures in supporting reconciliation efforts (Section 4).
- *How do individuals perceive their own role in driving change for reconciliation?* Shifting the focus from systems to individuals, this section explores indicators such as active citizenship, political agency, and political efficacy – both internal and external – to assess the extent to which citizens feel empowered to contribute to advancing reconciliation (Section 5).

The report concludes with a synthesis of key findings, highlighting overarching trends across the three thematic areas (Section 6) and policy recommendations (Section 7).

¹ The Insights Initiative is a local non-profit research organisation that has been established in 2025 to institutionally anchor and carry forward the Sri Lanka Barometer initiative.



2. METHODOLOGY

2. METHODOLOGY

The SLB uses a quantitative survey methodology to measure people's attitudes, opinions, and beliefs on a wide range of social, political, economic, and cultural issues. As part of a special class of public opinion surveys, it is designed to provide nuanced information about people's views at various levels of disaggregation.

Data is collected using a structured survey questionnaire based on the SLB's conceptual framework (see Annex 1), which was developed through extensive community and expert consultations as well as research conducted ahead of the first iteration of the SLB Survey. The framework consists of eight conceptual dimensions, each with sub-dimensions and associated social indicators that measure people's views on key concepts and form the basis for quantitative analysis. Core indicators are retained across survey rounds to track trends in public opinion on reconciliation over time, while new items are added into successive iterations to capture emerging issues. Examples include survey items on the impact of the COVID pandemic added in 2021, the economic crisis in 2023, and changes in the post-election period in 2025.

After conducting the SLB Baseline Survey in 2020 and a first follow-up in 2021, the SLB adopted a biannual survey interval, following the South African model. This frequency is sufficient to measure societal trends over time while ensuring feasibility, economic viability, and sustainability. A pilot survey with 60 respondents is conducted for each survey iteration to ensure the validity and reliability of survey questions prior to administering the survey country-wide.

The data for the 2025 iteration was collected in January and February 2025. A comprehensive overview of the data collection process is provided in Annex 2.

2.1. SAMPLING FRAMEWORK

The sample was selected from a sample frame of Sri Lankans aged 18 years and above. According to the 2012 Census, this group comprised approximately 70% of the total population, or 14,230,273 out of 20,359,439.² The final sample for the 2025 SLB Survey was 3,876 respondents.³

The sample has a 95% confidence level and a margin of error of 1.6% at the national level. Based on the adult population identified in the census, an optimal sample size was determined to ensure representativeness across multiple levels of disaggregation – including by province, spatial location, ethnicity, religion, gender, and age cohort.

A more detailed explanation of the sampling framework can be found in Annex 2.

2.2. DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

The analysis presented in this report utilises two forms of measure: composite indicators and single-item indicators.

A *composite indicator* is constructed based on multiple survey questionnaire items used to measure a single concept (e.g., political trust, active citizenship). In most cases, composite indicators are comprised of three or more survey items, which are scored by respondents on a 5-point Likert scale and then rescaled from 0 to 10 to facilitate interpretation and visualisation. The results are presented as single mean scores from 0 to 10 for each composite indicator, with higher scores representing greater sentiment towards the concept being measured.

Single-item indicators are constituted of individual survey questionnaire items and are designed specifically as single survey items to understand specific issues (e.g., meaning of reconciliation, barriers to reconciliation). The data from single-item indicators is presented in the form of frequencies (percentage of the population).

The survey questions used to measure each indicator are presented in Annex 4, corresponding to the graph numbers illustrating indicators throughout the report.

2 At the time of writing this report, the figures from the 2012 Census conducted by the Department of Census and Statistics remain the latest official population estimates. A new national census is currently underway and, if available in time, will serve as the basis for sampling in the 2027 SLB Survey.

3 The sample size was 3,880 for the 2020 Baseline Survey, 3,860 for the 2021 Survey, and 3,876 in 2023, enabling comparison across the different survey iterations.

2.3. ADDITIONAL NOTES

The survey report presents findings based on valid percentages, excluding missing values. Missing data are, however, explicitly noted in the report when they exceed 15% and warrant caution in interpretation or are relevant to substantive analysis. Comprehensive datasets that include missing values are available for further analysis via the Roper Center Archives.

Comparisons for the Up-Country Tamil⁴ ethnic group begin in 2023, due to the availability of disaggregated data from that year (refer to Annex 2 for details).

This report presents several new indicators added in 2025. Though lacking trend analysis or comparison with previous years, they provide initial insights into newly measured concepts:

- Greatest Responsibility for Reconciliation (Section 3)
- Perceived Level of Corruption (Section 4)
- Effectiveness of Governments in Addressing Corruption (Section 4)
- Institutions with Most Corruption (Section 4)
- Political Agency (Section 5)

⁴ While the Sri Lankan census classifies this ethnic group as Indian Tamil, existing research and community discussions highlight that many within the group prefer alternative terms that reflect their distinct cultural and historical identity. Commonly used self-identifiers include Up-Country Tamil, Malayaha Makkal/Tamil, and Indian Origin Tamil. In recognition of these preferences, the SLB adopts the term Up-Country Tamil, while fully acknowledging and respecting the range of terms this community uses to self-identify.



3. RECONCILIATION AMID THE POLITICAL TRANSITION

3. RECONCILIATION AMID THE POLITICAL TRANSITION


Since the end of the civil war in 2009, Sri Lanka's reconciliation journey has been marked by periods of progress, ambiguity, and uneven political commitment (see Section 1.1). In this dynamic and often contested context, the SLB has tracked public perceptions since 2020, recognising that understanding how citizens experience and interpret reconciliation is essential to shaping responsive and inclusive reconciliation efforts.

Accordingly, this section considers *how citizens perceive reconciliation amid the current political transition*. It provides insights into the public demand for reconciliation and perceptions of progress made thus far. It also explores how Sri Lankans understand the term reconciliation, what they perceive as the barriers to its achievement, and who they think should bear the greatest responsibility for advancing reconciliation efforts.

3.1. SRI LANKA'S RECONCILIATION DEFICIT

Since 2020, the SLB has measured public perceptions of both the demand for reconciliation as well as the perceived progress in achieving reconciliation. Throughout various crises – including the economic crisis of 2022, which shifted the national agenda towards recovery – survey findings have consistently shown that while the demand for reconciliation remains high, perceived progress continues to lag (Figure 1). This trend also holds in 2025, with results showing a slight uptick at the national level in both demand and perceived progress, returning to levels observed in 2020 after a slight decline in 2023. This increase, smaller in terms of demand but more pronounced in terms of progress, may reflect renewed public attention to reconciliation amid the 2024 political transition and early gestures by the newly elected government (see Section 1.1). These findings indicate that reconciliation remains a core concern for citizens, even during times of economic hardship, political change, and shifting national priorities.

Figure 1: Demand for and Progress of Reconciliation, Nationally, Mean, 2020–2025



At the same time, a gap persists between high public demand – what people feel is needed – and lower levels of perceived progress – what they believe has been achieved. This divergence, referred to as a ‘reconciliation deficit’ (Lederach, 1997; Uyangoda, 2011), underscores the continued need for bridging the gap between public aspiration and perceived realisation. It serves as a bellwether to gauge the level of dissatisfaction with, and likely alienation from, reconciliation efforts that citizens may experience. A widening deficit reflects growing disenchantment and loss of confidence among people in such efforts, which may adversely impact future initiatives. Conversely, a narrowing deficit indicates that reconciliation efforts are keeping pace with people’s expectations, thereby fostering their continued confidence in such processes and their personal contributions towards reconciliation efforts.

The findings further show that results for both demand and progress are broadly consistent across different ethnic groups (Figures 2 and 3), confirming that reconciliation is a shared national priority rather than just a concern of minority groups. At the same time, some variations emerge: demand is slightly higher among Sri Lankan Tamils and Muslims, likely reflecting their historical and ongoing experiences of conflict, giving them a more immediate and profound stake in the process (CPA, 2024b; Sepala, 2025). Notably, results among Up-Country Tamils show the lowest levels of perceived progress, with no change between 2023 and 2025 – unlike all other groups. This stagnation may reflect their continued marginalisation in national reconciliation efforts and discourse (Thirangama, 2013; CSCS, 2017; MeeNilankco et al., 2025).

The reconciliation deficit is more pronounced among Sri Lankan Tamils (2.2 points) and Up-Country Tamils (2.1 points) than Sinhalese and Muslims (1.6 points). These disparities underscore the need for more intentional efforts to include historically overlooked communities in policy conversations. They also point to the importance of reconciliation strategies that recognise both shared aspirations and uneven experiences of progress among different groups.

3. RECONCILIATION AMID THE POLITICAL TRANSITION

Figure 2: Demand for Reconciliation, by Ethnic Group, Mean, 2020–2025





Figure 3: Progress of Reconciliation, by Ethnic Group, Mean, 2020–2025



3.2. WHAT RECONCILIATION MEANS TO SRI LANKANS


When measuring the demand for and progress of reconciliation, it is crucial to understand how Sri Lankans make sense of the term itself, as these interpretations can shape expectations and inform action. Since 2020, public interpretations of reconciliation have both consolidated and diversified. The most striking trend is a sharp rise in the percentage of Sri Lankans who understand reconciliation as *unity/positive relations between all ethnic and religious groups*, which rose from 28.8% in 2021 to 48.5% in 2025 (Figure 4). This marks the highest figure recorded since the SLB Surveys began and suggests that reconciliation is increasingly understood not merely as the absence of conflict, but rather as the presence of meaningful coexistence and intergroup solidarity – a vision that goes beyond simply restoring order to instead actively building social cohesion.

Other understandings of reconciliation – such as *helping, supporting, trusting each other* (9.3%), *ensuring freedom and equality for all* (7.8%), and *economic development/prosperity* (3.8%) – also point to an expanding recognition of its social, structural, and economic dimensions. Only 6.5% of respondents in 2025 define reconciliation as *peace/harmony/no conflict*, reflecting a narrower understanding. This distinction is important: while peace and non-violence are necessary conditions, they are not sufficient for reconciliation (Lerche, 2000; Philpott, 2012). The growing association between reconciliation and a wider set of societal aspirations indicates rising expectations for transformative processes focused on repairing relationships rather than simply containing tensions.

Notably, the proportion of respondents who describe reconciliation in broad, unqualified terms – *reconciliation is good/important/necessary* – has steadily declined, from 15.9% in 2020 to just 5.9% in 2025. This should not be interpreted as declining support for reconciliation (as evidenced by high levels of demand in Figures 1 and 2). Rather, in the context of rising responses that emphasise unity, freedom, equality, and crucial elements of peaceful coexistence, these shifts likely reflect a more developed and concrete understanding of what reconciliation entails.

3. RECONCILIATION AMID THE POLITICAL TRANSITION

Figure 4: Meaning of Reconciliation, Nationally, %, 2025



While responses increasingly cluster around a few dominant themes, 12% of Sri Lankans provided a response coded as *other*, reflecting more disparate responses that did not align with any of the main categories. This continued diversity suggests that, even as shared understandings of reconciliation are gaining traction, the concept remains interpreted in varied and sometimes ambiguous ways. Such variation underscores the importance of sustained public dialogue and inclusive engagement, especially if reconciliation is to be translated from abstract principle into meaningful, widely supported action.

It should also be noted that 6% of respondents indicated they *don't know enough to say/don't understand*, while 22% did not respond at all (missing data). This may reflect limited familiarity with the term in local languages (සමහිරයාව [sammihiriyāva] and நல்லிணக்கம் [nallinakam]) or its infrequent everyday use. It does not, however, inherently suggest that these individuals dismiss the importance of reconciliation itself. In fact, other indicators reveal that this sub-group of respondents still highly valued other core components of reconciliation such as dealing with the past (mean score of 7.2 for this group), recognising past injustices (7.3), memorialisation (7.2), and a collective Sri Lankan identity (7.9). This suggests that even among those unable to define the term, there is an intuitive understanding of and support for its core principles.

3.3. RESPONSIBILITY, BARRIERS, AND RECONCILIATION INSTITUTIONS

In 2025, the SLB introduced a new survey indicator to assess who Sri Lankans believe holds the greatest responsibility for advancing reconciliation in the country. This addition was informed by insights from SLB community outreach programmes, where this question frequently emerged as a topic of discussion, as well as by the 2024 election discourse, which highlighted differing approaches to responsibility and implementation (CPA, 2024c). These discussions underscored the importance of understanding how citizens assign responsibility for reconciliation, shedding more light on how people conceptualise it and whom they look to for leadership in its realisation.


Among those who responded to the question on the meaning of reconciliation,⁵ 50.7% identify political institutions and actors, including the *government* (24.1%), *president* (22.8%), and *politicians* (3.8%), as bearing primary responsibility for advancing it. In contrast, 40.5% attribute this responsibility to *all people/society/the public*. While trends are broadly similar across ethnic groups, a higher proportion of Up-Country Tamils (51.9%) assigns primary responsibility to *all people/society/the public*, and higher proportions of Sri Lankan Tamils (29.9%), Up-Country Tamils (27.4%), and Muslims (25.5%) identify the *president* as holding the greatest responsibility, compared to Sinhalese respondents (20.7%) (Figure 5). The specific emphasis on the president may reflect both the heightened focus on the recent elections and the powers associated with Sri Lanka's executive presidency. Additionally, minority communities seem to expect stronger executive leadership in addressing historical grievances. Overall, the findings point to a dual conceptualisation of reconciliation as both a social and a political process.

Interestingly, only 3.5% of respondents ascribe primary responsibility for reconciliation to *religious leaders*. This does not imply that religious figures are viewed as unimportant in reconciliation efforts, but rather that they may not be seen as responsible for driving this process. It may also reflect the controversial role of individual religious figures in the recent past, including involvement in nationalist movements and rhetoric that has in some instances contributed to communal tensions or violence against minorities (Keenan, 2022; Associated Press, 2022).

⁵ Respondents who indicated that they did not understand the term reconciliation/did not answer the preceding question were excluded from the question on assigning responsibility, as it would not be meaningful to ask individuals to attribute responsibility for a concept they do not recognise or comprehend.


3. RECONCILIATION AMID THE POLITICAL TRANSITION

Figure 5: Greatest Responsibility for Advancing Reconciliation, Nationally and by Ethnic Group, %, 2025



Disaggregating responses to this question by gender also reveals some notable differences (Figure 6). More men than women assign primary responsibility for reconciliation to political actors and institutions such as the *president*, *politicians*, and the *government*, with a combined total of 56.2% as compared to 45.2% of women. In contrast, more women than men emphasise collective social responsibility, with 47% attributing reconciliation efforts to *all people/society/the public* compared to 33.9% of men. Additionally, albeit a smaller response category overall, more than twice as many men see primary responsibility with *religious leaders* (5.2% compared to 1.9% of women). These findings highlight a gendered divergence in how responsibility for reconciliation is understood, wherein men appear more likely to look toward authority figures and institutional actors to lead the process and women more often emphasise shared responsibility among all individuals and communities. These differing understandings may reflect deeply embedded gendered structures in Sri Lankan society (FOKUS, 2016; Fonseka and Schulz, 2020), where women's more limited participation in formal political processes may shape their emphasis on social engagement, while men's greater integration into these structures may lead them to place less emphasis on relational or community-based dimensions of reconciliation.


Figure 6: Greatest Responsibility for Advancing Reconciliation, Nationally and by Gender, %, 2025



Similar gendered patterns emerge in the perceptions of barriers to reconciliation (Figure 7). Women predominantly identify socioeconomic issues, including a *lack of harmony* (21.6%), *economic inequality* (15.2%), *discrimination* (12.8%), *language barriers* (4.4%), and *people's attitudes* (13.1%), with a combined percentage of 67.1%, compared to 49.1% for men. Conversely, more men identify political challenges, such as *abuse of power* (16.6%), *lack of political will* (13.1%), *divisive nationalist politics* (7.2%), and *corruption* (2.2%), as significant obstacles, with a combined total of 39.1%, compared to 23.2% for women.


3. RECONCILIATION AMID THE POLITICAL TRANSITION

Figure 7: Biggest Barrier to Reconciliation, Nationally and by Gender, %, 2025



This gendered lens intersects with broader national trends. Political factors have featured prominently as perceived barriers to reconciliation since SLB data collection commenced in 2020. In 2023, a combined total of 53.6% of Sri Lankans identified political issues, such as *abuse of political power/centralisation of power/political influence*, *lack of political will*, and *divisive nationalist politics*, as significant obstacles. By 2025, this figure has dropped significantly to 29.2%. Particularly notable is the decline in the perception of *political will* as a barrier, which decreased from 25.7% in 2020 to 10.4% in 2025, and *divisive nationalist politics*, which fell from 37.5% in 2020 to 6.0% in 2025 (Figure 8). While political issues remain a concern for many, these changes may reflect a broader shift in public sentiment, marked by cautious optimism and rising expectations for institutional responsiveness in the wake of the 2024 political transition.


Figure 8: Biggest Barrier to Reconciliation, Responses for Lack of Political Will and Divisive Nationalist Politics, Nationally, %, 2020–2025



The emphasis on political actors, albeit having decreased as an identified barrier, may also reflect the view that reconciliation should be a political priority. This interpretation aligns with the high levels of demand for reconciliation (see Section 3.1) and the high importance attributed to reconciliation institutions (national mean score of 7.8 in 2025), including the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka (HRCSL), OMP, OR, and the proposed CTUR (Figure 9).

The importance placed on these institutions is relatively similar across provinces, with slightly higher scores within the Northern and Eastern Provinces. These regions, having borne the brunt of the civil war, continue to face challenges such as land disputes and unresolved issues surrounding disappearances (Human Rights Watch, 2018; Wanigasuriya, 2020; Human Rights Watch, 2024a), and may therefore perceive these institutions to be particularly important in addressing past harms, securing justice, and facilitating long-awaited redress.

Figure 9: Importance of Reconciliation Institutions, Nationally and by Province, Mean, 2020–2025



It should also be noted that 10.1% of respondents did not respond to this indicator (missing data), which may suggest a lack of familiarity with these institutions for one in ten respondents. This points to a possible gap between the high expectations placed on them and a lack of awareness about their roles and mandates. It further underscores the need for both greater public outreach and strengthened capacity to deliver on their functions, to increase visibility, effectiveness, and legitimacy (see also Sri Lanka Barometer, 2024).

3.4. SUMMARY

The SLB findings presented in this section point to a range of perspectives and tensions that continue to surround the idea and practice of reconciliation in Sri Lanka. They reveal a persistent reconciliation deficit and highlight complex understandings of the roles of societal, political, and institutional mechanisms in advancing – or hindering – reconciliation and sustainable peace. While public demand for reconciliation remains high, assessments of progress continue to lag, with both political actors and collective societal efforts seen as central to this journey.

Furthermore, gendered analyses reveal differences in how men and women understand and experience reconciliation and its obstacles. More men perceive reconciliation as a political process, reliant on institutional mechanisms and authority figures, whereas more women view it as a community-driven, social process requiring collective engagement – patterns that may be shaped by broader gendered structures in society. Rather than reinforcing these divides, reconciliation efforts should actively challenge them: by ensuring women’s inclusion in institutional and political spaces, and by encouraging men’s engagement in social and community-based processes.

The background of the page is an abstract composition of silhouettes of people. The top half features silhouettes in shades of blue and teal against a lighter blue background. The bottom half features silhouettes in shades of orange, yellow, and red against a lighter orange background. A dark olive green horizontal band runs across the middle, containing the section header in white text.

4. SYSTEMS, STRUCTURES, AND SPACE FOR RECONCILIATION

Sri Lanka's progress in reconciliation has been slow and uneven in the years since the end of the war (Aliff, 2016; Fernando, 2020; Upuldeniya et al., 2022), often hindered by shifting political priorities and inconsistent implementation of existing policies across successive governments (Dimuthu Kumari, 2024; EconomyNext, 2024; The Morning, 2025). Reflecting the link between governance and reconciliation, one of the eight dimensions of reconciliation measured through the SLB is Accountable Governance, which considers issues of government inclusivity, credibility, stability, responsiveness, transparency, and accountability in systems that serve all citizens equitably (Sri Devapura, 2024).


Against this backdrop, this section explores the following question: *How do citizens perceive the governance systems, structures, and civic space required to advance reconciliation?* It examines public perceptions of the political and institutional landscape shaping reconciliation in Sri Lanka today, with a focus on political trust, corruption, and personal freedoms. Analysis of these indicators offers insight into citizen assessments of the integrity of governance systems, the effectiveness of institutional structures, and the openness of civic space in post-war Sri Lanka.

4.1. SHIFTS IN POLITICAL TRUST AND REGIONAL DYNAMICS


Section 3 noted a significant decrease in the perceptions of political will as a barrier to reconciliation in 2025 compared with earlier years. This shift is complemented by trends in the political trust indicator – which measures public confidence in institutions, including the national government, local government, divisional secretariat, police, and courts – mirroring optimism in perceptions of political intent and trust at the time of data collection in early 2025.

Political trust scores at the national level increased notably, rising by a full point to 6.9 from 5.9 in 2023 and reaching the highest levels of recorded political trust measured by the SLB since 2020 (Figure 10). These results mark a steady recovery from a low of 4.8 in 2021 and may reflect a sense of renewed public confidence following several key events, most notably the *Aragalaya* movement in 2022 and the landslide victory of the newly elected government in 2024.

Figure 10: Political Trust, Nationally, Mean, 2020–2025



This national trend is reflected across most provinces, with the North Western Province recording the highest levels of political trust (mean score of 7.2) and the Southern and Sabaragamuwa Provinces showing the most notable year-on-year increases, each rising by 1.3 points (Figure 11). However, political trust declined in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, reflecting more complex regional dynamics. One contributing factor may be the outcome of the 2024 parliamentary elections, in which the National People's Power (NPP) achieved notable success. While they secured victories in traditionally Tamil-majority districts such as Jaffna (Election Commission of Sri Lanka, 2024), marking the first instance of a non-Tamil party securing wins in these areas, this was largely attributed to the high fragmentation of Tamil political parties at the time (Tamil Guardian, 2025a; Kuruwita, 2025). Additionally, longstanding justice claims related to the war remain unresolved, continuing to erode trust and reflecting the fractured relationship between Tamil communities and the state (Satkunanathan, 2025). These patterns underscore the nuanced regional dynamics and the complexities of political trust in post-war contexts.

Figure 11: Political Trust, Nationally and by Province, Mean, 2020–2025


4.2. CORRUPTION AND ITS IMPACT ON RECONCILIATION

In recent years, the issue of corruption has gained considerable prominence within public discourse, largely catalysed by the economic crisis (ICG, 2024; CPA, 2023a). It has been widely identified as a key driver of the economic collapse and the subsequent hardships endured by citizens (CEPA, 2024; CPA, 2025b; World Bank, 2025; EconomyNext, 2025). Beyond its economic impact, corruption also hampers reconciliation processes by undermining political trust, diminishing individual agency, and eroding political efficacy (Richey, 2010; Transparency International, 2014; Jha et al., 2025).

In 2024, Sri Lanka scored 32 out of 100 in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI),⁶ where lower scores indicate higher levels of perceived corruption, reflecting a moderately high assessment of public sector corruption below the regional average score of 44. Sri Lanka ranked 121st out of 180 countries, placing it in the bottom third globally (Transparency International, 2025a; 2025c).

In this context, the NPP's anti-corruption agenda played a key role in bolstering its public appeal (Aamer, 2024; Hattotuwa, 2025). Reflecting these developments, the SLB introduced a series of corruption indicators in 2025 to gauge public opinion about its perceived prevalence and impact.

At the national level, perceptions of public sector corruption are moderately high in 2025, with a mean score of 6.1. Looking at the provincial level, mean scores are slightly lower than the national average in the North Western and North Central Provinces (5.6 and 5.7 respectively), while the Northern and Eastern Provinces perceive slightly higher levels of corruption (6.5 and 6.4 respectively) (Figure 12). These findings are consistent with lower levels of political trust and perceived state responsiveness in the Northern and Eastern Provinces (see Sections 4.1, 5.1). Other studies similarly suggests that regions where institutions are perceived as less accountable or responsive tend to report higher levels of corruption (Danish et al., 2024). The convergence of indicators – namely political trust, state responsiveness, and perceived corruption – points to the need for further research into how these dynamics interact. Future iterations of the SLB Survey will enable tracking and comparison of these trends over time.

Figure 12: Perceived Level of Corruption in the Public Sector, Nationally and by Province, Mean, 2025

⁶ The CPI is not based on general public opinion surveys but draws on expert assessments and business surveys, considering factors such as bribery, embezzlement, or nepotism. The SLB's measurement complements these findings.

4. SYSTEMS, STRUCTURES, AND SPACE FOR RECONCILIATION


When asked which public institutions exhibit the highest levels of corruption, nearly half of the respondents point to *parliament* (43.4%), followed by the *police* (14.5%), and *local government bodies* (12.5%), including provincial councils, local councils, and Grama Niladhari offices. These results highlight the importance of continued efforts to strengthen institutional integrity and rebuild public trust in democratic structures.

In light of these concerns, the 2025 SLB Survey asked respondents to compare their expectations of the current government's ability to effectively address corruption with that of previous administrations, offering insight into public confidence in prospects for reform.

While it is important to consider that only a few months had passed between the elections and the start of survey data collection in January 2025, the results nonetheless reveal considerable optimism among citizens, with 38.7% describing the current administration as either *effective* or *very effective* in addressing corruption (Figure 13). In contrast, only 12.5% of respondents believe that previous governments were effective in this regard. Conversely, only 10.2% of respondents expect the current government to be ineffective, combining responses for *not effective* and *not effective at all*. This is markedly lower than the 45.8% who express similar sentiments about previous governments. These perceptions align with the broader increase in political trust observed in 2025, suggesting a mutually reinforcing relationship: confidence in the government's ability to address a major issue like corruption may contribute to rising trust, just as heightened trust may shape more favourable perceptions of its effectiveness in addressing corruption.

It should be noted that this observed optimism, while encouraging, may be attributable to the post-election bump and novelty of the new government. In future SLB iterations, it will be important to track whether such perceptions are sustained.

Figure 13: Effectiveness of Previous and Present Government(s) in Addressing Corruption, Nationally, %, 2025



4.3. PERCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRATIC SPACE


Effective governance systems characterised by inclusivity, credibility, stability, responsiveness, transparency, and accountability are vital for advancing reconciliation and establishing a robust democratic framework (Grindle, 2010). Additionally, open and secure democratic spaces play a crucial role in fostering both reconciliation and the strength of democratic institutions (Gomez, 2019; Carothers and Hartnett, 2021). To examine these dynamics, the SLB explores perceived levels of personal freedoms and community safety in the country.

Perceptions of personal freedoms increased significantly from a mean score of 6.0 in 2023 to 7.4 in 2025 – the highest level recorded since SLB data collection began (Figure 14). While lower assessments of personal freedoms in previous SLB rounds are consistent with other data,⁷ the sharp increase in 2025 likely captures the heightened public expectations for tangible reforms and improvements in democratic space surrounding the recent political transition. These shifts also resonate with the increase in political trust observed in 2025, suggesting a shared public perception that institutional change and greater civic freedoms may now be more attainable.

The SLB findings on community safety also reflect positive sentiments. This indicator measures people's feeling of safety in the presence of law enforcement, military, and state intelligence operatives. Notably, the national scores for community safety have remained consistently high, with a slight increase observed in 2025 (from 8.3 in 2023 to 8.5 in 2025) (Figure 14).


⁷ Sri Lanka scores of 5.2 out of 10 in the 2024 Human Freedom Index, positioning it within the lower third globally (Vásquez et al., 2024). As the Human Freedom Index is based on third party data, including legal indicators from various sources (e.g., World Bank, Freedom House Index), rather than public opinion, SLB data and the Human Freedom Index should be understood as complementary measures which reflect different types of information.

Figure 14: Personal Freedoms and Community Safety, Nationally, Mean, 2020–2025



A provincial analysis of the data reveals variations in perception. While perceived levels of community safety in the Northern and Eastern Provinces remain notably lower than in other regions, the 2025 data reflect significant improvements (Figure 15). These disparities may be linked to the continued presence and activities of security and intelligence agencies in these areas (U.S. Department of State, 2023; Human Rights Watch, 2024b). At the same time, the positive shift may reflect heightened public optimism following recent political transition and associated expectation for reform, such as the proposed repeal of the PTA (CPA, 2023b), a policy closely associated with community safety concerns, and initial steps to desecuritise the North and East by removing military checkpoints (Tamil Guardian, 2025b; Pattanaik, 2025). However, it is important to recognise that such optimism may be short-lived if not accompanied by substantive and timely reform. Without tangible action, the gains in public confidence observed in the data may prove difficult to sustain.

Figure 15: Community Safety, Nationally and by Province, Mean, 2020–2025



4.4. SUMMARY

This section highlights a complex interplay between increased public confidence and lingering challenges in governance for reconciliation. The notable rise in political trust and perceptions of personal freedoms in 2025 may reflect both cautious optimism and heightened public expectations post-elections. Similarly, improvements in community safety scores suggest a growing confidence in the role of law enforcement and state authorities.

At the same time, corruption remains a critical obstacle, with parliament identified as the institution with the highest perceived levels of corruption, underscoring the need for decisive anti-corruption measures to further increase public confidence in critical public and governance institutions. Regional disparities, particularly in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, reveal nuanced dynamics that require tailored approaches to reconciliation and governance reform.

As Sri Lanka navigates this period of political transition, it must sustain public optimism through concrete actions and reforms that address systemic issues of corruption, transparency, inequality, and accountability to ensure lasting progress toward inclusive and stable governance structures that can meaningfully advance reconciliation.

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5. CIVIC PARTICIPATION FOR RECONCILIATION

5. CIVIC PARTICIPATION FOR RECONCILIATION

Active citizen participation is essential for fostering reconciliation and sustainable peace within a nation (Wallensteen, 2013). It typically involves several behaviours and actions, notably expressing societal concerns, holding leaders and governments accountable, and fulfilling civic duties such as voting (Gomez, 2019). Insights from SLB community consultations conducted in 2018/2019 highlighted that Sri Lankans value both the ability to inspire positive change and equal opportunities for civic involvement as key factors for achieving reconciliation (see Annex 1).

While earlier sections analysed how citizens see reconciliation amid the political transition and their perceptions of government structures and systems, this section shifts focus to the individual and explores the following question: *How do individuals perceive their own role in driving change for reconciliation?* It examines how Sri Lankans perceive themselves within these systems, focusing on their confidence to engage in civic and political matters (internal political efficacy), sense of influence over political outcomes (political agency), belief in the system to respond meaningfully to their needs (external political efficacy), and motivation to engage politically.


5.1. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLITICAL EFFICACY

Confidence in one's ability to engage with political systems plays a key role in citizens' willingness to participate in the democratic process and effect change (Aberbach, 1969; Padilla et al., 2020). To understand this dynamic in Sri Lanka, the SLB uses a composite indicator to measure internal political efficacy, which captures the extent to which individuals feel knowledgeable and confident enough to engage with social and political issues. This indicator also gauges citizens' attitudes about voting as a meaningful way to influence societal and political outcomes.

SLB data from 2025 indicates moderately high and improving levels of internal political efficacy, with the national mean score increasing by 0.6 points from 2023, and slightly surpassing the first recorded score in 2020 (Figure 16). This upward trend suggests a growing sense of confidence among citizens in their ability to engage with political systems. This is arguably influenced by the decisive 2024 election, the outcome of which ensued directly from the voting choices made by citizens, thereby reinforcing their belief in their ability to create systemic change.

The observed rise in political efficacy is evident among both women and men, with increases of 0.6 and 0.5 points respectively. However, women continue to report lower levels of political efficacy than men, and their scores remain below the national average (Figure 16). This disparity may also help explain the lower levels of active citizenship among women – 1.7 in 2025, compared to 2.4 for men (see also Section 5.2). Multiple factors contribute to this gap: political power in Sri Lanka has not only been historically associated with masculinity but has also largely remained in the hands of men, reflecting the systematic exclusion of women from political spaces (National Democratic Institute, 2020). Sri Lankan women continue to be among the least-represented in national legislatures globally (The Global Economy, 2023) and face significant structural and societal barriers to political participation (Athukorala et al., 2022). These challenges are reinforced by deeply entrenched patriarchal norms, exclusionary political institutions, and the prevalence of misogynistic attitudes and gendered disinformation that often target women in public life (WHO, 2018; International Civil Society Action Network, 2013; The Women Peace and Security Helpdesk, 2022). Nonetheless, there has been measurable progress, with a record 21 women elected to parliament in 2024, increasing the proportion of female representation to approximately 10.2%, doubling the 5.3% recorded in 2023 (Sri Lanka Brief, 2024).


Figure 16: Internal Political Efficacy, Nationally and by Gender, Mean, 2020–2025



5. CIVIC PARTICIPATION FOR RECONCILIATION

All provinces mirror the national trend of rising internal political efficacy between 2023 and 2025, except for the North Central Province, where the mean score remains unchanged. However, the time series reveals further nuance: since 2020, scores have increased overall in the Western, Central, Eastern, and Sabaragamuwa Provinces, while remaining below earlier recorded levels in all other provinces (Figure 17). The highest levels of internal political efficacy in 2025 are recorded in the Northern and Eastern Provinces (with mean scores of 7.2), which may be linked to the higher-than-average active citizenship observed in these regions (see Section 5.2).

Figure 17: Internal Political Efficacy, Nationally and by Province, Mean, 2020–2025




However, these levels of internal confidence are not matched by perceptions of political agency. Political agency refers to the capacity of individuals or groups to influence decisions, demand accountability, and shape governance outcomes. It is a multidimensional concept shaped by the openness of political institutions, prevailing social norms, and existing power dynamics (Dahl, 1971; Sen, 1999). The SLB has introduced a new indicator to measure political agency in 2025. It asks Sri Lankans how much they believe politicians listen to public opinion, advocate for community needs, and align with the will of the people. These perceptions provide insight into how individuals assess their influence on political processes by making their voices count within the democratic system.

In 2025, the national mean score for political agency stands at a moderately low 4.3 (Figure 18). The highest mean scores for political agency are recorded among Muslims (4.8), while the lowest are among Up-Country Tamils (3.8) – falling below the national average. The reasons for these lower scores may include the historic marginalisation of Up-Country Tamils, as well as their continued underrepresentation in formal political structures (International Institute on Statelessness and Inclusion, 2018; Ramasamy, 2022; MeeNilankco et al., 2025).

Interestingly, mean political agency scores among Sinhalese were lower than those of both Sri Lankan Tamils and Muslims – despite 56.3% of survey respondents identifying the Sinhalese majority as the most politically powerful group in the country.⁸ This contrast points to a divergence between externally attributed structural power and individual perceptions of influence. This divergence raises questions that merit further exploration through additional data points in future SLB iterations – potentially linked to shifts in political representation, a perceived decline of nationalist politics following the 2024 election, and disillusionment with mainstream political actors (DeVotta, 2024; Gamage and Dassanayake, 2024; Silva, 2025).

Figure 18: Political Agency, Nationally and by Ethnic Group, Mean, 2025




⁸ Another SLB indicator poses an open-ended question asking respondents which group they believe holds the most political power in the country. In 2025, 56.3% identified the Sinhalese majority, 27.6% pointed to a small group of elites from all communities, 11.4% to a small group of Sinhalese elites, 1.9% to clergy from all religions, 1.5% to a small group of Tamil elites, and 1.2% to a small group of Muslim elites.

5. CIVIC PARTICIPATION FOR RECONCILIATION

The gap between perceptions of internal political efficacy and political agency (6.7 and 4.3 respectively at the national level in 2025) further points to a disconnect between citizens' beliefs in their own political capacity and assessments of their ability to influence political outcomes. This may reflect ongoing scepticism about meaningful political representation – even amid renewed public optimism as highlighted through other indicators – and could weaken democratic engagement over time if left unaddressed.

As the political agency indicator was introduced in 2025, trends over time cannot yet be analysed. However, parallel measures such as external political efficacy offer further insights. External political efficacy is based on citizen evaluations of government responsiveness, which influences their likelihood of civic participation (Pitkin, 1967; Powell, 2004; Disch, 2011; Esaiasson et al., 2013). While levels of external political efficacy remain relatively high (mean score of 7.3 in 2025), scores have declined both nationally and across all provinces except Uva (Figure 19). The sharpest drop since 2023 is recorded in the Northern Province (by 1 point), while the Eastern Province shows the steepest overall decline since 2020 (by 1.6 points), continuing a steady downward trend over time. In comparison, time series scores within other provinces are more variable. The more pronounced declines in the North and East suggest a sharper erosion of public confidence in the state's ability to respond to people's needs in these historically marginalised regions.

Figure 19: State Responsiveness, Nationally and by Province, Mean 2020–2025



It should be noted that in 2025, the items to measure this indicator were expanded to include the national government in addition to previously assessed local government institutions (divisional secretariats, local councils, and Grama Niladhari offices). This adjustment had a noticeable impact on state responsiveness scores. While the mean scores reduced either way, the inclusion of the National Government item resulted in a further lowering of the national mean score from 7.6 to 7.3. This suggests that citizens perceive national-level institutions as less accessible and responsive than their local counterparts, a sentiment likely shaped by greater distance and relatively limited access to national government, compared to the closer proximity and more ready access to local structures.


The SLB findings on (internal and external) political efficacy and political agency offer a nuanced picture. While citizens report a growing sense of confidence in their capacities to engage politically, assessments of their ability to influence political outcomes are lower, and formal institutions are viewed as slightly less responsive in 2025, albeit scores remaining high overall. This discrepancy may reflect the broader political context of the 2024 transition, highlighting the potential of citizen engagement, while also pointing to greater effort needed to translate this engagement into governance outcomes and demonstrate institutional responsiveness.

5.2. MOTIVATION TO POLITICALLY ENGAGE


The 2022 economic crisis and the *Aragalaya* movement were a pivotal moment for civic engagement in Sri Lanka, highlighting the public's capacity to mobilise and demand political change (Freedom House, 2022; CPA, 2023a). However, while the movement led to leadership turnover, many structural reforms remain unfulfilled, reflecting deeper democratic challenges, including limited institutional mechanisms for sustained citizen influence. The *Aragalaya* thus highlighted both the potential of collective action and the enduring barriers to meaningful participatory governance.

These tensions are reflected in changing patterns of political motivation and engagement over time. In 2022, the SLB found that half the population (50.3%) felt more motivated to engage politically in response to the economic crisis (Figure 20). Subsequent findings, however, show that this momentum diminished significantly by 2023, with only 20.7% reporting increased motivation to politically engage, and a notable 67.3% disengaging politically. This trend again changed course in 2025, as the percentage of disengaged individuals declined to 50.1%, while 35.2% report being more motivated to engage politically (combined figures for *a little more motivated* and *a lot more motivated*).

Although these disengagement levels remain concerning for a democracy in which citizen participation is vital to political accountability and inclusive governance, the 2025 resurgence may be attributed to the 2024 electoral cycle, which included both presidential and parliamentary elections, events typically associated with heightened public engagement (Eckstein et al., 2024). Still, voter turnout in both elections was lower than in previous cycles (Silva, 2025), pointing to persistent challenges in (re-)building trust and enthusiasm among the electorate.

Figure 20: Motivation to Politically Engage Due to the Current Economic Situation, Nationally, %, 2022–2025⁹

A closer look at motivation to engage politically across age cohorts shows that in 2025, young adults aged 18 to 30 are the most motivated, with 39.8% answering that they feel either *a little* or *a lot more motivated* to engage politically (Figure 21). This group also reports the least disengagement, although still high at 46.1%. The data further shows that motivation declines gradually with older age cohorts, with Sri Lankans aged 61 and above expressing the highest levels of disengagement at 63.2%. These patterns suggest that older populations may feel more disconnected from political processes, possibly due to long-term disillusionment or structural barriers to participation. They may also reflect generational differences and the impact of the declining influence of traditional political parties following the 2024 political transition on older generations, who were more shaped by an era of patronage politics and strong loyalties to parties and personalities (Aamer, 2024; Jayasundara-Smits, 2022).

Figure 21: Motivation to Politically Engage Due to the Current Economic Situation, Nationally and by Age Cohort, %, 2025

Renewed motivation for engagement in 2025 is further reflected in an increase in active citizenship levels nationally, with the mean score rising significantly by 1.0 point from 1.1 to 2.1, albeit still at the lower end of the 0 to 10 scale. Notably, minority ethnic groups continue to report higher levels of active citizenship than members of the Sinhalese majority (Figure 22). Research suggests that divergent lived experiences, particularly those shaped by historical conflict, significantly influence patterns of political engagement (Azmi et al., 2015). This phenomenon is evident among Sri Lankan Tamils, whose political activism – largely concentrated in the Northern and Eastern Provinces – has historically been aimed at addressing grievances from both wartime and post-war periods (Thiranagama, 2011; Silva et al., 2018). The mean active citizenship score among Sri Lankan Tamils stands at 3.0 in 2025 (Figure 23), surpassing the national average by nearly 1.0 point, alongside similarly elevated scores from the Northern and Eastern Provinces (Figure 23).

⁹ Data collection for this indicator commenced with the SLB Snapshot Survey in 2022. Given the smaller sample size of the 2022 Snapshot Survey, the data was subsequently re-weighted to ensure comparability with later survey rounds.

Figure 22: Active Citizenship, Nationally and by Ethnic Group, Mean, 2020–2025





Figure 23: Active Citizenship, Nationally and by Province, Mean, 2020–2025



5.3. SUMMARY

The patterns of civic engagement emerging from the 2025 SLB data offer insights into Sri Lanka’s shifting political landscape. The findings underscore a dual reality: while citizens increasingly report a sense of empowerment and belief in their capacity to engage in political processes (internal political efficacy), and the political transition of 2024 appears to have catalysed renewed motivation for engagement, perceptions of the responsiveness of formal institutions have declined (external political efficacy). Additionally, challenges persist in ensuring that public voices translate into tangible policy influence (political agency).

The often distinct experiences in historically underrepresented regions, particularly the Northern and Eastern Provinces, illustrate the dynamic interplay between historical grievances and renewed political aspirations. As Sri Lanka moves forward, sustaining positive momentum will require not only fostering confidence in civic participation but also ensuring that government responsiveness aligns with the expectations of an engaged citizenry. The SLB data presented in this section reinforces that political engagement requires an empowered citizenry that is able to meaningfully participate in the democratic process not only in moments of crises or elections, but as part of a continuous process sustained by adequate systems and an enabling civic space.



6. CONCLUSIONS

6. CONCLUSIONS

The results of the 2025 SLB Survey provide important and unique insights into how citizens perceive the current state of reconciliation amid the political transition; their views on governance systems, structures, and spaces as they relate to the advancement of reconciliation; and their assessments of their own capacity and influence in driving change for reconciliation.

Within these three thematic areas and across the 2025 survey results, some areas of tension become apparent. These include heightened public aspirations and expectations of change, alongside persistent scepticism; shared needs and priorities, in contrast with disparate regional and community experiences of reconciliation; and increasing political confidence tempered by doubts about citizen influence and institutional responsiveness. These observations point to a public that is expectant yet cautious, hopeful yet aware of long-standing political and systemic limitations.

Amid these tensions, the SLB findings highlight both emerging opportunities and longstanding challenges in advancing reconciliation, (re-)building trust in political structures and institutions, and fostering inclusive civic engagement.

Importantly, the 2025 SLB Survey documents the continuation of a reconciliation deficit in Sri Lanka, in which high public demand for reconciliation is not matched by comparatively modest perceptions of progress. While this gap is evident across all major ethnic groups, it is more pronounced among Sri Lankan Tamils and Up-Country Tamils – highlighting the need for more inclusive approaches that engage communities historically most affected by conflict and marginalisation.

The findings also show that public understandings of reconciliation appear to be converging. Increasingly associated with unity and peaceful coexistence, reconciliation is framed not simply as the absence of violence, but as an ongoing process of (re-)building social relationships. At the same time, results from multiple indicators reveal a dual conception of reconciliation, as both a political process requiring institutional commitment, and a social process rooted in everyday relationships. This is also apparent in gendered views on both barriers to and responsibility for reconciliation. While more women see reconciliation as a shared societal responsibility and identify socioeconomic barriers such as economic inequality and discrimination, more men emphasise political factors as barriers and the responsibility of institutional actors.

These findings also highlight the centrality of good governance in shaping the country's reconciliation trajectory and reinforce the urgency of strengthening institutional accountability. Across indicators related to political trust, corruption, and personal freedoms, the 2025 data reveal cautious but tangible increases in public confidence – particularly when compared to the downward trend observed in 2021. Political trust rose to its highest recorded level since 2020, and perceptions of personal freedoms improved significantly, suggesting that the 2024 political transition has generated cautious optimism and renewed public expectations for institutional reform. However, maintaining this confidence over time will depend on the visibility and effectiveness of concrete, sustained action.

Additionally, regional disparities emerge: in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, political trust has declined, while higher levels of corruption are reported. These patterns likely reflect deeper concerns around representation, justice, and the credibility of state-led reconciliation efforts, underscoring the need for governance approaches that are not only transparent and accountable, but also locally responsive and cognisant of historical grievances and unequal experiences of state engagement.

In terms of civic participation, the findings reflect a tentative but discernible shift. Internal political efficacy and motivation to politically engage have recovered from a low point in 2023, suggesting that the political change in 2024 has – at least temporarily – revitalised civic engagement. However, this increased sense of individual confidence is not yet matched by perceptions of political agency, and perceptions of state responsiveness point to a mixed picture. Many citizens appear to remain doubtful that public officials will listen to or act upon their concerns, suggesting that without more accessible and responsive mechanisms for meaningful civic engagement, increased political motivation may (again) give way to frustration and disillusionment. Bridging this gap must be a priority for any political strategy aimed at deepening democratic accountability and inclusive governance.

Overall, the 2025 Sri Lanka Barometer Survey findings reflect a country at a pivotal juncture, where citizens are actively deliberating and renegotiating the terms of trust between themselves and the state. Across communities, there is a clear and consistent demand for reconciliation that calls not only for structural reform but also for renewed attention to relationships, inclusion, and recognition. The findings highlight the importance of intersectional approaches that consider identity markers such as gender, ethnicity, and age in both reconciliation policy and civic engagement, recognising the diverse ways in which individuals from different social groups and communities relate to political systems and the reconciliation process. While the recent political transition has generated renewed engagement and raised public expectations, these are accompanied by continued scepticism. Whether this moment translates into sustained progress will depend on the credibility, inclusivity, and transparency of the state's response.

Reconciliation, as reflected in the SLB data, is not a static goal but a continuous process that unfolds within evolving political and socioeconomic dynamics. This process must remain responsive to the enduring legacies of conflict as well as to the emerging aspirations of an increasingly engaged citizenry. The perspectives captured in this report offer clear signals about public priorities, needs, and expectations, providing an evidence-based foundation for those committed to (re-)building trust, strengthening democratic space, and ensuring that governance is shaped by and accountable to the people it serves.

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7. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

7. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

This section presents recommendations informed by the findings of the 2025 SLB Survey. These recommendations are offered as suggestions and intended to inform dialogue and reflection among policymakers, practitioners, and civil society actors, while acknowledging the importance of diverse perspectives and the value of public opinion.

Recommendations related to findings from Section 3: Reconciliation Amid the Political Transition (references to specific Sections in brackets)

1. **Bridge the reconciliation deficit through targeted outreach and implementation in underrepresented communities (3.1):** It is important to prioritise reconciliation programming that actively includes Sri Lankan Tamils and Up-Country Tamils, whose perceptions of progress remain lowest and whose reconciliation deficit is highest. Programmes should be locally embedded and informed by community priorities.
2. **Support public education and discourse to deepen understanding of reconciliation (3.2):** Given the growing association of reconciliation with unity and coexistence, but also persistent gaps in conceptual clarity, there is a need to develop appropriate initiatives, such as multilingual awareness campaigns and school curricula that reflect inclusive, pluralistic understandings of reconciliation. These efforts should be accompanied by accessible and engaging tools to ensure broad public reach and meaningful impact.
3. **Incorporate gendered perspectives into reconciliation policies and interventions (3.3):** Recognising that women tend to view reconciliation as a shared social responsibility while men focus more on institutional actors, policies should reflect these differing perspectives and address the gendered power dynamics that shape them. This could include promoting women's access to political processes (see also 9), tackling barriers such as discrimination and economic inequality – more frequently raised by women –, and designing initiatives that mobilise both community-based and institutional channels for engagement.
4. **Maintain reconciliation as a political priority and strengthen key reconciliation institutions (3.3):** The sharp decline in political will as a perceived barrier to reconciliation signals an opportunity for renewed progress. To build on this momentum, reconciliation commitments should be formalised through policy and legislation, with clear mandates and timelines for mechanisms such as the CTUR. At the same time, meaningful progress will depend on the visibility and credibility of institutions tasked with implementation. Despite their perceived importance, 10.1% of respondents are unfamiliar with bodies like the HRCSL, OMP, and OR, underscoring the need to invest in public outreach and engagement. Strengthening these institutions requires clarified mandates, adequate resources, effective inter-institutional coordination, and public accountability mechanisms, such as transparent procedures, regular reporting, and inclusive engagement – especially in, but not limited to, the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

Recommendations related to findings from Section 4: Systems, Structures, and Space for Reconciliation (references to specific Sections in brackets)

5. **(Re-)Build political trust through institutionalised public engagement and addressing regional disparities (4.1):** The post-election uptick in political trust presents an important opportunity to build momentum for more inclusive and accountable governance. Several approaches could help achieve this, such as institutionalising regular public dialogues, participatory feedback loops, and co-creation of policy, ensuring that citizen voices are both recognised and reflected in state performance. At the same time, in the Northern and Eastern Provinces where political trust has declined, confidence-building should include measures towards greater political representation and inclusion and improved local service delivery, while acknowledging and addressing historical grievances and calls for justice. These efforts can help rebuild trust in state institutions, particularly in historically marginalised regions.
6. **Strengthen anti-corruption efforts to restore public confidence in institutions (4.2):** Given moderately high levels of perceived corruption, especially in parliament and the police, it would be important to focus on the effective implementation of Sri Lanka's Anti-Corruption Act No. 9 of 2023. This includes strengthening the institutional capacities of bodies such as the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC), providing adequate financial and human resources, operationalising robust mechanisms for transparency and accountability, and ensuring merit-based appointments to reduce perceptions of elite capture and political interference. Effective enforcement and public oversight are essential to reversing perceptions of institutional decay and rebuilding trust in democratic governance.
7. **Deliver on the democratic reform agenda to protect civic space (4.3):** While perceptions of personal freedoms have improved, this shift seems closely tied to expectations following the 2024 political transition. Clear communication and transparency about reform efforts are essential to sustain the public optimism that may otherwise remain short-lived. Reforms could include repealing or amending restrictive legislation, such as the PTA, reducing militarisation in the North and East, initiating confidence-building measures (see also 10) and legal/structural reforms, and ensuring that freedoms of expression, assembly, and association are protected both legally and in practice.

Recommendations related to findings of Section 5: Civic Participation for Reconciliation (references to specific Sections in brackets)

8. **Close the gap between political confidence and perceived influence (5.1):** While internal political efficacy has improved, political agency remains rather low. This speaks to the need to strengthen participatory platforms such as citizen assemblies, public hearings, or budget consultations, and to introduce structured mechanisms for public tracking of election promises and post-election performance. These should allow citizens to see tangible impact from their engagement and foster political accountability.
9. **Address the gender gap in political efficacy and active citizenship (5.1 and 5.2):** With women's political efficacy scores below the national average, targeted interventions are undoubtedly crucial. This could include supporting female leadership pipelines through mentorship programmes, quotas, safe participation spaces, and political finance regulations to help close the campaign funding gap between men and women. It is also important to recognise and address the barriers women face in political life – including misogyny and gendered disinformation – and to promote a political culture where women can participate with dignity.
10. **Strengthen civic infrastructure and design inclusive engagement strategies across different constituencies (5.2):** Higher active citizenship scores among Tamil and Muslim communities, particularly in historically marginalised regions, should be supported through regional civil society funding, decentralised civic platforms, and inclusion in national dialogues to avoid burnout and ensure sustained participation. At the same time, efforts to deepen civic engagement must also reach groups that remain less politically active. For example, as youth report the highest motivation and lowest disengagement and older adults show the opposite, this calls for tailored civic education and mobilisation strategies – such as digital and activism-based approaches for youth, and trust-building, dialogue-oriented formats for older adults. Strengthening civic infrastructure while diversifying engagement strategies is key to fostering a more inclusive and participatory democratic culture.



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ANNEXES

ANNEX 1 – EIGHT DIMENSIONS OF RECONCILIATION

The Sri Lanka Barometer conceptual framework is based on consultations with academics, practitioners, and communities as well as research undertaken before the first iteration of the SLB Survey. Drawing on these insights, the framework comprises eight conceptual dimensions (or domains) of reconciliation, each containing several sub-dimensions, and within these, various social indicators. These indicators represent the actual measurement of people's views on key concepts and provide the basis for the quantitative analysis across different thematic areas.

Dimension	Realising the dimension	Survey indicators
1. Dealing with the Past	All Sri Lankans, regardless of identity group: - Have the opportunities and freedoms to remember, memorialise and mourn the past and the lives lost during the war. - Have access to psychosocial support services and alternative ways of healing. - Have the opportunity to receive information about the past and to learn from history – with multiple narratives being respected. - Have the opportunity to share their truths of how they experienced the armed conflict, in a context which acknowledges that there are multiple truths.	- Importance of dealing with the past - Recognition of past injustices - Barriers to dealing with the past - Memorialisation - Importance of reconciliation institutions
2. Justice for All	- Communities devastated by armed conflict are restored and justice for war-related injustices is delivered. - Victims have adequate access to fair reparations: property losses are recognised and compensated; land is returned to its rightful owners; and loss of income is compensated. - People whose loved ones disappeared are enabled to learn the truth about what happened to them, and are supported in coming to terms with their losses.	- Access to justice (<i>dropped in 2025</i>) - Barriers to justice - Normalisation of state violence against citizens (<i>changed from justification of violence in 2023</i>) - Reasons for reparations
3. Identity and Belonging	- Recognition that members of all social groups have needs and aspirations. - Positively identifying with a Sri Lankan identity despite differences related to social groups. - No people or groups feel that they are “second-class” citizens. - People have the freedom to embrace their own identities, and these are accepted and respected with dignity, despite differences.	- Importance of Sri Lankan identity - Source of group identity - Main basis of discrimination - Respect for others - Social group tolerance - Barriers to associating with people of different ethnic/religious groups - Religious intolerance (<i>added in 2023</i>) - Awareness of gender identities (<i>added in 2023</i>)
4. Interpersonal, Social, and Political Trust	- People trust each other irrespective of group affiliation or identity. - People trust democratic processes and institutions to meet their needs and function in an unbiased manner. - Media promotes and encourages reconciliation and trust between communities	- Interpersonal social trust (<i>changed from Interpersonal trust in 2025</i>) - Generalised social trust - Political trust - Source and language of media trusted the most (<i>changed from media trust in 2023</i>) - Media influence
5. Equality of Opportunity	- Equal access to opportunities (financial, economic, social, cultural, educational, natural resources) irrespective of group affiliation or identity. - Shared belief that all Sri Lankans have the right to equal opportunities and to enjoy their achievements.	- Equality of opportunity - Gender equality (<i>added in 2023</i>) - Influence of caste (<i>added in 2023</i>) - Equal rights for LGBTQ+ persons (<i>added in 2025</i>)

Dimension	Realising the dimension	Survey indicators
6. Active Citizenship	• Willingness and the space to contribute to positive change in the country. • Equal opportunities for civic engagement. • Freedom of speech/expression prevails	- o Level of active citizenship - o Internal political efficacy - o Personal freedoms - o Motivation to politically engage due to the current crisis (<i>dropped in 2025</i>) - o Motivation to politically engage due to the current economic situation (<i>added in 2025</i>) - o Motivation to politically engage due to the current political situation (<i>added in 2025</i>) - o Political agency (<i>added in 2025</i>)
7. Accountable Governance	• Governance systems and institutions work for all communities irrespective of group affiliation or identity. • Power imbalances in favour of political, social, or economic elites have been corrected. • Ethno-religious dominance has been eliminated through measures to counter these forces and effects and ensure accountability. • People of all social groups can be heard by the government and by each other. • All people are able to obtain services in their mother tongue and regional disparities in service provision diminish. • All social groups are equally represented in decision making and have the same opportunities for participation in public bodies. • Systems are transparent and accountable (to citizens and international commitments). • Systems are in place to address and actively prosecute bribery and corruption.	- o Distribution of economic and political power - o Access to services - basic and auxiliary services - o State responsiveness - o Awareness, importance, frequency of receiving services in mother tongue - o Perceived level of corruption in public sector (<i>added in 2025</i>) - o Strength of laws and legal processes in combatting corruption (<i>added in 2025</i>) - o Institutions in which the corruption occurs the most (<i>added in 2025</i>) - o Governments' effectiveness in addressing corruption (<i>added in 2025</i>) - o Corruption's impact on daily life (<i>added in 2025</i>) - o Democratic Pluralism (<i>added in 2025</i>)
8. Security and Wellbeing	• All Sri Lankans live free from violence and feel safe and secure. Men, women, and children are able to live without fear. • Being part of a safe, peaceful and just society regardless of belonging to a particular social group. • Media and human rights defenders are free from fear and able to engage in their work. • Basic needs are fulfilled, including adequate nutrition, sanitation, and quality health and education services.	- o Relative household wellbeing - o Threats to household wellbeing - o Lived poverty index - o Personal and community safety - o Normalisation of militarisation (<i>added in 2023</i>)
Overall Reconciliation Indicators		- o Demand for reconciliation - o Progress of reconciliation - o Meaning of reconciliation - o Barriers to achieving reconciliation - o Greatest responsibility for reconciliation (<i>added in 2025</i>)
Contextual Indicators		- o Biggest impact of the economic crisis (<i>added in 2023</i>) - o Impact of economic crisis on inter-ethnic relationships (<i>added in 2023</i>) - o Impact of COVID-19 (<i>dropped in 2023</i>)

ANNEX 2 – DETAILED METHODOLOGY

This annex explains how SLB Surveys are conducted, detailing the methodology, sampling framework, and the analysis and interpretation of indicators.

SURVEY METHODOLOGY

The SLB uses a quantitative survey methodology to measure people's attitudes, opinions, and beliefs on a wide range of social, political, economic, and cultural issues. As part of a special class of public opinion surveys, it is designed to provide nuanced information about people's views at various levels of disaggregation.

Unlike traditional opinion polls, which often focus on a single issue or moment in time, the SLB canvasses people's views on a broad range of themes related to reconciliation and social cohesion, and traces how these evolve over time. Additionally, the SLB is grounded in an extensive conceptual framework derived from existing theory and practice, and employs larger, more robust sampling designs and sample sizes, enabling more stable measures of public sentiment over time. While traditional opinion polls play an important role in capturing immediate public views, the SLB complements these efforts by offering greater resolution on topics of interest, more detailed analysis and explanation, and a contextual understanding of longer-term societal dynamics.

The SLB collects data using a structured survey questionnaire based on its conceptual framework (see Annex 1). The conceptual framework evolved from extensive community consultations and qualitative and quantitative research undertaken before the implementation of the first iteration of the SLB. Based on all these inputs, the framework was built to comprise eight conceptual dimensions, each consisting of several sub-dimensions, and within these, different social indicators. These indicators represent the actual measurement of people's views about the major concepts of the dimensions and sub-dimensions, and provide the basis for the quantitative analysis of the different thematic areas.

The SLB questionnaire itself consists of several different types of questions, as follows:

- Questions recording the demographic characteristics of respondents, including age, gender, religion, spatial location, etc.
- Questions using 5-point Likert scales to assess strength of opinion on a range of social, political, economic, and cultural issues, such as agreement/disagreement and approval/disapproval.
- Single mention questions to which respondents can either select a response from a pre-defined listed or answer in their own words. These responses are then post-coded after data collection is complete.
- Single mention questions with pre-defined response options.

Once the questionnaire was finalised in English, it was translated into Sinhala and Tamil using the double-blind method, to ensure the greatest possible accuracy of key terms and concepts. Thereafter, the questionnaires in all three languages (Sinhala, Tamil and English) were scripted to a Computer Aided Personal Interviewing (CAPI) platform and, once in the field, administered through face-to-face interviews. Using appropriate sampling, the respondents were selected to ensure adequate representation of all provinces and population groups (see Section 2.2).

After conducting the SLB Baseline Survey in 2020 and a first follow-up survey in 2021, the SLB has adopted a biannual survey interval, following the South African model. This survey interval is sufficient to measure societal trends over time while also addressing concerns of feasibility, economic viability, and sustainability. A pilot survey with a sample of 60 respondents is conducted for each survey to ensure the validity and reliability of survey questions prior to administering the survey country-wide (see Section 2.4).

The survey questionnaire undergoes a rigorous review process prior to every new iteration. This entails evaluating indicators and survey items from both statistical and substantial/contextual relevance, making adaptations where necessary or meaningful. Moreover, while core indicators that track trends in public opinion on reconciliation are retained, new questions/items are incorporated into each successive iteration to capture topical issues which arise over time. Examples of these include survey items on the impact of the COVID pandemic in 2021; the economic crisis in 2023; and changes in the post-election period in 2025 (see Section 2.3).

SAMPLING FRAMEWORK

The sample was selected from a sample frame of Sri Lankans 18 years of age or older. According to the Department of Census and Statistics in 2012, the national population was 20,359,439, of which 70% (14,230,273) are 18 years or older. The sample has adequate representation from geographical clusters – which includes urban, rural, and estate, as well as province and district clusters and ensures fair representation of the different groups within the population, including gender, age, ethnicity, and religion.

The sample has a 95% confidence level and a margin of error of 1.58% at the national level. Briefly, this means that for any obtained results, there is likely to be a variation of 1.5% in the obtained figure. For instance, if the survey found that 55% of people agreed with a statement, a 1.5% margin of error means that this figure of 55% actually ranges between 53.5% (55%–1.5%) and 56.5% (55% + 1.5%). In other words, we can be 95% confident that the level of agreement on that issue ranges between 53.5% and 56.5%.

Given the sample size, the margin of error necessarily increases when moving from the national (full sample) to smaller jurisdictions (subset sample). For this reason, the SLB Report focuses its analysis at the levels of disaggregation (national, provincial, ethnicity, age cohort, etc.) at which the margin of error is smallest and within acceptable bounds for explanation.

To achieve a statistically acceptable confidence at different levels of disaggregation requires a sample larger than one which is only seeking to have confidence in results at national level. In the Sri Lankan context, the sample size for such disaggregated analysis was determined to be above 3,500 and below 4,000 respondents. Based on this sampling estimation, the final sample for the 2025 SLB was determined to be 3,876.¹⁰ This sample size represents the optimal balance between statistical power, which is the ability to interpret results with sufficient degree of confidence, and affordability, which relates to the significant costs required to undertake fieldwork research. While a sample lower than 3,500 may have provided adequate confidence in results at the national level, this confidence would decline steeply for sub-national disaggregation such as province, ethnicity, religion, etc. Likewise, while a sample of over 4,000 would have boosted confidence, the increase in confidence would have been marginal and come at a significant financial cost which would not have justified the marginal increment in confidence.

To ensure adequate representativity at all levels of disaggregation, the sample was selected using a multi-stage random sampling technique, where the total national level sample was distributed across the 25 districts based on the Probability-Proportionate-to-Size sampling (PPS). The arrived district level sample was further stratified into urbanity and ethnicity based on the PPS sampling method. Briefly, PPS sampling ensures that the selection of sampling units corresponds proportionately to the size of the sampling group within the population. Firstly, to ensure an adequate sample size at the district level, sample adjustment was conducted to arrive enough data points at the district level in the survey. The sample arrived at the district level was distributed across urban, rural, and estate strata within each district based on PPS sampling. Thereafter, random Grama Niladhari (GN) division selection was carried out within each district to reflect the respective urbanity sample.

Additionally, in the 2021 study, it was observed that while the national representation of the Muslim ethnicity was 8%, the survey covered only 5%, and the Up-Country Tamils' sentiments were not presented in the report due to inadequate sample size, highlighting a limitation in the ability to disaggregate data by minority ethnic groups in the country. To address this issue, adjustments were made in the 2023 study sample, and carried forward to in the 2025 survey, to ensure adequate representation of each ethnic group within the overall sample enabling accurate data disaggregation by different ethnic population segments in the country. The following sample quotas were achieved for each ethnic group:

- Sinhalese – 64.4% of the sample
- Sri Lankan Tamil – 16.2% of the sample
- Up-Country Tamil – 5.1% of the sample
- Muslim – 13.7% of the sample

While the overall GN selection was carried out randomly, in case the selected GNs were not adequate to represent different ethnic groups' sample quotas discussed above, certain GN divisions were replaced purposively, ensuring the same urbanity focusing on areas where specific ethnic communities are concentrated.

Following completion of the survey, to address differences in sample representation between the national population and the survey sample, a data weighting process was conducted. This involved creating a weighting variable by cross-referencing urbanity, gender, religion, and age categories. For this task, the 2012 population statistics published by the DCS were used. Trimming was applied to reduce the effect of extreme weights.

See Annex 3 for the weighted sample size of the survey.

DATA COLLECTION METHOD

Once the Divisional Secretariats (DS) were selected, Grama Niladhari (GN) divisions within each DS were picked from a list extracted from the Department of Census and Statistics (DCS) of Sri Lanka. GN selection was done using a systematic random sampling method.

The left-hand rule was used in approaching households from the selected GNs; households on the left-hand side of the road from the starting point were selected to be interviewed. Enumerators were provided with pre-identified starting points – landmarks such as schools, churches, temples, hospitals, and government offices – and lists of the households for random selection. The household skipping pattern was applied to households on the left-hand side of the road after a successful interview to establish a fair spread of the sample at the primary sample units (PSU) level. Considering the proximity between houses, the skipping pattern applied in Urban and Estate areas was three households, while in rural areas with less household density, the skipping pattern was two households.

Individual respondents for the interviews were defined as anyone aged 18 years or older, who lives in the selected housing unit, eats from the same kitchen, and returns to the household at least weekly. All individuals meeting these criteria in the selected households were recorded sequentially in the CAPI (Computer Aided Personal Interviewing) system, along with their gender and age. A respondent was then

¹⁰ The sample size was 3,876 in Round 3 (2023), 3,860 in Round 2 (2021), and 3,880 in the Baseline Survey (2020).

selected from the household through the CAPI using the Kish Grid method.¹¹ If the respondent selected was not available for the interview at the time of the first visit, two more attempts at contact were made. If unsuccessful, the original respondent was replaced with another respondent using the same random process.

Once the questionnaire was finalised in terms of the questions and response formats, it was translated into Sinhala and Tamil using the double-blind translation procedure to ensure the best possible translation of key terms and concepts. The final questionnaires in all three languages (Sinhala, Tamil, and English) were scripted to a CAPI platform named SurveyToGo, which was used for data collection. The CAPI method helps ensure data quality, monitor sample selection using GPS coordinates, and saves time on data entry. The questionnaire was administered through face-to-face interviews, with statements within question sets randomised to minimise error and response fatigue.

DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

The analysis is presented as composite indicators and as single-item indicators.

A composite indicator is constructed based on multiple survey questionnaire items used to measure a single concept (e.g., demand for reconciliation, political trust, religious intolerance). In most cases, composite indicators are comprised of three or more survey items, which are scored by respondents on a 5-point Likert scale and then rescaled from 0 to 10 to facilitate interpretation and visualisation. This approach makes the results more intuitive – since many people are more familiar with interpreting a 0 to 10 scale – as well as allowing for more nuanced measurement of the resulting scores and comparisons across groups and with other composite scale scores. Additionally, the composite scales are scored to range at the lower end from 0 rather than 1 as this ensures greater correspondence of the scale scores to a measure such as percentages, which range from 0 to 100. Taken together, this scoring system enables greater resolution and understanding of the composite scale scores by a general audience. The final results are presented as single mean scores for each composite indicator.

It must be noted that while the scores are rescaled, they do not materially change in relation to each other. That is, actual responses that are low on the 1 to 5 questionnaire rating scale are still placed low down on the rescaled composite scores from 0 to 10, and vice versa for higher scores. Essentially, the rescaled scores for any respondent still occupy the same relative position when compared to other respondents, ensuring there is no distortion of their actual responses. This means that any comparisons across respondents or groups of respondents (by province, ethnicity, gender, etc.) are not in any way impacted by the rescaling process.

The survey questions used to measure each indicator are presented in Annex 4, corresponding to the graph numbers illustrating indicators throughout the report.

Single-item indicators are constituted of individual survey questionnaire items and were designed specifically as single survey items to understand specific issues (e.g., meaning of reconciliation, barriers to reconciliation). The data from single-item indicators is presented in the form of frequencies (percentage of the population) at the national level. When it is of analytical value, responses are presented with relevant levels of disaggregation.

PSYCHOMETRIC VALIDATION OF INDICATORS

The SLB survey indicators undergo rigorous psychometric validation to ensure the robustness, credibility, and reliability of the measurements used. This process builds on previous survey iterations and includes testing for both reliability and validity during the pilot stages. Following each survey, a full psychometric validation is conducted to assess the integrity of questionnaire items and the conceptual indicators they represent. This ongoing review confirms the strength of existing indicators and provides guidance for refining or revising new ones. Aligned with global best practices, this approach reinforces confidence in the survey instrument and its findings.

Detailed validation of the measurement scales can be made available upon request.

¹¹ The Kish Grid method is used in household surveys to randomise the selection of a respondent in the household. This method helps avoid selection bias and provides a systematic approach to selecting a respondent, ensuring that each survey participant has an equal probability or chance for selection

ANNEX 3 – SAMPLE PROFILE

Below are the details of the weighted sample size for the 2025 survey, which enables an adequate representation of the Sri Lankan population. The sample aligns with the 2012 Census data, encompassing ethnicity, religion, age, gender, and provincial and spatial sectors. Additionally, it includes information on respondents' education and employment status.

Figure 24: Gender Breakdown, %, 2025




Figure 25: Age Breakdown, %, 2025




Figure 26: Ethnic Group Breakdown, %, 2025




Figure 27: Religious Affiliation, %, 2025








Figure 28: Spatial Breakdown, %, 2025**Figure 29: Provincial Breakdown, %, 2025****Figure 30: Educational Attainment, %, 2025****Figure 31: Occupational Breakdown, %, 2025**

ANNEX 4 – RELATED SURVEY QUESTIONS

The survey questions below form the indicators presented in this report. They are organised by graph and figure number, corresponding to the relevant question.

Figure No.	Construct Measured (C = Composite Indicator, SO = Single Item Indicator Open Ended, SS= Single Item Indicator Scalar)	Survey Questions (2025)
1-3	Demand for Reconciliation (C)	Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements: - It is desirable to achieve reconciliation in Sri Lanka - It is necessary to achieve reconciliation in Sri Lanka - It is important to achieve reconciliation in Sri Lanka. Response Scale: Strongly Disagree (1) – Strongly Agree (5)
	Progress of Reconciliation (C)	Since the end of the armed conflict in 2009, do you think: - There has been progress in reconciliation - Relationships between different ethnic groups have improved - Relationships between different religious groups have improved - Relationships between groups who speak different languages have improved Response Scale: Strongly Disagree (1) – Strongly Agree (5)
4	Meaning of Reconciliation (SO)	What comes to your mind when thinking of reconciliation in Sri Lanka?
5-6	Greatest Responsibility for Advancing Reconciliation (SO)	Who do you think should take the greatest responsibility for reconciliation in Sri Lanka?
7-8	Biggest Barrier to Reconciliation (SO)	What would you indicate as the biggest barrier to achieve reconciliation in Sri Lanka?
9	Importance of Reconciliation Institutions (C)	How important do you feel are the following institutions in helping Sri Lankans deal with the consequences of the armed conflict? - Human Rights Commission - Office on Missing Persons (OMP) - Office for Reparations - Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) Response Scale: Not Important at all (1) – Very Important (5)
10-11	Political Trust (C)	Please indicate how much trust you have in each of the following institutions? - National government - Police - Courts - Divisional Secretariat - Urban Council/Municipal Council/ Pradeshiya Sabha - Grama Niladhari Response Scale: Not Trusting at all (1) – Very Trusting (5)

Figure No.	Construct Measured (C = Composite Indicator, SO = Single Item Indicator Open Ended, SS= Single Item Indicator Scalar)	Survey Questions (2025)
12	Perceived Level of Corruption in the Public Sector (C)	From what you know or what you have heard... - How often does corruption occur in government institutions in the country? - How often do elected political leaders engage in corrupt practices? - How often do public officials engage in corrupt practices? Response Scale: Never (1) – Always (5)
13	Effectiveness of Previous Government in Addressing Corruption (SS)	In your opinion, how effective were previous governments in addressing corruption? Response Scale: Very Effective (1) – Not Effective at all (5)
	Effectiveness Present Government in Addressing Corruption (SS)	In your opinion, how effective will the current government be in addressing corruption? Response Scale: Very Effective (1) – Not Effective at all (5)
14-15	Personal Freedoms (C)	In Sri Lanka, do you agree or disagree that you are free to: - Say or write what you think - Join any political organisation - Practice your religion - Join peaceful protests - Use the language of your choice - Follow a livelihood of your choice Response Scale: Strongly Disagree (1) – Strongly Agree (5)
	Community Safety (C)	How safe do you feel having the presence of the following in your community? - The police - The military - State intelligence operatives Response Scale: Not Safe at all (1) – Very Safe (5)
16-17	Internal Political Efficacy (C)	Thinking about political or social issues, to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following: - You feel you have enough knowledge to engage with social and political issues - You feel confident to engage with social and political issues - You vote because your vote makes a difference - Voting helps me to have a say on social and political issues Response Scale: Strongly Disagree (1) – Strongly Agree (5)
18	Political Agency (C)	Thinking about politicians in Sri Lanka, how much do you agree or disagree with the following? - Politicians are interested in what people like me think - People like me have influence on what the politicians do - Politicians do enough to support the needs of me and my community - Politicians follow the will of the people Response Scale: Strongly Disagree (1) – Strongly Agree (5)

Figure No.	Construct Measured (C = Composite Indicator, SO = Single Item Indicator Open Ended, SS= Single Item Indicator Scalar)	Survey Questions (2025)
19	State Responsiveness (C)	Based on what you know and what you have heard from others, how responsive would you say are the following government institutions and officials to looking after the needs of you and your family? 1. National Government 2. Divisional Secretariat 3. Urban Council/ Municipal Council/Pradeshiya Sabha 4. Grama Niladhari Office (village administrative officers) Response Scale: Unresponsive (1) – Very Responsive (5)
20–21	Motivation to Politically Engage Due to the Current Economic Situation (SS)	The current economic situation in the country has motivated you to become more politically engaged. Response Options: No, I have disengaged (1); No, stayed the same (2); Yes, a little (3); Yes, a lot (4)
22–23	Active Citizenship (C)	Please tell me if you have personally done any of these things during the past year: 1. Contact the media (radio, TV, or a newspaper) to complain about a problem 2. Contact an official in your community about an issue (local state actors – GN officer, local politician, Pradeshiya Sabha etc.) 3. Contact Civil Society Organisations such as NGOs and other non-state actors such as local community leaders, religious leaders etc. 4. Discuss political or social issues with others 5. Participate in legal and peaceful protest Response Options: No (0); Rarely (1); Sometimes (2); Frequently (3)



SRI LANKA BAROMETER

OUR VOICES . OUR CHOICES

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