



EXECUTIVE WHITE PAPER

# Zero Trust in OT

From “Air Gaps” to  
“Always Verify”.

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# ZERO TRUST IN OT

## INTRODUCTION

FROM “AIR GAPS” TO “ALWAYS VERIFY”

Not long ago, industrial systems lived in their own safe bubble. PLCs and SCADA servers were “air-gapped” – disconnected from the internet. Trust was implicit. But digital transformation, remote work, and IT/OT convergence have punched holes in that bubble. Suddenly, the same threats hitting corporate laptops are knocking on factory doors.

This is where **Zero Trust** comes in: “*Never trust, always verify.*”

## THE OLD WORLD VS. THE NEW WORLD

Let's imagine a medieval castle (perimeter defense). Now replace it with an airport (Zero Trust) where every passenger, staff member, and bag is checked continuously – even after entering the terminal.



### Old World (Implied Trust):

- Engineers assumed the OT network was safe if it was inside the perimeter.
- Legacy PLCs or HMIs could run for 20+ years without updates.
- Remote access was bolted on via VPNs or jump servers.

### New World (Zero Trust):

- Every connection –user, vendor, or machine – must continuously prove it belongs.
- Access is granted based on identity, context, and least privilege.
- Monitoring, segmentation, and policy enforcement become *living processes*, not one-off projects.

# DEMONSTRATION

## A COMMON REMOTE ACCESS SCENARIO

Let's model this with a realistic OT remote access use case:

### 1. Traditional Model

- Vendor connects via VPN → jump server → industrial workstation.
- Weak point: if the VPN or corporate domain is breached, attackers can move laterally into OT.

### 2. Zero Trust Model

- Remote vendor request → ZTNA broker (USRV/HERA for critical OT)
- Broker checks identity, device health, time, location.
- Only the *specific engineering workstation* is exposed, not the entire OT network.

This reduces the attack surface dramatically.

## THE SEVEN PILLARS OF ZERO TRUST IN OT

- **Users:** Continuous identity verification and MFA.
- **Devices:** Automated inventory, patching, and monitoring.
- **Applications & Workloads:** Securing on-prem, mobile, and cloud.
- **Data:** Encryption in transit and at rest.
- **Network & Environment:** Segmentation, isolation, granular policy.
- **Visibility & Analytics:** Threat intel, AI/ML-driven detection.
- **Automation & Orchestration:** Fast, automated responses.

## GOVERNANCE & CERTIFICATION VIEW

Executives often frame Zero Trust adoption in terms of **certification and governance**.

Here's the process mindset they expect:

1. Management commitment
2. Define scope (NIS2, ISO 27001, IEC 62443)
3. Risk assessment & GAP analysis
4. Implement Zero Trust measures:
  - **People:** Awareness and training
  - **Process:** Policies based on continuous verification
  - **Technology:** IAM, 2FA, JITA, ZTNA, PAM, VLANS
5. Internal audits → external audits → certification

# CHALLENGES

Executives should know Zero Trust is powerful, but not magic:

- Legacy OT systems may not support modern identity protocols.
- Safety-critical systems (SIS, triconex) require uninterrupted access.
- Vendor remote access can introduce hidden risks.

That's why many companies start with *quick wins* like network segmentation, local firewalls, PAM (Privileges Access Management), IDS (Intrusion Detection Systems), and OT domain, then expand into ZTNA and SOC (Security Operations Center) monitoring.

# CASE STUDY

THE FICTILE TILE FACTORY LAB

A fictitious tile factory lab (FICTILE) demonstrates Zero Trust implementation in OT. The lab features PLCs (Beckhoff, Siemens, Phoenix Contact), HMIs, IIoT devices, and Windows endpoints.

Initial State: Flat network, default credentials, all traffic allowed.

**Zero Trust Implementation:**

- **Identify:** Asset inventory with an ICS Network Monitoring Tool.
- **Manage:** Centralized identity, MFA.
- **Control:** VLANs, IT/OT segmentation.
- **Protect:** Encryption, least privilege.
- **Detect:** IDS for anomalous traffic.
- **Analyze:** Threat intel risk scoring.
- **Automate & Orchestrate:** Alerts and partial automated response.

Result: Legacy OT can transition from implied trust to a Zero Trust baseline.

# ROADMAP

FROM NOW TO 3 YEARS

- **Quick Wins (20–30 days):** Inventory assets, enforce MFA, deploy VLANs.
- **Medium Term (6–12 months):** Implement PAM, IDS/Claroty, segment OT/IT.
- **3-Year Vision:** Zero Trust embedded in audits, SOC operations, and supply chain partnerships.

## TAKEAWAY

Zero Trust in OT isn't just a buzzword – it's the mindset shift from "air-gapped and safe" to "always suspect, always verify."

It's not about ripping and replacing legacy systems overnight. It's about **incremental, risk-based steps** that executives can align with NIS2 and ISO 27001 compliance while protecting the business from the very real threats knocking on their factory doors.

By implementing a comprehensive set of zero-trust capabilities in your industrial environment, you will significantly enhance your overall security:

- A full user inventory ensures accurate identity management, while multi-factor authentication strengthens password security.
- Self-managed and hosted identity stores provide better access control and protection.
- Rule-based dynamic access enables fine-grained control, and periodic authentication ensures ongoing verification.
- With full and automated device inventory, you gain visibility and control over your assets.
- Device-based access control prevents unauthorized or untrusted devices from accessing critical resources, reducing the attack surface and minimizing the potential for security breaches.
- A full application inventory allows better management and monitoring.
- Integrated email anti-phishing measures fortify your defenses against social engineering attacks.
- Application access is restricted to authorized users even on public networks.
- Data encryption in transit safeguards sensitive information.
- Macro-segmentation enhances network isolation, and severely impairs malicious actor activities, reducing risk and impact.
- Extended traffic monitoring enables detection of suspicious activities.
- Increased traffic encryption further protects confidentiality and data privacy.
- Extended log collection and analysis using threat intelligence enhance threat detection capabilities.
- Automated threat alerts enable prompt response to potential threats.
- Although partially automated, incident response processes become more efficient.



## REFERENCES

THE FOLLOWING SOURCES PROVIDED INSIGHTS OR ARE CITED IN THIS DOCUMENT.

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