



International Panel on the Information Environment

The Role of Generative AI Use in 2024 Elections Worldwide

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SYNOPSIS

This technical paper provides a comprehensive evaluation of the role of Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI) in elections around the world in 2024. GenAI is being deployed in many ways during elections, ranging from the creation of deepfake video and audio messages, to sophisticated voter targeting. What are the implications of Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI) for elections administration and voter participation around the world?

To understand the global trends, the IPIE set up a formal incident database to capture all instances of political GenAI usage in 2024 as reported in news media, recording all available information on who uses GenAI, how, and for what purpose.

Based on an analysis of an original data set of 215 incidents, covering all 50 countries holding competitive national elections in 2024, we summarize global trends in the use of GenAI for campaign communications, candidate electioneering, foreign influence operations, and voter turnout efforts.

We find that:

- (1) Fully four-fifths (80%) of the countries holding elections in 2024 had GenAI incidents.
- (2) The vast majority (90%) of incidents involved content creation, such as audio messages, images, videos, and social media posts.
- (3) Almost half of the incidents have no known source (46%), a quarter were produced by political candidates and parties (25%), a fifth were produced by foreign actors (20%), and the remainder came from other sources (9%).
- (4) More than two-thirds (69%) of the incidents were described as having a harmful role in the election.

This technical paper discusses methodology, techniques for aggregating observations from comparative contexts, and the limitations of incident database analysis. This assessment delivers the first global, data-driven analysis of its kind, designed to inform policy recommendations that enhance election administration, foster trust in electoral processes, and boost voter turnout. GenAI technologies are already shaping political life. To guide responsible innovation and governance, technology designers and policymakers must understand both the positive applications and the potential harms these systems introduce.

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SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION

The Economist declared 2024 the “biggest election year in history”, during which national elections took place in over 60 countries, affecting more than half the world’s population [1]. Undoubtedly, 2024 was a pivotal year for democracies around the world. Elections were held in states including India, the world’s largest democracy by population, and the USA, the globe’s biggest economy by gross domestic product [2], [3], [4].

Although the number will be smaller in 2025, more key elections will take place. Germany, Europe’s biggest economy, and Canada, the USA’s northern neighbor, are among the countries that had important national elections in 2025 [5], [6]. Further, this number could increase—for example, if the French government collapses, it could trigger parliamentary elections [7], [8], [9]. Other unexpected elections could arise if governments fall due to losing votes of no confidence, street protests, or even coups d’état [10]. Given that democracies are political systems based on regular elections, ensuring that these elections can take place in a free and fair manner is integral to the survival of democracy [11], [12].

Upholding election integrity and shielding voters from deception are paramount to the survival of representative democracy [13]. Citizens can only translate their preferences into electoral behavior if they have access to accurate information [14]. False and misleading information can corrupt opinion formation to the point where voters’ choices at the ballot box misrepresent their actual intentions—or keep them away from the polls [15].

Consequently, there is fear concerning technologies that can pollute the information environment by negatively impacting voters’ abilities to discern truth, half-truths, and fiction. Concerns around Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI) are predominant [16]. Existing ills such as misinformation, microtargeted advertising, foreign interference, and the erosion of citizens’ trust in public institutions might be amplified by GenAI. This technology enables more sophisticated and scalable forms of deception, including enhanced audio and video deepfakes, bot networks, and chatbots generating text loop information [17], [18], [19].

The expert survey conducted by the IPIE in 2024 ([SFP2024.1](#)) found that experts had concerns about GenAI's effect on the information environment: "Nearly two thirds (63%) believe that AI-generated videos, voices, images, and text have negatively impacted the global information environment, while more than half (53%) believe that these technologies will have a negative impact in the next five years" [\[20\]](#). In addition, the experts who took part in the survey ranked "election integrity" as the second most concerning topic, only topped by "health misinformation" [\[21\]](#). Voters mirrored these concerns. The *2024 Digital News Report* by the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism found that 81% of South Africa's news consumers were worried about correct versus false news on the internet [\[22\]](#). In 2023, a YouGov survey revealed that most adult US citizens were concerned about the spread of AI deepfakes and political propaganda [\[23\]](#). In the UK in 2023, Ofcom, the regulatory and competition authority for broadcasting and telecommunications, found that over half (58%) of surveyed internet users were concerned about GenAI's future impact on society [\[24\]](#). In a survey fielded in the USA in the autumn of 2024 by the Pew Research Center, nearly eight times as many respondents expected AI to be used for mostly bad purposes in the 2024 US presidential election, versus those who thought it would be used mostly for good [\[25\]](#).

Commentators around the world referred to the elections in 2024 as the "AI elections"—usually expressing implicit or explicit fear when they used this term [\[26\]](#), [\[27\]](#), [\[28\]](#), [\[29\]](#). GenAI poses unique challenges to democratic forces worldwide interested in upholding election integrity and minimizing online interference. Existing approaches to combating misinformation and digital manipulation have proven limited in their capacity to counterbalance sophisticated GenAI-based tools [\[30\]](#). In order to address this dilemma and policy challenge, this technical paper aims to advance the understanding of the various ways in which GenAI was used during elections worldwide in 2024. With the help of this paper, researchers and policymakers can develop new counterstrategies and update existing approaches to mitigating corresponding risks for democracies [\[31\]](#), [\[32\]](#).

1.1 Key Terms

Figure 1. Key Terms

GenAI AI systems that analyze massive datasets to learn patterns and generate human-like content in response to prompts.	LLMs Advanced neural networks trained on billions of words, enabling fluent text generation and dynamic human-like dialogues.
Deepfakes Synthetic or manipulated media that mimics authentic visuals and audio, often blurring the line between real and artificial content.	Disinformation False information disseminated with the intention to deceive. However, the intention cannot always be determined, and the classification of content as deceptive is often disputed.

Source: IPIE

- Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI) refers to computer systems that draw on extremely large data sets to make statistical inferences about the relationship between words in a body of text, or pixels in an image [33]. From these inferences, GenAI systems can quickly produce content that is the same or similar to what a human could produce in response to prompts provided by humans.
- Large Language Models (LLMs) are the foundation of GenAI tools like ChatGPT. They are artificial neural networks capable of generating fluent texts and human dialogues [30]. LLMs are trained on billions of words of mainly human-produced text [34], [35]. For example, LLMs were used in a political manner in 2024 when European politicians relied on ChatGPT to write speeches, and Iranian disinformation operations targeted social media users in the USA.
- Deepfakes have entered the public discourse and refer to many types of entirely fabricated or digitally manipulated videos, audio, and images [36]. Deepfakes appear


to be truthful or authentic, and resemble existing people, places, objects, or environments [35]. Originally, deepfakes referred to a technique used for face swapping, a technique that does not involve GenAI [35], [37].

- Misinformation is false information disseminated without the intention to deceive. Disinformation is false information disseminated with the intention to deceive. Information that is true can be placed out of context to create a false narrative, or malinformation [38]. However, while this differentiation is helpful for analytic rigor, the intention cannot always be determined, and the classification of content as deceptive is often disputed. Therefore, the IPIE uses misinformation as an umbrella term ([SR2023.1](#), [SR2023.2](#)) to capture disinformation, misinformation, rumors, fake news, and propaganda.

The IPIE defines the role of GenAI regarding elections as positively or negatively affecting citizens' motivation to vote and the information they base their vote on. Based on this, the IPIE's [database](#) records three types of usage of GenAI that are captured in this technical paper's codebook. These three types of usage are conceptualized as indicative of the defined role of GenAI in elections. They are: content creation, content proliferation, and hypertargeting. This paper also considers two more aspects, namely, the overall quantity of incidents reported, and the actors behind the reported incidents. All these elements are based on existing peer-reviewed research, and their roles and potential effects are outlined in Figures 2-4. Based on previous research, the following concepts are investigated to assess the role of GenAI:


- Content creation and content proliferation [31], [39], [40], [41], [42]
- Hypertargeting [29], [31], [33], [43]
- Various actors involved [44], [45], [46]
- Manipulated media on democratic legitimacy (not only from GenAI) and related short-, medium-, and long-term effects is informed by [47], [48], [49], [50]

Figure 2. Conceptualizing the Roles of GenAI Usage Targeting Elections in 2024:
Content Creation




Source: IPIE

Figure 3. Conceptualizing the Roles of GenAI Usage Targeting Elections in 2024:
Content Proliferation



Source: IPIE

Figure 4. Conceptualizing the Roles of GenAI Usage Targeting Elections in 2024:
Hypertargeting



Source: IPIE

The role of GenAI usage, therefore, reveals itself in a threefold manner in this paper:

1. Quantitatively, analyzing which countries have more (or less) recorded instances (see section 4.1).
2. Qualitatively, examining which actors are behind which uses of GenAI—whether benevolent or not (see sections 4.2 and 4.3).
3. Finally, the role of GenAI on democracies can be short-, medium-, and/or long-term. For the latter two types, longitudinal or historical comparative studies are necessary, which are beyond the scope of this paper. However, as Figures 2 to 4 show, existing insights into the medium-term consequences of online campaigning, manipulated media, or misinformation (without specifically referencing GenAI) have been considered when conceptualizing the roles that are the subject of this paper.

1.2 Objectives

After the elections in India and the UK, some scholars suggested that the hype around AI and related digital advancements had led to an exaggerated perception of its role in influencing voting decisions [51], [52], [53]. In response, journalists quickly began writing about AI's underwhelming impact on the 2024 elections [54]. Consequently, there is a need for a better understanding of GenAI and for developing democratic responses that avoid the pitfalls of alarmism and the overestimation of GenAI's societal and political effects.

A detailed report from the Observatory on Information and Democracy, published in January 2025, states that there is a lack of strong evidence regarding how systematic efforts to use GenAI for political deception are, as well as which specific actors are involved. Despite this, the paper notes that disinformation tactics are becoming increasingly sophisticated due to the growing power, accessibility, and user-friendliness of GenAI tools [55].

To address this gap, this technical paper—along with the accompanying database—provides a comprehensive basis for assessing the role of GenAI during elections worldwide in 2024. The paper draws on an original, open access [database](#) (opens new tab) that captures all reported instances of political GenAI usage in the 2024 elections globally. The project includes a cross-case comparison of countries that held competitive national elections in 2024. The incidents recorded in the database detail the actors who used GenAI and the content they produced, and classify the usage as “good”, “bad”, or “unclear” within the context of the 2024 elections. This work provides evidence that can be further researched by examining additional data, local contexts, political landscapes, and media environments in greater detail.

The goal of this paper is to analyze the role of GenAI in the elections of 2024. Specifically, it aims to investigate which countries and elections experienced GenAI usage, the nature of that usage, and the actors that employed it (refer to section 1.1 Key Terms for additional details). Furthermore, the accompanying *Summary for Policymakers* ([SFP2025.1](#)) provides policy recommendations that include the types of data needed to systematically measure the

impact of GenAI during elections, as well as guidelines for campaign rules to minimize the harmful effects of GenAI in electoral processes.

Key insights are as follows:

- (1) GenAI incidents were reported in 80% of countries.
- (2) Content creation (audio, images, videos, or text messages) was the primary application of GenAI, making up 90% of GenAI usage in elections worldwide in 2024.
- (3) Foreign actors (20%) and political candidates and parties (25%) were significant users of GenAI for interference or campaigning, but in 46% of cases the identities of the actors were unclear.
- (4) India and the USA had the highest recorded GenAI instances during national elections, with 30 occurrences each.
- (5) Among the various applications of GenAI deployment—from content creation to hypertargeting by foreign actors and domestic political candidates—16% was used for seemingly benevolent purposes, while 69% served apparently malicious ends, with the rest unclear.
- (6) The overview of GenAI deployment does not clarify why some GenAI uses appear effective while others do not. For example, there are few recorded instances of GenAI use in Romania. However, foreign actors employed it in a sophisticated campaign during Romania’s national election, and it was perceived to have significantly influenced the outcome, leading to the annulment of the presidential results [\[56\]](#), [\[57\]](#). As the International Foundation for Electoral Systems explains: “the [Romanian constitutional] court’s decision highlighted the impact of the extensive deployment of artificial intelligence (AI), automated systems, and coordinated information integrity campaigns on electoral integrity, among other findings of interference” [\[57\]](#).

GenAI appeared in various contexts during elections in 2024, with the spread of nefarious content being the biggest concern. For instance, some GenAI-generated audio messages,

images, videos, and texts were aimed at harassing female candidates and damaging their reputations [58], [59], [60]. Other GenAI applications targeted public trust and could have contributed to the so-called liar's dividend: the notion that when people learn that deepfakes are increasingly realistic, false claims that authentic content is GenAI-generated also become more persuasive [42], [61], [62]. Research already suggests that political deepfakes often correlate with increased skepticism towards online content [63].

Despite the concern over hypertargeting—defined as “directing particular news stories or advertising to specific demographics with the aim of polarizing and tilting political preferences” [64]—it appeared in only 4% of recorded instances. In early 2024, some US political consultants suggested that advancing technology and data analysis capabilities would enable the creation of hyper-personalized content that could “move the needle” in future campaigns [33]. The IPIE database’s low percentage may underrepresent the actual prevalence of these GenAI tactics, as hypertargeting is typically more difficult to detect than GenAI-generated images. This means there may be a higher but hidden and unreported number of hypertargeting cases compared to the more easily identified deepfakes.

The technical paper is organized into the following sections:

- A review of existing studies and insights on GenAI’s role in the 2024 elections
- Methodological approach
- An analysis of the database created for this paper
- Key findings and directions for future research

The analytical insights provided here underpin the policy recommendations detailed in the accompanying *Summary for Policymakers* ([SFP2025.1](#)).

SECTION 2. BACKGROUND: STATE OF THE FIELD

Researchers, policymakers, and civil society interested in measuring the impact of GenAI during the 2024 elections can currently rely on five main publicly accessible bodies of work and related data or literature:

- (1) Self-published reports by technology companies on the use of GenAI on their platforms and infrastructure.
- (2) Tracking sites operated by third parties that document political GenAI incidents nationally and/or internationally.
- (3) Journalistic reporting that investigates instances of political uses of GenAI in shorter news reports or longer investigative stories.
- (4) Reports by academics and think-tanks on the deployment and (potential) political effects of GenAI.
- (5) Academic research by an interdisciplinary body of scholars in subjects ranging from computer science to communication studies, law, political science, and psychology.

The following overview is not meant to be a comprehensive literature review but rather a background section. This background section embeds this technical paper in the existing landscape of data and analyses that are meaningful for gauging GenAI impacts on political processes such as elections. The cited examples aim to cover a range of existing public data sources, but additional sources in all five categories are available, especially in languages other than English.

2.1 Reports by Technology Companies

Technology companies, such as the social media behemoth Meta and AI research organizations like OpenAI, sometimes publish publicly accessible reports on how their technologies have been exploited for malevolent purposes. These reports usually originate from the companies' security and safety teams, which are tasked with identifying malicious activity. In the case of Meta, this is often referred to as “coordinated inauthentic behavior”

[65], [66], [67]. OpenAI's reports also highlight instances where ChatGPT, its flagship GenAI chatbot, has been exploited to produce harmful content [68], [69].

These reports are meaningful as they offer the public insights into how users are targeted online with potentially harmful content. They are also important for policymakers aiming to regulate the most nefarious types of online deception. However, technology companies rarely share their raw data with external researchers, which would allow for independent analysis before or after the content is removed by the companies [70], [71].

This means that citizens and policymakers have little option but to trust the rigor of the companies' internal analyses. Some key players, such as Midjourney and X, publish hardly any data voluntarily regarding online manipulation [72], [73], [74], [75], [76]. The limitations of this body of insights are therefore closely linked to the amount of installed trust in, and mandated reliance on, the companies' disclosures. In addition, legislation on disclosure and transparency requirements varies around the world, creating a skewed landscape for company reporting [77], [78]. Even where such legislation exists, like in the European Union, enforcing compliance among largely US-based companies is difficult [77], [79]. Although company reports were consulted, their obscurity and relative scarcity compared to other literature and sources (see next sections) mean that these company reports represent only a small fraction of the data needed to gauge GenAI's impact on elections in 2024.

2.2 Trackers and Public Data Sets

Tracking sites and public data sets created by third parties that document political GenAI incidents nationally or internationally are valuable resources. For example, the nonprofit publication *Rest of World* created a *2024 AI Elections Tracker* to follow the use of AI during 2024 elections worldwide [80]. The South Asian media organization BOOM created a similar *DeepFake Tracker* to record, as the name gives away, deepfakes surfacing mainly in the areas BOOM covers (India, Bangladesh and Myanmar) [81].

An international nonprofit organization based in the USA, WITNESS, started a *Deepfakes Rapid Response Force* initiative to which journalists from around the world can submit suspect content. This connects “journalists and fact-checkers with leading experts in media forensics, AI synthesis, and deepfakes to provide timely and in-depth analysis of content suspected of being AI-generated or manipulated” [82]. The magazine *WIRED*, which focuses on reporting “how technology is changing every aspect of our lives—from culture to business, science to design,” started an *AI Elections Project* for which an internal team tracked instances of AI use in and around national elections in 2024 [83]. These are the main examples of public trackers, but there are others [84], [85], [86], [87].

These resources are valuable in a myriad of ways. For example, the WITNESS *Deepfakes Rapid Response Force* can help journalists identify whether content has been manipulated by AI. Journalists can therefore counter AI-generated misinformation that has already started to spread. However, the WITNESS data set is not publicly accessible and hence cannot easily be used for analysis by those who are not part of the initiative.

Some of the trackers mentioned above largely rely on people reporting instances to the organizations that created them. This means that if no one reports such instances, they remain unrecorded. In spring 2025, the NYU Center for Social Media and Politics reported that they “received very few submissions from political consultants” for their *AI Political Archive*, which was supposed to capture a comprehensive picture of deepfake employment in political campaigns in the USA. NYU’s researchers filled this reporting gap by manually reviewing Meta’s Ad Library and Google’s Ad Transparency Center for examples of GenAI campaigning in the USA [84], [88].

In addition, some aspects of the trackers’ methodologies are vague. For example, *Rest of World* says that their tracker features the “most noteworthy incidents of AI-generated election content globally,” but leaves open what counts as “most noteworthy” [80]. With the tracker focusing on countries in the global majority world, it includes only 15 countries, and there are no exclusion criteria that apply, such as leaving out countries with uncompetitive elections,

like Belarus. Similarly, BOOM's *DeepFake Tracker* is relatively limited geographically and thematically, as it only tracks AI-generated audio, videos, and images, not other uses of GenAI, such as hypertargeting. At the same time, these trackers provide an important service as they fill in gaps left uncovered by organizations that focus on countries in the West.

While these resources offer valuable glimpses into which specific GenAI content is proliferating, they provide few insights into the GenAI technologies that impact political content proliferation (versus creation), or tactics such as hypertargeting. Still, the public nature of these resources makes them indispensable for researchers and policymakers whose work aims to understand the impact of GenAI on elections.

The IPIE's database contributes to the existing landscape by providing additional information. This is achieved by applying a string-based search instead of relying on outside reporting, and by not limiting the database to GenAI content creation (such as deepfakes). IPIE's database therefore includes more data than the trackers mentioned above, according to what can be deduced from the trackers' public interfaces and their own reporting. *WIRED*, *Rest of World*, as well as *AI Political Archive* (which is solely focused on the USA), have less than 100 instances reported in their trackers.

In addition, the IPIE's database only includes countries that held competitive national elections. This rationale was applied because the role of GenAI in elections is more pertinent in countries with free and fair elections, and relatively free and fair elections, than in countries with uncompetitive, repressed elections. At the same time, it covers the globe.

2.3 Newspaper Coverage

Journalists across the world have covered GenAI uses related to politics and the 2024 elections extensively [89], [90], [91], [92], [93], [94]. For this reason, the IPIE's database centralizes insights into GenAI and elections that are partially grounded in journalistic reporting. By doing so, it advances existing, decentralized insights. In general, journalistic reporting plays a crucial role in uncovering GenAI uses. Investigative stories such as those by the Filipino online news website *Rappler* unearthed some of the ways that widespread GenAI

images and videos impacted the Indonesian and Malaysian elections in 2024 [92]. Meanwhile, news reports and bulletins provide a broader perspective on the evolving landscape of political campaigning. However, journalistic coverage may carry a negative bias. Reporters have previously noted challenges in making technological developments newsworthy, as well as the pressures to focus on problematic uses rather than positive applications [95], [96]. As a result, constructive uses of GenAI in the 2024 elections may have been underreported, and consequently, underrepresented in the IPIE's database.

The broad range of journalistic outputs on GenAI and elections is extremely important. For the purpose of gauging the roles of GenAI on elections in 2024, however, the main challenge is that it is decentralized. It is often difficult to systematically collect all the articles that even just one outlet has published on a topic. This is even harder given that there is no single repository for all news outlets around the world. This is how the database used in this technical paper fills a gap. By relying on newspaper data aggregators, such as LexisNexis, the IPIE has created a database that brings together evidence from across the world on the use of GenAI that impacted elections in 2024. The database's added value lies in extracting insights from the various newspaper reports and coding these insights into predefined categories (according to the codebook, which can be accessed in the [Annex](#)).

2.4 Think-tanks and Academic Public-facing Reports

Given the concerns around how GenAI could have affected politics and elections in 2024, several think-tanks and academic research centers emerged prominently. The African Digital Democracy Observatory, Code for Africa, and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies conducted studies on and in Africa [97], [98], [99]. The Media Institute of Southern Africa and the Mozilla Foundation published an in-depth report on AI readiness, use, and misinformation in Southern Africa, touching on political impacts [100]. In Canada, the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions published a report called *Harmful Hallucinations: Generative AI and Elections* [101]. In early 2025, Ivado and the University of Ottawa's AI + Society Initiative outlined how AI poses a threat to elections and democracy and offered recommendations how governments should adopt rules governing AI use in elections [102]. In Europe, several

projects funded by the European Union (TITAN, AI4Media, AI4Trust, and vera.ai) coproduced the white paper *Generative AI and Disinformation: Recent Advances, Challenges, and Opportunities* [30]. The Institute for Strategic Dialogue delved into various campaigns in Germany, Ireland, the UK, and the USA that used GenAI for deceptive purposes, such as the “Irish Channel”, which is a website with affiliated social media accounts that used GenAI to create and spread misleading information [103], [104].

In the UK, the Centre for Emerging Technology and Security at the Alan Turing Institute investigated “AI-enhanced hostile influence operations during election cycles, focusing on the 2024 US presidential election and future concerns in this area” in a research report [105]. In the USA, the Center for Media Engagement at the University of Texas at Austin produced a series of white papers on GenAI and elections that cover elections in India, Mexico, Europe, South Africa, and the USA [106]. Also in the USA, the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University reported on their analysis of AI use in the 2024 elections. They looked at whether or not deepfakes were deceptive, and determined that deceptive political content was cheap to replicate without AI. They did not look at the impact of deepfakes on the elections [106].

This provides more depth concerning individual instances but less insight into global trends. Some reports, like that by the Media Institute of Southern Africa and the Mozilla Foundation, strive to be comprehensive on the question of AI in certain regional contexts, which means that GenAI and its political impacts (election campaigning, misinformation, and so on) are tangentially discussed. Other publications, like that produced by the Knight First Amendment Institute, are targeted analyses of data from AI trackers such as the *WIRED AI Elections Project* [107]. The report prepared by the Observatory on Information and Democracy, for example, aims to provide a comprehensive global picture of the “State of Knowledge on News Media, AI and Data Governance” but does not aim to explore GenAI that is used to spread disinformation [55].

Again, several other organizations tackle questions on AI and its societal and political impacts [108], [109], [110]. For example, NetLab in Rio de Janeiro uncovered how deepfakes of elected politicians spread as promoted ads on social media with the aim of defrauding Brazilian voters [111]. Some are cited in this background section as they contribute to the relevant, authoritative, public body of work that is available for citizens, policymakers, and researchers interested in the impact of GenAI on elections. This IPIE technical paper builds on this existing research by adopting a global perspective. Its analysis compares GenAI use across 50 countries, identifying patterns in political applications—such as content creation, dissemination, and hypertargeting—and examining which actors leveraged GenAI most.

2.5 Academic Studies

A multidisciplinary body of scholars has produced academic research on the impacts and potential impacts of GenAI on elections. These scholars' academic areas range from computer science [31], [41], [112], [113], [114], to communication studies [115], law [116], political science [41], [114], [117], [118], and psychology [112], [113]. In addition, many publications are interdisciplinary, and some include authors who work for industries or organizations such as OpenAI [41], [114].

Given that the topic of this paper concerns recent elections, the body of relevant academic publications is limited. Most existing academic publications are preprints in open-access repositories such as Arxiv and Zenodo that comment on GenAI's potential role in 2024 elections.

SECTION 3. METHODOLOGY

This paper presents a descriptive analysis based on an original [database](#) (opens new tab) that compiles all reported incidents involving GenAI in competitive national elections worldwide in 2024. To ensure comprehensive coverage, the IPIE conducted a three-part data collection process from December 2024 to February 2025, systematically identifying and documenting these cases.

3.1 Data Collection

The data collection process consisted of three components: (1) a string-based search of LexisNexis (NexisUni) and Newsstream collections, (2) an advanced Google search, and (3) a review of 15 additional reference sites for supplementary sources and quality control. For additional details on the data collection, including the search strings utilized and limitations, see the [Annex](#) to this technical paper.

3.2 Database

The cases in the database are countries that undertook competitive national elections in 2024 ($n = 50$). To determine which countries conducted such elections, International IDEA's 2024 *Global Elections Super-Cycle* database [\[119\]](#), the Varieties of Democracy's (V-Dem) *Democracy Report 2024: Democracy Winning and Losing at the Ballot* [\[120\]](#), and Freedom House's *Global Freedom Scores for 2024* [\[121\]](#) were consulted. For the justification for using these sources, see the Annex. Table 1 shows the countries included in the database.

Table 1. List of Countries with Competitive National Elections in 2024

Austria	Georgia	Mexico	Slovakia
Bangladesh	Ghana	Moldova	Solomon Islands
Belgium	Iceland	Mongolia	South Africa
Bhutan	India	Mozambique	South Korea
Botswana	Indonesia	Namibia	Sri Lanka
Bulgaria	Ireland	North Macedonia	Taiwan
Comoros	Japan	Pakistan	Togo
Croatia	Kiribati	Palau	Tunisia
Dominican Republic	Lithuania	Panama	Tuvalu
El Salvador	Madagascar	Portugal	United Kingdom
Finland	Maldives	Romania	United States
France	Mauritania	San Marino	Uruguay
	Mauritius	Senegal	

Source: IPIE

The decision to use countries as the primary unit of analysis, rather than individual elections, is the most suitable approach for this paper for several reasons: (1) this paper aims to calibrate which countries experienced GenAI playing a large, medium, or small role in elections, (2) the impacts of GenAI on campaigning can be short-term, medium-term, or long-term, and in order to capture at least the first two, the database includes all reported incidents of GenAI use related to the elections in the countries, and (3) it is often impossible to differentiate between different campaigns for different elections in one country; in practice, campaign messages and tactics overlap and cross-proliferate, so to best capture

this reality, the database includes all incidents of GenAI that refer to national elections in the countries in 2024.

Additionally, limiting the analysis to countries that meet certain democracy and freedom thresholds is the most appropriate approach when examining GenAI's role in elections because: (1) elections in unfree countries do not reflect voters' choices, so the potential roles of GenAI content on swaying voters' decisions cannot be detected, and (2) local journalists in countries that are undemocratic cannot report freely, and access for foreign journalists is limited. Therefore, cases of GenAI use in elections are likely to be unreported or at least underreported, and this could skew the database because cases involving free elections are likely to correlate with more reporting on those elections, including reporting about GenAI use and its roles.

All recorded instances by case/country include nine variables: country, region/city, type of usage, actor, good or bad purposes, source, link to source, comment 1, and comment 2. Good/bad, positive/negative, benevolent or nefarious are used interchangeably. For the full codebook, please see the Annex.

The deductive coding was undertaken by an IPIE consulting scientist. Following this, an intercoder reliability (ICR) test was conducted to gauge the reproducibility of the coding process. For the ICR, two external graduate students were recruited, each of whom coded a sample of 20% of the database using the study's codebook. During this exercise, the external coders expressed some uncertainty about their ability to code the variable "good/bad" correctly. This variable was the only binary variable used in the database, but the fact that it is difficult to say in several instances whether the recorded GenAI usage is "good" or "bad" was factored in. This was done by allowing the additional code "unclear" (UC) in this category, which makes the "good/bad" variable not truly binary, and does not force a binary coding decision.

Despite this challenge, the IPIE's results and those produced by the two external coders relating to the "good", "bad", and "unclear" codes overlap by 87%, with Cohen's Kappa of

.74. Overall, the agreement between coders ranges from 82% ($\kappa = .58$) to 87% ($\kappa = .76$) for all variables. The highest discrepancy between the external coders and the IPIE's consulting scientist is 20%. This was recorded twice—once for the category “region/city” and once for the category “actor”. For more details, see the [Annex](#).

3.3 Analysis

For the descriptive analysis, the IPIE created a master sheet of all cases in the database and conducted a cross-case comparison across countries as well as across recorded incidents of GenAI usage. The aim of this technical paper is to draw conclusions about political GenAI usage, specifically targeting elections. More precisely, it is focused on providing insights into *international* trends and patterns in usage. This technical paper therefore provides relevant information for policymakers, researchers, and civil society representatives interested in bolstering resilience against nefarious uses of GenAI and strengthening legitimate uses.


With these aims in mind, the IPIE conducted its analysis in two stages. First, the IPIE identified which countries had the highest number of recorded incidents of political GenAI usage in 2024, and which had the lowest. To do this, the IPIE manually reviewed the Excel spreadsheets for each country. Second, the IPIE conducted a comparative analysis of the variables “type of usage”, “actor”, and “good” or “bad” usage. This comparative analysis was carried out independently, meaning that the variable “type of usage” was analyzed across all cases first (relying on the Excel spreadsheets mentioned above), then the variable “actor”, and so on.

SECTION 4. RESULTS

4.1 Political Usage of GenAI in 2024 Across the Globe

GenAI was employed to target national elections in 2024 in over three-quarters (80%) of the 50 countries in the IPIE database. The remaining 20% of countries with no identified data for GenAI usage are largely those with smaller populations (less than 1 million inhabitants): Bhutan, Comoros, Iceland, Kiribati, San Marino, and Tuvalu, as well as Mauritius (1.2 million), Botswana (2.7 million), Mongolia (3.4 million), and Togo (9 million).

Figure 5. Global Distribution of GenAI Usage in 2024 Elections



Source: IPIE calculations based on data collected 10-12-2024 to 17-02-2025.

Note: Some instances of GenAI may surface after the collection period, although most will have been reported in this date range. See the Annex for more details.

Possible explanations for the lack of recorded GenAI usage targeting elections in both groups of countries include less journalistic coverage of these countries' elections as well as lower

internet penetration rates. For example, according to the World Bank, Togo has an internet penetration rate of 38% [122]. Further, according to DataReportal, only 10% of internet users in Togo were active social media users by January 2024 [123]. This is in stark contrast to India. In January 2024, the internet penetration rate in India was 52%, and 32% of the population were active social media users [124]. While Togo is among the countries for which the IPIE did not find GenAI usages targeting elections in 2024, India is one of the two countries with the highest recorded usages.

However, if the occurrence of political GenAI usages in 2024 was directly linked to the internet penetration rate or the number of active social media users, there would be more results for Togo in the database. Another explanation could be that Togo, according to V-Dem, is an “electoral autocracy”, which indicates that some democratic aspects are deficient, including restricted freedom of expression and association, and not so free and fair elections. Therefore, domestic repression could have affected reporting on political GenAI usage. However, V-Dem also categorizes India as an “electoral autocracy”, and the IPIE found several examples in India.

Therefore, the database cannot be used to establish causation between either the internet penetration rate or the level of democracy and evidence of political GenAI use in 2024 in the countries in the IPIE’s database. Still, it is important to keep these background factors in mind when interpreting the results. There are several other indicators that intersect with information consumption during election periods. For example, evidence of polarization around specific political controversies, the penetration rate of specific platforms locally, or readership of online legacy media can provide additional insights into some of the database’s results. Expanding on these aspects could be insightful for future research.

At the same time, evidence of GenAI use in campaigning was found in a wide variety of countries, such as Croatia, Mauritania, North Macedonia, Namibia, Senegal, and Uruguay. These are countries that international observers likely paid less attention to than geopolitical

heavyweights such as India and the USA. However, some reports (international and domestic) still emerged.

IPIE recorded GenAI incidents in double digits for eight countries (16%), from ten incidents in France to 30 in India and the USA each. The countries with the least instances (some as low as one) were Belgium, El Salvador, Finland, Lithuania, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritania, Mozambique, North Macedonia, Palau, and Panama.

Overall, it is impossible to capture all instances of GenAI usage worldwide via the open-source research that was conducted for this paper. This is due to content spreading in private networks, such as closed Facebook groups and chats on messaging apps like WhatsApp, as well as being sent by nefarious political actors clearly interested in using GenAI tools covertly [\[125\]](#).

The vast majority (80%) of countries evidently experienced GenAI usage during their national elections in 2024. This is a clear indication of the widespread use and availability of GenAI technology, as well as the political will to rely on it across the globe. Given the attention given to GenAI's impact on elections in 2024, the relatively low numbers of references to GenAI in each country on the IPIE's database can be considered somewhat surprising. When reviewing hundreds of articles, the IPIE concluded that many reports referenced the same examples (resulting in only one entry on the IPIE's database). While the overall numbers might be lower than expected by some readers, the IPIE's database still includes many more examples than presented in previously mentioned trackers or papers. Explanations for these lower-than-expected numbers could be, for example, that people rarely report the GenAI content they see in their feeds to external trackers; or that journalists focus on big stories and do not report on a multitude of potentially banal GenAI videos (the IPIE's database only includes *reported* instances of GenAI use). Finally, for inclusion into the database, GenAI incidents needed to fulfil certain characteristics: reported and surfaced in 2024, targeting national elections, having political relevance. Several GenAI incidents do not have these characteristics and hence are not included in the IPIE's database.

All instances of GenAI usage that fit the IPIE’s characteristics were factored into the quantitative description of its spread across the case studies—independent of how they were used, that is, whether for benevolent or nefarious reasons. These aspects of use will be explored in later sections. As referenced in the previous section on key terms and concepts, conducting additional analysis beyond an investigation of the quantitative spread is crucial for drawing conclusions about the roles of this GenAI usage targeting elections.

Further, the quantitative overview of GenAI deployment also lacks the depth needed to explain the palpable potency of some GenAI uses compared to their relatively impotent effects in other cases. For example, there are only a few recorded instances of GenAI use in Romania in the IPIE’s database. However, its employment in Romania to target the country’s national election was embedded in a highly sophisticated, coordinated campaign that had an immense impact—ultimately leading to the annulment of the presidential election results [56]. As the International Foundation for Electoral Systems explains: “the [Romanian constitutional] court’s decision highlighted the impact of the extensive deployment of artificial intelligence (AI), automated systems, and coordinated information integrity campaigns on electoral integrity, among other findings of interference” [57].

The insights drawn from the data that are discussed in the next section will go beyond identifying the spread of the political use of GenAI generally, and will help to uncover the role of GenAI by analyzing which types of political usage were more prevalent in 2024 and which were less so.

4.2 Content Creation: The Most Prominent Type of Usage

The recorded instances of political GenAI usage targeting 2024 elections worldwide in the IPIE’s database are distributed across four types: (1) content creation, (2) content proliferation, (3) hypertargeting, and (4) unclear.

1. “Content creation” designates the application of GenAI to create material or content related to an election, for instance GenAI-generated speech material shared in the lead-up to election day.

2. “Content proliferation” describes the use of GenAI in proliferating, sharing, translating, or expediting the delivery of material to an audience, such as GenAI-powered social media accounts distributing political messages during a political campaign.
3. “Hypertargeting” describes the application of GenAI to target an individual or group, for example relying on GenAI tools to conduct a political campaign based on a particular demographic constituency.
4. “Unclear” refers to the unspecified use of GenAI that is relevant to an election by an actor, for example, when an article discusses the use of GenAI by a political candidate but does not explain *how* GenAI was used.

First, the vast majority (90%) of recorded incidents in the database related to content creation (1), with 71% of these solely comprising content creation, and 29% including content creation alongside content proliferation and/or hypertargeting.

Examples include:

- GenAI-generated videos circulating on election day in Bangladesh. In one deepfake video that spread across social media, an independent candidate for the Gaibandha-1 constituency, Abdullah Nahid Nigar, supposedly announced that she had withdrawn from the election [\[126\]](#), [\[127\]](#).
- An AI-manipulated video in Taiwan in which a woman claimed that Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party’s candidate Lai Ching-te had three mistresses with whom he had illegitimate children (he won the presidency despite this video) [\[128\]](#).
- Various deepfakes using AI voice generators in Namibia portraying President Biden supporting local political parties [\[129\]](#).

Second, 24% of recorded incidents in the database relate to content proliferation. However, 20% of these cover only content proliferation.

Examples include:

- Using a network of 171 fake bot accounts on X powered by ChatGPT with content for distribution promoting the ruling party of Ghana [\[130\]](#).
- Nine GenAI voice clones being employed to disseminate false narratives during the national election across India [\[131\]](#).

Third, an aggregate 4% of the recorded incidents in the database relate to hypertargeting. Only 1% of these relate solely to hypertargeting; the remainder comprise a combination of hypertargeting and content creation and/or content proliferation.

Examples include:

- Interference by Belarusian state actors during the Lithuanian presidential election when deceptively edited interviews were translated by GenAI tools and used to geographically segment target audiences in two languages (Russian and Lithuanian) [\[132\]](#).
- GenAI was used by local tech companies to create 25 million personalized AI calls to voters in two southern states in India [\[133\]](#).

Fourth and finally, 4% of the recorded incidents in the database were unclear. These amount to eight cases in which GenAI was employed in a political manner, but the precise type of usage (content creation, content proliferation or hypertargeting) is unclear.

Examples include:

- Reporting on the use of GenAI to spread misinformation in Mozambique, but with a lack of detail on the actors, content, and tactics of this spread of misinformation [\[134\]](#).

There are three relevant explanations for the outsize number of recorded instances concerning content creation, as opposed to content proliferation and hypertargeting.

The first is that the roll-out of ChatGPT in 2022 was followed by the large-scale adoption of text-generating GenAI tools, such as ChatGPT, Claude, and Google Gemini (formerly Bard) [135], [136]. In recent years, diffusion models and publicly available, relatively cheap models like Midjourney and Stable Diffusion have become popular and can generate multiple realistic images and videos using text prompting [74], [137]. In the IPIE's database, GenAI content ostensibly relying on Midjourney is represented in various geographies.

Their international popularity, alongside their advanced language capabilities and the fact that developers created innovative, local models, culminated in a boom in GenAI content penetrating all online spaces. Similarly, although image- and video-generating tools such as Midjourney were only released in 2022, they have become a rapid success story with some noteworthy use cases, such as in Indonesia. Here, the campaign run by the winning candidate in the 2024 presidential election, Prabowo Subianto, developed a chubby-cheeked AI avatar using Midjourney that was incredibly popular with the public. Overall, content created by Midjourney and ChatGPT was central to the now-president's campaign [138], [139]. In other words, political actors embraced these technologies—just as internet users from various backgrounds did—experimenting with the potential to elevate their political campaigning.

The second explanation for the high number of content creation instances (as opposed to those relating to content proliferation or hypertargeting) is the heightened difficulty of identifying and tracing the proliferation and hypertargeting of GenAI content. There are some detection tools that can be used to help locate GenAI content, such as those found on Originality.ai or in the FaceForensics++ data set [140], [141], [142], [143]. Tracking how content is spread, however, often requires advanced tools or insider data access, for example the type of access given to threat analysis teams at social media companies.

A final explanation is that hypertargeting, like proliferation, is hard to detect, and legitimate actors like political candidates are often unwilling to admit that they have employed GenAI

tools to assist them in their targeted political campaigns. For the 2024 USA election, researchers interviewed campaign consultants from both major parties, vendors of political GenAI tools, political candidates, and digital strategists. They discovered that all the political actors interviewed had been experimenting with GenAI tools—and some emphasized that they had used such tools for fundraising and for targeting voters [33]. In the study just discussed, many interviewees did not want to disclose exactly how and to what extent they had relied on GenAI for these purposes. This is not just a reputational question. In many instances, political campaigns want to utilize targeting techniques that rely on GenAI, but they are either outlawed or operate in legal gray zones, prompting the campaign to cover up its GenAI usage. In some instances, however, journalists revealed the extensive usage of GenAI for hypertargeting, such as by a political consultant in Indonesia who said that he had developed an app (Pemilu.AI) that uses ChatGPT-4 and 3.5 to craft hyperlocal campaign strategies and speeches. Reuters interviewed experts and content creators about the use of GenAI in Indonesia's election and they noted that vendors and campaigns were “pushing the boundaries” of the guidelines issued by the tool makers such as ChatGPT and Midjourney. [138], [139].

The next section will examine additional insights about the nature and extent of GenAI use during 2024 elections worldwide by focusing on the actors behind the recorded instances. These insights will help uncover the role of GenAI use by analyzing who applied these technologies and for which reasons (for nefarious or benevolent purposes).

4.3 Difficulty of Identifying Actors: Unclear Actors in 46% of Cases

The actors who were recorded as applying GenAI in elections in 2024 worldwide have been divided into six categories: (1) foreign actor, (2) political party or candidate, (3) paid commercial actor, (4) partisan group, (5) domestic government, and (6) unclear.

To further designate the type of GenAI-use instances that were found, the database also categorizes the purpose of each instance as “good,” “bad”, or “unclear.” “Good” refers to the use of GenAI for an ostensibly good purpose that is relevant to an election. This includes

healthy political commentary and critique. It also includes, for example, GenAI tools being utilized to support translation needs in relation to a candidate's speech that is delivered in a rural community where some speak a different language to that of the candidate. "Bad" indicates the use of GenAI for an ostensibly nefarious purpose that is relevant to an election. This includes attempts at hostile mimicry or deception, for example foreign actors using a GenAI bot network to dissuade voters from voting. Also, with regard to this variable, a third option is included: "unclear". This refers to the use of GenAI in a manner that does not clearly demonstrate its purpose, but is still relevant to an election. For example, GenAI-generated audio could be used to pass on seemingly trivial messages from a jailed political candidate.

The six categories of actors are:

1. "Foreign actor" refers to the usage of GenAI that is relevant to a national election by a foreign power or institution (named or unnamed). For example, a GenAI-powered campaign could be influenced by a foreign corporation with state affiliation.
2. "Political party or candidate" indicates the use of GenAI that is relevant to a national election by a political candidate or their party (including a former political actor). For example, an opposition candidate could create GenAI-generated speech material for an upcoming national election, and this is reported in an article.
3. "Paid commercial actor" refers to the usage of GenAI that is relevant to a national election by a paid commercial actor or corporate entity. For example, a consultancy group could be hired to establish a GenAI bot network to call potential voters in rural regions.
4. "Partisan group" designates the use of GenAI that is relevant to a national election by a group that is not officially affiliated with a political party, but has clear political beliefs. For example, a pro-BJP social media group could create pro-Modi deepfakes on Instagram.

5. “Government” refers to the use of GenAI that is relevant to a national election by a domestic government that is in power. For example, a government authority could use GenAI tools to verify candidates’ legitimacy in the election period.
6. “Unclear” indicates the use of GenAI that is relevant to a national election by an unspecified actor. For example, there could be an article that discusses GenAI-generated deepfakes of leading political candidates but without saying who created or disseminated them.

Foreign actors were found to be involved in 20% of reported incidents concerning interfering in national elections using GenAI content and tactics. Of these, 95% are attributable to foreign actors acting alone, and 5% involve foreign actors and political candidates or local parties. The entirety of GenAI-related foreign interference had nefarious purposes.

Examples include:

- Iranian interference during the national elections in the USA in 2024 that used ChatGPT to generate both progressive and conservative articles and social media comments [\[144\]](#).
- Russia and China coordinating an election-related interference campaign targeting the Solomon Islands, which included relying on GenAI-generated voices taken from the pro-Chinese Communist Party YouTube channel Chinese Revival [\[145\]](#).

Political parties and candidates make up 25% of actors in the database. They created 88% of these instances alone, with the remaining 12% created by political parties or candidates in combination with paid commercial actors, partisan groups, or foreign actors. The largest proportion of GenAI use in political campaigning by political parties or candidates was

purportedly benevolent (38% good), with the remaining 62% split equally between bad and unclear.

Examples include:

- A prominent right-wing party (FPÖ) in Austria used GenAI-generated images and video material in their campaigning (despite a voluntary agreement supported by the other major parties to “refrain from using deepfakes”. FPÖ was one of only two parties that refused to sign an agreement not to use AI for the dissemination of false information during the election) [146].
- Political candidates in Japan employed chatbots to answer questions on behalf of the candidates [147], and in the United Kingdom an AI candidate called “AI Steve” was officially on the ballot for the country’s national parliamentary election [148].

Paid commercial actors were involved in 6% of the cases in the IPIE’s database. In 31% of these cases, paid commercial actors were working in tandem with partisan groups, political parties and candidates, and/or foreign actors, whereas 69% of the cases involved paid commercial actors acting alone. The purpose of the GenAI-generated campaigning was in 38% of cases, with the remaining instances split equally between good and bad (30% each).

Examples include:

- Paid commercial actors (companies) in India employed GenAI tools to resurrect dead politicians for fake audio and video endorsements that were distributed via phone calls and video [133].
- In the USA, X’s GenAI ChatBot (Grok), developed by a paid commercial actor, spread misinformation about voting information and about Harris’s eligibility to be president [149].

Partisan groups conducted 6% of the GenAI-generated political campaigning. Out of this percentage, partisan groups were solely responsible for 76% of instances, and worked with paid commercial actors and/or political parties and candidates in the remaining 24%. Half (50%) of these examples of campaigning by partisan groups using GenAI were deemed to be nefarious (bad), only 14% were found to be allegedly benevolent (good), and 36% of cases were unclear.

Examples include:

- In the midst of allegations of various disinformation campaigns in Georgia, various GenAI-manipulated videos spread on social media targeting opposition figures [\[150\]](#).
- The “Irish Channel”, a website in the Republic of Ireland, used GenAI to develop misinformation [\[104\]](#).
- GenAI tools were likely employed in the Maldives to create a fake screenshot of a supposed post on X depicting the President of the Maldives apologizing to the Indian people [\[151\]](#).

Domestic government actors ran 1% of GenAI-generated political campaigns, according to the IPIE’s database, and they had no assistance from any other actors. Ostensibly, all recorded instances of GenAI campaigning by government actors were also entirely benevolent (good) and hence ostensibly positive. Still, it is worth noting that this could be due to a general inability to access state strategies for repressing political dialogue. Although the database did not include this for the 2024 period, this does not mean it did not happen.

Examples include:

- Government actors in Madagascar used GenAI tools with the aim of propping up election security (voter authentication in this case) [\[152\]](#).
- GenAI chatbots were deployed in South Africa to manage voter registration [\[153\]](#).

Unclear actors were responsible for the largest proportion of GenAI-generated campaigns: 46% of all recorded instances. The vast majority of these seem to have been conducted for nefarious purposes (79%), with 14% unclear and only 7% good.

Examples include:

- A GenAI-generated audio of President Luis Abinader was circulated by hundreds of bots in the Dominican Republic in which he argues that it is necessary to wait for the elections to be over before the Dominican government can take measures to facilitate the migration of Haitians [\[154\]](#).
- Roughly 150 anonymous template accounts on X were conducting influence campaigns ahead of the national election in the Republic of Ireland utilizing GenAI-generated content [\[155\]](#).
- A deepfake of now-US President Donald Trump circulated in Pakistan depicting him saying that if he were to be reelected, he would try his “best to get Imran Khan (former Pakistani Prime Minister) out of jail as soon as possible. He is my friend. I love him. I will support him to take over the government again” [\[156\]](#).

It is worth repeating the IPIE’s finding that in almost half (46%) of the incidents reported in the IPIE’s database, the actor is unclear. There are several explanations for this. On the one hand, many actors deliberately attempt to stay hidden. Some of them pursue nefarious goals, such as the Russian actors who tried to sway Moldovan voters using disinformation to vote against the pro-European candidate Maia Sandu in the presidential election [\[157\]](#). In this case, the desire of the foreign actors to stay hidden is clear: if their foreign meddling is discovered, their potential power to sway voters is destroyed (because the deception that is uncovered undermines the potential persuasion of their message). More imminently and practically, they face possible repercussions by social media companies, who regularly take down foreign influence operations. Or if the actors behind the influence campaign are revealed, they might face sanctions, such as being banned from a platform or even criminal prosecution. In sum, there is a clear-cut interest in staying invisible.

In other instances, the actors employing GenAI for political reasons might be doing so because their aim is to achieve beneficial outcomes. For example, when political candidates hire consultancies (“paid commercial actors” in the database) to employ GenAI to create audio messages in local dialects for hard-to-reach, less literate populations in rural India. This is not necessarily nefarious but can serve benevolent purposes. In either case, the desire not to be discovered is less strong, but likely still exists as this could diminish the authenticity of the campaign. In many cases the employment of consultants for political campaigning is merely frowned on, but in other cases it is illegal. The preference is usually, therefore, for a lot of these contracts and actors to stay in the shadows—even if they are not actually breaking the law *per se*.

The fact that 20% of recorded instances in the database denote foreign actors using GenAI for nefarious purposes shows that there continues to be a high level of interest in interfering with voters’ choices and electoral processes generally. The figure indicates that foreign actors think that this is an effective way to pursue their international relations goals by influencing elections abroad. Democracies will always be particularly vulnerable to this sort of interference due to rights, such as freedom of speech, that exist in many countries. However, there are several ways that democracies can build resilience, which are outlined in the summary for policymakers ([SFP2025.1](#)).

Finally, the database’s insights on political parties and candidates that employ GenAI also have relevant implications. In one quarter of instances, these actors (political candidates and parties) were behind the employment of GenAI. In 38% of these cases, the IPIE deems these GenAI usages to be for ostensibly good purposes. This data underlines the necessity of finding out how GenAI might be helpful for democratizing political campaigning, such as through assisting underserved communities to be better represented on a national level. In short, policymakers and societies need to make sure that the beneficial impacts of GenAI in politics are not eliminated due to fear of GenAI-driven interference. These points will also factor in the recommendations of this technical paper.

SECTION 5. CONCLUSIONS

Summary of Findings

This technical paper serves three main purposes:

- First, it describes how the IPIE developed an open-access database documenting reported uses of GenAI across 50 countries that held competitive national elections in 2024. The goal is to provide valuable structured data for public analysis by researchers interested in the political impacts of GenAI.
- The second purpose is to analyze this database. The work focuses on international comparative insights along the recorded variables, such as the type of usage, the actors involved, and whether the usage is categorized as good or bad. This analysis aims to fill the gap in global insights based on original data collection.
- Finally, the third aim of the paper is to serve as a data-grounded foundation for policy recommendations designed to mitigate the negative effects of GenAI on elections while highlighting positive use cases.

The IPIE database documented the presence of GenAI in 40 out of 50 competitive national elections held worldwide in 2024. These instances included a variety of applications, from content creation to hypertargeting by foreign actors and domestic political candidates. Of the documented cases, 16% appeared to serve benevolent purposes, while 69% seemed to align with potentially harmful objectives. The purposes of the remaining cases were unclear.

In general, GenAI tools and tactics in disinformation campaigns were often employed as one of many ways to create or distribute deceptive content. This underscores the need to view GenAI as a technological accelerator that capitalizes on established mechanisms of positive online campaigning, but also of digital deception. In other words, the structural and institutional foundations of polluted information environments also underpin the employment of GenAI politically. Exaggerated concerns about GenAI may not necessarily curb GenAI-generated content, but could inadvertently benefit those resistant to meaningful

reform. This poses a risk by framing the issue as a standalone problem with a simple fix, rather than considering it within a broader context.

Moreover, false and misleading information circulated widely in the run-up to national elections in 2024—even in countries where no GenAI use was recorded [158]. Some of these cases may have involved undetected GenAI, but the IPIE database specifically tracks incidents of GenAI-generated campaigning. Because GenAI took off in 2022-2023, by 2024 several countries, international organizations, and domestic companies had established guardrails or voluntary commitments to limit its political use, which likely reduced its prevalence to some extent.

Broader Implications

The IPIE database is global, and all countries that held competitive national elections during 2024 were included and investigated. This process has produced crucial insights into the global electoral role of GenAI. It was important to include smaller countries outside the major geographies to unveil the potential impact that GenAI can have in smaller constituencies, as well as in less regulated and observed spaces—in some of which we found the harms of deceptive GenAI usage to be particularly visible. For example, in Mexico, GenAI technologies were deployed to delegitimize and harass the two women candidates running for the presidency [159].

Overall, the IPIE database contains several significant insights, including the concept of the liar's dividend. Even a few instances of political deepfakes can severely undermine trust in online content and provide a convenient justification for politicians who want to dismiss real content by simply alleging it is fake [62]. Sam Gregory, executive director of WITNESS, a human rights organization, outlined to *WIRED* that “in an analysis of all the reports to WITNESS’ Deepfakes Rapid-Response Force, about a third of the cases were politicians using AI to deny evidence of a real event—many involving leaked conversations” [160].

Another insight is that female politicians face disproportionate levels of vulnerability and backlash due to deepfakes. Or that even small markets can deploy GenAI-generated content

with tools like GenAI accelerators, which the *Financial Times* described as “cheap tools offered by artificial intelligence start-ups” [161]. To gain more of these insights, additional in-depth case analysis is required, which future research can explore.

Directions for Future Research

This paper’s focus on competitive national elections means that it excludes local, regional, or cross-national elections (e.g., elections for the European Parliament). There is some evidence that campaigners and political consultants experimented more with GenAI on the local level [33], [88]. And researchers have recorded incidents where GenAI had a role in the EU parliamentary elections [162], [163]. A future project could compare the role of GenAI in local, regional, and EU elections to that in national elections.

Future research using this database could explore additional aspects, such as regional comparisons, by relying on the “region/city” variable, or cross-continental comparisons by considering countries in the Americas compared to those in Asia. It could conduct additional qualitative analysis by extracting more detailed information from the recorded instances. The IPIE’s database and technical paper provide evidence that may be further researched by examining local contexts, political landscapes, and media ecologies in an in-depth manner.

The IPIE has created a four-step scheme to assess the role of GenAI in elections in 2024. The scheme is based on this IPIE technical paper and its related database, as well as on the IPIE’s conceptualizations (see section 1.1. Key Terms). Figures 6 to 10 capture examples of how the four aspects of the scheme allow an assessment of whether the role was small, medium, or large. The graphic includes two case study examples as well as an overall assessment based on all cases in the database ($n = 50$). While the first aspect (occurrence) is a necessary variable for any role, the other three aspects are weighted variables with equal relevance. Aspects two and three are descriptive (which types of usage and which actors employed GenAI politically), while aspect four is normative (good/bad).

Numerical overviews based on categories can only describe the roles of GenAI usage to a certain extent. As the Romanian example shows, even if there are only a few recorded

instances of GenAI use in a country in the database, one instance can still lead to GenAI having a large role [\[56\]](#).

Another country for which we found relatively little evidence of GenAI-generated campaigning was Tunisia. This is somewhat surprising as the country has experienced proliferating disinformation targeted at elections and at opposition politicians in recent years. There are three main explanations for the lack of GenAI used to target the country's presidential election in 2024. First, there is an increasingly repressive information environment that harasses journalists who do not toe the president's line [\[164\]](#). Second, as in all 2024 elections, plenty of misinformation was spread that did not rely on GenAI. Therefore, false and misleading information was likely circulating in the lead-up to the country's 2024 elections, but because it did not use GenAI it is not captured in the IPIE's database [\[165\]](#). Third, many voters as well as external observers condemned the presidential elections in Tunisia as a farce [\[166\]](#), [\[167\]](#). As a result, political campaigning for what many saw as a sham election could have been subdued due to the diminished importance of the 2024 elections in many voters' eyes. Dozens of candidates were prevented from running by changed eligibility criteria, arrests, and other efforts by the government to prevent opposition figures from running.

In future research, longitudinal studies could provide valuable insights on short- versus medium- and long-term effects. Historical comparative studies could assess how GenAI usage ranks within a variety of media and social media tools in the hands of campaigners or foreign actors aiming to influence elections.

Based on the IPIE's database, researchers could deduce further insights on the impact of GenAI use on elections specifically, and on politics more generally. For example, separating countries into two groups: highly competitive ("free") and competitive ("partly free"), could uncover whether GenAI use is associated with how aggressive a campaign is. Identifying which type of GenAI was used and how it was used differently by the incumbent compared to the challengers standing for election could uncover similar insights: who is more likely to use

it, and in what ways? Finally, additional analyses could dive into exactly which tools the instances recorded in the database cover (where this is possible, that is, when a source mentions tools) to map the popularity of different tools.

GenAI is not an isolated force reshaping elections, but rather an evolving tool within existing political communication strategies. As regulatory efforts and voluntary commitments continue to take shape, a nuanced approach is needed, which acknowledges GenAI's role in both deception and legitimate political campaigning without falling into fear-driven narratives that obscure deeper structural issues.

Figure 6. Overview of Results: Occurrence of GenAI Usage



Source: IPIE calculations based on data collected 10-12-2024 to 17-02-2025.

Note: Percentages can add up to over 100% as some codes are not mutually exclusive. See codebook for more information.

Figure 7. Overview of Results: Type of Usage

Second aspect: Type of usage		
All Countries Medium Role	EXAMPLE CASE STUDY Indonesia Large Role	EXAMPLE CASE STUDY Uruguay Small Role
Content creation		
*90% of all instances	*81% of instances	*100%
Content proliferation		
*5% of all instances	*19% of instances	-
Hypertargeting		
*3% of all instances	*6% of instances	-

Source: IPIE calculations based on data collected 10-12-2024 to 17-02-2025.

Note: Percentages can add up to over 100% as some codes are not mutually exclusive. See codebook for more information.


Figure 8. Overview of Results: Actors Involved

Third aspect: Actors		
All Countries Medium Role	EXAMPLE CASE STUDY Indonesia Large Role	EXAMPLE CASE STUDY Uruguay Small Role
Foreign actor		
*20% of instances	-	-
Political party or candidate		
*25% of instances	*28% of instances	-
Paid commercial actor		
*6% of all instances	*6% of instances	-
Partisan group		
*7% of all instances	*6% of instances	*100% of instances
Domestic government		
*1% of all instances	-	-
Unclear		
*46% of instances	*60% of instances	-

Source: IPIE calculations based on data collected 10-12-2024 to 17-02-2025.

Note: Percentages can add up to over 100% as some codes are not mutually exclusive. See codebook for more information.

Figure 9. Overview of Results: Good, Bad and Unclear Roles of GenAI Usage



Source: IPIE calculations based on data collected 10-12-2024 to 17-02-2025.

Note: Percentages can add up to over 100% as some codes are not mutually exclusive. See codebook for more information.

Figure 10. Conclusion

Conclusion		
All Countries Medium Role	EXAMPLE CASE STUDY Indonesia Large Role	EXAMPLE CASE STUDY Uruguay Small Role
Medium Role The role of GenAI in elections across the world in 2024 overall was medium. First, GenAI was deployed in 80% of countries, which indicates wide usage and therefore a potentially large role. Second, while the types of usage varied, content creation far outweighed the others at 90%. While types of usage varied and included creative ways of being persuasive using GenAI, the biggest effects likely came from content creation, as these instances far outweighed other types of GenAI usage. Third, no single type comprised the majority of actors. Instead, they came from a broad range of institutions, and these individuals were all likely aiming to affect voters in a decisive manner. Fourth, while the majority of attempts to influence elections using GenAI materials were malevolent, 16% were ostensibly good and 15% were unclear in their intent. Interestingly, there is a clear-cut correlation between aspects three and four in that all instances of GenAI usage by foreign actors were coded as bad in the database. In conclusion, GenAI had a medium role overall but there were strong variations across countries as well as variations in the types of actors and types of usage. In some countries, GenAI didn't play any role. Zero occurrences were recorded, which means that the necessary variable of the analysis is missing because there is no evidence to consider.	Large Role The role of GenAI in the 2024 competitive national elections in Indonesia was large. First, the country had 16 instances of GenAI usage, putting it in the top third of all countries in the database. Second, all three types of GenAI usage (CC, CP, and HT) have been recorded for Indonesia. This indicates that Indonesian voters were, or might have been, affected in a variety of ways. Third, while the actors behind the instances were unclear in more than half of the cases, a variety of actors still relied on GenAI, and that likely affected voters. Finally, according to the database, the intention of GenAI use in 2024 elections in Indonesia was largely bad. In other words, voters were deceived, or attempts were made to deceive them in more than half the cases. However, in 19% of the cases, GenAI was employed for ostensibly benevolent reasons, potentially driving citizen engagement.	Small Role The role of GenAI in the 2024 competitive national elections in Uruguay was small. IPIE recorded only one instance of political GenAI usage targeting such elections. This instance was one of content creation by a partisan group with nefarious intent, but the role was likely limited due to quick renouncement of the deepfake by other political actors. In sum, the very low number (1) as well as the nature of the GenAI employed resulted in a small role for GenAI usage during the 2024 elections in Uruguay.

Source: IPIE

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ANNEX

Case Study Justification

For the purposes of this technical paper *The Role of Generative AI Use in 2024 Elections Worldwide*, 50 countries were included as case studies ($n = 50$). In these countries, competitive elections were held on a national level. The IPIE acknowledges that the campaigning practices and media markets of countries with competitive elections are not always directly comparable. The IPIE [database](#) and technical paper therefore provide evidence that may be further researched by examining local contexts, political landscapes, and media ecologies in an in-depth manner.

The first necessary variable is therefore: National Elections.

To determine which countries held elections in 2024, the researchers consulted the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA's) *2024 Global Elections SuperCycle* database [1]. The total number of national elections taking place in 2024 is determined by countries with representation in the United Nations (plus Taiwan), which held national elections in 2024 (total number: 64).

While IDEA counts individual elections as separate case studies, our report relies on countries as case studies. Therefore, countries that held presidential elections and/or parliamentary/legislative elections, and/or general elections (a simultaneous legislative and presidential election like in the USA) are counted as one case study, thus potentially including multiple elections. Similarly, in countries where elections involve multiple rounds of voting (such as France), or take place in different phases across the country (such as India), the various elections are still counted as one case (the country).

The rationale for relying on countries as cases (instead of individual elections) is appropriate for this technical paper as:

- (1) The technical paper aims to calibrate in which countries GenAI's role was larger, and in which it was smaller.

- (2) The role of GenAI in campaigning can have short-, mid-, and long-term implications. In order to capture all three, the database includes all incidents of GenAI related to elections in the countries.
- (3) In most cases, it is impossible to distinguish different campaigns for different elections within one country. In practice, campaign messages and tactics overlap and cross-proliferate. To best capture this reality, the database includes all incidents of GenAI surrounding national elections in the countries involved.

The second necessary variable is: Competitive Elections.

In order to determine which of the countries that held national elections in 2024 were competitive, the researchers consulted the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem's) *Democracy Report 2024* [2] and Freedom House's *World Scores for 2024* [3].

To ensure the most insightful global results, the IPIE chose to rely on a combination of V-Dem's and Freedom House's rankings of countries worldwide. The technical paper's database includes all countries that V-Dem classifies as "liberal democracy" or "electoral democracy". It further includes countries that V-Dem identifies as "democratic grey zone", "autocratic grey zone", or "electoral autocracy", and that rank "partly free" with Freedom House (such as India, Indonesia, and Mauritius).

The IPIE ([SR2023.3](#)) has previously established that V-Dem asserts that elections in electoral autocracies carry some meaning: "Citizens can vote for the chief executive and legislature via multi-party elections. However, certain freedoms like association and expression are restricted, making elections *less (emphasis added)* meaningful, free, and fair." The technical paper excludes all countries that V-Dem identifies as "electoral autocracy" and that rank as "not free" with Freedom House. The technical paper also excludes all countries that rank as 'closed autocracies' with V-Dem, even if Freedom House classifies them as "partly free" (such as Kuwait).

The rationale for relying on this combination of V-Dem and Freedom House rankings is based on three considerations:

- (1) First, the technical paper aims to provide global coverage, but some countries with elections in 2024 were not included in V-Dem's ranking (such as San Marino).
- (2) Second, the technical paper aims for pertinent insights from all world regions, and some large-scale (but flawed) democracies from the Global South would have been excluded by only following V-Dem's country definitions of "liberal democracy" and "electoral democracy"—missing out on insights from Bangladesh and India, for instance.
- (3) Third, the technical paper aims to assess the role of GenAI in elections, and hence elections should have tangible effects in the countries involved. In other words, elections in countries that are "not free" (or "closed autocracies") do not always reflect voters' choices, so the potential implications of GenAI content in swaying voters' decisions cannot be detected. Further, local journalists in countries that are "not free" cannot report freely, and access for foreign journalists is limited. Therefore, cases of GenAI use in elections are likely to be unreported or at least underreported and could skew the database as other cases of free elections are likely to correlate with more reporting on those elections, including GenAI use.

When relying on Freedom House and V-Dem, expectations about media freedom, pluralism, public trust, and the role of legacy media are viewed from the perspective of a Westphalian public sphere. These underpinnings carry relevance for the analysis of this technical paper (specifically regarding disinformation and public trust). Other scholars might make different analyses when factoring in local political communication practices and their recent evolution in local media markets.

Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) ranks almost all countries worldwide in six categories: “liberal democracy”, “electoral democracy”, “democratic grey zone”, “autocratic grey zone”, “electoral autocracy”, and “closed autocracy”. If the database had *solely* relied on examining V-Dem’s “liberal democracies” and “electoral democracies”, there would have been 31 countries on the list. For whole list, please see below:

- | | |
|-----------------------|---------------------|
| 1. Austria | 17. Namibia |
| 2. Belgium | 18. North Macedonia |
| 3. Bhutan | 19. Panama |
| 4. Botswana | 20. Portugal |
| 5. Croatia | 21. Romania |
| 6. Dominican Republic | 22. Senegal |
| 7. Finland | 23. Slovakia |
| 8. Georgia | 24. South Korea |
| 9. Ghana | 25. Solomon Islands |
| 10. Iceland | 26. South Africa |
| 11. Indonesia | 27. Sri Lanka |
| 12. Lithuania | 28. Taiwan |
| 13. Maldives | 29. United States |
| 14. Mexico | 30. United Kingdom |
| 15. Moldova | 31. Uruguay |
| 16. Mongolia | |

Freedom House ranks all countries worldwide in categories of “free”, “partly free”, and “not free”. If the database had *solely* relied on examining Freedom House’s “free” and “partly free” categories, there would have been 51 countries on the list. For the whole list, please see below:

- | | | |
|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| 1. Austria | 18. Ireland | 35. Panama |
| 2. Bangladesh | 19. Japan | 36. Portugal |
| 3. Belgium | 20. Kiribati | 37. Romania |
| 4. Bhutan | 21. Kuwait | 38. San Marino |
| 5. Botswana | 22. Lithuania | 39. Senegal |
| 6. Bulgaria | 23. Madagascar | 40. Slovakia |
| 7. Comoros | 24. Maldives | 41. Solomon Islands |
| 8. Croatia | 25. Mauritania | 42. South Africa |
| 9. Dominican Republic | 26. Mauritius | 43. South Korea |
| 10. El Salvador | 27. Mexico | 44. Sri Lanka |
| 11. Finland | 28. Moldova | 45. Taiwan |
| 12. France | 29. Mongolia | 46. Togo |
| 13. Georgia | 30. Mozambique | 47. Tunisia |
| 14. Ghana | 31. Namibia | 48. Tuvalu |
| 15. Iceland | 32. North Macedonia | 49. United Kingdom |
| 16. India | 33. Pakistan | 50. United States |
| 17. Indonesia | 34. Palau | 51. Uruguay |

List of Countries

By applying the rationale of relying on a combination of V-Dem and Freedom House rankings, the following list emerges, containing all the countries that are part of the report's database:

- | | | |
|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| 1. Austria | 18. Ireland | 35. Portugal |
| 2. Bangladesh | 19. Japan | 36. Romania |
| 3. Belgium | 20. Kiribati | 37. San Marino |
| 4. Bhutan | 21. Lithuania | 38. Senegal |
| 5. Botswana | 22. Madagascar | 39. Slovakia |
| 6. Bulgaria | 23. Maldives | 40. Solomon Islands |
| 7. Comoros | 24. Mauritania | 41. South Africa |
| 8. Croatia | 25. Mauritius | 42. South Korea |
| 9. Dominican Republic | 26. Mexico | 43. Sri Lanka |
| 10. El Salvador | 27. Moldova | 44. Taiwan |
| 11. Finland | 28. Mongolia | 45. Togo |
| 12. France | 29. Mozambique | 46. Tunisia |
| 13. Georgia | 30. Namibia | 47. Tuvalu |
| 14. Ghana | 31. North Macedonia | 48. United Kingdom |
| 15. Iceland | 32. Pakistan | 49. United States |
| 16. India | 33. Palau | 50. Uruguay |
| 17. Indonesia | 34. Panama | |

Data Collection

LexisNexis and Newsstream

The researchers relied on keyword-based search strings to distill relevant entries from LexisNexis, and applied structured search strings across all selected countries. These queries included both English and locally relevant terms, such as the local name for the country, and local words for “elections” and “artificial intelligence”. If these general searches did not yield relevant results, additional qualifiers were added, such as “manipulation” “campaign”, “disinformation”, and “deepfakes”, also in local languages where possible, and with proximity operators to reduce irrelevant hits.

Relevant links

- <https://advance.lexis.com/firsttime?crd=375ae1d6-4df3-43e7-931f-ad3db836a7c6&pdmfid=1519360> (LexisNexis)
- <https://www.proquest.com/internationalnews1/index?accountid=213250&parentSessionId=2ZYhLRj47EvT%2BsDA7DZjCWbpCdVVRs7S8BjNROAJk%2Fk%3D> (Newsstream)

Additional sourcing

- *Advanced Google search*

Google-specific search operators were employed for supplementary data sources. This allowed additional country-relevant/specific results to be identified, for instance, through the use of country-specific operators (like “site:at” for Austria). The country operators only returned results published on domains ending in “.at”, which is a way to return both country- and language-specific information.

Relevant links

- https://www.google.com/advanced_search
- *Additional references sites*
 1. https://cetas.turing.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2024-11/cetas_research_report_-_ai-enabled_influence_operations_-_safeguarding_future_elections.pdf

2. <https://about.fb.com/news/2024/12/2024-global-elections-meta-platforms/>
3. <https://mediaengagement.org/research/generative-artificial-intelligence-and-elections/>
4. <https://mediaengagement.org/research/generative-ai-elections-and-beyond/>
5. <https://www.aipoliticalarchive.org/submissions>
6. <https://foundation.mozilla.org/en/research/library/global-elections-casebook/casebook/>
7. <https://www.eods.eu/eom-reports/>
8. https://interference2024.org/?mkt_tok=NjU5LVdaWC0wNzUAAAGXIDTbWPITl3lK6GhrgPb_2rNtMjo3yKUvOIhb2rWNPdcaWu73IDIMtlnTzKEXvldPaPdArrAt94Q2oz3enoqwfxthHJAnlZa3PwRBts9oSxzFs
9. <https://dfrlab.org/research/>
10. <https://democracy-reporting.org/en/office/global>
11. <https://disinfo.africa>
12. <https://restofworld.org/2024/elections-ai-tracker/>
13. <https://www.boomlive.in/boom-research>
14. <https://www.wired.com/story/generative-ai-global-elections/>
15. <https://www.gmfus.org/spitting-images-tracking-deepfakes-and-generative-ai-elections>

Limitations and Mitigations

The 50 countries identified as holding competitive national elections in 2024 represent a broad variety of cases on all five continents.

From less populous countries like Austria and the Dominican Republic, to the world's most populous democracy, India; from the world's largest Muslim country, Indonesia, to one of NATO's lesser-known members, North Macedonia; from a democracy that is the world's economic powerhouse, the USA, to the world's youngest democracy (Tunisia).

Consequently, there is more research and reporting on some cases than in others. For example, the US 2024 elections received more coverage than Bhutan's 2024 elections. The varying strength and size of the news media in different jurisdictions affects the reporting that this research was able to uncover. Generally, minority languages are less reported on—for example in the USA, most efforts are directed at detecting misinformation in English. This could have skewed the results. These discrepancies in the volume of writing and reporting across the cases can impact data collection. In order to mitigate this, the researchers consulted additional sources in addition to the primary LexisNexis data collection. Further, the researchers translated key search strings into local languages to capture more content.

It is important to note that there could be a negative bias in the data reviewed. Journalists have previously highlighted the challenges of making tech developments newsworthy, and the pressures they face when highlighting bad practices [4], [5]. It could be, therefore, that positive use cases of GenAI related to 2024 elections were reported less frequently, or not at all, and hence appear less often in the IPIE database.

Some sources and entries in the database refer to various allegations of GenAI usage without specific details, making it challenging to list specific instances of GenAI use while avoiding duplicates. The IPIE has therefore included these sources as a single entry, but has provided a short overview of the various different allegations raised.

The IPIE created a separate sheet entitled “Multiples”, which contains all references to reports of multiple instances of GenAI usage during elections. Please note that this sheet only contains entries where the number of instances is quantified (such as “51 instances of deepfakes in the [country] election”). The IPIE excluded bot network nodes (such as “500 coordinated bot social media accounts created by the Russian Federation”) as these should be considered to be a single coordinated case of GenAI usage.

The IPIE attempted to avoid duplicates as far as possible, but there is still a chance that some individual entries for a country like India have also been counted in the Multiples sheet, since many sources do not specify cases. Treating these instances as separate incidents more than

doubles the total count of GenAI usage during 2024 elections worldwide, from 215 to 573 recorded incidents. This inflated number is important for background, noting the many instances in one campaign, but for the purposes of this technical paper, the IPIE treats them as one recorded incident. This means that 215 is the total number of GenAI incidents affecting elections worldwide for our data analysis.

For the purposes of this technical paper, the IPIE focusses on incidents that include GenAI use. However, the use of this concept in public discourse and in some publications is blurred, which is why the database likely contains examples of other AI applications. In the database there are also a small number (11) of entries which detail (i) warnings of potential future AI usage in particular elections (without mentioning a specific case), (ii) allegations concerning GenAI usage that don't directly reference an election, and (iii) details of misinformation or disinformation campaigns conducted during an election that likely use AI but don't directly mention it. The latter additional pieces of information were included as they may hint at an incident or a broader trend of GenAI use in a particular country's election. A separate column in the database flags these entries.

Local writing and reporting might be published in languages that the research team does not speak. Further research in local languages and dialects could be useful but was outside the scope of this project. The researchers relied on their own language capabilities in Arabic, English, French, and Spanish, and used DeepL for other translations.

In addition, the researchers selected specific country-based publications on LexisNexis to control for the source of the originating information. However, LexisNexis does not provide equal country coverage and can sometimes return too much noise because of its end of article country name "tags." Therefore, LexisNexis data collection was supplemented by Google Advanced search as well as other reference sites, which were utilized following core research (LexisNexis and Google Advanced search). For a list of the 15 additional reference sites see the next section.

Further, the focus on national, competitive elections excludes regional elections, as well as, for example, elections for the European Parliament. There is some evidence that campaigners and political consultants were more experimental with using GenAI on local levels [6]. Researchers have also recorded incidents of GenAI in the European elections [7]. These incidents are largely lacking from our current database. A future project could include those elections and compare GenAI's role in local, regional, and European elections to national elections.

Finally, more instances of GenAI usage during elections worldwide in 2024 could also surface after the collection period of this database (December 2024 to February 2025). However, the bulk should have been uncovered by February 2025. Similarly, this project adhered to strict timeframes for the search (see the Search Strings section). This project focuses on data in 2024, but there are likely some examples of AI usage occurring in 2022/2023 which relate to the 2024 elections. To mitigate this limitation, the researchers reviewed all entries, finding that many of our sources consist of post-election reports that address all allegations of AI usage in the lead-up to an election regardless of their timing. This partially answers this limitation.

When it comes to coding, the IPIE acknowledges that our database does not have “objectivity”. However, the IPIE conducted a coding exercise aimed at substantiating reliability and validity while reflexively refining the analysis by evoking dialogue between external coders and the technical paper author (see ICR section).

Search Strings

[A note on search strings: While some major countries had only one search string utilized, this is due in part to the satisfactory level of returns received from the initial search. If additional searches ended up being iterative and producing results already recorded in the database, the researchers moved on to the next country. While this database aims to be comprehensive and therefore designed for most inclusive/generic search strings, it is possible that additional searches with additional keywords such as “ChatGPT” would produce additional results. See the notes on additional search strings for some insights on this.]

Generic

- Core Search (LN and Google): (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “country xyz” AND “2024”
 - **Occasionally with minor variations to widen the search (by removing the “political OR campaign” operator)*

If unsatisfactory returns, use:

- Search 2 (Google): “artificial intelligence” and “elections” and “country xyz” AND “2024” *(in local language)*
- Search 3 (Google): (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “country xyz” AND “2024” AND site: .url

Country Specific

Austria

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Austria” AND “2024”
- “artifizielle intelligenz” “wahl” “2024” “osterreich”
- (“künstliche Intelligenz” OR “KI”) AND “wahl” AND “2024” AND “osterreich” AND “wahl 2024”

Bangladesh

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Bangladesh” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “Bangladesh” AND “Bangladeshi”

Belgium

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Belgium” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “Belgium” AND “Belgian”
- “Belgique” “election” “2024” “intelligence artificielle” site:.be

Bhutan

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Bhutan” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “Bhutan” AND “Bhutanese”

Botswana

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Botswana” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Botswana” AND “2024” site:.bw

Bulgaria

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Bulgaria” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “Bulgaria” AND “Bulgarian”
- “2024” “изкуствен интелект” “избори” “България”

Comoros

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Comoros” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
- “Comores” “élection” “2024” “intelligence artificielle”

Croatia

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Croatia” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: Croatian

Dominican Republic

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Dominican Republic” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
- “República Dominicana” “elecciones” “2024” “inteligencia artificial”

El Salvador

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “El Salvador” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “El Salvador” AND “Salvadorian”

Finland

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Finland” AND “2024”
- Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
- Key word inclusion: “Finland” AND “Finnish”
- “Suomi” “tekoäly” “2024” “vaalit”

France

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “France” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “French” AND “France”
- "allegations" AND "artificial intelligence" AND "france" AND "election" AND "2024"

Georgia

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Georgia” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “Georgian” AND “Georgia”
- “ხელოვნური ინტელექტი” “ხელოვნური ინტელექტი” “2024”

Ghana

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Ghana” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “Ghana” AND “Ghanaian”

Iceland

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Iceland” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
- “Ísland” “kosningar” “2024” “gervigreind”

India

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “India” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “India” AND “Indian election”

Indonesia

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Indonesia” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “Indonesia” AND “Indonesian”

Ireland

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Ireland” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “Ireland” AND “Irish” AND “Irish election”
- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Ireland” AND “2024” site:.ie
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024

Japan

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Japan” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “Japan” AND “Japanese”
- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Japan” AND “2024” site:.jp
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
- “人工知能” “日本” “選挙” “2024”

Kiribati

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Kiribati” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024

Lithuania

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Lithuania” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “Lithuania” AND “Lithuanian”
- “dirbtinis intelektas” “Lietuva” “rinkimai” “2024”

Madagascar

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Madagascar” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
- “Madagascar” “élection” “2024” “intelligence artificielle”

Maldives

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Maldives” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024

Mauritania

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Mauritania” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “Mauritania” AND “Mauritanian”
- موريتانيا، ذكاء اصطناعي، 2024، انتخابات 2024

Mauritius

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Mauritius” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024

Mexico

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Mexico” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “Mexico” AND “Mexican”
- “México” “elección” “2024” “inteligencia artificial”

Moldova

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Moldova” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “Moldova” AND “Moldovan”

Mongolia

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Mongolia” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
- “Монгол сонгууль” “2024” “он хиймэл оюун ухаан”

Mozambique

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Mozambique” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “Mozambique”

Namibia

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Namibia” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “Namibia” AND “Namibian”

North Macedonia

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “North Macedonia” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
- “избори” “2024” “година vештачка интелигенција Северна Македонија”

Pakistan

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Pakistan” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “Pakistan” AND “Pakistani”

Palau

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Palau” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024

Panama

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Panama” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
- Panamá “elección” “2024” “inteligencia artificial”

Portugal

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Portugal” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “Portugal” AND “Portuguese”
 - Key word exclusion: “Brazil”
- “inteligência artificial” “Portugal” “eleições” “2024”

Romania

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Romania” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “Romania” AND “Romanian”
- “România” “inteligentă artificială” “2024” “alegeri”

San Marino

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “San Marino” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
- “San Marino” “elezione” “2024” “intelligenza artificiale”

Senegal

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Senegal” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “Senegal” AND “Senegalese”
- “intelligence artificielle” “Sénégal” “élection” “2024”

Slovakia

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Slovakia” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “Slovakia” AND “Slovakian”
- “umelá inteligencia” “Slovensko” “voľby” “2024”

Solomon Islands

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Soloman Islands” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024

South Africa

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “South Africa” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “South Africa” AND “South African”

South Korea

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “South Korea” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “South Korea” AND “South Korean”

Sri Lanka

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Sri Lanka” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “Sri Lanka” AND “Sri Lankan”

Taiwan

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Taiwan” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “Taiwan” AND “Taiwanese”

Togo

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Togo” AND “2024”
- “Togo” “election” “2024” “intelligence artificielle”
- “Togo” “election” “2024” “intelligence artificielle” site:.tg

Tunisia

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Tunisia” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “Tunisia” AND “Tunisian”
- “intelligence artificielle” “Tunisie” “élection” “2024”
- تونس “الانتخابات” “2024” “الذكاء الاصطناعي”

Tuvalu

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Tuvalu” AND “2024”
- “Tuvalu” “artificial intelligence” “election”

United Kingdom

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “United Kingdom” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “United Kingdom” AND “British”
- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “United Kingdom” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “United Kingdom” AND “British” AND “AI-generated”

United States of America:

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “United States” AND “American” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “United States” AND “American”
- NOTE: the vast majority of material was in the form of cumulative reports, so specific incidents are less available

Uruguay

- (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“political” OR “campaign”) AND (“misinformation” OR “disinformation” OR “deepfake” OR “bots”) AND “election” AND “Uruguay” AND “2024”
- "Uruguay" "inteligencia artificial" "2024" "elección"

Notes on Additional Search Strings

Based on feedback within the IPIE, additional searches were conducted.

The internal feedback on the search strings was the following:

“While the search strings cover the basics (AI, deepfakes, bots), IMHO they're missing some key angles. Please consider adding the following to get additional stories: For election integrity: ("democratic integrity" OR "election integrity" OR "electoral fairness"). For voter behavior/opinion: ("voter perception" OR "voter attitude" OR "voter response" OR "public opinion" OR "voter trust" OR "electoral trust"). Specific AI tools: (“ChatGPT” OR “DALL-E” OR “Midjourney”, etc.)”

In short, there were no significant new findings produced by these searches, aside from five new cases which have been added to the database.

For a longer explanation, please see below:

- Of the five new sources identified, all emanated from the AI tool-specific searches. However, these cases did not provide patterns or trends that were not already evident through the existing dataset. While these AI-tool specific searches certainly produced large amounts of content, the majority was either already reflected in our existing dataset or not relevant to specific instances of AI. Similar searches for the remaining countries are likely to produce similar results.
- As previously flagged, there are a range of further searches (predominantly utilizing local languages) which could reveal additional cases. However, this would simply benefit the overall size of the database and not necessarily change its main findings/takeaways (considering that the existing dataset already represents the vast majority of AI cases). In sum, the trends that our database captures are not significantly affected by these new results.

- AI tool-specific searches also produced previously identified cases of “Country XYZ bans AI content from websites, including Midjourney.” These searches did not produce new cases but provided additional information about existing cases. This search string is highly-time intensive as it requires greater verification against existing datasets.
- All other searches produced no new insights or cases. As with all previous research strings, this may be improved by increased local language searches and additional resources/time.
- Note that all searches were conducted on LexisNexis as this was the main tool previously utilized. These additional searches were not conducted on Google since previous experience showed that increased specificity in Google Search strings produced significantly fewer applicable results.

For details on the additional search strings, see below:

- Three new categories for searches:
 - Election Integrity:
 - (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“democratic integrity” OR “election integrity” OR “electoral fairness”) AND “Country XYZ” AND “2024”
 - Voter Behavior/Opinion:
 - (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“voter perception” OR “voter attitude” OR “voter response” OR “public opinion” OR “voter trust” OR “electoral trust”) AND “Country XYZ” AND “2024”
 - Specific GenAI tools:
 - (“ChatGPT” OR “DALL-E” OR “Midjourney”) AND “election” AND “Country XYZ” AND “2024”
- Additional search strings were applied to a sample of four countries representing different world regions and population sizes. In addition, these additional search strings were tried for India and the USA, the two countries with the highest results in the database:

- Croatia:
 - 1: (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“democratic integrity” OR “election integrity” OR “electoral fairness”) AND “Croatia” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “Croatia” AND “Croatian election”
 - FINDINGS: N/A
 - 2: (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“voter perception” OR “voter attitude” OR “voter response” OR “public opinion” OR “voter trust” OR “electoral trust”) AND “Croatia” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “Croatia” AND “Croatian election”
 - FINDINGS: N/A
 - 3: (“ChatGPT” OR “DALL-E” OR “Midjourney”) AND “election” AND “Croatia” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “Croatia” AND “Croatian election”
 - FINDINGS: N/A
- India:
 - 1: (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“democratic integrity” OR “election integrity” OR “electoral fairness”) AND “India” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “India” AND “Indian election”
 - FINDINGS: N/A, few results with no specific references to new AI usages
 - 2: (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“voter perception” OR “voter attitude” OR “voter response” OR “public opinion” OR “voter trust” OR “electoral trust”) AND “India” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “India” AND “Indian election”
 - FINDINGS: One source (added to database)
 - (Wednesday, November 27, 2024). Beijing’s online influence operations along the India China border. *Impact News Service*. <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:6DHK-VBC1-F0YC-N4Y1-00000-00&context=1519360>.

- 3: (“ChatGPT” OR “DALL-E” OR “Midjourney”) AND “election” AND “India” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “India” AND “Indian election”
 - FINDINGS: N/A
- Namibia:
 - 1: (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“democratic integrity” OR “election integrity” OR “electoral fairness”) AND “Namibia” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “Namibia” AND “Namibian election”
 - FINDINGS: N/A
 - 2: (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“voter perception” OR “voter attitude” OR “voter response” OR “public opinion” OR “voter trust” OR “electoral trust”) AND “Namibia” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “Namibia” AND “Namibian election”
 - FINDINGS: N/A
 - 3: (“ChatGPT” OR “DALL-E” OR “Midjourney”) AND “election” AND “Namibia” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “Namibia” AND “Namibian election”
 - FINDINGS: One source (added to Database)
 - Namibian Sun. (Friday, September 20, 2024). Unlike the stomach, the brain makes no sound when empty. *Namibian Sun*.
<https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:6D1C-HGW1-F11P-X01F-00000-00&context=1519360>.
- United States:
 - 1: (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“democratic integrity” OR “election integrity” OR “electoral fairness”) AND “United States” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “United States” AND “US election”
 - FINDINGS: One new source

- (Friday, August 9, 2024). Iran ramping up US election interference efforts: Microsoft. Agence France Presse -- English. <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:6CP0-VW01-DY93-M0N7-00000-00&context=1519360>.
- 2: (“artificial intelligence” OR “AI”) AND (“voter perception” OR “voter attitude” OR “voter response” OR “public opinion” OR “voter trust” OR “electoral trust”) AND “United States” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “United States” AND “US election”
 - FINDINGS:
 - Many sources, all are duplicates of existing dataset.
- 3: (“ChatGPT” OR “DALL-E” OR “Midjourney”) AND “election” AND “United States” AND “2024”
 - Timeline: 01/01/2024 – 31/12/2024
 - Key word inclusion: “United States” AND “US election”
 - FINDINGS: Most sources describe AI tools’ consideration of legislation regarding AI usage in elections, or proactive measures to take down AI content – not specific instances of AI usage.
 - (Wednesday, November 13, 2024). United States: ChatGPT blocked 250,000 AI image requests of US election candidates. *Thai News Service*. <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:6DD9-1461-DXMS-807V-00000-00&context=1519360>.
 - By Clare Duffy, CNN. (Wednesday, March 6, 2024). Top AI photo generators produce misleading election-related images, study finds. *CNN Wire*. <https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:6BGP-DNK1-DY7V-G22R-00000-00&context=1519360>.

Codebook

Variable	Category Descriptions	Examples
<i>Country</i>	Country variable to distinguish between states.	“France”
<i>Region/City</i>	Regional or city variable to distinguish specific locations associated with an allegation of GenAI usage. UC: (<i>Unclear</i>) Variable used to describe an instance of GenAI usage with no clear regional or city affiliation. VARIOUS: Variable used to describe an instance of GenAI usage that either references various cities, transcends regional borders, or is nationwide.	“New Delhi” “UC” “Various”
<i>Type of Usage</i>	CC: (<i>Content Creation</i>) Variable used to describe the application of GenAI in creating material or content related to an election. CP: (<i>Content Proliferation</i>) Variable used to describe the use of GenAI in proliferating, sharing, translating, or expediting	Example 1: (CC) “Deepfakes” “AI-generated speech material” “AI-developed images” Example 2: (CP) “Bot farms” “AI powered social media accounts” “AI tools translating speeches in real time”

	the delivery of material to an audience. HT: (<i>Hypertargeting</i>) Variable used to describe the application of GenAI to specifically target an individual or group. UC: (<i>Unclear</i>) Variable referring to the unspecified use of GenAI by an actor relevant to an election.	Example 3: (HT) “AI campaign based on a demographic constituency” Example 4: (UC) “Use of AI by political candidate”
Actor	FA: (<i>Foreign Actor</i>) Variable referring to the usage of GenAI by a foreign power or institution (named or unnamed), relevant to an election. PPC: (<i>Political Party or Candidate</i>) Variable referring to the usage of GenAI by a political candidate or their party (including a former political actor), relevant to an election. PCA: (<i>Paid Commercial Actor</i>) Variable referring to the usage of GenAI by a paid commercial actor or	Example 1: (FA) “AI bot campaign utilized by the Russians” “AI-powered influence campaign by Israeli corporation with state affiliation” Example 2: (PPC) “Deepfake of former political leader endorsing current candidate” “AI speech material generated by opposition candidate for election” Example 3: (PCA) “Consultancy group hired to establish an AI bot network to call potential voters in rural regions”

	corporate entity, relevant to an election. PG: (<i>Partisan Group</i>) Variable referring to the use of GenAI by a group not officially affiliated with a political party but with clear political beliefs, relevant to an election. GOVERNMENT: Variable referring to the use of GenAI by a government authority in power, relevant to an election. UC: (<i>Unclear</i>) Variable referring to the use of GenAI by an unspecified actor, relevant to an election.	Example 4: (<i>PG</i>) “Pro-BJP social media group created pro-Modi deepfakes on Instagram” Example 5: (<i>Government</i>) “Government-established AI tools to verify voter candidacy in an election period” Example 6: (<i>UC</i>) “AI-generated deepfakes of leading political candidates with no clear origin”
<i>Good or Bad Usage</i>	G: (<i>Good</i>) Variable referring to the use of GenAI for an ostensibly good purpose, relevant to an election. This includes healthy political commentary and critique. B: (<i>Bad</i>) Variable referring to the use of GenAI for an ostensibly nefarious purpose, relevant to an election. This includes	Example 1: (<i>G</i>) “AI-manipulated video of Modi dancing and singing” “AI tools utilized to support translation needs for a speech in a rural community” Example 2: (<i>B</i>) “AI deepfake of a leading political candidate in a sexualised context” “AI deepfake video manipulating a PPC’s campaign promise” “Bot call

	attempts at mimicry or deception and disinformation. UC: (<i>Unclear</i>) Variable referring to the use of GenAI in a manner that does not clearly demonstrate its purpose, relevant to an election.	network utilized by a foreign actor to dissuade voters from voting” Example 3: (<i>UC</i>) “Use of AI-generated audio to pass along messages from a jailed political candidate” “Allegation of AI usage by PPC to run campaign against leading opposition figure (purpose/impact unclear)”
Source	LN: (<i>LexisNexis</i>) Variable referring to a source emanating from research chains on the LexisNexis site. LR: (<i>Literature Review</i>) Variable referring to a source emanating from research chains on alternative sites, databases, and advanced searches.	“LN” “LR”
Link	Section for the URL associated with the source.	“https://www.wired.com/story/indian-elections-ai-deepfakes/”
Comment 1	Section for immediate observations from the source	“This source details the use of AI by a PPC...”
Comment 2	Section for further analytical observations from the source, and further URLs, if necessary.	“For further details, see URL:...”

Intercoder Reliability (ICR)

To assess the reliability of the coding process, two graduate students were recruited to apply the codebook used by the consulting scientist to 20% of the dataset, while ensuring a diverse range of country cases. As O'Connor and Joffe argue: "Depending on the size of the data set, 10–25% of data units would be typical [for ICR]" [8]. They also outline that it is important that this sample is "selected randomly or using some other justifiable criteria (e.g., selecting a member of each group in a stratified sample)" [8].

The coders received an Excel sheet with three variables: country, source (LN = LexisNexis, or LR = Literature Review), and a link to the source, along with the codebook (see the Codebook section). Following the codebook, they conducted a content analysis by reviewing sources, extracting relevant information, and coding accordingly. In terms of output, they were instructed to create two documents:

- (1) a database with their coding decisions, and
- (2) a summary of the challenges they encountered when coding

The first document was used to calculate the intercoder reliability rate, which assesses consistency and accuracy in coding by measuring the agreement between coders when using the same protocol to evaluate content. The second document was used to further estimate coding validity (see the Results section).

The coders worked independently, without mutual exchange or specific allocations. Advice differs regarding the level of interaction coders that should have prior to commencing the coding. In order to enhance the coding's reproducibility, the IPIE recruited external people who were not involved in designing the coding frame [9]. Since the data consists of collected articles and not raw personal data, external individuals could be involved while respecting the boundaries of ethical research.

It is important to note that this ICR procedure does not guarantee "objectivity". As will be discussed in the Results section, the database can still be interpreted differently by different people depending on their background and personal experiences. Instead, this coding exercise

aimed to establish reliability and validity, while refining the analysis by evoking dialogue between the external coders and the technical paper author. An additional aim of performing this ICR was to identify areas that needed clarification [10]. Therefore, the primary researcher held discussions with the two external coders to identify how and why interpretations conflicted, but no data was altered.

Results

Region/city

Coder 1: 8 of 40 (20%) entries for the variable region/city were coded differently. Coder 1 utilized “UC” and “Various” more often compared to our database.

Coder 2: 5 out of 40 (13%) entries for the variable region/city were coded differently. Coder 2 relied on “Various” in instances where the IPIE had coded “UC” or put Mathrubhumi (a newspaper published in Kerala) instead of Kerala.

Cohen’s Kappa across three coders reached a moderate agreement value of .58.

Type of usage

Coder 1: 6 out of 40 (15%) entries for the variable type of usage were coded differently. In half the instances, the code differed entirely (CC by coder 1 versus CP by the IPIE); the other half were insufficient codes where coder 1 did not also code a second code (only CC by coder 1 versus CC CP by IPIE).

Coder 2: 5 out of 40 (13%) entries for the variable type of usage were coded differently. In only one instance, the code differed entirely (CC by coder 2 versus CP in the IPIE database); the remaining four entries are either insufficient codes where coder 1 did not also code a second code, or coder 2 coded two codes and the IPIE has only one recorded in the database.

Cohen’s Kappa across three coders reached a substantial agreement value of .63.

Actor

Coder 1: 8 out of 40 (20%) entries for the variable actor were coded differently. All these instances were examples of discrepancies between unclear (UC) or a designated actor (such as PCA, PPC). This points to the problem that many articles use phrases like “it is likely that actor A is behind this”, or “suspected involvement by B”. The coders were therefore unsure whether to record the mentioned suspected actor, or denote UC.

Coder 2: 5 out of 40 (13%) entries for the variable actor were coded differently. Of these, three were discrepancies between UC versus foreign actor (FA). Especially in instances of foreign involvement, journalists can often only speculate. The coders were therefore unsure whether to record the suspected actor as FA, or denote it as UC.

Cohen’s Kappa across three coders reached a substantial agreement value of .76.

Good or bad usage

Coder 1: 5 out of 40 different (13%) entries for the variable good or bad usage were coded differently. Three of these were differing opinions of the coder on whether the GenAI instance was “good” or “bad”. The remaining two were discrepancies in distinguishing unclear (UC) from the good/bad categories.

Coder 2: 5 out of 40 different (13%) entries for the variable good or bad usage were coded differently. Two of these were differing opinions of the coder on whether the GenAI instance was “good” or “bad”. The remaining three were discrepancies in distinguishing unclear (UC) from the good/bad categories.

In total, coder 1’s entries differed from the experts’ entries in 27 of 160 cases (17%); coder 2’s entries differed in 20 of 160 cases (13%). Cohen’s Kappa across three coders reached a substantial agreement value of .74.

The highest discrepancy between the external coders and the consulting scientist was 20%. This was recorded twice—once for the category “region/city” and once for the category “actor”. The difficulty in determining the actor behind some of the GenAI usage has therefore been emphasized in the analysis sections of the technical paper. Furthermore, deciding if a political

GenAI usage is “good” or “bad” is a judgment by the coder based on their personal experience and background, rather than being entirely grounded in the source (article). The IPIE acknowledges that the results for this category can alter depending on the background of the coder. Still, in this ICR, both coders only differed by 13% from the records in the database, indicating that in over 80% of instances the articles are clear in describing the usage of GenAI in benevolent or malevolent terms—or are straightforwardly saying it’s unclear.

In addition, the IPIE avoided making the codebook too granular. A very granular codebook could decrease ICR. As a result, some additional interesting information sits within the source links but is not captured in the database. For example, different types of GenAI generated content such as text, images, and voice notes.

Overall, the IPIE aimed to capture the variables most important to our research goals of drawing relevant, global conclusions on political GenAI usage in 2024 elections. It would therefore be of great value to the research field if future projects targeted more specific questions while relying on this database.

It is crucial to note that ICR interpretations are challenging in terms of consistency [8]. However, following Miles and Huberman’s suggestion of a standard of 80% agreement, this study reaches an acceptable level of reliability [11]. The IPIE acknowledges the individual interpretations that enter qualitative coding, which is why the defined categories and codes aim to leave as little room for error as possible. Strategies to approach that goal were, for example, the inclusion of the “unclear” category to avoid the coders being forced into a binary decision of “good” or “bad”.

Code validity

Both coders expressed confidence in applying the codebook to the database. Overall, they considered the defined codes to be adequate.

Coder 1 expressed difficulties with regard to the “Actor” variable. More specifically:

- (1) Occasional difficulties in differentiating between the ruling party and government, as articles used the terms interchangeably.
- (2) Occasional difficulties in identifying the actor, as articles focused on the victims.
- (3) Occasional difficulties in identifying any association of AI startups mentioned with a political party or candidate (articles mentioned different AI startups that were used to create the AI deepfakes, but didn't mention any association of said startups with a political party or candidate).

The database and technical paper address these difficulties in the following ways:

- (1) The database allows for multiple sub-categories. In other words, the categories of variables “region/city”, “type of usage”, “actor”, and “good or bad usage” are not mutually exclusive. That means that one entry can be both the ruling party (PPC) and the domestic government (Government) CP at the same time. This type of coding, however, could inflate results. Still, in our case the number of articles that identify domestic government actors is marginal (1%) and therefore the sub-category did not cause inflated results overall.
- (2) Unclear (UC) is provided as a sub-category, which is the most common sub-category in the database (46%). The reasons for this were that identifying the actor behind GenAI political campaigning is not always clear, which is recognized in the codebook as well as mentioned in the report. This comment by the coder points towards a lack of clarity about what defines a “paid commercial actor”. Coder 1 seems to infer that they understand that the commercial actor needs to be paid by a political body. The codebook defines this sub-category as “referring to the usage of GenAI by a paid commercial actor or corporate entity, relevant to an election”. Upon examination of the coded sample, however, both the IPIE results and those from coder 1 overlap to 80% in this regard.
- (3) Finally, coder 1 said that “sometimes propaganda/disinformation was discussed in a non-explicit AI context (focus on social media or offline or other tech)”. Upon reviewing

the coded sample by coder 1, however, the coder has not indicated that any incident is ineligible for the AI and elections database.

Coder 2 primarily expressed difficulties about the “good or bad” variable. The main challenge was to identify if the category was either good or bad—namely, too binary for a complex picture:

- (1) At times, the coding felt subjective for the coder, and they said “*Personally (emphasis added), I would deem this as a bad thing, but I suppose it's not technically ‘disinformation’ but rather pushing a pro-Russian agenda that attempts to sway an election result.*”
- (2) Furthermore, some articles described both bad deepfakes as well as good uses for electoral campaigns. Some articles talked about GenAI deepfakes in general as bad, but in the specific country discussed there were no concrete negative examples. Some articles described GenAI as being used to “confuse voters”—the coder said “obviously this is bad, however, it also doesn’t seem to fit into the more extreme ‘bad usage’ category”. Again, this points out the difficulties with the good/bad category.

The database and technical paper address these difficulties in the following ways:

- (1) While this variable is the only binary variable used in the database, the IPIE also factors in the fact that in several cases it is difficult to judge whether the recorded GenAI usage is “good” or “bad”. The IPIE does this by allowing these instances to be coded as “unclear” (UC) in this category. By doing so the variable “good/bad” is not only binary but allows for more complex evaluation.
- (2) Since one of the external coders expressed difficulties when coding this variable (benevolent versus malevolent political GenAI usage), it is relevant to emphasize that researchers working with the database in future might experience similar challenges. However, the IPIE results and those from coder 2 overlap 87% in this regard.

Finally, coder 2 expressed uncertainty when coding the variable “type of usage”. It was not always clear which sub-category was correct when “AI was used as a tool to streamline data analytics for election campaign purposes”. The coder noted that it was “kind of CP, but also doesn’t fit the category description as translating information to the public”. The codebook

explains CP as the “Variable used to describe the use of GenAI in proliferating, sharing, translating, or expediting the delivery of material to an audience.” Upon examining the coded sample, however, IPIE found that our results overlapped with those of coder 2 by 87% for this variable.

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