



PSD3/PSR Is Raising the Bar:

Fraud, Liability and the
Future of Authentication



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How modern fraud exploits authentication

Typical patterns:

- phishing and fake banking pages
- social engineering and impersonation
- remote-access / screen-sharing abuse
- APP or manipulated payment approval

PSD3/PSR: where are we now?

PSD3/PSR timeline



***Legislative process still ongoing. Direction is now much clearer.**

What PSD3/PSR changes for authentication

From:

Do we perform
compliant SCA?



To:

Is the authentication journey
appropriate for today's fraud risk?

Implications:

- 1** Fraud prevention
- 2** Liability and responsibility
- 3** Stronger, more inclusive SCA methods

Three authentication questions for PSD3/PSR readiness

1 Can it be phished or shared?


Can the authentication result be copied, dictated or reused?

2 Does the user see what they approve?

Is transaction confirmation clear and independent?

3 Does one method fit every customer?

Does the bank provide a suitable method for different segments?




 **otpbank**




OTP Bank – Starting point


A high-assurance customer segment
with a legacy authentication journey

- **Corporate customers with elevated security requirements**
 - **Existing legacy hardware OTP tokens**
 - **Manual transaction-data entry and OTP transcription**
 - **Need to improve both security and user experience**
- 


**Why did OTP Bank Moldova
decide it was time to change?**




**Why not simply move everyone
to mobile authentication?**



**What did you expect from
the new authentication solution?**



What changed after deployment?



CASE STUDY

How OTP Bank Moldova Modernized Security & UX for Corporate Customers



**DOWNLOAD
THE CASE STUDY**



OTP vs FIDO2: What changes

How the authentication flow changes when a hardware token replaces manual OTP entry

OTP TOKEN — OLD



Shared Secret

Stored on both the device and the server



Phishable Code

Can be relayed to a fake site in real time



Manual Retyping

Read on one device, typed into another



Code Only

Confirms a number, not the transaction



TALISMAN — FIDO2 / WEBAUTHN



No Shared Secret

Private key never leaves the token



Origin-Bound

Won't respond on a phishing clone



One Continuous Flow

No switching between devices



WYSIWYS

You sign exactly what you see

Why it matters

Business and compliance impact of moving to phishing-resistant hardware tokens



Phishing-Resistant

Blocks real-time relay attacks



Device authenticity

Audit trails and compliance



User experience

No rewriting leaves less space for mistakes



Smartphone-independent

Aligned with RSR/PSD3

Key takeaways

1 Fraud-resistant
Beyond traditional Strong Customer Authentication

2 Inclusive
Mobile-first, not mobile-only

3 Frictionless
Better security can mean better UX

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GARTNER PEER INSIGHTS

CERTIFICATION



What We Do

User Authentication



Single Sign-On



**Mobile-First
Authentication**



**Talisman
Hardware Token**



**Passkeys
and FIDO2**

Identity Beyond Authentication



**Digital ID Wallet
Gateway**



**Identity
Verification**



**Electronic
Signatures**

Mobile App Security




**In-App
Protection**

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Questions and Answers





Thank you

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