


research report

Reforming Global Institutions in an Era of Geopolitical Strain: Evidence from 15 Case Studies

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Abstract

Global governance institutions, and the broader rules-based international order, are widely seen to be in crisis – yet the demand for effective global governance and international institutions remains strong. A wide range of global challenges – climate change, pandemics, migration, inequalities, digitalisation, and security – are more effectively addressed through international cooperation than unilateral action. This report studies how international institutions can be transformed to better address global challenges amid the present crisis of the rules-based international order. It compares the results of 15 case studies examining the reform of international institutions carried out within the ENSURED research project. These case studies cover five key policy areas: trade and taxation, climate and biodiversity, global health, human rights, migration and refugees, and digitalisation. Each of these case studies examines recent reform efforts and the positions of major international actors, focusing in particular on how to make international institutions more effective, democratic, and robust. These case studies rely on 184 interviews, an in-depth study of primary and secondary sources, and in some instances, participant observation and stakeholder meetings. Overall, this research report highlights how changing policy problems and the diverging positions of many major actors have resulted in uneven reforms across different international institutions.

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Introduction

It is widely accepted that global governance institutions and the rules-based international order are in crisis (Ikenberry 2018; Mearsheimer 2019; Lake, Martin, and Risse 2021) or at least seriously gridlocked and heavily contested (Hale, Held, and Young 2013; Tallberg and Zürn 2019). Both established powers, particularly the United States (US) under President Donald Trump, and emerging powers, notably China, have put the multilateral system under significant strain. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has reverberated across the global governance landscape, while nationalist populism has fuelled unilateral behaviour, treaty withdrawal,

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obstructionism, and non-compliance with established global governance norms (Copelovitch and Pevehouse 2019; Börzel and Zürn 2021; Daßler, Heinkelmann-Wild, and Kruck 2024; Von Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2025).

It is equally accepted that the demand for effective global governance and high-functioning international institutions remains strong. Many of today's significant global challenges – climate change, pandemics, migration, inequalities, digitalisation, and security, to name a few – can be better addressed through international cooperation than through unilateral action (see classic arguments of Keohane 1984; Caporaso 1992; Abbott and Snidal 1998; Ikenberry 2020). This has resulted in repeated calls by policy leaders for 'more' global governance – or at the least an upgraded 'Global Governance 2.0,' as reflected in the keynote report, *Our Common Agenda*, by United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres (2021). Among academics and experts there is also a long-standing acknowledgement of the need to expand, improve, and transform global governance (e.g., Slaughter 2005; Held 2006; Goldin 2013; Hale, Held, and Young 2013; Eberlein 2019; Westerwinter, Abbott, and Biersteker 2021).

This raises an important question: how can international institutions be transformed to address global challenges given the crisis of the rules-based international order? This report seeks to answer that question by comparing the results of 15 case studies looking at the reform of international institutions carried out within the ENSURED research project (see Table 1).¹ These case studies cover five key policy areas: trade and taxation, climate and biodiversity, global health, human rights, migration and refugees, and digitalisation. Each one analyses recent reform efforts and the positions of major actors, with a particular focus on strengthening the effectiveness, democratic quality, and robustness of international institutions (Choi et al. 2024).

We distinguish between constitutive change and formal reforms – which typically address an institution's scope and mandate – and internal reforms, which concern its functioning and the implementation of its policies (Singh

1 The case study reports are available on the ENSURED website (<https://www.ensured-europe.eu>) and include Boukal, Janský, Palanský, and Parížek 2025; Bursi and Greco 2025; Choi and Liese 2025; Fernández and Heinzel 2025a, 2025b, 2025c; Hoxtell 2025; King and Pousadela 2025; Kustova, Dietz, Van Hoof, and Karlas 2025; Marconi and Greco 2025; Parížek and Weinhardt 2025; Peerboom, Tsourdi, and Kenkel 2025; Petri and Karlas 2025; Petri, Srivastava, Drieskens, and Lameire 2025; Weinhardt, Parížek, and Srivastava 2025.

and Woolcock 2022, 3–7). These case studies rely on 184 interviews with relevant officials from international organisations (IOs), national diplomats, and experts, as well as an in-depth study of primary and secondary sources including official documents and policy papers. In some cases, the studies draw upon data collected from participant observation and stakeholder meetings. Overall, such a large-scale comparison of rich qualitative research, with a focus on the most recent developments across different international institutions, provides a unique contribution to the existing literature.

This research report has three main findings. First, the case studies clarify that *international policy problems are changing*, and that this reality provides the main impetus for reform agendas. New policy needs have arrived on the international agenda (e.g., digitalisation), political choices to address them have changed (e.g., the desirability of free trade), crises have become more complex (e.g., climate), and their salience and magnitude have increased (e.g., pandemics and migration). Challenges are also more transversal and cut across policy areas and institutions, significantly impacting domestic political landscapes and societal transition as a whole. The 15 case studies highlight that the supply of global governance by existing international institutions often no longer fits such changing policy problems. Institutions clearly face adaptation issues due to populist backlashes and power transitions, yet the case studies also highlight that the current set of policy problems on the international agenda is formidable and entangled.²

Table 1. Case Studies in the ENSURED Project

Policy Area	Case Study Topics
Trade and taxation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reforming the WTO • Expanding the scope of the WTO trading regime • Establishing rules on taxation in the G20/OECD and UN
Climate and biodiversity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reforming UNFCCC decision-making in COPs • Implementing the Paris Agreement on climate change • Strengthening the global biodiversity framework
Global health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enhancing vaccine access in the intellectual property rights regime • Negotiating the Pandemic Agreement • Reforming the WHO
Human rights, refugees, and migration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reforming the UN Human Rights Council • Implementing the Global Compacts on Migration and Refugees • Protecting the rights of women and LGBTQI+ individuals
Digitalisation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regulating cyberspace at the UN • Regulating cryptocurrency through global financial institutions • Negotiating the AI Convention at the Council of Europe

² The point that cooperation problems are becoming harder was already made by Hale et al. (2013) in their book on gridlock.

Second, when it comes to the *positions of major international actors* and their relative potential to transform institutions, the US under the Trump administration is disengaging. This is well-documented for Trump's first term (2017-2021), and the case studies also provide evidence extending into his second term beginning in 2025. There is no denying that Washington has turned its back on most international institutions – as illustrated in nearly all 15 case studies. This ranges from outright withdrawal (climate, health, and the UN Human Rights Council) to a lack of participation and

a preference for unilateral measures (in areas such as taxation, migration, cryptocurrencies, and AI), as well as non-compliance with trade rules and dispute settlement mechanisms.

There is no denying that Washington has turned its back on most international institutions.

Other major actors have yet to adjust their positions to this new reality. The case studies highlight that the European Union (EU) and its member states are regularly at odds, not just with China and Russia, but also with India, Brazil, and South Africa (IBSA), as well as with different formations of the African Group. Despite internal friction, the EU and its member states tend to favour multilateralism – they also want to maintain the status quo (i.e., defend institutions and make them more 'robust') as long as institutions benefit Europe. Yet other actors have different views on the purpose of several international institutions: India and numerous African countries have been pursuing more 'democratic' cooperation with a view to equal (state) participation, consensus-building, and appropriate funding. These divergent preferences complicate pushes for institutional reform.

Finally, while there have been some efforts in the last five years to *expand global governance* – notably its scope, through constitutive change and institutional reform – most of these efforts have focused on the *internal functioning of institutions*. To put it differently, while the negotiations on major initiatives like the Pandemic Agreement at the World Health Organization (WHO), minimum taxation at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Framework Convention at the Council of Europe have received significant attention and publicity, the emphasis – as the case studies reveal – has been on incremental reforms related mostly to policy implementation. These include increased informal deliberations to manoeuvre around gridlock, the establishment of funds to expand resources and improve implementation, and norm-setting by international bureaucracies through the production of reports and other outputs. The case studies show that, across numerous institutions, there are many reform ideas floating around expert and official circles, but they quickly run up against the familiar obstacle of political will. There is nevertheless unexploited potential here, even if it may require more political leadership, deal-making between actors, and some imagination.

The 15 case studies therefore highlight the great difficulty of global governance transformation today. At the same time, they offer some valuable perspective. The nature of policy problems differs across international institutions and not every initiative is blocked by geopolitics or populism. Addressing these problems requires formulating smarter institutional solutions for seemingly intractable issues, improving implementation

processes, and providing sufficient resources. Furthermore, while international institutions cannot rely on the US for the foreseeable future, the case studies have identified no less than 20 major actors across the different policy areas which are participating in institutional reform efforts. It is also worth noting that in none of the case studies are the actor constellations defined solely by bilateral Sino-American rivalry – the picture is much more complex and cannot be reduced to great power politics alone. Complex actor constellations also allow for partnering between like-minded actors. Major actors will have to make compromises and be more sensitive to competing views and preferences, but there is clear potential here for cooperation. Finally, the case studies show that several reforms have already been implemented across international institutions since 2020. And, even if the pace has been insufficient, reform agendas are actively in place (often despite popular beliefs about gridlocked institutions). Overall, this report shows that we need to take the specific context, policy problems, actor constellations, and reform efforts in individual institutions seriously.

This report consists of three sections. First, it compares global governance challenges and the impetus for reforms across the case studies. Second, it zooms in on the positions of the major relevant international actors in the case studies and their positions with respect to effectiveness, democratic quality, and robustness of international institutions. Third, it takes stock of recent reforms across the case studies and the unexploited potential for global governance reform. The conclusion reflects on what these findings imply for the future of global governance and international institutions.

This report shows that we need to take the specific context, policy problems, actor constellations, and reform efforts in individual institutions seriously.

Global Governance Challenges and the Impetus for Reform

As a starting point, it is important to consider the challenges that international institutions are currently facing and the specific items that they have on their agendas when they discuss and consider reforms. International institutions are obviously subject to numerous pressures from geopolitics to populism (see Weinhardt and Dijkstra 2024). Major international actors channel such systematic and domestic preferences through various institutions. Yet actual reform agendas tend to be more institution-specific and closer to what happens on an everyday basis within international institutions, such as how to tackle emerging policy problems or how to improve implementation, increase participation, and strengthen resources. In this section, we distinguish

International institutions have difficulty adapting to changing policy needs and problems and they face serious shortcomings with the implementation of agreed policies.

between reform agendas related to *setting the policy programmes* of international institutions (their scope and mandate) and implementing such programmes through *operational activities* involving decision-making processes, compliance, and resources (see Dijkstra, Kruck, and Zangl 2025 on policy programmes versus operational activities).

Empirically, this report compares 15 case studies of reform efforts in international institutions across five policy areas (trade and taxation, climate and biodiversity, global health, human rights, migration and refugees, and digitalisation) (see Table 1). As the types of institutions differ significantly across policy areas, these case studies include formal international organisations (such as the World Trade Organization [WTO] and the WHO), specific organs of international organisations (such as the UN Human Rights Council), conventions (such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC] and the Convention on Biological Diversity [CBD]), treaties and agreements agreed in the context of parent international institutions (such as taxation in the OECD, the Pandemic Agreement and the Migration and Refugees Compacts), and even broader regimes (such as intellectual property rights for vaccines and the human rights of women and LGBTQI+ persons). This is inevitable as global governance is rich in terms of institutional diversity. What appears when comparing the 15 case studies is twofold: international institutions have difficulty adapting to changing policy needs and problems and they face serious shortcomings with the implementation of agreed policies.

Starting with the policy area of *trade and taxation*, the three case studies with this focus find that the changing policy problems are creating a need for reform, while increasing geoeconomics is questioning the functioning of existing institutions and rules. In the WTO, there is a need to update the rulebook due to the far more intense use of industrial policy instruments and intensified linkage of trade to security (Parizek and Weinhardt 2025). Views on the desirability of ‘free trade’ have also changed and trade has become more intertwined with other policy areas. While there is a longer-standing

connection to development, the environment and inclusiveness are newer topics on the WTO agenda, as is security and the geopoliticisation of trade at large (ibid.; Weinhardt et al. 2025). Changing policy problems have also resulted in calls for global governance around taxation, as liberalised capital markets, digitalisation, and financial innovation allow multinational firms to operate across jurisdictions and exploit gaps between national rules (Boukal et al. 2025). This has been picked up by the Group of 20 (G20) and the OECD, but taxation is now also on the UN agenda. What complicates WTO reform is that the organisation faces a strong contestation of its established rules (such as the Most Favoured Nation [MFN] principle) and a challenge to its dispute settlement mechanism and its Appellate Body, which is at the centre of its operational activities.

When it comes to *climate and biodiversity*, the three case studies mostly point at operational problems and implementation (Kustova et al. 2025; Petri and Karlas 2025; Petri et al. 2025). In the decision-making processes at the Conference of the Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC and the CBD, there are concerns about the consensus rule, overloaded agendas, equality in state participation, as well as access, participation, and an enhanced role for non-state actors. In addition, both conventions face massive implementation gaps, which are an important part of the reform agenda. Cooperation problems range from non-compliance of state parties (which may submit less-than-ambitious national climate and biodiversity plans or not fulfil their own commitments) to how to develop mechanisms, instruments, and capacities that can facilitate implementation. In both the UNFCCC and the CBD this involves consistent contestation and debate around mobilising and distributing financial resources to tackle the climate and biodiversity crises around the globe.

The COVID-19 pandemic has clearly made *global health* a salient area for global governance reform. That is not to say that reform efforts in, for instance, the WHO have a much longer history (Fernández and Heinzl 2025c). The pandemic highlighted clear operational and legal shortcomings and provided impetus for the establishment of a new Pandemic Agreement as well as amendments to the International Health Regulations (IHR) (Fernández and Heinzl 2025b), both of which increase the scope and mandate of global health governance. Similarly, demands for vaccine equity resulted in calls to reform the global regime governing intellectual property (Fernández and Heinzl 2025a). However, the pandemic also exposed clear shortcomings in the WHO's operations, including its reliance on largely voluntary funding, its decentralised institutional structure, as well as implementation and compliance challenges at the member-state level.

In the areas of *human rights, refugees and migration*, we see both shifts in the structure of policy problems as well as heavy contestation of established norms and mandates. The number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) has increased dramatically since the early 2010s, raising questions of responsibility-sharing for host countries – an impetus for the Global Compacts – while also challenging the rights-based mandate enshrined in the 1951 Refugee Convention (Peerboom et al. 2025). Such norm contestation is compounded by a shrinking civic space and is also evident in the UN Human Rights Council (King and Pousadela 2025), specifically with respect to the rights of women and LGBTQI+ people (Choi

and Liese 2025). Although recent reforms have focused on establishing new institutional forums, such as the International Migration Review Forum and the Global Refugee Forum, overall operational capacity has weakened.

New technologies are not only affecting the problem structure of international cooperation, but are also increasingly viewed as central to geopolitical rivalry.

This erosion is reflected in blocked human rights resolutions, weak enforceability and accountability mechanisms, restrictions on civil society participation, and, above all, a significant decline in resources.

Finally, in the area of *digitalisation*, new technologies are not only affecting the problem structure of international cooperation, but are also increasingly viewed as central to geopolitical rivalry in the coming decades. In this respect, the case studies address the topics of cyber security, cryptocurrencies, and

AI regulation (Marconi and Greco 2025; Bursi and Greco 2025; Hoxtell 2025). The question here is not so much whether these topics need to be addressed internationally but rather in which institutional fora and on the basis of which principles. On cyber, the UN now has a long-running dedicated process, while cryptocurrency is addressed through the existing frameworks of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Financial Stability Board (FSB), and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The case study on AI regulation focuses on the Council of Europe, which so far has established the only legally-binding convention. Even though the emphasis has been on setting up policy programmes for digital regulation, it is clear that implementation and compliance will ultimately be challenging.

Table 2. Main Agendas for Institutional Reform Across Policy Areas

Policy Area	Setting Policy Programmes	Implementing Policy Programmes
Trade and taxation	Changing problem structure due to linkage between trade and other policy areas; contestation of existing rules (MFN); distributive conflict over taxation.	Erosion of WTO dispute settlement and Appellate Body; uneven state implementation of tax cooperation.
Climate and biodiversity	Ambitious policy programmes under the Paris Agreement (2015) and Kunming-Montreal Biodiversity Framework (2022); focus on implementation.	Concerns over consensus decision-making, equal (state) participation, non-state access; weak implementation and compliance; funding shortages.
Global health	Expansion of mandates to cover pandemics; reconsideration of vaccine equity.	Weak WHO resource base; decentralised institutional structure; shortfalls in member state implementation.
Human rights, refugees and migration	Rising refugee numbers and responsibility-sharing challenges; erosion of long-established norms.	Norm contestation undermining operations; blocked resolutions; weak enforceability and accountability; restricted civil society access; severe resource constraints.
Digitalisation	Demand for regulation; uncertainty over institutional forum and mandate.	Implementation challenges anticipated; limited reform activity to date.

When comparing the global governance challenges across the 15 case studies, we see that the changing policy problems provide a key impetus for the reform and expansion of the *policy programmes* of various international institutions. Cooperation problems naturally evolve over time, and this requires reforms and the establishment of new institutions (Dijkstra et al. 2025; Jupille, Mattli, and Snidal 2013; Hofmann and Pawlak 2023). Several examples stand out. There is growing demand for regulation in the field of digitalisation, alongside the need to update the WTO rulebook and address untaxed cross-border revenue. The COVID-19 pandemic and the rising number of refugees have also driven calls for reform. Some of these evolving policy problems are deeply political and closely linked to domestic systems, while others stem from growing complexity, the cross-cutting nature of issues, and the increasing salience and scale of global challenges. We also observe contestation of established rules and norms, contributing to erosion and regression in the policy programmes of several international institutions (Wiener 2018; Zürn 2018; Deitelhoff and Zimmermann 2020). Examples include the contestation of human rights norms across the UN system as well as in the policy areas of climate, migration, gender, and inclusiveness. Some other well-established rules are also contested, such as the MFN principle in the WTO or intellectual property rights with respect to vaccine access. These are major inputs for reforms.

As important as the scope and mandates of international institutions are, the case studies also make clear that many reform efforts revolve around institutions' decision-making processes, compliance level, and resource base. Indeed, much effort is dedicated to the *operational activities* of institutions, which must implement the policy programmes. In several case studies, there are key trade-offs regarding effective decision-making and the extent to which these affect equal and inclusive participation. The consensus rule is being questioned in the WTO as well as in climate and biodiversity institutions, while there are increasing demands for greater participation in areas such as taxation and digitalisation. Implementation and compliance also remain pressing concerns – whether in climate and biodiversity, where national efforts often fall short, or in the human rights regime. Finally, several case studies highlight significant funding shortages, ranging from the resources needed for routine operations in the WHO and the human rights system to the larger funds required in climate and biodiversity to support states in implementing commitments. The UN80 process, resulting in part from the funding crisis across the UN system, will likely make this challenge worse, potentially leading to further needs for institutional reform.

Several case studies highlight significant funding shortages.

Positions of Major International Actors

To understand how major international actors view the reform of international institutions, we have mapped their positions across the 15 case studies with respect to their preferences for the effectiveness, level of democracy, and the robustness of cooperation. In this respect, the case studies all rely on the ENSURED conceptual framework and its operationalisation of effectiveness, democracy, and robustness in global governance (Choi et al. 2024). Across the case studies, the authors have identified the most important international actors in terms of institutional reforms. Often, these include the US, the EU and its member states, several of the BRICS countries (made up of 10 countries including Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), but may also include others such as particularly vocal or affected states (e.g., the Small Island Developing States on climate) and non-state actors (e.g., civil society organisations and multinationals). Below, we discuss what the variation in actor constellations across policy areas means for institutional reform.

Effectiveness of institutions can mean very different things to different actors.

When major actors are concerned about the *effectiveness* of international institutions and push for reforms in this area, they are ultimately dissatisfied with the extent to which international institutions achieve their stated goals – at least in the way in which these actors interpret these goals. Apart from the eventual impact of institutions, major actors are also concerned about intermediate steps, such as whether international institutions sufficiently produce policy output in terms of quantity, ambition, and timeliness, as well as whether such outputs are properly implemented and complied with. Across the case studies, major actors significantly disagree on and even contest what they consider to be the stated goals of international institutions. Therefore, effectiveness of institutions can mean very different things to different actors. This often has a distributional dimension: if the goal of the WTO is to increase global trade, major actors may still disagree on whether the WTO brings them individually enough benefits. This is in tension with the ways in which we often think about organisational effectiveness (Underdal 1992; Young 1999; Sommerer et al. 2022), which tends to be measured at the institutional level.

With respect to *democratic* international institutions, major actors also vary in their preferences. They may hold preferences in terms of equal state participation (presence of all stakeholders, fair decision-making rules, and a representative bureaucracy in the institutions) but also the participation of non-state actors, as they are relevant to achieving the goals of the institution. The latter may be coupled with various accountability, transparency, and oversight mechanisms. Across the case studies, major actors also disagree significantly on which of these aspects make institutions more democratic. In particular, some major actors only consider international institutions democratic if states with large populations are appropriately represented. Other major actors consider

that beyond state representation, institutions require different democratic features such as access for non-state actors and multinationals, and may need parliamentary assemblies for direct oversight. Interestingly, across the case studies, few actors want both more equal state participation and greater access for non-state actors.

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While effectiveness and the level of democracy (and their trade-offs) have long been concerns for international institutions, several major actors have more recently put renewed emphasis on their *robustness*. Robustness refers to an institution's capacity to withstand external and internal contestations over time while maintaining its core functions. This has been important historically – for example, with the UN purposefully being designed to be more robust than the League of Nations – but also in the current era where international institutions are arguably more contested than in the past. Robustness also refers to institutional and rule stability as well as governance autonomy; it is about the financial and staff resources of institutions and the commitment of the member parties to core rules. Additionally, robustness points at long-term stability and performance, which often aligns with effective and democratic institutions. However, there are also clear trade-offs with the other preferences: robustness emphasises maintaining the status quo, whereas effectiveness may require adaptation. Likewise, the control and oversight mechanisms inherent in democratic institutions may also put limits on the governance autonomy of institutions.

Across the different policy areas, we can identify different actor constellations and preferences for global governance transformation. In *trade and taxation*, there is a strong distributive aspect to the positions of major actors. In the WTO, for instance, the US, China, and the EU focus strongly on the effectiveness of cooperation, by which they do not necessarily mean more global trade overall, but rather outcomes that benefit them as individual actors (Parizek and Weinhardt 2025). Important here is the consistent economic growth of China and how it has benefited from the open-trade regime since it joined the WTO in 2001. Dispute settlement rulings that benefited China, on the other hand, have raised significant scepticism in the US (and to a lesser extent in the EU) about the effectiveness of the WTO. For example, the US has criticised the WTO of overreach but also a failure to address state subsidies in China. Member states thus profoundly disagree on the social and economic purpose of the WTO. For the EU, trade is also a means to address other problems, such as the environment, while China and India see a clear nexus with development.

While effectiveness is widely discussed, the robustness of the WTO is also increasingly a key concern for the EU (which, more than other actors, relies on trade). This is particularly clear in the erosion of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism. Furthermore, India puts strong emphasis on the democratic quality and representativeness of the WTO, which it feels falls short, and continues to insist on consensus decision-making. In the case study on taxation, we see similar discussions (Boukal et al. 2025). The EU and the US (under the Biden administration) have been concerned about tax avoidance by multinational companies, which increasingly make

use of different jurisdictions to shelter or boost profits. This has resulted in a joint OECD/G20 process focused on the effectiveness of minimum taxation. The Trump administration has since instead opted for unilateral measures to address the problem. Meanwhile, Brazil and African countries have made strong efforts to address taxation within the UN framework, stressing the need for equal state representation. Whether this results in an effective and robust taxation regime remains to be seen.

Table 3. Major Actors and Their Positions Across Policy Areas

Policy Area	Major Actors Included in the Case Studies	Key Conflicting Positions
Trade and taxation	African Group, Brazil, China, EU, India, US	Distributional conflict over benefits of trade and taxation rules; divergent preferences regarding effectiveness, democracy and robustness.
Climate and biodiversity	African Group, Arab Group, Brazil, China, EU, India, Least Developed Countries, Russia, Small Island Developing States, South Africa, US	Shared focus on effectiveness; disputes over leadership in implementation, burden-sharing and financing; ongoing debates over equal participation and non-state access.
Global health	African Group, Brazil, China, Colombia, Equity Group, EU, Gates Foundation, Pharma industry, South Centre, US, WHO Secretariat	Status-quo support for mandate expansion and stable WHO funding; revisionist demands for equity in intellectual property rights, particularly from Africa and Latin America.
Human rights, refugees and migration	African Group, Arab Group, Brazil, China, Civil Society Organisations, EU, Russia, UN offices, US	Intense contestation of existing norms and rules; conflicting views on regime effectiveness, democracy and robustness.
Digitalisation	China, Civil Society Organisations, EU, India, Indonesia, private sector, Russia, South Africa, US	Divergent views on regulatory substance and democratic and digital openness; institutional choice and forum-shopping to gain advantages.

Note: Actors in black = In all three case studies of the policy brief. Actors in grey = In one/two case studies.

In the area of *climate and biodiversity*, the case studies highlight that a variety of major actors pursue a range of different preferences. In this regard, there is a greater plurality of actors than in the field of trade and taxation. As a starting point, the US has changed its preferences repeatedly over the last decades depending on the political orientation of its presidential administration. Notably, it has not ratified the CBD (which otherwise includes all UN members) (Petri et al. 2025) or the Kyoto Protocol, and it withdrew from the Paris Agreement (Kustova et al. 2025; Petri and Karlas 2025). Yet the US has also been ‘leading from behind’ in providing strong support – under recent Democratic presidencies – for climate action (with an emphasis on effectiveness) and has been instrumental in getting landmark agreements negotiated. EU member states have been fervent supporters of climate and biodiversity action since the 1990s, and their preferences clearly go beyond the effectiveness of the regime. The EU is also pursuing a stronger role for non-state actors and has been concerned particularly with keeping the climate agenda on track in the face of a

volatile American agenda. It has at times struggled with its leadership role and external perceptions thereof, its domestic implementation and making enough funds available. Nonetheless, the EU clearly remains a key actor (Kustova et al. 2025; Petri et al. 2025).

China is increasingly taking on a leadership role in climate and biodiversity, mirroring its domestic ambitions on the global energy transition, which includes carbon markets, solar power, and electric vehicles, yet under the principles of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) and national sovereignty. Its emphasis is more on effectiveness and robustness of the regimes, while India clearly stresses CBDR while underlining equal and meaningful participation (Petri and Karlas 2025). The BRICS coalition is an emerging new actor in the biodiversity COPs and is driving the Tropical Forest Forever Facility, which was launched at COP30 in Brazil. A variety of other actors play key roles in the climate and biodiversity regimes, such as the Small Island Developing States, which demand greater effectiveness and more inclusive and stronger participation, including from non-state actors. Brazil, like the US, has changed its preferences over time, but now takes more of a leadership role, notably by hosting COP30 in Belém in 2025 (Kustova et al. 2025), but also in the CBD (Petri et al. 2025). The African Group has been underlining CBDR, pursuing more equal participation, and has also expressed disappointment at inadequate funding.

China is increasingly taking on a leadership role in climate and biodiversity, mirroring its domestic ambitions on the global energy transition.

The actor constellations in *global health* are yet again different. While the WHO, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic, has been approached through a geopolitical lens in which the US and China have competed over the organisation, across the case studies we have also identified non-state actors such as the Gates Foundation, the pharmaceutical industry, and even the WHO secretariat itself as relevant actors (Fernández and Heinzel 2025c). Furthermore, in the case of intellectual property rights and vaccine equity, Brazil and Colombia have been key actors, while the negotiating parties for the Pandemic Agreement included the African Group, the Equity Group, and the G7+ (Fernández and Heinzel 2025b, 2025c). Significant for global health, which is strongly expertise-driven but also an add-on to the domestic infrastructure for public health, is both the decentralised nature of the WHO with its regional offices, as well as the broader global health regime complex which includes a wide range of agencies. Nonetheless, the WHO is unique with its universal membership (minus the US) and its mandate as the directing and coordinating authority on international health work – but it is a crowded field.

The US has had a somewhat turbulent history with the WHO, notably with the Trump administration's withdrawal from the body in January 2025 (Fernández and Heinzel 2025c). In general, the US has been demanding more effectiveness in reforms, transparency, and accountability in WHO operations, while leveraging voluntary funding for those agendas. The EU and its member states have more muted positions for global health reform. They want to incrementally improve the WHO in terms of effectiveness, democracy, and robustness, while wanting to clearly safeguard the existing intellectual property regime. EU leadership was critical during the

negotiation of the Pandemic Agreement – a declared moment of victory for multilateralism in the shadow of ‘America First’ – but the substance as well as potential effectiveness of the Agreement have been criticised (Fernández and Heinzl 2025b). China is largely a status quo player in the three case studies. Indeed, pressure for participation, equity, and, above all, equal vaccine access has come from other actors.

For the policy areas *human rights*, *refugees*, and *migration*, our case studies show that there is a strong contestation by many major international actors of the UN Human Rights Council, as well as of women’s and LGBTQI+ rights (including China, Russia, and on several human rights issues, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and the African Group). Instead of making the human rights regime more effective, robust, and democratic, many actors are actively eroding the regime and its established rules and norms (Choi and Liese 2025; King and Pousadela 2025). Suggestions to strengthen the membership criteria of the Human Rights Council or to improve transparency and give more access to civil society organisations are few and far between, as are efforts to provide sufficient resources (King and Pousadela 2025). Even the EU, which tends to be among the most pro-human rights advocates among the state actors, does not always speak with a single voice. The US under Trump has withdrawn from the Human Rights Council, placing itself entirely outside the system. In the area of refugees and migration, the international community has struggled with the implementation of the Compacts adopted in 2015 (Peerboom, Tsourdi and Kenkel 2025): pushback comes from the US and also the EU. Overall, human rights, refugees, and migration is currently one of the most contested areas in global governance and protagonists report serious trouble defending and keeping the existing regimes in place.

Finally, with respect to the rapidly emerging domain of *digitalisation*, the case studies on cyber security, cryptocurrency, and AI illustrate how diverse actor constellations seek to shape future regulation to their advantage while remaining hesitant to commit as the technology continues to evolve. There are also strong ideological differences between the major actors which may favour market-based regulation with the participation of non-state actors (US), a more human-centric approach that champions issues such as privacy (EU), and state-driven regulation with a strong focus on digital sovereignty (China and Russia) (Marconi and Greco 2025). Forum-shopping and institutional choice has also been a key strategy. In the field of cyber, the move from the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to the UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) was significant in terms of participation and democracy, and this continues with the establishment of a new Global Mechanism (operational by March 2026) to succeed the OEWG. In the case of the Council of Europe Framework Convention on AI, there was a strong push by the EU to internationalise its own EU AI act, and this Convention allows non-Council of Europe members to subscribe to this set of rules (Hoxtell 2025). For cryptocurrencies, the choice was to stick with established financial bodies rather than set up a new framework.

In such a relatively new policy area as digitalisation, the preferences of the major actors are also subject to change. This is particularly the case with the US. Compared to the Biden administration, the Trump White House is far more favourable towards cryptocurrencies. Moreover, the US under Biden negotiated the Council of Europe AI Convention, but

this is unlikely to be ratified under the current Republican administration (Bursi and Greco 2025). China forbids cryptocurrency, but Hong Kong has become an important international hub. Across the field of digitalisation, major actors also seem to make trade-offs between the robustness of future regulation and their effect. This is clear from the case study on the Council of Europe AI Convention, which is principles-based, technology-neutral and includes several exceptions. Furthermore, it relies on domestic implementation and capacity-building, all of which come at the expense of its potential effectiveness.

When comparing the case studies across the policy areas, it becomes clear that the US is disengaging across the board. In all 15 case studies (with cyber security being an exception), the US under President Trump is clearly walking away from the relevant international institutions. This is a shift from the Biden administration, which while not enthusiastic about policy areas such as trade, health, and digital, at least supported the reform agenda of the various international institutions (largely with an emphasis on improving effectiveness). In the case of the Trump administration, disengagement with international institutions ranges from full withdrawal (climate, health, and the UN Human Rights Council) to a lack of full multilateral participation with a preference for unilateral measures (taxation, migration, cryptocurrency, and AI) and non-compliance (trade rules and dispute settlement). While Trump's 'America First' approach is well-known (on America First 2.0, see, e.g., Dijkstra 2025; Faude and Heinkelmann-Wild 2025), this remains a striking and consistent finding across the 15 case studies.

Regarding other major international actors, it is not always clear what they mean by effectiveness, robustness, and democracy – raising the important question: 'for whose benefit?' The EU and its member states generally have broad preferences encompassing greater effectiveness, democracy, *and* robustness. However, these preferences are largely interest-driven: they emphasise robustness when defending the status quo, democracy when engaging with like-minded non-state actors, and effectiveness when advancing global governance issues they prioritize. This contrasts with China's narrower focus on the effectiveness of certain institutions (such as trade, climate, and cryptocurrency) with some attention to participation, and India's stronger emphasis on equal participation and CBDR, though primarily in trade and climate. Across the 15 case studies, we identified no less than 20 different actors involved in various reforms (see Table 3), demonstrating the diversity of actor constellations. Notably, no case reduces these constellations solely to Sino-American rivalry. While this suggests potential opportunities for institutional reform, it is clear that actors have differing preferences and often frame the underlying problems differently.

In terms of reconciling the positions of the different actors, we also see clear trade-offs (and in some cases synergies) between effectiveness, democracy, and robustness (Table 4). In the case of the WTO, various international actors have pursued the plurilaterals as a way of moving forward with the trade regime and pursuing effectiveness, but this can run into participation concerns. Taxation, on the other hand, is now moving toward the UN framework precisely for the purpose of participation. In climate and biodiversity, the case studies find an interest of parties to keep

the process party-driven and consensus-based, which limits the potential for more ambitious enforcement rules and thus effective implementation. In both digital and human rights domains there are also clear demands for participation, even if this does not translate into high effectiveness. Trade-offs between effectiveness and robustness are also evident – for example in the Paris Agreement, where networked governance provides a robust framework, or in the Council of Europe AI Convention, which excludes certain issues. Similarly, in taxation, strong provisions of the OECD/G20 framework have been gradually diluted to ensure continued US participation in the regime.

Table 4. Trade-Offs and Synergies between Effective, Democratic, and Robust Institutions

Policy Area	Trade-Offs and Synergies
Trade and taxation	Trade-offs between effectiveness and democracy in the WTO (plurilaterals vs. consensus); robustness linked to effectiveness (dispute settlement and Appellate Body); broad WTO scope supports effectiveness, democracy, and robustness; effectiveness-democracy trade-offs in taxation (OECD vs. UN forum choice).
Climate and biodiversity	Effectiveness-democracy trade-offs linked to consensus rules, broad participation, and agenda congestion; universal buy-in as a condition for effectiveness; flexible rules enhancing robustness but reducing effectiveness (Paris Agreement); stricter reporting increasing effectiveness but weakening stability (biodiversity); non-state actor participation strengthening robustness.
Global health	Effectiveness-robustness trade-offs between intellectual property protection and vaccine equity; robustness-democracy trade-offs in WHO funding mechanisms and transparency.
Human rights, refugees and migration	Synergies between democracy (non-state participation), robustness (resources), and effectiveness in human rights regimes; declining robustness and shrinking civic space undermining Global Compacts and rights protection; effectiveness-democracy trade-offs in migration through bilateral or minilateral approaches.
Digitalisation	Trade-offs among effectiveness, robustness, and democracy; contested institutional choice shaping state equality and non-state participation; state-centred UN cyber initiatives vs. low-transparency financial regulation of cryptocurrency; robustness prioritised over effectiveness in the AI Framework Convention.

Overall, in terms of trade-offs and synergies between more effective, democratic, and robust global governance, it appears that issues are institution-specific. It is also important that in the 15 case studies, we have identified different sorts of trade-offs between specific indicators of effectiveness, democracy, and robustness. For instance, the demand for transparency or the involvement of non-state actors, which are democracy indicators, interact differently with effectiveness than equal state participation, to take one example, which is also a democracy indicator. Some of the strongest potential synergies are in the policy area of human rights (a domain facing significant contestation and erosion), where the involvement of civil society actors contributes to both the effectiveness and the robustness of the regime. In contrast, some of the strongest potential trade-offs are in the digital field (a domain where institutional design choices still have to be made), where a robust or fully democratic regime might stifle technological innovation.

Unexploited Potential for Global Governance Reform

As a final step this report compares the reforms that have been achieved across the case studies. It distinguishes between constitutive change and formal reforms, on the one hand, and internal reforms, on the other (Singh and Woolcock 2022, 3–7). It also examines reforms at the boundaries of institutions as well as the broader reform context. Although the timelines of the individual case studies vary, this section focuses on reforms achieved since 2020 for comparative purposes.

Constitutive change is about treaty-level reforms which redefine, reinterpret, or reassert the social purpose of a given international institution. Examples include creating a new treaty such as the 2024 Framework Convention on AI by the Council of Europe or the 2025 Pandemic Agreement, which expands existing policy programmes in the WHO. Constitutive change can mean changing the scope and mandate of the institutions as well as amending and developing their structure (e.g., Dijkstra et al. 2025: Chapter 4). It is, however, important to note that many reforms – even constitutive or institutional changes – come about in the absence of formal treaty change (e.g., Kreuder-Sonnen 2019; Kreuder-Sonnen and Zangl 2025). We therefore also look at *formal reforms*, which may not involve ratification procedures and more incrementally transform constitutional and/or institutional structures. Across the case studies, these include the WTO agreement on Fisheries Subsidies and, within the context of the OECD, the Model Rules for Pillar Two which set minimum taxation guidelines. In both cases, the scope of the parent institutions was clearly expanded.

It is not a surprise that reforms at the constitutive or formal level largely involve emerging or new issue areas, including taxation, pandemics, biodiversity, cyber security, and AI. There is an understanding that such topics are insufficiently addressed by the existing set of institutions and therefore require substantial reform or even the establishment of new institutions and treaties (see Jupille et al. 2013 on institutional choice for new agenda issues). At the same time, there has also been a strong push by certain actors – notably the EU and its member states – to expand global governance, backed in several cases by a groundswell of public support (to address taxation injustices, protect the environment and biodiversity, and to prevent future pandemics). However, it is also clear that in almost all cases of constitutive and formal global governance expansion, the US was a lukewarm supporter. It went along under Biden but quit under Trump. This goes for taxation, biodiversity, health, cyber security, and AI. In this respect, these cases represent ‘multilateralism without America’ at best, and at worst, ineffective ‘window-dressing multilateralism.’

It is not a surprise that reforms at the constitutive or formal level largely involve emerging or new issue areas.

While the case studies thus identify some progress at a constitutive and formal level over the last five years, in most of the cases we see no

reforms. This is somewhat underwhelming when considering the need to set more ambitious policy programmes, as noted above. At the same time, this is a reflection of the current geopolitical climate where the potential for reforms is limited. As an interviewee in the WTO case study noted, “this is not the time for reforms, political challenges are real” (as cited in Parizek and Weinhardt 2025, 21). There is also an understanding that attempts at constitutional change may unravel existing rules. In the area of migration and refugees, for instance, Peerboom, Tsourdi and Kenkel (2025, 29) write that “A far-reaching, legally binding reform process could contribute to more effective and robust migration governance, but such a process is unlikely in the current political climate. Were such a reform to be pursued, it would probably lead to the curtailment of existing rights frameworks.” In this respect, rather than expanding or making global governance better through constitutive and formal reforms, the mode is one of defending existing rules.

Table 5. Main Global Governance Reforms Across International Institutions, Post-2020

Continued on the next page.

Case Studies	Constitutive Change and Formal Reforms	Reforming Internal Functioning	External Reforms and Institutional Context
WTO Reform	Plurilateral initiatives but not yet integrated into the WTO.	Informal deliberations; 100+ specific changes to housekeeping in “reform by doing.”	MPIA set up to cover for the defunct Appellate Body.
WTO-Related Agendas	Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies (2022); Several plurilateral initiatives but not yet integrated into WTO.	Informal and soft-law initiatives.	
OECD/UN Taxation	Model Rules for Pillar Two (2021) by OECD.		Negotiations over taxation have moved to the UN with the aim of adopting a future Convention (2027).
UNFCCC COP Reform		Various ideas on how to improve decision-making, but no real reforms.	
Paris Agreement		Funds established for the implementation and language on fossil fuels; guidelines and rules for implementation.	
Biodiversity	Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (2022).	Operationalisation of KMGBF and establishment of funds.	
Vaccine IPR and Access		COVID-19-specific TRIPS waiver.	Some capacity building for COVID-19 vaccine-sharing (e.g., COVAX which delivered nearly two billion doses).
Pandemic Treaty	Amended International Health Regulation (2024); Pandemic Agreement (2025).		

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WHO Reform		Establishment of WHO Foundation and working groups to strengthen resources.
UN Human Rights Council		Various ideas on how to improve functioning but no reforms.
Global Compacts on Migration and Refugees		No political will for reform, which may curtail existing rights frameworks.
Sex/Gender Norms		Some initiatives by UN Secretariat.
Cyberspace Regulation	Establishment of new Global Mechanism (to be operational by March 2026) to succeed OEWG.	Publication of several reports by OEWG.
Cryptocurrencies		Consultative reports and recommendations published by the FSB, FATF, BCBS.
CoE AI Framework Convention	Framework Convention on AI (2024).	Establishment of HUDERIA for capacity building.

Apart from constitutive change and formal reform, reform efforts can target the ways in which international institutions *function internally* (Singh and Woolcock 2022). This is particularly relevant for IOs that administer their own secretariats and financial resources – in contrast to international agreements or treaties. Such reforms therefore tend to relate to the implementation of policy programmes, but they also clearly have the potential to make international institutions more effective, robust and democratic. Such internal reforms are perhaps best summarised by the WTO mantra of “reform by doing” (Parizek and Weinhardt 2025), even if they can involve more than 100 smaller measures to make the institution function more effectively.

When zooming in on the 15 case studies, it becomes clear that such internal reforms cover several categories. Some of them are informal consultations and deliberation, for instance in the WTO, which is traditionally a formal institution with explicit rules underpinned by a dispute settlement mechanism (Parizek and Weinhardt 2025; Weinhardt et al. 2025). Other approaches at tackling internal functioning and strengthening implementation involve the establishment of special funds, building capacities, and increasing resources. This includes the Loss and Damage Fund for climate change, the Global Biodiversity Framework Fund for biodiversity, the WHO Foundation to raise funds for global health, and the Council of Europe’s HUDERIA tool, which helps both public and private actors with risk and impact assessment for AI systems in the context of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (Fernández and Heinzel 2025c; Kustova et al. 2025; Petri et al. 2025; Hoxtell 2025). Other examples include very specific decisions, such as a waiver for COVID-19

vaccines rather than broader reforms in the intellectual property regime (Fernández and Heinzel 2025c) or norm setting by expert bureaucracies and secretariats in the realm of cryptocurrency (Bursi and Greco 2025).

With respect to the potential reforms for the internal functioning of international institutions, several of the 15 case studies show that a range of reform proposals are circulating within the epistemic communities surrounding those institutions. Notably, there are many ideas about how to improve climate decision-making in the context of the COP meetings of the UNFCCC (Petri and Karlas 2025) and the UN Human Rights Council (King and Pousadela 2025), but all of them run rather quickly into a ‘lack of political will,’ even if they have the backing of some of the major actors. ‘Political will’ can, however, change with a dose of leadership and there may be ways of improving the functioning of, for instance, climate decision-making. Other unexploited potential for reform includes the various plurilateral meetings and agreements in the WTO. Following the collapse of the single undertaking of the Doha Development Round, WTO members in various compositions have negotiated a series of partial agreements. Some of these negotiations have been concluded and are now waiting for

a stamp of approval from the full membership (Parizek and Weinhardt 2025; Weinhardt et al. 2025). Even if some major powers continue to block plurilaterals and insist on consensus decision-making, there is clearly potential for progress.

A final impetus for reform in several of the case studies concerns the UN80 process, triggered by the funding crisis at the UN.

A final impetus for reform in several of the case studies concerns the UN80 process, triggered by the funding crisis at the UN. Several international institutions will simply have to survive with fewer resources, necessitating downsizing and reorganisation. This is

felt most acutely in those UN institutions that have sizeable funds and programmes, particularly in the fields of global health, refugees and migration, such as the WHO, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). In light of this reality, the merger of the UNHCR and the IOM has been suggested (Peerboom et al. 2025), which will likely put pressure on the rights-based mandate of the former under the 1951 Refugee Convention as well as the implementation of the two Compacts. Funding challenges will also impact climate-oriented institutions, particularly as COPs remain ambitious undertakings with tens of thousands of delegates and attendees participating every year. The UN Human Rights Council, as well as support for human rights norms, will equally feel the reduction in assessed and voluntary funding (Choi and Liese 2025). The UN80 process may thus offer some limited opportunities for rationalisation and reform, but will put the various UN-related institutions further under pressure.

Conclusion

It is widely understood that global governance institutions and the rules-based international order are in crisis, or at least marred in a state of serious contestation and gridlock. At the same time, it is equally understood that the demand for global governance and international institutions remains strong, as many global challenges can be better addressed through international cooperation rather than unilateral action. Against this background, this research report asks the question: *how can international institutions be transformed to address global challenges given the crisis of the rules-based international order?* It has answered this question by comparing the 15 case studies of the ENSURED project. These case studies span five policy areas, include different types of institutions, and are informed by 184 interviews and other sources of data. Together they provide a unique and in-depth perspective on the reforms of global governance institutions since 2020.

Global governance reform is far from straightforward, but there remains unexploited potential for progress.

The case studies analysed in this report show that global governance reform is far from straightforward, but that there remains unexploited potential for progress.

Over the past five years, some advances have been made in expanding the scope and mandates of several international institutions through formal reforms. From taxation standards in the OECD to the Biodiversity Framework and the AI Framework Convention in the Council of Europe, these are not hard law institutions – with strict rules and enforcement mechanisms – but they nonetheless establish important norms and rules. When full consensus cannot be reached, alternative approaches emerge, such as ‘consensus minus one’ in the case of the Pandemic Agreement or the WTO’s approach to plurilaterals. Below the threshold of constitutive change and formal reform, efforts to prioritise the internal workings of institutions and implementation of policies have yielded some results. This includes setting up informal deliberations to get around gridlock, the establishment of funds to improve implementation and resources, or norm-setting by international bureaucracies through the publication of reports and other materials. This report has clearly highlighted the diversity of actor constellations and underscored how major actors often talk past one another when pursuing reforms.

Overall, the case studies highlight a high degree of complexity and institutional specificity. Beyond the basic observation that many institutions are gridlocked or that the US is changing course, this complicates cross-case comparisons. At the same time, complexity and institutional specificity must be taken seriously, as they are relevant variables in their own right when considering questions of institutional reform. What works in one policy area may not work in another, even under similar conditions. Moreover, major international actors do not always hold comprehensive or consistent positions across different policy domains. This flexibility can create space for reform, while simultaneously privileging insiders over outsiders. It is therefore important to avoid reductionist explanations that attribute reform failures too readily to ‘geopolitics’ or ‘populism’ – case specific dynamics matter considerably.

This report also has several limitations. Although it draws on a strong evidence base of 15 case studies examining different types of international institutions across a wide range of policy areas, it does not cover all international institutions, such as the UN Security Council, the World Bank, the IMF, the G20, or other regional organisations. Nevertheless, comparing multiple case studies provides strong external validity. Changing policy problems, variation in actor constellations, and institution-specific reform dynamics are therefore likely to be relevant across many other institutions as well. Conducting in-depth case studies and interviewing officials, experts, and stakeholders offers a valuable way to uncover the inner-workings of global governance reform. In this respect, the evidence contained in the 184 interviews conducted provide rich insights that complement findings from the ENSURED project based on other methodologies (e.g., Sommerer and Choi 2025; Verhaegen, Dijkstra, and Sommerer 2025).

Interviews

Table 6. Number of Interviews per Policy Area

Policy Area	Case Studies	Interviews
Trade and taxation	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Reforming the WTOExpanding the scope of the WTO trading regimeEstablishing rules on taxation in the G20/OECD and UN	55
Climate and biodiversity	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Reforming UNFCCC decision-making in COPsImplementing the Paris Agreement on climate changeStrengthening the global biodiversity framework	24
Global health	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Enhancing vaccine access in intellectual property rights regimeNegotiating the Pandemic AgreementReforming the WHO	33
Human rights, refugees and migration	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Reforming the UN Human Rights CouncilImplementing the Global Compacts on Migration and RefugeesProtecting the rights of women and LGBTQI+ individuals	40
Digitalisation	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Regulating cyberspace at the UNRegulating cryptocurrency through the financial institutionsNegotiating the AI Convention at the Council of Europe	32
Total		184

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