



THE BOLIVIA MOON AGREEMENT

STUDENTS REIMAGINING
LUNAR GOVERNANCE



A participatory translation of student ideas into a
justice-centered framework for activities concerning the Moon



Nur University (Universidad Núr) is a private, Bahá'í-inspired higher education institution headquartered in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia. Established via a foundational decree in 1982, it holds historical distinction as one of the country's pioneering private institutions and became Bolivia's first dedicated graduate college in 1994.



LunARC is building the Lunar University, where young people globally co-create the systems humanity needs to thrive on Earth and beyond. Through design labs and knowledge infrastructure, we put youth in the driver's seat, not as spectators, but as architects of the futures they'll inherit. We're proving that imagination can function as infrastructure. What begins in classrooms and communities today becomes shared knowledge for tomorrow—carried forward through collaborations rooted in openness, care, and collective wisdom.



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Bolivia Moon Agreement

METHODOLOGY

The Bolivia Moon Agreement is a student-governed legal and cultural reworking of the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. Using the Moon Agreement's treaty architecture as a legal frame to scaffold the students' insights, it translates selected parts of that architecture through the concepts, tensions, and governance imagination produced by students during the April 2026 LunARC Lab at Universidad NUR in Santa Cruz, Bolivia . By intentionally choosing an international instrument which has been ratified by few countries, several which are from the Global South, we can build on an existing legal framework which has not hardened into customary international law. This does not however reflect an initiative to revive or amend the Moon Agreement as such.

The Lab brought together students from law, medicine, engineering, tourism, psychology, international relations, among other fields. Over three days, participants moved through personal reflections on the Moon, collective governance exercises, and the development of a final message intended for the Moon. The Lab's outputs include documentation of student motivations, whole-group discussions, team maps, design guidelines, governance model presentations, individual and collective guardrail responses, reflective questionnaires, online governance games, facilitator interpretive notes, and a LunARC payload text intended for future delivery to the Moon.

In reimagining the original Moon Agreement, this document treats the Lab record as a form of student-generated travaux préparatoires: an interpretive record of how ideas emerged, were challenged, and were refined through collective deliberation. The Bolivia Moon Agreement's text balances original treaty language with student ideas that have been translated into a legal architecture based on the Moon Agreement. The commentary preserves tensions, reasoning, and interpretive context that provide additional depth to the ideas reflected in the treaty text. The annex allows readers to trace treaty clauses and commentary claims to three source layers: Lab evidence, the original Moon Agreement, and selected travaux préparatoires from the original treaty negotiations. The original Moon Agreement travaux are brought into the document only where they illuminate or parallel conversations that emerged during the Lab; this document is not intended to be a complete examination of the Moon Agreement's negotiating history, rather it aims to shed light into areas of prior deliberation that the students have contributed fresh ideas to.

The Bolivia Moon Agreement also applies a Bolivia Voice Integration method. Spanish, Indigenous, and locally grounded concepts are preserved where they do legal or governance work. Terms such as Suma Qamaña, Equilibrio, Cosmovisión, Comunidad, Bien común lunar, Líder sabio, and nosotros decidimos are vital to understanding the students' vision. Where these concepts first appear, they are succinctly defined. Deeper cultural and legal interpretation then appears in the commentary.

Each Lab team named both its governance model and itself. The commentary refers to the teams by the names they chose: Team Interestelar (model: Sistema Internacional), Team Terranova (model: Monitoreo Sostenible), Team La Tierra Prometida (model: Comunidad), and Team Madre Luna (model: Equilibrio).

This document shows how a participatory Lab can be translated into a legally intelligible framework while preserving authorship, local meaning, and traceability. In this sense, the Bolivia Moon Agreement places the students in conversation with the States that negotiated the original Moon Agreement, asking where their ideas align, where they deepen existing law, and where they challenge the assumptions of state-centered space governance.

The conclusions and recommendations reflected in the following document do not necessarily reflect positions or opinions held by Nur University, LunARC, or ICAAD. These are products of the students involved in the Lab, manifestations of their worldviews and ideals.

PREAMBLE

In 2026, we were students in Bolivia. We spent three days designing governance for the Moon.

We came together from law, medicine, engineering, tourism, psychology, and international relations.

Some of us arrived feeling incapable. That changed.

We asked: if we could build a new world from nothing, what would we refuse to repeat?

We learned that exploring is not conquering. It is learning to live with the unknown.

We learned that no one saves themselves alone. Not on Earth. Not anywhere.

We stopped being spectators of reality. We became architects, protagonists.

We said the Moon belongs to no one. Not to whoever arrives first. Not to any flag.

We brought Suma Qamaña — living well together — not only from Bolivia, but for the world.

We said: it is not about going further. It is about being better when we arrive.

We said teach children well. A person with good values will not need a rule to stop them.

We said when something goes wrong, everyone must see who decided it. No one hides.

We knew this because Bolivia fought hard to keep its water, its land, and its forests shared.

Your truth is not the absolute truth. It is only one part of the great color.

The spark of change we feel now is what defines our path.

Current borders are temporary. Our destiny depends on turning ambition into shared purpose.

Through our blood runs the blood of the explorer. We always find a way to move forward.

We were students. We had no power except the quality of what we could imagine together.

We imagined you. We hoped you would be braver, and that these words would help.

This message was sent to the Moon by the first LunARC students of the Lunar University, in Bolivia.

[P1.1]

Commentary

The Preamble is the students' act of authorship. Written as a message to the future, it does not summarize the Agreement so much as reveal the moral imagination from which the Agreement grows. The students speak in the first person plural because the document begins from collective transformation: some arrived feeling incapable but left as architects. That movement from spectatorship to authorship is one of the central claims of the Bolivia Moon Agreement. Young people are not merely being consulted about a future already designed by others; they are helping shape the legal and moral language through which that future can be governed. **[CP.1]**

The Preamble also introduces the Agreement's central paradox: the Moon belongs to no one, yet responsibility for it belongs to all. The students reject conquest, first arrival, flags, and hidden decision-making, while grounding their vision in Bolivia's own struggles over water, land, and forests as shared goods. Their reference to Suma Qamaña, plural truth, and turning ambition into shared purpose gives the Agreement its interpretive center. Exploration is not rejected, but it is disciplined by humility, accountability, and the obligation to be "better when we arrive." **[CP.2]**

ARTICLE 1: SCOPE

1. This Agreement applies to the Moon and to other celestial bodies within the solar system unless specific legal norms enter into force with respect to any of those celestial bodies. **[A1.1]**

2. Any reference to the Moon includes orbits or trajectories around the Moon. **[A1.2]**

3. This Agreement shall be interpreted in light of the relationship among the Moon, Earth, and the living systems of Earth. The Moon shall not be prioritized as a place to access, regulate, or extract from, but as a celestial body with scientific, cultural, spiritual, and relational significance. **[A1.3]**

4. Benefits derived from activities concerning the Moon shall be governed by this Agreement and pursued only with due regard for: environmental protection and sustainability, current and future generations, and the principles of Suma Qamaña, Equilibrio, Comunidad, and the Bien común lunar. **[A1.4]**

5. This Agreement does not apply directly to extraterrestrial materials that reach the surface of Earth by natural means. The principles of this Agreement may, however, guide how such materials are approached, studied, preserved, or shared. **[A1.5]**

Commentary

Article 1 reframes scope as relationship. The Lab did not begin with law. It began with students naming what the Moon meant to them before any governance prompt was introduced: companion, mother, angel, light, hope, discovery, cosmovisión, and the unknown. Those statements matter because they show that the Moon was never only an object of regulation. It was already a relationship, a mirror, and a source of meaning. **[C1.1]**

This article therefore keeps the Moon Agreement's broad scope but refuses a purely geographic reading. The Agreement applies to the Moon, orbits, trajectories, and other celestial bodies, but its interpretive center is the relationship among the Moon, Earth, and living systems. That framing is where the Lab begins to challenge ordinary space law vocabulary: access without relationship risks

becoming extraction; regulation without Cosmovisión — knowledge pluralism — risks flattening what participants held sacred. **[C1.2]**

The spiritual dimension should not be misread as religious governance. In the Lab, students distinguished spiritual grounding from division by religion, with one team explaining that a spiritual foundation could unify at the level of species rather than nation, race, or creed. Article 1 preserves that distinction by naming spiritual and relational significance without turning the Agreement into a sectarian instrument. **[C1.3]**

ARTICLE 2: PRINCIPLES

1. All activities concerning the Moon shall be carried out in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and applicable international human rights treaties, in a manner that advances dignity, peace, security, cooperation, and justice. **[A2.1]**

2. Lunar exploration shall be guided by curiosity and humility towards the unknown, and shall not reproduce patterns of colonialism, domination, exclusion, or extraction carried from Earth. **[A2.2]**

3. States and authorized actors shall act with due regard for the rights, interests, knowledge, and wellbeing of peoples and communities, including present and future generations. **[A2.3]**

Commentary

Article 2 gives the Agreement its anti-colonial orientation. Students did not reject exploration. They rejected the familiar pattern in which exploration becomes a language of domination, ownership, exclusion, and extraction. Their formulation — “exploring is not conquering” — becomes a general principle for interpreting every later article. **[C2.1]**

This is why the draft avoids the word “use” where possible. In the original space-law architecture, “exploration and use” is standard language. But in current legal and commercial debates, “use” can become the bridge from access to extraction. Article 2 does not erase peaceful science, discovery, or presence. It asks that activity concerning the Moon begin from humility and responsibility toward the unknown, rather than from an entitlement to take. **[C2.2]**

The Lab also preserved a productive tension. Some students spoke in the language of progress, revolution, and frontier. Others spoke of caution, relationship, and the need to avoid repeating Earth’s mistakes. Article 2 does not suppress the frontier impulse; it disciplines it through anti-conquest and responsibility. **[C2.3]**

ARTICLE 3: PEACE

1. The Moon shall be engaged exclusively for peaceful purposes by all State Parties and by authorized actors under their jurisdiction and control. **[A3.1]**
2. Any threat or use of force, hostile act, or threat of hostile act on the Moon is prohibited. It is likewise prohibited to use the Moon to commit or threaten any such act in relation to Earth, the Moon, spacecraft, personnel, stations, installations, or other space objects. **[A3.2]**
3. States Parties shall not place in orbit or trajectory around the Moon any object carrying nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction, or other weapons, nor place or use such weapons on or in the Moon. **[A3.3]**
4. Military bases, installations, fortifications, weapons testing, and military manoeuvres on the Moon are forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or other peaceful purposes is not prohibited where such activity is transparent, non-coercive, and consistent with this Agreement. The use of military equipment or facilities shall be permitted only where strictly necessary for peaceful purposes and subject to public notice and review. **[A3.4]**
5. Measures taken in response to a serious threat to Earth, the Moon, or other celestial bodies shall not be used to establish permanent weapons capacity, militarized infrastructure, exclusionary control, or sovereign rights. **[A3.5]**
6. Peaceful purposes shall be interpreted to include freedom from domination, coercion, intimidation, conquest, and any claim of sovereign rights by any State Party or authorized actors. **[A3.6]**

Commentary

Article 3 turns peaceful purposes into more than a weapons rule. The students' anti-conquest principle gives peace a relational meaning: the Moon cannot be peaceful if it is free of weapons, and yet, organized through coercion, domination, intimidation, or sovereign control. **[C3.1]**

This is one place where the student travaux and state travaux align strongly, but not completely. The early state-draft record and the final Moon Agreement both foreground peaceful purposes and restrictions on military activity. The Bolivia Lab extends that architecture by asking what disturbs peace even without open warfare. In one of the students' exercises, they imagined what a headline in 2100 would say, the "Treaty of Tranquility" declaring the Moon humanity's first sanctuary of peace, captures that broader aspiration. **[C3.2]**

The Article therefore strengthens the prohibition on weapons while preserving peaceful scientific activity. Any emergency measure taken to protect Earth or lunar life must remain temporary, transparent, and incapable of becoming a permanent military foothold. **[C3.3]**

ARTICLE 4: COOPERATION

1. Exploration and presence concerning the Moon shall be carried out for the benefit, dignity, and wellbeing of all peoples, irrespective of their economic, scientific, technological, or political power, and with due regard to present and future generations. **[A4.1]**

2. States and authorized actors shall be guided by Suma Qamaña — living in harmony with everything that surrounds us — in all activities concerning the Moon. Cooperation shall include shared responsibility, mutual assistance, and meaningful participation in shaping lunar futures. **[A4.2]**
3. Benefits derived from activities concerning the Moon shall strengthen the conditions for dignity, participation, and equitable development, especially for peoples and communities that have historically been non-spacefaring. **[A4.3]**
4. Lunar governance shall be rooted in Comunidad — relational community — recognizing that no State, institution, private entity, or person acts alone. Activities concerning the Moon shall therefore be planned, reviewed, and carried out in ways that strengthen relationships among peoples, communities, Earth, and the Moon. **[A4.4]**
5. International cooperation may occur through States, international organizations, scientific institutions, private actors, civil society, educational communities, Indigenous peoples, youth, and other knowledge communities whose experience is relevant to shared futures. **[A4.5]**

Commentary

Article 4 is where Suma Qamaña and Comunidad become legal principles of cooperation. Lab participants did not understand cooperation as politeness among States. They treated it as a condition of survival. One student later put the idea plainly: cooperation is not an ethical option but a survival necessity, because collective wellbeing is what makes individual existence possible in critical environments. **[C4.1]**

The students also challenged the thinness of ordinary international cooperation. Team Interestelar argued that what is often called cooperation in international relations can resemble charity, strategic advantage, or selective sharing. Real cooperation, in their framing, required a deeper mutuality: a system in which resources, knowledge, responsibility, and decision-making do not remain concentrated in the hands of those already powerful. **[C4.2]**

Comunidad adds a second layer. It prevents the Agreement from treating States as the only containers of human concern. The Lab's community models asked how decisions could be made from lived realities, how representatives could remain accountable to communities, and how people could become authors rather than spectators. In Article 4, cooperation therefore becomes a relationship among States, peoples, communities, knowledge holders, Earth, and the Moon. **[C4.3]**

The original Moon Agreement's language of cooperation and mutual assistance remains the legal anchor, but the Bolivia Lab changes the measure of success. Cooperation is not successful because a report was shared, a meeting was held, or a powerful actor offered assistance. It is successful only if it expands meaningful participation, reduces dependence, and makes shared futures possible. **[C4.4]**

ARTICLE 5: TRANSPARENCY

1. States and authorized actors shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the public, the international scientific community, and relevant knowledge communities, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of activities concerning the Moon. **[A5.1]**
2. Information shall be provided in a timely, accessible, and understandable form, so that the purpose, location, duration, risks, environmental measures, and results of lunar activities can be meaningfully reviewed. **[A5.2]**
3. Where activities are planned in the same area, orbit, or trajectory, States and authorized actors shall promptly inform one another and coordinate to prevent interference, harm, secrecy, or misunderstanding. **[A5.3]**
4. Any phenomenon discovered in outer space, including on or in relation to the Moon, that may endanger life or health, indicate organic life, or materially deepen scientific understanding shall be reported promptly to the Secretary-General, the public, and the international scientific community. **[A5.4]**
5. Transparency shall be understood as a condition of accountability. When harm occurs, the public must be able to understand who was responsible, who or what was harmed, what was foreseeable, and what measures have been taken to mitigate, remediate, and prevent future harm. **[A5.5]**

Commentary

The Lab turns transparency from a notice requirement into a democratic condition of lunar governance. Students repeatedly link information to accountability: people must know what resources exist, who controls them, what risks are being released, and how responsibility can be assigned when something goes wrong. The phrase “No one hides” captures this ethic in its simplest form. **[C5.1]**

This is where the student travaux and state travaux can be placed in productive conversation. The original Moon Agreement required information sharing with the Secretary-General, the public, and the international scientific community. India and Nigeria went further in the travaux by proposing a more collective knowledge sharing architecture around samples, data, participation, dissemination, and UN reporting. The Lab deepens that same instinct by connecting information sharing to public accountability and anti-corruption. **[C5.2]**

For the students, traceability was not only technical, but a response to the fear that power, ambition, and corruption would follow humanity to the Moon. Transparency therefore has to be legible to more than States and experts. It must allow civil society, communities, youth, and other knowledge holders to understand the decisions being made in their name. **[C5.3]**

ARTICLE 6: SCIENCE

1. There shall be freedom of scientific investigation concerning the Moon by all States Parties, without discrimination of any kind, on the basis of equality and in accordance with international law. **[A6.1]**
2. Scientific investigation shall be peaceful, transparent, and directed toward shared knowledge for the benefit of all peoples. **[A6.2]**
3. States Parties may collect and remove samples of lunar mineral and other substances for scientific purposes, subject to the concept of Suma Qamaña in this Agreement. A meaningful portion of samples, data, and analysis shall be made available to interested States, scientific and educational communities, and relevant public institutions. **[A6.3]**
4. Cosmovisión — knowledge pluralism — shall be respected as a valid source of governance knowledge when scientific activity affects questions of preservation, spiritual and cultural meaning, harm, stewardship, or relationship to the Moon. **[A6.4]**
5. States Parties shall promote the sharing of scientific knowledge and educational opportunities for the public to the greatest extent feasible and practicable. **[A6.5]**

Commentary

Article 6 preserves scientific freedom, but the Lab refuses to let science stand outside values. Students asked whether technological research without values is empty, and several reflected that one truth is never the whole truth. Cosmovisión gives legal form to that insight. It does not displace science; it requires science to remain accountable to the wider systems of meaning through which harm, care, preservation, and responsibility are understood. **[C6.1]**

This is one of the strongest places to bring the travaux into the commentary. India proposed scientific investigation without discrimination and on the basis of equality. India and Nigeria proposed a model in which lunar samples and information would circulate through UN-linked mechanisms so that scientific benefit would not be held only by those able to reach the Moon. The Bolivia Lab moves in the same direction, but with a broader knowledge frame: access to science is not only access to samples or data, but access to the authority to help define what knowledge matters. **[C6.2]**

The concept of Cosmovisión should be handled carefully. In the Lab, it was not merely cultural background. Students brought astrology, mythology, spirituality, the Moon as mother, the Moon as angel, and the Moon as a guide into the room before governance prompts were introduced. That matters because the later governance models were built on top of those relationships. Article 6 therefore treats knowledge pluralism as part of scientific responsibility, not as an exception to it. **[C6.3]**

ARTICLE 7: EQUILIBRIO

1. In all activities concerning the Moon, States and authorized actors shall protect Equilibrio — the living balance that sustains life, resources, and community — by preventing disruption of the Moon's existing environment, harmful contamination, and harmful effects on Earth arising from lunar activity or extraterrestrial matter. **[A7.1]**
2. The duty to protect Equilibrio includes safeguarding lunar environments, essential resources, life-support systems, and sites of scientific and heritage significance. **[A7.2]**
3. Lunar activities shall be planned and carried out as part of a living system. Water, waste, food, habitation, energy, communication, safety, justice, knowledge-sharing, and social equity shall be treated as connected conditions of long-term sustainability, not as separate technical sectors. **[A7.3]**
4. States and authorized actors shall publicly disclose the measures they adopt to protect Equilibrio. They shall notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the public, affected communities where relevant, and the international scientific community of activities that may cause environmental harm or affect significant lunar sites. **[A7.4]**
5. Areas of the Moon with special significance may be designated as protected lunar preserves. Decisions concerning such areas shall consider Cosmovisión alongside scientific and technical expertise. **[A7.5]**
6. No activity shall proceed where serious risk to Equilibrio cannot be prevented, mitigated, independently reviewed, and publicly justified. In conditions of uncertainty, decisions shall be guided by the precautionary principle. **[A7.6]**

Commentary

The Bolivia Lab deepens environmental protection through Equilibrio. Students did not treat environmental protection as a narrow duty to avoid contamination. They understood balance as a living system in which resources, technology, community, justice, and long-term survival are connected. Team Madre Luna made this visible by placing Equilibrio through the center of a circular map of life systems: water, waste, food, housing, renewable resources, risk management, communication, knowledge-sharing, equity, and sustainable development. **[C7.1]**

Across the Lab, Equilibrio travelled across disciplines without losing force. Team Interestelar reached it through power distribution and international responsibility. Team Terranova reached it through justice, monitoring, health, and circular economy. Team La Tierra Prometida reached it through community, stewardship, and the rejection of ownership. Team Madre Luna reached it through life-systems design and responsible leadership. That convergence is why Equilibrio can operate as a treaty standard rather than a single team's metaphor. **[C7.2]**

The concept also contains a warning about governance failure. Students located the main threats to balance inside the human system: ambition, egoism, capitalism, deception, corruption, and the tendency to repeat Earth's patterns. Team Madre Luna named *mentira* and *ambición* as harms to balance, and *cooperación*, *líder sabio*, and *responsabilidad* as forces that restore it. Article 7 translates that insight into duties of prevention, disclosure, review, precaution, and stewardship. **[C7.3]**

The state travaux gives this provision a useful historical anchor. The USSR draft already spoke in terms of avoiding disruption of the existing balance of the lunar environment, adverse changes, and contamination. The final Moon Agreement carried that environmental balance language forward. The Bolivia Lab does not replace that legal architecture; it gives “balance” a fuller governance meaning. Balance is not only an environmental condition. It is the relationship among life-support systems, resources, knowledge, justice, and community. [C7.4]

Article 7 also shows why Cosmovisión belongs in the environmental article. The Lab made clear that what deserves protection cannot be defined only by technical expertise. Scientific sites matter, but so do places where meaning is derived through communities' understanding of cultural, spiritual, Indigenous, local, or relational knowledge. [C7.5]

ARTICLE 8: ACCESS

1. States Parties may pursue peaceful exploration and may have access to the Moon anywhere on or below its surface, subject to this Agreement. [A8.1]

2. For these purposes, States Parties may land and launch space objects and may place personnel, vehicles, equipment, instruments, stations, and installations on or below the surface of the Moon. [A8.2]

3. None of these activities shall be deemed to create ownership, priority, exclusionary control, or permanent advantage over any place, path, resource, or area of the Moon. [A8.3]

4. States Parties and authorized actors shall conduct lunar activities with due regard for the lawful activities of others. Where interference may reasonably occur, the parties concerned shall consult promptly and take appropriate measures to prevent harm. [A8.4]

5. The freedom to explore must align with accountability, cooperation, and due regard for Comunidad and Equilibrio. [A8.5]

Commentary

Article 8 is where freedom of access becomes freedom with responsibility. The Lab participants repeatedly rejected the idea that arrival creates entitlement. Their statement that the Moon belongs to no one — not to whoever arrives first and not to any flag — gives Article 8 its central interpretive limit. Participants reject the idea of “first in, best dressed,” ensuring that freedom of exploration does not become a pathway to foreclose opportunities for others. [C8.1]

This article also speaks to a tension that ran through the Lab: students were excited by exploration, discovery, and the possibility of beginning again, but they were wary of the way access can harden into advantage. That is why paragraph 3 matters. It keeps the legal freedom to explore from becoming a quiet pathway to exclusion, territorial control, or first-mover dominance. [C8.2]

The original Moon Agreement protects freedom of activity on the Moon, but the Bolivia Lab asks what kind of freedom is legitimate. Freedom without Comunidad risks isolation and competition. Freedom without Equilibrio risks disruption. Article 8 therefore treats access not as a permission to take space, but as a responsibility to remain in the right relationship with others. [C8.3]

ARTICLE 9: STATIONS

1. States Parties may establish crewed and uncrewed stations on the Moon. A State establishing a station shall use only the area required for the needs of that station and shall promptly inform the Secretary-General of its location, purpose, expected duration, and safety measures. **[A9.1]**
2. Stations shall be installed and operated so that they do not impede free access to all areas of the Moon by personnel, vehicles, and equipment acting in accordance with this Agreement. **[A9.2]**
3. Stations, safety zones, infrastructure, markers, or technical systems shall not become de facto territorial claims, permanent exclusions, or private corridors of control. **[A9.3]**
4. Stations shall be designed and operated consistently with Equilibrio, including responsible resource cycles, waste reduction, energy sustainability, transparent communication, while respecting the scientific, cultural, spiritual, and relational significance of places on the Moon. **[A9.4]**

Commentary

The students anticipated lunar infrastructure, but they did not treat infrastructure as neutral. Their imagined 2100 headlines included both hopeful and cautionary futures: a self-sustaining lunar base, protected radio silence on the far side of the moon, oxygen crises, diverted safety funds, mineral looting, and conflicts over who may go to the Moon. Article 9 carries that tension. A station may be necessary for life and scientific work, but it can also become the first form of exclusion. **[C9.1]**

Team Madre Luna's Equilibrio model is especially relevant here because it imagined habitation as a life-system rather than a technical footprint. Water, waste, energy, food, shelter, risk management, and communication, were not separate sectors; they were interdependent conditions for survival. Article 9 translates that insight into station design. A lunar station may become necessary, but its design should be for collective exploration and survival not extraction and de facto territories. **[C9.2]**

The state-travaux material also matters here. Austria's proposal made clear that the placement of personnel, vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations, and installations should not create ownership rights. The Bolivia Lab deepens that legal warning. Students were not only concerned with formal ownership; they were concerned with patterns of power that can produce control without ever calling it territory. **[C9.3]**

ARTICLE 10: RESCUE

1. States Parties shall adopt all practicable measures to safeguard the life and health of persons on the Moon. For this purpose, any person on the Moon shall be regarded as an astronaut under Article V of the Outer Space Treaty and as personnel of a spacecraft within the meaning of the Rescue Agreement. **[A10.1]**
2. States Parties shall offer shelter, supplies, medical assistance, and other necessary aid in their stations, installations, vehicles, and facilities to persons in distress on the Moon. **[A10.2]**
3. Mutual aid shall be treated as a basic rule of lunar presence: no one saves themselves alone. **[A10.3]**

4. The protection of life shall include physical safety, mental health, medical supplies, risk management, and non-discriminatory access to emergency support. **[A10.4]**

Commentary

Article 10 is one of the clearest places where the students' language can become legal principle without much translation. "No one saves themselves alone" turns rescue from a narrow emergency obligation into a rule for lunar life. In a limited, fragile, and interdependent environment, survival cannot be organized around separation. **[C10.1]**

The Lab also broadens what it means to protect life and health. Students discussed health, mental health, supplies, risk, adaptation, and equitable access as parts of a governance system. They understood that human survival on the Moon would depend not only on rescue after catastrophe, but on systems of care that prevent people from being abandoned before distress becomes visible. **[C10.2]**

ARTICLE 11: BIEN COMÚN

1. The Moon and its natural resources belong to no one. They are the common heritage of humankind and part of the Bien común lunar — the lunar common good. **[A11.1]**

2. The Moon's surface, subsurface, natural resources, orbital parameters, including places of scientific, cultural, spiritual, or relational significance shall not be subject to sovereignty, ownership, appropriation, domination, or exclusive control by claim, occupation, arrival, technological capacity, investment, extraction, contract, registration, or any other means. **[A11.2]**

3. Neither the surface, subsurface, or its natural resources shall become property of any State Party or its authorized actors. The placement of people, vehicles, stations, instruments, markers, or other infrastructure on, below, above, or in relation to the Moon shall not create ownership, territorial control, exclusionary rights, priority, or permanent advantage. **[A11.3]**

4. State Parties and their authorized actors have the right to explore the Moon without discrimination and on the basis of equality. Nevertheless, lunar resources shall not be taken under a logic of property rights, right of discovery, or first arrival. Any activity concerning lunar resources shall be governed by an international body (similar to the International Seabed Authority) established under this Agreement and guided by Equilibrio, Suma Qamaña, Comunidad, and the Bien común lunar. **[A11.4]**

5. Limited scientific sampling may be permitted where it is peaceful, transparent, environmentally responsible, non-exclusive, and directed toward shared knowledge rather than private benefit. Scientific activity shall respect Cosmovisión and shall not separate discovery from responsibility to the Moon or from the interests of non-spacefaring communities. **[A11.5]**

6. The international body for lunar resources shall be established before exploitation becomes feasible and shall ensure orderly and safe development, rational and precautionary management, protection of lunar environments and significant sites, prevention of monopoly and first-mover advantage, equitable sharing of benefits, meaningful participation by non-spacefaring States, and public accountability for harm. **[A11.6]**

7. Nosotros decidimos - governance remains with those impacted - shall guide decisions affecting communities whose knowledge, territories, or lived experience of extraction are relevant to preventing harm on the Moon. **[A11.7]**

Commentary

Article 11 is where the Bolivia Lab most directly enters into conversation with the original Moon Agreement negotiations. The final Moon Agreement already uses the language of common heritage and non-appropriation, but the students give that language a different emotional and political force. “The Moon belongs to no one” was not an abstract property rule. It was a warning against first arrival, flags, private capture, and the repetition of Earth’s extractive histories. **[C11.1]**

Bien común lunar helps translate that warning into legal form. Common heritage can sound institutional, technical, or remote. Bien común lunar makes the duty more immediate: the Moon cannot be treated as a prize, a warehouse, or a private corridor of advantage. It must be governed as a shared good whose benefits, risks, knowledge, and decisions cannot be enclosed by those who arrive first or possess the most capital. **[C11.2]**

The state travaux show that the original negotiators were also struggling with these questions. Austria proposed language linking non-appropriation, no ownership of the surface or resources in place, a future international regime, equitable sharing, and special consideration for developing countries. Bulgaria’s working paper placed equal exploration, non-appropriation, resource disclosure, and equitable sharing into a fuller treaty architecture. Mongolia pressed the benefit-sharing thread, especially for developing countries. India and Nigeria pushed the knowledge sharing issue further by proposing mechanisms for samples, data, participation, dissemination, and reporting through the United Nations. **[C11.3]**

The Bolivia Lab aligns with those state efforts, but it also exposes their limits. The state travaux largely ask how benefits should be shared among States and how resource exploitation should eventually be governed. The students ask a prior legitimacy question: who gets to shape the rules before extraction becomes normal? That is the force of nosotros decidimos. It does not mean that one community owns the Moon. It means that communities with lived experience of extraction, dispossession, or resource conflict must not be treated as afterthoughts. **[C11.4]**

The students were drawing from places where land, forests, water, and common goods have been governed through conflict, resistance, and unequal power. Those experiences matter because they show what “common heritage” can fail to prevent if governance remains distant, technical, or captured by those with economic leverage. **[C11.5]**

Article 11 should also preserve a tension that the students did not fully resolve. They rejected ownership by States, companies, or first movers, but they did not simply choose “state control” as the answer. In the RANT game, a state-only extraction solution was rejected. The stronger instinct was not “the right owner,” but “no owner.” That is why this article frames resource governance through an international body, but also through Comunidad, Cosmovisión, public accountability, and affected community participation. **[C11.6]**

The reference to an international body should be developed carefully. The International Seabed Authority provides an analogy for governing resources in a commons like space, but the Bolivia Lab

would likely resist any institution that becomes bureaucratic, state-dominated, or detached from communities. [C11.7]

ARTICLE 12: JURISDICTION

1. States Parties shall retain jurisdiction and control over their personnel, vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations, and installations on the Moon, subject to this Agreement. Such jurisdiction and control shall not extend to ownership or control of lunar places, areas, paths, or resources. [A12.1]

2. Retaining jurisdiction and control carry duties of care, transparency, and repair. A State Party shall remain responsible for harms caused by its personnel, vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations, or installations, including harms to persons, the lunar environment, protected sites, shared resources, or other interests recognized in this Agreement. [A12.2]

3. Lost space vehicles, equipment, and installations shall be returned according to Article 5 of the Rescue Agreement. [A12.3]

4. In an emergency involving a threat to human life or serious harm, States Parties and authorized actors may use the equipment, vehicles, installations, facilities, or supplies of another State Party where necessary. Prompt notice shall be given to the Secretary-General and the State Party concerned. [A12.4]

5. Emergency use shall be governed by mutual aid, transparency, proportionality, and restoration once the emergency has passed. [A12.5]

Commentary

Article 12 keeps jurisdiction from becoming quiet ownership. The Lab's anti-appropriation instinct matters here because control over equipment or installations can easily become control over place. The students repeatedly rejected the idea that presence, capacity, or first arrival should create superior authority. Jurisdiction therefore remains functional, not territorial. [C12.1]

The Lab also adds a duty of repair. Students wanted visible accountability: when something goes wrong, everyone should be able to see who decided, who acted, and who must repair the harm. Article 12 turns that accountability thread toward objects, installations, and emergency use. [C12.2]

The emergency provision is where "no one saves themselves alone" becomes practical. In a lunar environment, equipment and supplies may determine survival. The right to use another State's facility in an emergency should not be framed as an exception or charity; it is part of the mutual aid required for any legitimate lunar presence. [C12.3]

ARTICLE 13: NOTICE

1. A State Party that learns of the crash landing, forced landing, or other unintended landing on the Moon of a space object or component not launched by it shall promptly inform the launching State Party and the Secretary-General of the United Nations. **[A13.1]**
2. Response to unintended landing shall prioritize safety, environmental protection, preservation of relevant evidence, and transparent public notice where harm may have occurred. **[A13.2]**
3. No person or actor shall conceal decisions, risks, or information relevant to harm arising from unintended landing. **[A13.3]**

Commentary

Article 13 carries one of the clearest student principles: no one hides. The Lab's accountability logic is especially important when accidents occur, because accidents can become moments of evasion. The students' concern was not only that harm might happen; it was that power would hide the decisions that made harm foreseeable. **[C13.1]**

The Article therefore treats notice as more than administrative communication between States. It preserves evidence, protects the public record, and keeps accidents from becoming private events controlled by the actors most interested in limiting scrutiny. **[C13.2]**

ARTICLE 14: RESPONSIBILITY

1. States Parties shall bear international responsibility for national activities on the Moon, whether carried out by governmental agencies or authorized actors, such as non-governmental entities, and shall ensure that such activities conform to this Agreement. **[A14.1]**
2. Authorized actors may engage in activities concerning the Moon only under authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party, with public reporting and supervision sufficient to ensure accountability. **[A14.2]**
3. When harm occurs or obligations are breached, authorization, supervision, and remedies shall be traceable. The public shall be able to identify who was responsible, who or what was harmed, what was foreseeable, and what measures have been taken to mitigate or remediate the harm. **[A14.3]**
4. States Parties recognize that detailed arrangements concerning liability and remedies may become necessary as activities concerning the Moon expand, including arrangements to redress environmental harm, depletion of natural resources, and impacts to heritage sites. **[A14.4]**

Commentary

Article 14 is where the Lab's legality-legitimacy distinction becomes central. Team Madre Luna drew a sharp line between law that exists on paper and law that people regard as legitimate. Other teams raised the same concern in a different way: rules must have teeth, justice systems can be too binary, and people with power will find ways around imperfect laws. **[C14.1]**

Traceability is the Lab's answer to impunity. The students were not satisfied with abstract responsibility. They wanted systems that could show where a harmful decision came from and who

had the power to prevent it. That is why Article 14 links authorization, supervision, and remedies. If private or institutional actors are allowed to operate through States, the public must be able to follow the chain of responsibility back to the decision point. **[C14.2]**

This Article is also important for private actors. The Lab did not treat companies as outside governance. Students repeatedly worried that companies, capital, ambition, and unequal power could distort lunar futures. Article 14 therefore makes State responsibility a shield against evasion, not a way to launder private activity through formal authorization. **[C14.3]**

ARTICLE 15: CONSULTATION

1. Each State Party may assure itself that activities of other States Parties concerning the Moon are compatible with this Agreement. For this purpose, space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations, and installations on the Moon shall be open to other States Parties, subject to reasonable advance notice, safety, and protection against interference with normal operations. **[A15.1]**

2. A State Party that believes another State Party is not fulfilling its obligations, or is interfering with its rights under this Agreement, may request consultations. The State Party receiving the request shall enter into consultations without delay. Consultations should be open to public observation when possible. **[A15.2]**

3. Consultations shall seek a mutually acceptable resolution with due regard for the rights, interests, knowledge, and responsibilities of all parties concerned. The Secretary-General shall be informed of the results. **[A15.3]**

4. Where consultations do not resolve the controversy, the parties shall pursue peaceful means appropriate to the circumstances and may seek assistance from the Secretary-General. **[A15.4]**

5. Consultation shall not be limited to crisis response. States Parties shall maintain open, transparent, and accessible processes for review, debate, and conflict prevention concerning activities that may affect Equilibrio, Comunidad, common heritage, or the rights of future generations. **[A15.5]**

Commentary

The Lab adds a deliberation layer to consultation. Students did not imagine conflict management only as a formal dispute process that begins after escalation. TeamLa Tierra Prometida described governance as requiring a permanently open space for debate and conflict management because conflict is inevitable wherever people have different goals. **[C15.1]**

This is a subtle but important shift. The Moon Agreement's consultation framework responds to disputes among States. The Bolivia Lab asks how governance can keep disagreement visible before it becomes a crisis. Article 15 therefore treats consultation as a continuous practice of legitimacy, not only a mechanism for legal repair. **[C15.2]**

The student emphasis on voice also belongs here. In the "Sí, Pero" exercise, students identified voice as power: the ability to raise one's voice was treated as a governance principle. Consultation that is closed, technical, or accessible only to States does not meet that standard. **[C15.3]**

ARTICLE 16: ACTORS

1. References in this Agreement to States shall apply, except where otherwise provided, to any international intergovernmental organization that conducts activities concerning the Moon and declares its acceptance of the rights and obligations of this Agreement, where a majority of its member States are Parties to this Agreement and to the Outer Space Treaty. **[A16.1]**

2. International organizations and private actors operating through State Parties shall uphold the duty of peace, transparency, and accountability while recognizing their responsibility of non-appropriative stewardship. Any benefits serve the Bien común lunar. **[A16.2]**

3. Participation through international organizations shall not be used to avoid responsibility, obscure decision-making, or exclude communities whose knowledge and interests are affected by lunar activity. **[A16.3]**

Commentary

Article 16 reflects the Lab's broader governance ecology. Students mapped lunar governance through States, international organizations, civil society, companies, communities, the United Nations, technology, resources, and knowledge systems. They did not imagine governance as a single vertical chain. **[C16.1]**

That broader ecology creates both possibility and risk. More actors can mean more knowledge, participation, and accountability. But more actors can also mean more opacity, especially when responsibility is dispersed across organizations, contractors, technical systems, and public-private arrangements. Article 16 therefore expands participation without letting complexity become a hiding place. **[C16.2]**

ARTICLE 17: AMENDMENTS

1. Any State Party may propose amendments to this Agreement. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party accepting them upon acceptance by a majority of States Parties and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it. **[A17.1]**

2. Proposed amendments shall be accompanied by a public explanation of how they affect major governance concepts, including Suma Qamaña, Equilibrio, Comunidad, and Cosmovisión. The amendments should also clearly demonstrate their impact on present and future generations on both the Moon and Earth. **[A17.2]**

3. Amendment processes shall include a public comment period that is accessible, multilingual, and inclusive of civil society, youth, Indigenous peoples, and scientific and educational institutions. **[A17.3]**

Commentary

Article 17 turns amendment into a validation process. The Lab's translation architecture depends on the idea that students and communities are not merely consulted once and then left behind. If the Agreement changes, the concepts that give it meaning must not be quietly diluted. [C17.1]

This is especially important because some of the Lab's concepts resist easy translation. Cosmovisión, Comunidad, Suma Qamaña, Líder sabio, and nosotros decidimos could all be flattened by later legal drafting. Article 17 requires future amendments to show what they are doing to those concepts, not simply to revise around them. [C17.2]

ARTICLE 18: REVIEW

1. Ten years after entry into force, the question of review of this Agreement shall be included in the provisional agenda of the General Assembly of the United Nations. At any time after five years, a review conference may be convened in accordance with the procedures of this Agreement and with the concurrence of the majority of State Parties. No State Parties should have veto power over whether the Agreement can be reviewed. [A18.1]

2. A review conference shall consider whether this Agreement remains faithful to its purposes, including the protection of Equilibrio, the governance of lunar resources, the effectiveness of transparency and accountability measures, and the participation of non-spacefaring States. [A18.2]

3. The review process shall also include a public comment period that is accessible, multilingual, and inclusive of civil society, youth, Indigenous peoples, scientific and educational institutions, and other knowledge holders to assess how the Agreement is working in practice. [A18.3]

Commentary

Article 18 carries forward the Lab's concern that governance must evolve over time. Students repeatedly described systems that learn: circular monitoring, traceability, rotation of representatives, continuing development, and ideas that improve through iteration. A static treaty would not reflect that imagination. [C18.1]

The review process also protects against the slow erosion of meaning. Facilitator synthesis made clear that what appears misunderstood in a model may be precisely what preserves its integrity. Article 18 therefore asks future reviewers not only whether the Agreement is efficient, but whether it remains faithful to the concepts and tensions that gave rise to it. [C18.2]

ARTICLE 19: SIGNATURE

1. This Agreement shall be open for signature by all States. [A19.1]

2. This Agreement shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Any State that does not sign before entry into force may accede to it at any time. Instruments of ratification or accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. [A19.2]

3. This Agreement shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following deposit of the fifth instrument of ratification. For each State ratifying or acceding thereafter, it shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following deposit of that State's instrument. **[A19.3]**

4. The Secretary-General shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of signatures, ratifications, accessions, entry into force, and other notices. **[A19.4]**

Commentary

No relevant commentary by lab participants. **[C19.1]**

ARTICLE 20: WITHDRAWAL

1. Any State Party may give notice of withdrawal from this Agreement one year after its entry into force by written notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Withdrawal shall take effect one year after receipt of the notification. **[A20.1]**

2. Withdrawal shall not extinguish responsibility for obligations, harms, data, samples, installations, resource activities, environmental measures, or remedies arising before the effective date of withdrawal. **[A20.2]**

3. Duties necessary to prevent harm, protect evidence, provide emergency aid, safeguard **Equilibrio**, and repair injury shall continue after withdrawal where the conduct or risk arose while the State was bound by this Agreement. **[A20.3]**

Commentary

Article 20 reflects the Lab's insistence that exit cannot become evasion. Students repeatedly worried about corruption, hidden decisions, and actors escaping responsibility. Withdrawal should not allow a State or authorized actor to leave behind harm while taking with it the information needed for repair. **[C20.1]**

The continuing-duty language is therefore not punitive. It is a traceability rule. If responsibility could disappear through withdrawal, then withdrawal itself would become a technique for hiding. **[C20.2]**

ARTICLE 21: TRANSLATION

1. This Agreement shall exist in the languages of every State Party. Each official language text is equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send certified copies to all signatory and acceding States. **[A21.1]**

2. Concepts preserved in this Agreement, including Suma Qamaña, Equilibrio, Cosmovisión, Comunidad, Bien común lunar, Líder sabio, and nosotros decidimos, shall be interpreted as governance concepts and shall not be translated in a manner that removes their legal, cultural, relational, or spiritual force. **[A21.2]**

3. Translations, commentaries, annexes, and future interpretations of this Agreement shall preserve the voices, concepts, tensions, and authorship of the communities from which they emerged, including where they challenge institutionalized legal concepts. **[A21.3]**

Commentary

Article 21 makes translation part of preserving the legal essence of the Agreement. The Lab participants showed that meaning can be lost, not only because of bad faith, but when local concepts are removed from their legal, cultural, and spiritual contexts. **[C21.1]**

This Article protects against that loss. Suma Qamaña carries a governance model of living in harmony. Equilibrio carries a systems-based standard for sustaining life, resources, and community. Cosmovisión carries knowledge pluralism. Comunidad carries relational governance. Líder sabio preserves the important tension between leadership and hierarchy. Nosotros decidimos preserves the demand that those affected by extraction and governance decisions not be treated as afterthoughts. **[C21.2]**

This final article also reflects the method of the whole project. The Bolivia Moon Agreement is not only a treaty text; it is a record of translation. Its legitimacy depends on whether future readers can still hear the students inside the legal form. **[C21.3]**

Annex A — Treaty Text Citation & Traceability

Stamp	Lab Evidence ID(s)	Moon Agreement Citation	Travaux Citation
P1.1	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P003]; [BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P004]; [BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P005]; [BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P006]; [BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P007]; [BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P008]; [BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P009]; [BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P010]; [BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P011]; [BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P012]; [BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P013]; [BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P014]; [BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P015]; [BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P017]; [BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P018]; [BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P019]; [BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P020]; [BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P021]; [BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P022]	No Moon Agreement source.	No state-travaux source.
A1.1	No specific student/lab source.	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 1(1).	No state-travaux source.
A1.2	No specific student/lab source.	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 1(2).	No state-travaux source.
A1.3	[BOL-D1-LUNA-P002–P009; BOL-D1-LUNA-R009; BOL-D1-LUNA-R012–R013; BOL-D1-LUNA-R023]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 1.	No state-travaux source.
A1.4	[BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P097–P107; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P083; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P052; BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P010]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 1.	No state-travaux source.
A1.5	No specific student/lab source.	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 1(3).	No state-travaux source.
A2.1	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P007; BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P030; BOL-D0-MOTIV-P004; BOL-D1-LUNA-P005–P007]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 2.	No state-travaux source.
A2.2	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P007; BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P030; BOL-D0-MOTIV-P004; BOL-D1-LUNA-P005–P007]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 2.	No state-travaux source.
A2.3	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P007; BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P030; BOL-D0-MOTIV-P004; BOL-D1-LUNA-P005–P007]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 2.	No state-travaux source.
A3.1	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P007; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P021; BOL-D3-HEAD-P008–P009; BOL-D3-HEAD-P026–P027; BOL-D3-HEAD-P056]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 3(1)–(4).	USSR draft treaty foregrounded exclusive peaceful purposes and restrictions on military activity concerning the Moon. [STE-USSR-1971-C1L568-PEACE-001; UN Doc. A/C.1/L.568, proposed arts. II–III, pp. 1–2].
A3.2	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P007; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P021; BOL-D3-HEAD-P008–P009; BOL-D3-HEAD-P026–P027; BOL-D3-HEAD-P056]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 3(1)–(4).	USSR draft treaty foregrounded exclusive peaceful purposes and restrictions on military activity concerning the Moon. [STE-USSR-1971-C1L568-PEACE-001; UN Doc. A/C.1/L.568, proposed arts. II–III, pp. 1–2].

A3.3	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P007; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P021; BOL-D3-HEAD-P008–P009; BOL-D3-HEAD-P026–P027; BOL-D3-HEAD-P056]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 3(1)–(4).	USSR draft treaty foregrounded exclusive peaceful purposes and restrictions on military activity concerning the Moon. [STE-USSR-1971-C1L568-PEACE-001; UN Doc. A/C.1/L.568, proposed arts. II–III, pp. 1–2].
A3.4	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P007; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P021; BOL-D3-HEAD-P008–P009; BOL-D3-HEAD-P026–P027; BOL-D3-HEAD-P056]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 3(1)–(4).	USSR draft treaty foregrounded exclusive peaceful purposes and restrictions on military activity concerning the Moon. [STE-USSR-1971-C1L568-PEACE-001; UN Doc. A/C.1/L.568, proposed arts. II–III, pp. 1–2].
A3.5	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P007; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P021; BOL-D3-HEAD-P008–P009; BOL-D3-HEAD-P026–P027; BOL-D3-HEAD-P056]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 3(1)–(4).	USSR draft treaty foregrounded exclusive peaceful purposes and restrictions on military activity concerning the Moon. [STE-USSR-1971-C1L568-PEACE-001; UN Doc. A/C.1/L.568, proposed arts. II–III, pp. 1–2].
A3.6	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P007; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P021; BOL-D3-HEAD-P008–P009; BOL-D3-HEAD-P026–P027; BOL-D3-HEAD-P056]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 3(1)–(4).	USSR draft treaty foregrounded exclusive peaceful purposes and restrictions on military activity concerning the Moon. [STE-USSR-1971-C1L568-PEACE-001; UN Doc. A/C.1/L.568, proposed arts. II–III, pp. 1–2].
A4.1	[BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P097–P107; BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P183–P184; BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P275; BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-R005; BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-P004; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P052]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 4(1)–(2).	No state-travaux source.
A4.2	[BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P097–P107; BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P183–P184; BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P275; BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-R005; BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-P004; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P052]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 4(1)–(2).	No state-travaux source.
A4.3	[BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P097–P107; BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P183–P184; BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P275; BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-R005; BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-P004; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P052]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 4(1)–(2).	No state-travaux source.
A4.4	[BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P097–P107; BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P183–P184; BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P275; BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-R005; BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-P004; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P052]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 4(1)–(2).	No state-travaux source.

A4.5	[BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P097–P107; BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P183–P184; BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P275; BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-R005; BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-P004; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P052]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 4(1)–(2).	No state-travaux source.
A5.1	[BOL-D1-SIPERO-R007; BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P014; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P094; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P101; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P012; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P017]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 5(1)–(3).	India and Nigeria proposed a stronger knowledge-sharing architecture for lunar samples, data, dissemination, participation, and reporting through the United Nations. [STE-IND-NGA-1974-L97-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.97, proposed arts. VI–VII, p. 1].
A5.2	[BOL-D1-SIPERO-R007; BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P014; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P094; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P101; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P012; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P017]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 5(1)–(3).	India and Nigeria proposed a stronger knowledge-sharing architecture for lunar samples, data, dissemination, participation, and reporting through the United Nations. [STE-IND-NGA-1974-L97-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.97, proposed arts. VI–VII, p. 1].
A5.3	[BOL-D1-SIPERO-R007; BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P014; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P094; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P101; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P012; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P017]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 5(1)–(3).	India and Nigeria proposed a stronger knowledge-sharing architecture for lunar samples, data, dissemination, participation, and reporting through the United Nations. [STE-IND-NGA-1974-L97-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.97, proposed arts. VI–VII, p. 1].
A5.4	[BOL-D1-SIPERO-R007; BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P014; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P094; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P101; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P012; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P017]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 5(1)–(3).	India and Nigeria proposed a stronger knowledge-sharing architecture for lunar samples, data, dissemination, participation, and reporting through the United Nations. [STE-IND-NGA-1974-L97-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.97, proposed arts. VI–VII, p. 1].
A5.5	[BOL-D1-SIPERO-R007; BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P014; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P094; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P101; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P012; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P017]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 5(1)–(3).	India and Nigeria proposed a stronger knowledge-sharing architecture for lunar samples, data, dissemination, participation, and reporting through the United Nations. [STE-IND-NGA-1974-L97-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.97, proposed arts. VI–VII, p. 1].
A6.1	[BOL-D1-SIPERO-R010; BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P015; BOL-D1-LUNA-P004; BOL-D1-LUNA-P009; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P081]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 6(1)–(3).	India proposed freedom of scientific investigation without discrimination and on the basis of equality, while India and Nigeria proposed shared access to samples and information. [STE-IND-1974-L95-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.95, p. 1; STE-IND-NGA-1974-L97-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.97, proposed arts. VI–VII, p. 1].
A6.2	[BOL-D1-SIPERO-R010; BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P015; BOL-D1-LUNA-P004; BOL-D1-LUNA-P009; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P081]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 6(1)–(3).	India proposed freedom of scientific investigation without discrimination and on the basis of equality, while India and Nigeria proposed shared access to samples and information. [STE-IND-1974-L95-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.95, p. 1; STE-IND-NGA-1974-L97-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.97, proposed arts. VI–VII, p. 1].

A6.3	[BOL-D1-SIPERO-R010; BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P015; BOL-D1-LUNA-P004; BOL-D1-LUNA-P009; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P081]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 6(1)–(3).	India proposed freedom of scientific investigation without discrimination and on the basis of equality, while India and Nigeria proposed shared access to samples and information. [STE-IND-1974-L95-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.95, p. 1; STE-IND-NGA-1974-L97-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.97, proposed arts. VI–VII, p. 1].
A6.4	[BOL-D1-SIPERO-R010; BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P015; BOL-D1-LUNA-P004; BOL-D1-LUNA-P009; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P081]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 6(1)–(3).	India proposed freedom of scientific investigation without discrimination and on the basis of equality, while India and Nigeria proposed shared access to samples and information. [STE-IND-1974-L95-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.95, p. 1; STE-IND-NGA-1974-L97-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.97, proposed arts. VI–VII, p. 1].
A6.5	[BOL-D1-SIPERO-R010; BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P015; BOL-D1-LUNA-P004; BOL-D1-LUNA-P009; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P081]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 6(1)–(3).	India proposed freedom of scientific investigation without discrimination and on the basis of equality, while India and Nigeria proposed shared access to samples and information. [STE-IND-1974-L95-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.95, p. 1; STE-IND-NGA-1974-L97-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.97, proposed arts. VI–VII, p. 1].
A7.1	[BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P083–P112; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P114–P115]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 7(1)–(3).	The USSR draft proposed avoiding disruption of the existing balance of the lunar environment, adverse changes, and contamination. [STE-USSR-1971-C1L568-AIV-001; UN Doc. A/C.1/L.568, proposed art. IV(1)–(2), p. 2].
A7.2	[BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P083–P112; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P114–P115]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 7(1)–(3).	The USSR draft proposed avoiding disruption of the existing balance of the lunar environment, adverse changes, and contamination. [STE-USSR-1971-C1L568-AIV-001; UN Doc. A/C.1/L.568, proposed art. IV(1)–(2), p. 2].
A7.3	[BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P083–P112; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P114–P115]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 7(1)–(3).	The USSR draft proposed avoiding disruption of the existing balance of the lunar environment, adverse changes, and contamination. [STE-USSR-1971-C1L568-AIV-001; UN Doc. A/C.1/L.568, proposed art. IV(1)–(2), p. 2].
A7.4	[BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P083–P112; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P114–P115]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 7(1)–(3).	The USSR draft proposed avoiding disruption of the existing balance of the lunar environment, adverse changes, and contamination. [STE-USSR-1971-C1L568-AIV-001; UN Doc. A/C.1/L.568, proposed art. IV(1)–(2), p. 2].
A7.5	[BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P083–P112; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P114–P115]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 7(1)–(3).	The USSR draft proposed avoiding disruption of the existing balance of the lunar environment, adverse changes, and contamination. [STE-USSR-1971-C1L568-AIV-001; UN Doc. A/C.1/L.568, proposed art. IV(1)–(2), p. 2].

A7.6	[BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P083–P112; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P114–P115]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 7(1)–(3).	The USSR draft proposed avoiding disruption of the existing balance of the lunar environment, adverse changes, and contamination. [STE-USSR-1971-C1L568-AIV-001; UN Doc. A/C.1/L.568, proposed art. IV(1)–(2), p. 2].
A8.1	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P010; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P040–P042; BOL-D1-RANT-P011]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 8(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
A8.2	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P010; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P040–P042; BOL-D1-RANT-P011]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 8(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
A8.3	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P010; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P040–P042; BOL-D1-RANT-P011]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 8(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
A8.4	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P010; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P040–P042; BOL-D1-RANT-P011]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 8(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
A8.5	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P010; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P040–P042; BOL-D1-RANT-P011]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 8(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
A9.1	[BOL-D3-HEAD-P005; BOL-D3-HEAD-P008–P010; BOL-D3-HEAD-P015–P017; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P083–P104; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P111]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 9(1)–(2).	No state-travaux source.
A9.2	[BOL-D3-HEAD-P005; BOL-D3-HEAD-P008–P010; BOL-D3-HEAD-P015–P017; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P083–P104; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P111]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 9(1)–(2).	No state-travaux source.
A9.3	[BOL-D3-HEAD-P005; BOL-D3-HEAD-P008–P010; BOL-D3-HEAD-P015–P017; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P083–P104; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P111]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 9(1)–(2).	Austria proposed that placement of personnel, vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations, and installations should not create ownership rights. [STE-AUT-1973-L74-AX-002; UN Doc. A/AC.105/L.74, proposed art. X(2), p. 1].
A9.4	[BOL-D3-HEAD-P005; BOL-D3-HEAD-P008–P010; BOL-D3-HEAD-P015–P017; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P083–P104; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P111]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 9(1)–(2).	Austria proposed that placement of personnel, vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations, and installations should not create ownership rights. [STE-AUT-1973-L74-AX-002; UN Doc. A/AC.105/L.74, proposed art. X(2), p. 1].
A10.1	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P008; BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P183–P186; BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-R026; BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-R030; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P032; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P019]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 10(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
A10.2	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P008; BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P183–P186; BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-R026; BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-R030; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P032; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P019]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 10(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.

A10.3	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P008; BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P183–P186; BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-R026; BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-R030; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P032; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P019]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 10(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
A10.4	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P008; BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P183–P186; BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-R026; BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-R030; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P032; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P019]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 10(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
A11.1	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P010; BOL-D1-SIPERO-R005; BOL-D1-RANT-P011; BOL-D1-RANT-P013; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P112; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P028–P035; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P051; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P034]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 11(1)–(8).	Austria, Bulgaria, Mongolia, India, and Nigeria proposed or supported non-appropriation, no ownership of resources in place, an international resource regime, equitable benefit sharing, developing-country consideration, and knowledge sharing. [STE-AUT-1973-L74-AX-001–004; UN Doc. A/AC.105/L.74, proposed art. X, pp. 1–2; STE-BGR-1974-L93-AXI-001–003; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.93, proposed art. XI, pp. 2–3; STE-MNG-1974-L98-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.98, p. 1; STE-MNG-1974-L98REV1-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.98/Rev.1, p. 1; STE-IND-NGA-1974-L97-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.97, p. 1].
A11.2	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P010; BOL-D1-SIPERO-R005; BOL-D1-RANT-P011; BOL-D1-RANT-P013; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P112; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P028–P035; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P051; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P034]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 11(1)–(8).	Austria, Bulgaria, Mongolia, India, and Nigeria proposed or supported non-appropriation, no ownership of resources in place, an international resource regime, equitable benefit sharing, developing-country consideration, and knowledge sharing. [STE-AUT-1973-L74-AX-001–004; UN Doc. A/AC.105/L.74, proposed art. X, pp. 1–2; STE-BGR-1974-L93-AXI-001–003; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.93, proposed art. XI, pp. 2–3; STE-MNG-1974-L98-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.98, p. 1; STE-MNG-1974-L98REV1-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.98/Rev.1, p. 1; STE-IND-NGA-1974-L97-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.97, p. 1].
A11.3	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P010; BOL-D1-SIPERO-R005; BOL-D1-RANT-P011; BOL-D1-RANT-P013; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P112; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P028–P035; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P051; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P034]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 11(1)–(8).	Austria, Bulgaria, Mongolia, India, and Nigeria proposed or supported non-appropriation, no ownership of resources in place, an international resource regime, equitable benefit sharing, developing-country consideration, and knowledge sharing. [STE-AUT-1973-L74-AX-001–004; UN Doc. A/AC.105/L.74, proposed art. X, pp. 1–2; STE-BGR-1974-L93-AXI-001–003; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.93, proposed art. XI, pp. 2–3; STE-MNG-1974-L98-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.98, p. 1; STE-MNG-1974-L98REV1-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.98/Rev.1, p. 1;

STE-IND-NGA-1974-L97-001; UN Doc.
A/AC.105/C.2/L.97, p. 1].

A11.4	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P010; BOL-D1-SIPERO-R005; BOL-D1-RANT-P011; BOL-D1-RANT-P013; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P112; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P028–P035; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P051; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P034]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 11(1)–(8).	Austria, Bulgaria, Mongolia, India, and Nigeria proposed or supported non-appropriation, no ownership of resources in place, an international resource regime, equitable benefit sharing, developing-country consideration, and knowledge sharing. [STE-AUT-1973-L74-AX-001–004; UN Doc. A/AC.105/L.74, proposed art. X, pp. 1–2; STE-BGR-1974-L93-AXI-001–003; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.93, proposed art. XI, pp. 2–3; STE-MNG-1974-L98-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.98, p. 1; STE-MNG-1974-L98REV1-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.98/Rev.1, p. 1; STE-IND-NGA-1974-L97-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.97, p. 1].
A11.5	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P010; BOL-D1-SIPERO-R005; BOL-D1-RANT-P011; BOL-D1-RANT-P013; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P112; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P028–P035; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P051; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P034]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 11(1)–(8).	Austria, Bulgaria, Mongolia, India, and Nigeria proposed or supported non-appropriation, no ownership of resources in place, an international resource regime, equitable benefit sharing, developing-country consideration, and knowledge sharing. [STE-AUT-1973-L74-AX-001–004; UN Doc. A/AC.105/L.74, proposed art. X, pp. 1–2; STE-BGR-1974-L93-AXI-001–003; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.93, proposed art. XI, pp. 2–3; STE-MNG-1974-L98-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.98, p. 1; STE-MNG-1974-L98REV1-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.98/Rev.1, p. 1; STE-IND-NGA-1974-L97-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.97, p. 1].
A11.6	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P010; BOL-D1-SIPERO-R005; BOL-D1-RANT-P011; BOL-D1-RANT-P013; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P112; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P028–P035; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P051; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P034]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 11(1)–(8).	Austria, Bulgaria, Mongolia, India, and Nigeria proposed or supported non-appropriation, no ownership of resources in place, an international resource regime, equitable benefit sharing, developing-country consideration, and knowledge sharing. [STE-AUT-1973-L74-AX-001–004; UN Doc. A/AC.105/L.74, proposed art. X, pp. 1–2; STE-BGR-1974-L93-AXI-001–003; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.93, proposed art. XI, pp. 2–3; STE-MNG-1974-L98-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.98, p. 1; STE-MNG-1974-L98REV1-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.98/Rev.1, p. 1; STE-IND-NGA-1974-L97-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.97, p. 1].

A11.7	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P010; BOL-D1-SIPERO-R005; BOL-D1-RANT-P011; BOL-D1-RANT-P013; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P112; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P028–P035; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P051; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P034]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 11(1)–(8).	Austria, Bulgaria, Mongolia, India, and Nigeria proposed or supported non-appropriation, no ownership of resources in place, an international resource regime, equitable benefit sharing, developing-country consideration, and knowledge sharing. [STE-AUT-1973-L74-AX-001–004; UN Doc. A/AC.105/L.74, proposed art. X, pp. 1–2; STE-BGR-1974-L93-AXI-001–003; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.93, proposed art. XI, pp. 2–3; STE-MNG-1974-L98-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.98, p. 1; STE-MNG-1974-L98REV1-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.98/Rev.1, p. 1; STE-IND-NGA-1974-L97-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.97, p. 1].
A12.1	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P008; BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P014; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P017; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P048]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 12(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
A12.2	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P008; BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P014; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P017; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P048]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 12(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
A12.3	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P008; BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P014; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P017; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P048]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 12(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
A12.4	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P008; BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P014; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P017; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P048]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 12(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
A12.5	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P008; BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P014; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P017; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P048]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 12(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
A13.1	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P014; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P017; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P023]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 13.	No state-travaux source.
A13.2	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P014; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P017; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P023]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 13.	No state-travaux source.
A13.3	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P014; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P017; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P023]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 13.	No state-travaux source.
A14.1	[BOL-D1-SIPERO-R001; BOL-D1-SIPERO-R013; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P111; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P017; BOL-D1-RANT-R015–R016]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 14(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
A14.2	[BOL-D1-SIPERO-R001; BOL-D1-SIPERO-R013; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P111; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P017; BOL-D1-RANT-R015–R016]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 14(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.

A14.3	[BOL-D1-SIPERO-R001; BOL-D1-SIPERO-R013; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P111; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P017; BOL-D1-RANT-R015–R016]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 14(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
A14.4	[BOL-D1-SIPERO-R001; BOL-D1-SIPERO-R013; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P111; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P017; BOL-D1-RANT-R015–R016]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 14(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
A15.1	[BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-R041–R045; BOL-D1-SIPERO-R012; BOL-D1-SIPERO-P006; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P079]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 15(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
A15.2	[BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-R041–R045; BOL-D1-SIPERO-R012; BOL-D1-SIPERO-P006; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P079]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 15(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
A15.3	[BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-R041–R045; BOL-D1-SIPERO-R012; BOL-D1-SIPERO-P006; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P079]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 15(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
A15.4	[BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-R041–R045; BOL-D1-SIPERO-R012; BOL-D1-SIPERO-P006; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P079]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 15(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
A15.5	[BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-R041–R045; BOL-D1-SIPERO-R012; BOL-D1-SIPERO-P006; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P079]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 15(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
A16.1	[BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P004–P012; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P103; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P034; BOL-D3-E1-PEER-P048–P054]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 16.	No state-travaux source.
A16.2	[BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P004–P012; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P103; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P034; BOL-D3-E1-PEER-P048–P054]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 16.	No state-travaux source.
A16.3	[BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P004–P012; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P103; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P034; BOL-D3-E1-PEER-P048–P054]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 16.	No state-travaux source.
A17.1	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P009; BOL-D1-SIPERO-R012; BOL-D3-E1-PEER-P062; BOL-D3-E2-IGUARD-P009; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P044]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 17.	No state-travaux source.
A17.2	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P009; BOL-D1-SIPERO-R012; BOL-D3-E1-PEER-P062; BOL-D3-E2-IGUARD-P009; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P044]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 17.	No state-travaux source.

A17.3	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P009; BOL-D1-SIPERO-R012; BOL-D3-E1-PEER-P062; BOL-D3-E2-IGUARD-P009; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P044]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 17.	No state-travaux source.
A18.1	[BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P022–P025; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P036; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P044; BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P284]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 18.	No state-travaux source.
A18.2	[BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P022–P025; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P036; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P044; BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P284]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 18.	No state-travaux source.
A18.3	[BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P022–P025; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P036; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P044; BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P284]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 18.	No state-travaux source.
A19.1	No specific student/lab source.	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 19.	No state-travaux source.
A19.2	No specific student/lab source.	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 19.	No state-travaux source.
A19.3	No specific student/lab source.	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 19.	No state-travaux source.
A19.4	No specific student/lab source.	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 19.	No state-travaux source.
A20.1	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P014; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P017; BOL-D1-RANT-R015–R016]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 20.	No state-travaux source.
A20.2	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P014; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P017; BOL-D1-RANT-R015–R016]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 20.	No state-travaux source.
A20.3	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P014; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P017; BOL-D1-RANT-R015–R016]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 20.	No state-travaux source.
A21.1	[BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P097–P107; BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P015; BOL-D3-E1-PEER-P062; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P036; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P044]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 21.	No state-travaux source.
A21.2	[BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P097–P107; BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P015; BOL-D3-E1-PEER-P062; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P036; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P044]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 21.	No state-travaux source.
A21.3	[BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P097–P107; BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P015; BOL-D3-E1-PEER-P062; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P036; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P044]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 21.	No state-travaux source.

Annex B — Commentary Citation & Traceability

Stamp	Lab Evidence ID(s)	Moon Agreement Citation	Travaux Citation
CP.1	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P003]; [BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P005]; [BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P009]; [BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P020]; [BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P021]	No Moon Agreement source.	No state-travaux source.
CP.2	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P007]; [BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P008]; [BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P010]; [BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P011]; [BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P012]; [BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P014]; [BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P015]; [BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P016]; [BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P018]	No Moon Agreement source.	No state-travaux source.
C1.1	No specific student/lab source.	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 1(1).	No state-travaux source.
C1.2	No specific student/lab source.	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 1(2).	No state-travaux source.
C1.3	[BOL-D1-LUNA-P002–P009; BOL-D1-LUNA-R009; BOL-D1-LUNA-R012–R013; BOL-D1-LUNA-R023]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 1.	No state-travaux source.
C2.1	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P007; BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P030; BOL-D0-MOTIV-P004; BOL-D1-LUNA-P005–P007]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 2.	No state-travaux source.
C2.2	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P007; BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P030; BOL-D0-MOTIV-P004; BOL-D1-LUNA-P005–P007]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 2.	No state-travaux source.
C2.3	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P007; BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P030; BOL-D0-MOTIV-P004; BOL-D1-LUNA-P005–P007]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 2.	No state-travaux source.
C3.1	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P007; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P021; BOL-D3-HEAD-P008–P009; BOL-D3-HEAD-P026–P027; BOL-D3-HEAD-P056]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 3(1)–(4).	No state-travaux source.
C3.2	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P007; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P021; BOL-D3-HEAD-P008–P009; BOL-D3-HEAD-P026–P027; BOL-D3-HEAD-P056]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 3(1)–(4).	USSR draft treaty foregrounded exclusive peaceful purposes and restrictions on military activity concerning the Moon. [STE-USSR-1971-C1L568-PEACE-001; UN Doc. A/C.1/L.568, proposed arts. II–III, pp. 1–2].
C3.3	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P007; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P021; BOL-D3-HEAD-P008–P009; BOL-D3-HEAD-P026–P027; BOL-D3-HEAD-P056]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 3(1)–(4).	No state-travaux source.
C4.1	[BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P097–P107; BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P183–P184; BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P275; BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-R005; BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-P004; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P052]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 4(1)–(2).	No state-travaux source.

C4.2	[BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P097–P107; BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P183–P184; BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P275; BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-R005; BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-P004; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P052]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 4(1)–(2).	No state-travaux source.
C4.3	[BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P097–P107; BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P183–P184; BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P275; BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-R005; BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-P004; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P052]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 4(1)–(2).	No state-travaux source.
C4.4	[BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P097–P107; BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P183–P184; BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P275; BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-R005; BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-P004; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P052]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 4(1)–(2).	No state-travaux source.
C5.1	[BOL-D1-SIPERO-R007; BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P014; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P094; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P101; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P012; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P017]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 5(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
C5.2	[BOL-D1-SIPERO-R007; BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P014; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P094; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P101; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P012; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P017]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 5(1)–(3).	India and Nigeria proposed a stronger knowledge-sharing architecture for lunar samples, data, dissemination, participation, and reporting through the United Nations. [STE-IND-NGA-1974-L97-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.97, proposed arts. VI–VII, p. 1].
C5.3	[BOL-D1-SIPERO-R007; BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P014; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P094; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P101; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P012; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P017]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 5(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
C6.1	[BOL-D1-SIPERO-R010; BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P015; BOL-D1-LUNA-P004; BOL-D1-LUNA-P009; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P081]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 6(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
C6.2	[BOL-D1-SIPERO-R010; BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P015; BOL-D1-LUNA-P004; BOL-D1-LUNA-P009; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P081]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 6(1)–(3).	India proposed freedom of scientific investigation without discrimination and on the basis of equality, while India and Nigeria proposed shared access to samples and information. [STE-IND-1974-L95-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.95, p. 1; STE-IND-NGA-1974-L97-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.97, proposed arts. VI–VII, p. 1].
C6.3	[BOL-D1-SIPERO-R010; BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P015; BOL-D1-LUNA-P004; BOL-D1-LUNA-P009; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P081]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 6(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.

C7.1	[BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P083–P112; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P114–P115]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 7(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
C7.2	[BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P083–P112; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P114–P115]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 7(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
C7.3	[BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P083–P112; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P114–P115]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 7(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
C7.4	[BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P083–P112; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P114–P115]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 7(1)–(3).	The USSR draft proposed avoiding disruption of the existing balance of the lunar environment, adverse changes, and contamination. [STE-USSR-1971-C1L568-AIV-001; UN Doc. A/C.1/L.568, proposed art. IV(1)–(2), p. 2].
C7.5	[BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P083–P112; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P114–P115]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 7(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
C8.1	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P010; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P040–P042; BOL-D1-RANT-P011]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 8(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
C8.2	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P010; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P040–P042; BOL-D1-RANT-P011]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 8(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
C8.3	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P010; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P040–P042; BOL-D1-RANT-P011]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 8(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
C9.1	[BOL-D3-HEAD-P005; BOL-D3-HEAD-P008–P010; BOL-D3-HEAD-P015–P017; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P083–P104; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P111]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 9(1)–(2).	No state-travaux source.
C9.2	[BOL-D3-HEAD-P005; BOL-D3-HEAD-P008–P010; BOL-D3-HEAD-P015–P017; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P083–P104; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P111]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 9(1)–(2).	No state-travaux source.
C9.3	[BOL-D3-HEAD-P005; BOL-D3-HEAD-P008–P010; BOL-D3-HEAD-P015–P017; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P083–P104; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P111]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 9(1)–(2).	Austria proposed that placement of personnel, vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations, and installations should not create ownership rights. [STE-AUT-1973-L74-AX-002; UN Doc. A/AC.105/L.74, proposed art. X(2), p. 1].
C10.1	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P008; BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P183–P186; BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-R026; BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-R030; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P032; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P019]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 10(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.

C10.2	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P008; BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P183–P186; BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-R026; BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-R030; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P032; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P019]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 10(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
C11.1	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P010; BOL-D1-SIPERO-R005; BOL-D1-RANT-P011; BOL-D1-RANT-P013; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P112; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P028–P035; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P051; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P034]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 11(1)–(8).	No state-travaux source.
C11.2	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P010; BOL-D1-SIPERO-R005; BOL-D1-RANT-P011; BOL-D1-RANT-P013; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P112; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P028–P035; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P051; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P034]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 11(1)–(8).	No state-travaux source.
C11.3	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P010; BOL-D1-SIPERO-R005; BOL-D1-RANT-P011; BOL-D1-RANT-P013; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P112; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P028–P035; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P051; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P034]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 11(1)–(8).	Austria, Bulgaria, Mongolia, India, and Nigeria proposed or supported non-appropriation, no ownership of resources in place, an international resource regime, equitable benefit sharing, developing-country consideration, and knowledge sharing. [STE-AUT-1973-L74-AX-001–004; UN Doc. A/AC.105/L.74, proposed art. X, pp. 1–2; STE-BGR-1974-L93-AXI-001–003; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.93, proposed art. XI, pp. 2–3; STE-MNG-1974-L98-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.98, p. 1; STE-MNG-1974-L98REV1-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.98/Rev.1, p. 1; STE-IND-NGA-1974-L97-001; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.97, p. 1].
C11.4	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P010; BOL-D1-SIPERO-R005; BOL-D1-RANT-P011; BOL-D1-RANT-P013; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P112; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P028–P035; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P051; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P034]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 11(1)–(8).	No state-travaux source.
C11.5	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P010; BOL-D1-SIPERO-R005; BOL-D1-RANT-P011; BOL-D1-RANT-P013; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P112; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P028–P035; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P051; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P034]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 11(1)–(8).	No state-travaux source.
C11.6	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P010; BOL-D1-SIPERO-R005; BOL-D1-RANT-P011; BOL-D1-RANT-P013; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P112; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P028–P035; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P051; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P034]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 11(1)–(8).	No state-travaux source.

C11.7	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P010; BOL-D1-SIPERO-R005; BOL-D1-RANT-P011; BOL-D1-RANT-P013; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P112; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P028–P035; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P051; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P034]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 11(1)–(8).	No state-travaux source.
C12.1	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P008; BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P014; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P017; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P048]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 12(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
C12.2	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P008; BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P014; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P017; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P048]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 12(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
C12.3	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P008; BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P014; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P017; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P048]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 12(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
C13.1	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P014; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P017; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P023]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 13.	No state-travaux source.
C13.2	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P014; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P017; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P023]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 13.	No state-travaux source.
C14.1	[BOL-D1-SIPERO-R001; BOL-D1-SIPERO-R013; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P111; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P017; BOL-D1-RANT-R015–R016]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 14(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
C14.2	[BOL-D1-SIPERO-R001; BOL-D1-SIPERO-R013; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P111; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P017; BOL-D1-RANT-R015–R016]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 14(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
C14.3	[BOL-D1-SIPERO-R001; BOL-D1-SIPERO-R013; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P111; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P017; BOL-D1-RANT-R015–R016]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 14(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
C15.1	[BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-R041–R045; BOL-D1-SIPERO-R012; BOL-D1-SIPERO-P006; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P079]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 15(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
C15.2	[BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-R041–R045; BOL-D1-SIPERO-R012; BOL-D1-SIPERO-P006; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P079]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 15(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
C15.3	[BOL-D2-E2-GUIDE-R041–R045; BOL-D1-SIPERO-R012; BOL-D1-SIPERO-P006; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P079]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 15(1)–(3).	No state-travaux source.
C16.1	[BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P004–P012; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P103; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P034; BOL-D3-E1-PEER-P048–P054]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 16.	No state-travaux source.

C16.2	[BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P004–P012; BOL-D2-E1-LSYS-P103; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P034; BOL-D3-E1-PEER-P048–P054]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 16.	No state-travaux source.
C17.1	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P009; BOL-D1-SIPERO-R012; BOL-D3-E1-PEER-P062; BOL-D3-E2-IGUARD-P009; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P044]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 17.	No state-travaux source.
C17.2	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P009; BOL-D1-SIPERO-R012; BOL-D3-E1-PEER-P062; BOL-D3-E2-IGUARD-P009; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P044]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 17.	No state-travaux source.
C18.1	[BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P022–P025; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P036; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P044; BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P284]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 18.	No state-travaux source.
C18.2	[BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P022–P025; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P036; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P044; BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P284]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 18.	No state-travaux source.
C19.1	No specific student/lab source.	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 19.	No state-travaux source.
C20.1	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P014; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P017; BOL-D1-RANT-R015–R016]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 20.	No state-travaux source.
C20.2	[BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P014; BOL-D2-E3-DECIDE-P017; BOL-D1-RANT-R015–R016]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 20.	No state-travaux source.
C21.1	[BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P097–P107; BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P015; BOL-D3-E1-PEER-P062; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P036; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P044]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 21.	No state-travaux source.
C21.2	[BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P097–P107; BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P015; BOL-D3-E1-PEER-P062; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P036; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P044]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 21.	No state-travaux source.
C21.3	[BOL-D3-E4-TMOI-ANALYSIS-P097–P107; BOL-PAYLOAD-EN-P015; BOL-D3-E1-PEER-P062; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P036; BOL-D3-E3-CGUARD-P044]	Moon Agreement, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 21.	No state-travaux source.