



Demolition of KK Park in Myanmar. Source: MRTV News.



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The Scam Compounds Brief



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Mass deportation of scam suspects in Cambodia.
Source: General Department of Immigration (Cambodia).

The Scam Compounds Brief – Issue 1

Reporting period: 1 January to 14 February 2026

An evidence-based briefing on scam compounds and trafficking–fraud networks

About this Brief

The Scam Compounds Brief is an ongoing analytical series by Humanity Research Consultancy Limited (HRC) that examines the evolution of transnational criminal networks, primarily Chinese-speaking syndicates, operating scam facilities. Each issue identifies emerging operational patterns, enforcement actions, and structural shifts across affected jurisdictions.

By drawing on open-source intelligence — including content from niche social media platforms — the brief translates and contextualises information that is often inaccessible to international audiences. Rather than providing high-frequency updates, the series synthesises broader trends and surfaces specific leads that may not be fully documented elsewhere. This provides unique insight into the shifting dynamics of the online scam industry. The brief aims to promote greater visibility and scrutiny, equipping governments, law enforcement, researchers, and civil society with the evidence needed to address these evolving threats.

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Sources and verification note

This briefing draws on official statements, open-source reporting, court judgments, and monitored online channels, including Chinese-language sources and closed messaging platforms. Where information cannot be independently verified, it is indicated as reported or alleged. Identifying details are removed to protect individuals at risk.

Notice on access to sensitive content

For security and ethical reasons, direct links to social media posts that may indicate criminal activity are not published in this brief. Such materials can be made available upon request to law enforcement authorities or accredited researchers, subject to appropriate verification of credentials.

Summary

- In early 2026, the Cambodian government adopted a more aggressive stance toward scam compounds, reportedly raiding or intervening in 190 suspected scam sites.
- Cambodia arrested Chen Zhi, Chairman of the Prince Group, and extradited him to China. The Prince Group has long been identified as a major organised fraud operator with historical ties to senior government figures.
- Joint operations by Myanmar, China, and Thailand resulted in the demolition of the notorious KK Park compound in Myawaddy, a site previously believed to hold tens of thousands of individuals, including both trafficking victims and willing participants.
- Chinese authorities executed key members of the Bai and Ming families who operated prolific digital crime hubs in Myanmar, including the notorious Crouching Tiger Villa compound in Kokang.
- Despite intensified law enforcement, HRC observes no evidence that the tens of thousands of victims of trafficking and forced criminality are being accurately identified or provided with essential support services.
- HRC investigations have uncovered a growing diversity of individuals advertising their services to the organised fraud sector; these actors frequently present themselves as "models" or "AI models" to market skills related to online fraud.
- HRC identifies evidence indicates that the criminal ecosystem supporting organised fraud, particularly money laundering as a service, continues to thrive. Monitored Telegram activity reveals the prominence of third-party "guarantee" platforms, such as the Tudou channel, which provide marketplaces for a range of illicit services.

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


Figure. Video shared in Telegram channel on the 4 February, with accompanying text “The Exodus of Scam Operators from Cambodia: This evening, the Bavet border crossing into Vietnam has reached capacity as a growing number of scam operators (“gou-tui”) prepare to depart Cambodia.”

1. Leadership Attitude

Authorities in Cambodia and Myanmar have adopted a noticeably tougher public stance toward scam operations in early 2026. However, it remains unclear whether this shift reflects sustained enforcement or another round of symbolic measures.

1.1 Cambodia

In late January and early February 2026, senior Cambodian leaders publicly signalled a harder official stance toward scam operations. In late January, Senate President Hun Sen declared that Cambodia is [“not a safe haven, but a hell for criminals.”](#) marking a notable rhetorical shift after years of official denials regarding the scale of scam compounds in the country. This change in tone was followed on 6 February by [a directive from Prime Minister Hun Manet](#) calling for intensified efforts against scams and corruption, framing scam operations as a governance and integrity issue rather than an isolated criminal problem. Taken together, these statements suggest an effort by Cambodia’s top leadership to reposition the state’s public posture toward transnational scam networks. However, it remains unclear whether this rhetorical shift will translate into sustained structural or institutional reforms.



Figure 1. On 11 February 2026, Phnom Penh Governor Khuong Sreng ordered intensified operations to eliminate online scam ringleaders from the capital by 30 March 2026. Source: [Khmer Times](#) (2026).

Restrictions on Press Freedom

While the Cambodian government appears to have taken a tougher stance in addressing scam compounds, it continues to restrict press freedom relating to reporting on such operations. For example, in early February, [two local journalists were detained](#) for nearly 24 hours and accused of incitement after publishing a report on an alleged online scam site in Bati district, Takeo province. [Their report](#) noted that

67 officials from the Bati district administration had filed a complaint alleging that the local police chief had long provided protection to online fraud compounds and collected protection payments of approximately USD 5,000 per month.




Figure 2. The five-page complaint letter published carries the signatures and thumbprints of 67 police officers, including the district’s deputy police chief. Source: [Koh Santepheap Daily](#).

Similarly, on 11 February, investigative reporter Mech Dara was [briefly detained](#) while covering a raid on an alleged scam compound in [Dara Sakor](#) and was released only after being forced to delete his photographs. These incidents suggest that, despite heightened enforcement rhetoric, systemic constraints on press freedom continue to undermine transparency and accountability in efforts to address scam compounds in Cambodia.

1.2 Myanmar

In January 2026, the Myanmar government publicly framed the demolition of scam-related structures in the KK Park and Shwe Kokko areas as part of a broader state policy to eradicate online scams and illegal gambling. Official statements reported [the demolition of 635 illegal buildings](#) in KK Park and emphasised that combating online fraud is a “national responsibility”, to be pursued in coordination with domestic forces and neighbouring countries. This rhetoric builds on a [China–Myanmar–Thailand ministerial-level coordination mechanism](#) established in early 2025, under which joint operations against online fraud have been carried out. Myanmar’s leadership has [reiterated](#) through state media that such crimes must not be allowed to take root anywhere in the country.



Figure 3. China, Myanmar and Thailand established a ministerial-level coordination mechanism in early 2025 to combat online fraud and have since carried out multiple joint operations. Source: Screenshot from video published by [Sina Finance](#).

Notably, nearly a year ago, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) issued [an ultimatum](#) ordering Chinese nationals illegally operating scam centres and other illicit businesses to leave areas under its control by the end of February 2025. In practice, however, there has been little meaningful change, with multiple compounds continuing to operate with minimal disruption, underscoring the potential limitation of such declarations.

1.3 South Korea

In early February 2026, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung publicly addressed transnational scam networks linked to Southeast Asia through his personal social media. On 2 February, he issued a warning in Khmer aimed at scam networks operating in Cambodia, though the post was later deleted [following diplomatic backlash](#). On 6 February, Lee again [commented](#) on scam compounds in Cambodia, reinforcing Seoul's increasingly visible political attention to overseas scam crimes affecting South Korean citizens. These interventions suggest a willingness by South Korea's leadership to publicly name and pressure transnational scam operations, even at the risk of diplomatic friction.



Figure 4. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet and South Korean President Lee Jae Myung discuss combating online scams on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit. Source: [Hun Manet's Facebook](#)

2. Raids, Escapes, and Deportations

Large-scale escapes and deportations have created chaotic conditions, alongside urgent needs for victim identification, protection, and support.

2.1 Cambodia

According to [reports](#), between 1 January 2026 and early February 2026, Cambodian authorities raided 44 casinos and disrupted 190 sites suspected of involvement in online scam operations. The official [claimed](#) that 173 senior crime figures linked to cybercrimes had been arrested, and [110,095](#) foreigners deported in the same period. Meanwhile, Cambodia's Ministry of Justice reported that over the past eight months, courts have heard [37](#) online scam cases.

Amid successive waves of crackdowns on scam sites, suspects of multiple nationalities have been arrested. For example, in the [Golden Lion Casino \(金狮赌场\) raid](#), those detained included Chinese, Korean, Japanese, US citizens, Filipino, Pakistani, and Indian nationals, reflecting the transnational character of these operations.



Figure 5: Cambodian police raided the Golden Lion Casino Hotel building in Sihanoukville, focusing their inspection on the 18th and 19th floors, and arrested 805 individuals linked to the scam. Source: [CC Times](#).

While the Cambodian government raided scam compounds almost daily during the reporting period, it provided [limited recognition](#) of the [existence of trafficking victims](#) within these facilities. The overwhelming majority of individuals were treated as scam suspects and dealt with accordingly, without undergoing proper victim identification. Frontline NGO workers report a severe lack of both procedural

and material support for survivors of human trafficking. This gap leaves many at risk of being [re-trafficked](#) or pushed [back into precarious conditions](#).

Moreover, while the government has addressed lower-level corruption, such as misconduct within local police stations, systemic and high-level corruption — including politicians allegedly providing protection to scam compounds — has [not been meaningfully addressed](#).

Likely due to the recent raids and enforcement crackdowns, several scam compounds in Cambodia have reportedly [relaxed internal controls](#) in recent weeks, allowing individuals previously confined inside to move more freely. As a result, some trafficked victims have been able to escape independently. However, the easing of restrictions has also enabled voluntary scam workers to leave and reportedly relocate to other compounds that have not yet faced enforcement action, raising concerns about displacement rather than the dismantlement of operations.

For example, in February, a large number of individuals carrying suitcases have [reportedly](#) been seen leaving [#8 Park](#), a major scam compound located off National Road 8 in Prey Veng Province near the Vietnam border. The compound is [connected to the Prince Group](#) and estimated to host [tens of thousands](#) of workers, making it one of the largest scam hubs in the area.



Figure 6. Satellite image of #8 Park. Source: Google Maps.

2.2 Myanmar

According to a [press release](#) by China's Ministry of Public Security on the 9 February 2026, over 1,500 criminal suspects arrested during the joint China–Myanmar–Thailand crackdown on scam and gambling compounds in Myawaddy, Myanmar, were repatriated to China. More than 630 buildings linked to fraud operations in KK Park, Myawaddy, have [reportedly](#) been demolished, including scam offices as well as [on-site facilities such as hospitals and gyms](#). At the same time, frontline NGOs operating along the Myanmar–Thai border reported assisting thousands of survivors of human trafficking who escaped from scam compounds between late 2025 and early 2026.

Myanmar authorities said operations over the past two years have led to the repatriation of more than [70,000 foreign nationals](#) who were forced to work at scam centres. However, the KK Park alone was believed to hold [tens of thousands](#) of individuals, comprising both willing participants in criminal activity and victims of human trafficking. While thousands were either arrested as criminal suspects or assisted as survivors, many others remained unidentified.



Figure 7. KK Park following demolition. Source: Screenshot from video published by [Sina Finance](#).

3. Arrest, Prosecution, and Sentencing of Ringleaders

3.1 The Arrest of Chen Zhi (Formerly Operated in Cambodia)

Cambodia arrested Chen Zhi, chairman of Cambodia's Prince Group, in early January 2026, which marks one of the most significant enforcement actions against figures linked to the regional scam compound ecosystem. At its peak, Prince Group was reported to earn [over \\$30 million](#) a day from fraudulent pig-butcher schemes and related illicit activities. While Chen Zhi and his Prince Group operate scam parks, casinos, and banks in Cambodia, investigations indicate that their [money](#)

[laundering footprint](#) has extended to Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Palau, Belize, the British Virgin Islands, the Marshall Islands, London, New York, and other jurisdictions.

However, Chen has been [extradited](#) to China, which may have strategic implications. It may prevent sensitive political and business networks from being scrutinised in a U.S. court, where proceedings could potentially expose deeper ties between commercial actors and state-linked figures. Moreover, in the absence of an extradition treaty between China and the United States, once Chen enters the Chinese judicial system, [U.S. arrest warrants](#) would effectively lose practical enforceability.

3.2 Execution of 4 Members of the Bai Family (Formerly Operated in Kokang, Myanmar)

In early February, Chinese authorities [executed](#) four core members of the Bai family criminal group following Supreme People's Court approval. Operating out of Myanmar's Kokang region, the group managed heavily fortified compounds dedicated to large-scale online scams and illegal gambling totalling over USD 4 billion. While the group was linked to violent crimes such as kidnapping and homicide, the executions underscore Beijing's aggressive new stance, specifically targeting the sophisticated fraud networks destabilising its border regions.

3.3 Execution of 11 Members of the Ming family (Formerly Operated in Kokang, Myanmar)

In late January, China [executed](#) 11 individuals tied to the Ming Xuechang crime family for running a \$1 billion transnational scam and gambling ring. Centred at the notorious Crouching Tiger Villa (卧虎山庄)¹ in Kokang, the operation employed an estimated 10,000 workers dedicated to conducting online fraud. The crackdown followed the group's involvement in the deaths of 14 Chinese citizens, marking a definitive end to one of the region's most prolific digital crime hubs.


¹ The infrastructure supporting these operations was documented well before the recent enforcement actions. In an April 2023 briefing titled "Guidance on Responding to Victims in Forced Scam Labour", HRC showcased images and GPS coordinates of the Crouching Tiger Villa. This report highlighted the compound's role as a primary site for forced labour within the online scam industry, providing early evidence of the industrial-scale fraud taking place within the region.

4. Monitored Dynamics of Social Media Channels Related to Scam Compounds

4.1 Purported Rise of Foreign “Models” in Scam Hub Cities According to Recruitment Listings

Monitoring of Telegram channels by HRC indicates that a growing number of foreign individuals, including but not limited to individuals from North Africa, Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia, have been advertising themselves as “models” or “AI models” while seeking employment opportunities. Many reference prior work experience in countries such as Cambodia, Dubai, and Myanmar, and some state that they are currently located in known scam hub cities.

In certain cases, individuals specify expected salaries, for example, USD 7,000 per month. Some also describe their previous responsibilities in terms such as “handling the US market, including crypto trading and gold trading,” suggesting potential involvement in online fraud operations.

	<p>Figure 8. Screenshot of a Telegram channel post advertising an individual named “Angel” from Uzbekistan, who speaks four languages fluently and is seeking an “AI model” role with an expected salary of USD 7,000. The post states that she is currently based in Sihanoukville, Cambodia, and previously “handled the US market.”</p> <p>The post was published on 3 February, and the screenshot was taken on 14 February.</p>
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模型 MT360 (话务+AI 模特)

❤ 国籍：哈萨克 🇰🇿

❤ 年龄：28 岁

❤ 语言：英文 🇺🇸 / 中文 🇨🇳 / 土耳其 🇹🇷

❤ 期望薪资：5000

❤ 当前地点：柬埔寨 🇰🇲

❤ 要求：单间

❤ 经验：有模特经验

❤ 可以去哪些国家：柬埔寨 🇰🇲 / 缅甸 🇲🇲

咨询 客服 东南亚招聘 @modelkefu99

反馈，谈合作，投诉 @kkppl66778

(妹子频道，👤 频道，模特频道，翻译频道，东南亚招聘)

Figure 9. A Telegram post advertised a 28-year-old individual from Kazakhstan who speaks three languages and is currently located in Cambodia, expressing willingness to work in either Cambodia or Myanmar. In an accompanying video, the individual stated that they had two years of experience “in this industry.” The post was published on 13 February, and the screenshot was taken on 14 February.

中柬 HR 人才储备有限公司

🌱 国籍：柬埔寨

🌱 姓名：艾辰

🌱 身高：1.75cm

🌱 体重：73

🌱 年龄：27

🌱 语言和水平：翻译中英，打电话，杀客

🌱 期望工资：4000

🌱 现居地：金边

🌱 语言：中文，英文，泰语，俄罗斯，阿拉伯

🌱 学历：中文 1 年 英语 4 年大学，2 年制在澳大利亚

🌱 工作经验：管理员 4 年 (迪拜) 印度市场，欧洲市

场，美国市场 (加密货币，搜单，关系投资)

2 年翻译 (柬埔寨) 迪拜市场，美国市场，(加密货币，

黄金交易)

🌱 个人要求：单间，国外公司，基本工资 4000 以上

🌱 请发送你的中英文自我介绍视频，或者语音自我介绍

中柬 HR 人才储备有限公司





Figure 10. A Telegram post advertising a multilingual individual seeking a role to “speak with customers” and “make kills” for an expected salary of USD 4,000. Speaking Chinese, English, Thai, Russian, and Arabic, the candidate claims four years of management experience in Dubai, “covering Indian, European, and US markets, focused on crypto and relational investment”. The post further highlights two years of experience in Cambodia as a translator “for crypto and gold trading, targeting the Dubai and US markets”. The post was published on 4 February, and the screenshot was captured on 14 February 2026.



模特 mt294 (真人 + AI)
 ❤️ 国籍 nationality: 俄罗斯
 ❤️ 年龄 age: 24 岁
 ❤️ 语言 language: 英语
 ❤️ 薪资 expected salary: 5000
 ❤️ 现在的地方 location: 🇰🇷 金边
 ❤️ 要求 requirements: 单间
 ❤️ 经验 exp: 有经验
 ❤️ 可以去哪个国家: #财通 #金边 #木牌 #拜林

Figure 11. A Telegram post advertising a 24-year-old Russian national currently located in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. The individual is seeking a salary of USD 5,000 and expresses a willingness to work in Chrey Thom, Phnom Penh, Bavet, or Pailin—all identified as notorious online scam hotspots.

The post was published on 11 February, and the screenshot was captured on 15 February 2026.

4.2 Apparent Scam Compound-Linked Money Laundering Exchanges Persist

The illicit on-chain money laundering ecosystem has grown dramatically in recent years, [increasing](#) from USD 10 billion in 2020 to over USD 82 billion in 2025. Additionally, Chinese-language money laundering networks (CMLNs) have [increased their share](#) of known illicit laundering activity to approximately 20% in 2025.

Evidence from recent Telegram activity demonstrates that money laundering networks supporting scam compounds remain highly active and technically sophisticated. These operations rely on third-party "guarantee" platforms, such as the Tudou channel (土豆供需), which provide a secure marketplace for criminal syndicates to procure financial services. Within these digital hubs, clients like the "Ocean Group" recruit specialised "fleets" to process illicit proceeds derived from social engineering, sex-related scams, and pig-butcher operations.



土豆供需 @tdgx

13 February

5.6K 02:43

【需】

远洋集团需二道回存卡：底料:纯空降 精聊

扶贫人tou 现金存2道大量有货

给你们存现完我们会让卡主删除一切有关现存卡号的信息。所以司法率很低，在跑的卡用大半年的都有，只要有卡。想稳定发财请联系我！

联系人：@yyjr40 @yyjr9 @YYJT

Figure 12. A Telegram post from the "Ocean Group" syndicate advertising a demand for bank cards to facilitate money laundering for online scam operations. The post emphasises that the sources of the money were made through "pure air-drop" and "refined chat", terms indicating funds derived from highly targeted, sex-related, social engineering, and pig-butcherer scams. To recruit suppliers, the group guarantees a low "judicial rate" (risk of police freezing the accounts) by claiming they instruct cardholders to delete all transactional data immediately after cash deposits are made. The post suggests that some cards have remained operational for over six months, promising a stable route to wealth for those who can provide the necessary banking infrastructure. The post was published on 13 February, and the screenshot was captured on 14 February 2026.




Figure 13. A Telegram post advertising a demand for various money laundering services and infrastructure to facilitate the flow of illicit funds from online scam operations. The post lists several "fleets" or methods for moving money, including "physical fleets" for high-value goods like mobile phones, graphics cards, and gold, as well as "ATM withdrawal fleets" requiring mailed bank cards. Notably, the post specifies that the source of the funds includes "refined chat" (social engineering, including pig-butcherer scam), "se-liao" (funds from sex-related scams), and "investment platforms" (investment scams). The post was published on 9 February, and the screenshot was captured on 14 February 2026.