TRIGON

9 September 2026

Research

CEE | Equity Research

Mirbud

In search of new growth engines

Hold

(Previous: Under Review)

Target Price: PLN 13.5

Upside: +13%

When we placed our recommendation UNDER REVIEW in May this year, we highlighted that the long-awaited ruling of the Regional Court in Warsaw, related to the appeal filed by the Mirbud x Torpol consortium against the rejection of the consortium's bid in the tender for the construction of Rail Baltica, would allow us to better understand the trajectory of Mirbud Group's order intake over the coming quarters. By dismissing the consortium's appeal, the court has to some extent clarified the near-term outlook for Mirbud Group's rail segment – more than 2 years have passed since the share issue was carried out, and yet the Group has so far failed to build a material backlog in this part of the business. It therefore appears that the Group now faces key decisions regarding the further development of both the acquired Transkol and the rail segment as a whole.

We therefore conclude that the Group's ambitious M&A plans (at the last conference the Management Board indicated that the Company is currently negotiating with two entities in the rail segment and one entity in the power segment) are a natural attempt to build new growth engines, especially as FY27E will likely bring the peak in the supply of road orders from GDDKiA, while later years should bring a shrinking number of new greenfield projects launched by this awarding authority. At the same time, we are aware that the Group remains in a period of elevated investment (the land plot in Poznań, asphalt mix plants, potential M&A), which should put further pressure on FCF. In the current environment we prefer companies that are leaders of the most important construction segments, i.e. rail (#TOR) or energy (#PXM). At the same time, given the current phase of the cycle, we lean towards companies with a clear cash buffer and a material footprint in every segment of the industry (#BDX). The "self-cleaning" procedure that the Group will be going through in the near future also remains an open question, and its timetable to some extent "overlaps" with the awards in the largest tenders, including the construction of the CPK Terminal (for a broader description see p. 6).

Taking the above arguments into account, we resume coverage with a HOLD recommendation and a target price of PLN 13.5, implying 13% upside. Our operating profit forecasts for FY26/27E are 27/6% above consensus, respectively, while the Group itself currently trades at a 7/21% premium for FY27-28E to its peer group.

Earnings momentum. We expect the good earnings momentum to be sustained in 2H26E, although reported results will follow a completely different trajectory than adjusted ones (as a reminder, in 4Q25 the Group recognized PLN 74m of profit from other operating activities, mainly on the revaluation of Torpol shares). We therefore expect adjusted EBITDA to grow by as much as 71% y/y in 2H26E, while the increase in reported results will amount to c. 3%. A broader description of out model assumptions is presented on p. 10.

Valuation. We base our valuation of Mirbud 100% on a DCF model – we assume a risk-free rate of 5.5% and a market risk premium of 5.5%. In the terminal period we assume average annual revenue of PLN 5.7bn and a gross margin of 8.7% (vs. PLN 3.0bn and 7.7% in FY25). Our assumptions imply a 12-month target price of PLN 13.5. In addition, we present a scenario analysis (for a broader description see p. 13): in the optimistic scenario we value Mirbud shares at PLN 18.5 and in the pessimistic one at PLN 9 - importantly, in all of the scenarios presented we assume positive order intake growth and profitability above that reported in FY25. The peer-based valuation returns a value of PLN 12.3.

Risk factors. For a broader description see p. 25.

PLNm	2023	2024	2025	2026E	2027E	2028E
Revenues	3,322	3,252	2,951	3,541	4,078	5,003
adj. EBITDA	249	211	130	203	224	247
EBIT	224	182	168	183	180	199
adj. Net profit	140	126	58	111	125	144
EPS (PLN)	1.5	1.1	0.5	1.0	1.1	1.3
adj. P/E (x)	7.8	10.5	22.7	11.9	10.6	9.1
adj. EV/EBITDA (x)	4.5	6.1	11.6	7.4	7.0	5.7
FCFF Yield (%)	-1.9%	-12.4%	-10.4%	3.3%	-1.1%	13.4%
DY (%)	2.3%	1.5%	0.8%	1.7%	1.9%	1.9%

Source: Company, Trigon

GPW Analytical Support Programme

FACT SHEET

Ticker			**MRB**
Sector			**Construction**
Price (PLN)			**12.0**
52W range (PLN)			**9.765 / 15.48**
Shares outstanding (m)			**110.1**
Market Cap (PLNm)			**1,321**
Free-float			**62%**
3M Avg. Vol. (PLNm)			**1.9**
Price performance	1M	3M	1Y
	-8%	**-6%**	**-26%**

RELATIVE SHARE PRICE VS WIG INDEX



RECOMMENDATIONS	DATE	TP
Under Review	22.07.2026	
Under Review	14.05.2026	
Buy	21.04.2026	15.0
Buy	06.02.2026	15.0
Buy	10.12.2025	18.5
Buy	23.10.2025	18.5
Buy	13.10.2025	18.5

SHAREHOLDERS	Share %
Jerzy Mirgos	37.9%
OFE Nationale-Nederlanden	10.0%
TFI PZU	7.0%
OFE PZU Złota Jesień	5.1%

INVESTOR CALENDAR

3Q26 Earnings	26.11.2026

ANALYST

David Sharma, CFA

Valuation	Current		Previous		Change
DCF	13.5	100%	-	-	-
Multiples	12.3	0%	-	-	-

Estimates chng	2026E			2027E			2028E		
PLNm	Curr.	Prev.	Chg.	Curr.	Prev.	Chg.	Curr.	Prev.	Chg.
Revenues	**3,541**	-	-	**4,078**	-	-	**5,003**	-	-
EBITDA	**221**	-	-	**224**	-	-	**247**	-	-
margin	6.3%	- -		5.5%	- -		4.9%	- -	
EBIT	**183**	-	-	**180**	-	-	**199**	-	-
margin	5.2%	- -		4.4%	- -		4.0%	- -	
Net profit	**126**	-	-	**125**	-	-	**144**	-	-
margin	3.6%	- -		3.1%	- -		2.9%	- -	

Trigon vs. cons	2026E			2027E			2028E		
PLNm	Trigon	Cons.	Diff.	Trigon	Cons.	Diff.	Trigon	Cons.	Diff.
Revenues	**3,541**	**3,406**	**4%**	**4,078**	**3,676**	**11%**	**5,003**	**---**	**-**
EBITDA	**221**	**---**	**-**	**224**	**---**	**-**	**247**	**---**	**-**
margin	6.3%	-	-	5.5%	-	-	4.9%	-	-
EBIT	**183**	**145**	**27%**	**180**	**169**	**6%**	**199**	**---**	**-**
margin	5.2%	4.3%	0.9pp	4.4%	4.6%	-0.2pp	4.0%	-	-
Net profit	**126**	**88**	**43%**	**125**	**106**	**18%**	**144**	**---**	**-**
margin	3.6%	2.6%	1.0pp	3.1%	2.9%	0.2pp	2.9%	-	-

KPIs (PLNm)	2023	2024	2025	2026E	2027E	2028E	CAGR
Shares outstanding	91.7	110.1	110.1	110.1	110.1	110.1	4%
DPS (PLN)	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	-4%
adj. EPS (PLN)	1.5	1.1	0.5	1.0	1.1	1.3	-3%
BVPS (PLN)	8.6	9.9	10.8	11.8	12.7	13.8	10%
ND / EBITDA (x)	0.0	-0.2	0.9	0.8	1.1	0.4	
ND / Equity (x)	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	
FCFF	-21	-159	-155	49	-17	190	-255%
NWC	91	492	743	897	976	917	
Net Debt	9	-41	177	176	242	96	
Minorities & other EV adj.	0	0	0	0	0	0	
adj. Net Debt	9	-41	177	176	242	96	

Ratios	2023	2024	2025	2026E	2027E	2028E	Avg.
adj. EBITDA yoy	18%	-15%	-38%	56%	10%	11%	
EBIT yoy	26%	-19%	-7%	9%	-2%	11%	
adj. EPS yoy	6%	-25%	-54%	91%	13%	16%	
Gross margin	10.1%	9.0%	7.7%	9.2%	8.7%	7.8%	8.7%
adj. EBITDA margin	7.5%	6.5%	4.4%	5.7%	5.5%	4.9%	5.7%
EBIT margin	6.7%	5.6%	5.7%	5.2%	4.4%	4.0%	5.3%
adj. Net profit margin	4.2%	3.9%	2.0%	3.1%	3.1%	2.9%	3.2%
ROE (%)	17%	11%	9%	10%	9%	10%	11%
ROA (%)	6%	5%	4%	4%	4%	4%	4%

Company specific KPIs	2023	2024	2025	2026E	2027E	2028E	CAGR
Backlog	4,622	7,992	8,465	10,108	11,430	12,775	23%
New orders signed	2,186	6,367	3,427	5,100	5,300	6,200	23%
Residential	73	101	210	200	200	200	22%
Public Utility and I&L	1,205	999	892	2,400	2,600	3,000	20%
Roads	907	5,267	2,220	2,500	2,500	3,000	27%
Railways	0	0	104	0	0	0	-

Source: Company, Trigon

Multiples at PLN 12	2023	2024	2025	2026E	2027E	2028E
P/E (x)	8.1	10.9	11.8	10.5	10.6	9.1
adj. P/E (x)	7.8	10.5	22.7	11.9	10.6	9.1
EV/EBITDA (x)	4.6	6.3	7.5	6.8	7.0	5.7
adj. EV/EBITDA (x)	4.5	6.1	11.6	7.4	7.0	5.7
P/BV (x)	1.4	1.2	1.1	1.0	0.9	0.9
FCFF Yield (%)	-2%	-12%	-10%	3%	-1%	13%
DY (%)	2.3%	1.5%	0.8%	1.7%	1.9%	1.9%

Multiples at Target Price	2023	2024	2025	2026E	2027E	2028E
P/E (x)	9.1	12.2	13.2	11.8	11.9	10.3
adj. P/E (x)	8.8	11.8	25.6	13.4	11.9	10.3
EV/EBITDA (x)	5.1	7.1	8.3	7.5	7.7	6.4
adj. EV/EBITDA (x)	5.0	6.9	12.8	8.2	7.7	6.4
P/BV (x)	1.6	1.4	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.0
FCFF Yield (%)	-2%	-11%	-9%	3%	-1%	12%
DY (%)	2.1%	1.3%	0.7%	1.5%	1.7%	1.7%

P&L Statement (PLNm)	2023	2024	2025	2026E	2027E	2028E
Revenues	**3,322**	**3,252**	**2,951**	**3,541**	**4,078**	**5,003**
COGS	2,987	2,961	2,724	3,217	3,722	4,612
Gross Profit	**336**	**291**	**227**	**325**	**356**	**391**
Selling costs	7	8	7	9	10	13
G&A costs	88	95	121	151	166	179
Other operating items, net	-10	105	77	19	0	0
EBITDA	**243**	**204**	**199**	**221**	**224**	**247**
adj. EBITDA	**249**	**211**	**130**	**203**	**224**	**247**
D&A	19	22	31	38	44	48
EBIT	**224**	**182**	**168**	**183**	**180**	**199**
Net financial costs	-54	-30	-24	-26	-24	-18
EBT	**170**	**152**	**145**	**157**	**156**	**181**
Minority interest	0	0	0	0	0	0
Net profit	**135**	**121**	**112**	**126**	**125**	**144**
adj. net profit	**140**	**126**	**58**	**111**	**125**	**144**

Balance Sheet (PLNm)	2023	2024	2025	2026E	2027E	2028E
Non-current Assets	**845**	**830**	**1,002**	**952**	**1,038**	**1,070**
Current Assets	**1,439**	**1,583**	**1,867**	**2,301**	**2,406**	**2,597**
Inventories	390	361	397	803	938	1,047
Receivables	596	795	1,166	1,193	1,229	1,165
Cash and cash equivalents	396	397	273	274	208	354
Assets	**2,284**	**2,414**	**2,869**	**3,253**	**3,444**	**3,667**
Equity	**794**	**1,095**	**1,193**	**1,297**	**1,397**	**1,517**
Non-current Liabilities	**496**	**495**	**733**	**733**	**733**	**733**
Long-term borrowings	314	218	341	341	341	341
Current Liabilities	**994**	**824**	**942**	**1,222**	**1,313**	**1,417**
Short-term borrowings	91	138	108	108	108	108
Payables	895	664	820	1,099	1,191	1,294
Equity and Liabilities	**2,284**	**2,414**	**2,869**	**3,253**	**3,444**	**3,667**

CF Statement (PLNm)	2023	2024	2025	2026E	2027E	2028E
Operating CF	**148**	**-48**	**-58**	**16**	**113**	**270**
Change in NWC	-30	-335	-273	-154	-79	59
D&A	19	22	31	38	44	48
Investing CF	**-146**	**-85**	**-73**	**63**	**-100**	**-50**
CAPEX	-150	-150	-97	-95	-100	-50
Financing CF	**-114**	**134**	**6**	**-78**	**-79**	**-73**
Lease payments	-23	-25	-25	-30	-30	-30
Dividend/Buy-back	-26	-19	-11	-22	-25	-25
Net change in cash	**-112**	**1**	**-124**	**1**	**-66**	**147**

Table of contents

Investment summary

A record order backlog is only a matter of time. The Group's backlog at the end of June stood at a record PLN 8.9bn (+9% y/y), of which as much as PLN 7.4bn was infrastructure contracts. Given that in July and August alone the Group signed contracts for a further PLN 300m, with another nearly PLN 3bn sitting in the “waiting room”, we expect the order backlog to exceed PLN 10bn at year-end (+19% y/y). **We also assume that, given the rising average duration of the largest contracts, the order backlog should keep growing in FY27-29E, reaching its “peak” at PLN 13.2bn.**

#MRB: Backlog evolution (PLNm)



Source: Trigon, Company

Given recent developments around rail contracts, we have decided to “zero out” order intake in this segment. The Group currently has two active “lowest” bids in rail tenders (line no. 8 worth PLN 402m net and the tram track in Bydgoszcz worth PLN 87m net), while we treat the potential signing of these contracts as upside risk. **We note, however, that in FY26E the Group signed/submitted the lowest bid in tenders worth PLN 2.7bn, and we therefore expect this part of the business to dominate this year's order intake.** In the following years we expect building construction contracts to gain in importance, especially as the peak in road segment order intake should coincide with GDDKiA's tender cycle and occur in FY28E.

#MRB: New order intake (PLNm)



Source: Trigon, Company

A year of more cautious bidding? In recent years the Group priced its tender bids fairly aggressively, which ultimately translated into lower profitability, particularly visible in FY24-26E. **Based on our estimates, however, Mirbud's bids this year appear far more conservative – the average deviation of Mirbud's winning bid amounted to just 5% in this period vs. 9% in FY25**. We also note that it is the deviation of the winning bid from the second-lowest bid, rather than from the investor's budget, that we see as the best proxy for tracking price competition in tenders.

#MRB: Road tenders won

Num.	Tender launched Month	Tender launched Year	Bid chosen/contract signed Month	Bid chosen/contract signed Year	PLNm MRB bid	PLNm 2nd lowest	diff.	PLNm Inv. budget	diff.	Segment	Investor	Status
1	12	2025	8	2026	213	225	6%	325	53%	Roads	GDDKiA	Lowest bid
2	12	2025	8	2026	368	376	2%	458	24%	Roads	GDDKiA	Lowest bid
3	5	2026	7	2026	59	59	1%	44	-25%	Roads	ZDW Zielona Góra	Lowest bid
4	1	2026	8	2026	58	59	1%	67	15%	Roads	GDDKiA	Signed
5	2	2026	5	2026	556	577	4%	504	-9%	Roads	GDDKiA	Lowest bid
6	8	2025	6	2026	372	417	12%	315	-15%	Roads	GDDKiA	Signed
7	6	2025	1	2026	121	122	0%	187	55%	Roads	GDDKiA	Signed
8	12	2024	3	2026	111	121	9%	166	49%	Roads	Powiat Słupecki	Signed
9	11	2025	5	2026	73	74	2%	46	-37%	Roads	GDDKiA	Signed
10	12	2025	5	2026	44	47	6%	64	45%	Roads	GDDKiA	Lowest bid
11	12	2025	3	2026	294	306	4%	474	61%	Roads	GDDKiA	Lowest bid
12	5	2025	3	2026	464	489	5%	548	18%	Roads	GDDKiA	Lowest bid
2026 TOTAL					2,735	2,874	**5%**	3,198	**17%**			
1	7	2025	9	2025	107	139	30%	116	9%	Roads	Powiat Inowrocław	Signed
2	2	2025	10	2025	153	159	4%	211	38%	Roads	Gmina Olsztyn	Signed
3	7	2025	11	2025	54	69	28%	50	-8%	Roads	Powiat Inowrocław	Signed
4	8	2024	9	2025	226	227	0%	232	2%	Roads	GDDKiA	Signed
5	12	2024	9	2025	129	146	13%	156	21%	Roads	GDDKiA	Signed
6	1	2025	7	2025	154	168	9%	125	-19%	Roads	Gmina Sławków	Signed
7	9	2024	7	2025	447	459	3%	408	-9%	Roads	GDDKiA	Signed
8	11	2024	7	2025	99	111	12%	119	21%	Roads	GDDKiA	Signed
9	8	2024	6	2025	217	242	11%	179	-17%	Roads	GDDKiA	Signed
10	5	2024	5	2025	109	116	6%	126	15%	Roads	MZDW w Warszawie	Signed
11	8	2024	3	2025	226	227	0%	232	2%	Roads	GDDKiA	Signed
12	10	2023	2	2025	35	56	59%	56	60%	Roads	GDDKiA	Signed
13	10	2023	2	2025	94	108	16%	139	48%	Roads	GDDKiA	Signed
14	8	2024	1	2025	93	104	12%	107	16%	Roads	Gmina Miękinia	Signed
2025 TOTAL							**9%**		**5%**			
2024 TOTAL									**25%**			
2023 TOTAL									**16%**			
2022 TOTAL									**50%**			

Source: Trigon, Bloomberg

#MRB: Rail tenders won

Num.	Tender launched Month	Tender launched Year	Bid chosen/contract signed Month	Bid chosen/contract signed Year	PLNm MRB bid	PLNm 2nd lowest	diff.	PLNm Inv. budget	diff.	Segment	Investor	Status
1	9	2025	6	2026	87	91	4%	88	2%	Trams	ZDMiK Bydgoszcz	Signed
2	11	2025	5	2026	402	433	8%	464	15%	Rails	PKP PLK	Lowest bid
2026 TOTAL					402	433	**8%**	464	**15%**			

Source: Trigon, Bloomberg

We estimate that Mirbud's market share in the segment of GDDKiA contracts may reach c. 21%. In recent years, the share of contracts signed by Mirbud in the total pool of road contracts ranged from 9% to 67%.

#MRB: Road contracts signed in Poland and MRB's market share



Source: Trigon, Company

How may self-cleaning affect order intake? Following Friday's ruling of the Regional Court in Warsaw, Mirbud S.A. is required to go through the self-cleaning procedure. We note that this procedure is relatively difficult for construction companies to address proactively – the process itself is not a centralized procedure, which means that the Company has to implement certain changes somewhat "blindly", and only at the appeal stage, once competitors challenge subsequent tenders, will the KIO ruling show whether the Company has managed to complete the process effectively. **It is worth recalling the case of Budimex, which fully addressed the issue only at the fourth iteration of the 'self-cleaning' process. Nevertheless, the KIO classified Mirbud's conduct as 'recklessness or negligence under Art. 109(1)(10)' rather than intentional action (point 8), which in our view should have a positive impact on the timeline of the entire process. The risk, however, lies in the schedule of awards in the large tenders, including the CPK terminal – given that it is Mirbud S.A. that leads several consortia which passed pre-qualification, competitors in the above-mentioned tenders may have further legal arguments allowing MRB's bids to be excluded from those tenders**.

The margin trough is behind us. At the last conference the Group noticeably cooled our expectations regarding the margin trajectory, indicating that the room for margin expansion from current levels is "limited" – we therefore assume that FY26E will bring some improvement in the gross margin, while in the following years rising subcontracting costs will consume part of revenue. **Nevertheless, the profitability trough is already behind us – at the reported level the Group came through this period relatively unscathed (reported EPS in FY25 -8% y/y), whereas had the results been adjusted for the revaluation of Torpol shares to market value, the erosion would have amounted to as much as 54% y/y.** We also hope that the coming periods will bring an improvement in earnings quality – the balance of contract assets still remains very high, particularly against peers and against the general momentum in the construction cycle.

#MRB: P&L projections for FY26-28E



Source: Trigon, Company

The balance sheet does not look optimal. As we wrote in our May note, under the applicable IFRS 15 standard construction companies have a degree of discretion in managing earnings, which, greatly simplifying, on the one hand allows results to be smoothed between periods (where a more conservative policy is applied), and on the other makes it possible to somewhat "dress up" the actual profitability achieved on the contracts in progress. Following the publication of 2Q26 results, we maintain our view that most of them (Budimex, Polimex, Torpol) run their P&L fairly conservatively. In Mirbud's case, however, we point to a fairly aggressive approach, which has resulted in a step-change increase in contract assets on the Company's balance sheet.

Mirbud's situation is quite different from that of the other Companies we cover. Mirbud's order backlog rose from PLN 4.6bn at the end of FY23 to PLN 8bn at the end of FY24 and PLN 8.5bn at the end of FY25. Despite the growing share of multi-year, slow-turning "Design and Build" contracts and contracts financed under the Polish Deal (in practice a "Finance and Build" formula, i.e. invoicing only at the end of the contract), the widening disproportion between contract assets and contract liabilities appears rather high. In the period mentioned above, Mirbud's contract assets rose from just PLN 98m in FY23 to PLN 337m in FY24 and as much as PLN 705m at the end of FY25, while contract liabilities remained stable (PLN 48m at the end of FY25 vs. PLN 69m at the end of FY23). As a result, at the end of last year contract assets were worth c. 24% of Mirbud's revenue in the **construction segment in FY25, while the value of the liabilities amounted to only 2% of revenue. The situation at the end of June brought the first signs of improvement, i.e. a visible decline in the valuation of construction contracts on the asset side, accompanied by an increase in trade receivables,** which in our view clearly indicates that part of the key works, not yet settled but already recognized in the P&L, has moved into the invoicing phase and has therefore been "accepted" by the awarding parties. Nevertheless, the situation remains far from optimal – **at the end of June net contract assets accounted for as much as 14% of construction revenue over the last 12 months. By comparison, for Budimex/Polimex/Torpol this ratio stands at +5/+11/-1%, respectively, where positive values are the optimal level.**

#MRB: Balance sheet decomposition

MIRBUD	1H21	FY21	1H22	FY22	1H23	FY23	1H24	FY24	1H25	FY25	1H26
AKTYWA OBROTOWE	**570**	**498**	**912**	**1,518**	**741**	**1,437**	**669**	**1,583**	**1,035**	**1,867**	**2,291**
Należności handlowe	360	398	751	439	527	384	386	458	505	284	571
Naliczenie należności z tytułu rozliczenia kontraktów długoterminowych	49	0	58	50	99	98	156	337	415	705	568
Pozostałe	161	100	102	1,029	115	955	126	788	115	878	1,152
ZOBOWIĄZANIA KRÓTKOTERMINOWE	**534**	**673**	**942**	**847**	**856**	**892**	**664**	**657**	**681**	**812**	**700**
Zobowiązania handlowe	392	376	455	352	281	452	266	363	410	471	320
Zobowiązania z tytułu rozliczenia kontraktów długoterminowych	0	90	179	136	162	69	60	4	28	48	107
Zaliczki otrzymane króterminowe	73	108	196	188	227	190	145	87	90	126	67
Pozostałe	69	100	112	171	186	181	193	204	152	167	206
Rezerwy na naprawy gwarancyjne	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	5	5
Rezerwy na naprawy gwarnacyjne jako %LTM przychodów	*0.1%*	*0.0%*	*0.0%*	*0.1%*	*0.1%*	*0.1%*	*0.1%*	*0.1%*	*0.1%*	*0.2%*	*0.2%*
Rezerwy na naprawy gwarnacyjne jako % portfela zamówień	*0.0%*	*0.0%*	*0.0%*	*0.0%*	*0.0%*	*0.0%*	*0.0%*	*0.0%*	*0.0%*	*0.1%*	*0.1%*
Przychody segmentu budowlanego	**810**	**1,534**	**1,354**	**1,912**	**1,196**	**1,931**	**1,329**	**1,668**	**1,206**	**1,747**	**1,440**
Wycena kontraktów (AKTYWA) jako %LTM przychodów	*3%*	*0%*	*2%*	*2%*	*3%*	*3%*	*5%*	*11%*	*14%*	*24%*	*18%*
Wycena kontraktów (PASYWA) jako %LTM przychodów	*0%*	*4%*	*6%*	*4%*	*5%*	*2%*	*2%*	*0%*	*1%*	*2%*	*3%*
Różnica (na plus = konserwatywniejsze prowadzenie P&L)	*-3%*	*4%*	*4%*	*3%*	*2%*	*-1%*	*-3%*	*-11%*	*-13%*	*-22%*	*-14%*
Portfel zamówień	**4,815**	**4,815**	**5,755**	**5,564**	**4,817**	**4,622**	**6,092**	**7,992**	**8,115**	**8,465**	**8,879**
Wycena kontraktów (AKTYWA) jako % portfela zamówień	*1%*	*0%*	*1%*	*1%*	*2%*	*2%*	*3%*	*4%*	*5%*	*8%*	*6%*
Wycena kontraktów (PASYWA) jako % portfela zamówień	*0%*	*2%*	*3%*	*2%*	*3%*	*1%*	*1%*	*0%*	*0%*	*1%*	*1%*
Różnica (na plus = konserwatywniejsze prowadzenie P&L)	*-1%*	*2%*	*2%*	*2%*	*1%*	*-1%*	*-2%*	*-4%*	*-5%*	*-8%*	*-5%*

Source: Trigon, Company

FCF trajectory below the sector average. In recent years the Group has managed its P&L relatively aggressively and has additionally carried out a number of investments (including the acquisition of Torpol shares, Transkol and asphalt mix plants), as a result of which FCF was clearly negative in FY23-25E (-PLN 335m in total). In our view, the assessment of cash flows is absolutely crucial from the perspective of investment attractiveness in the construction segment. Until now we had quietly hoped that Mirbud would be able to "settle" several legacy contracts, such as Węgierska Górka or the Tri-City Metropolitan Ring Road, and that OCF in FY26E alone would reach PLN 200-300m, driven among others by the PLN 200m received from GDDKiA after the signing of indexation annexes. Ultimately, **the Management Board clearly cooled our expectations for the second half of the year – the legacy contracts are being settled more slowly than assumed, and the indexation inflows we had assumed are gross inflows, i.e. before settlement with subcontractors. We now expect OCF in FY26E to amount to several million PLN, with positive FCF (3% yield) generated thanks to the sale of Torpol shares and the sale of one of the JHM retail pavilions.**

Based on our estimates, the Group will end FY26E with positive net debt, which in our view is a suboptimal situation in the context of the upcoming build-up of construction activity in Poland. Moreover, FY27E may not be much better in terms of cash generation. While OCF should be positive, the Group plans to acquire several more asphalt mix plants, which will limit FCF. **The reconstruction of Marywilska 44, which may absorb as much as PLN 130m, also remains an open question – the City Council has approved a plan to extend the land lease, and M44 itself** has already obtained a building permit. **The timing of the further tranches of payments for the land in Poznań (a further c. PLN 300m) will also be difficult to quantify**, as will the cash "cost" of the growing order backlog, which for large infrastructure contracts is typically associated with negative FCF in the first quarters of execution.

#MRB: Cash flow projections for FY26-28E



Source: Trigon, Company

FY27-28E should significantly change the cost environment in the construction industry. We expect subcontracting costs in the construction industry to rise by at least 20% by FY29E, with the increase in steel prices likely to be particularly significant. At the same time, indexation will probably compensate contractors for part of the margin, but as we enter the period of peak workloads we prefer companies with a historical track record of conservative bidding and with a large cash buffer (net cash) as well as bidding headroom (unused guarantee lines).

#MRB: Raw materals prices forecast



Source: Trigon, BDX Presentation

JHM supporting results. We expect the Group to gradually increase both handovers and sales in the coming years. We do not expect a larger step-up in scale until after FY30E, when the projects developed at the Osiedle Maltańskie in Poznań will start to become visible.

#MRB: JHM projections for FY26-28E



Source: Trigon, Company

Valuation

Model assumptions

Model assumptions. In our base scenario we expect the Group to achieve its strategic target at the end of FY26E, i.e. an order backlog exceeding PLN 10bn. **Since the start of the year the Group has signed contracts worth PLN 2.3bn, and the current "waiting room" amounts to nearly PLN 3bn. We therefore feel relatively comfortable with the PLN 5.1bn of new contracts we expect in FY26E (+49% y/y),** and we also believe that over the next 2 years the Group will be able to maintain a similar pace of order intake (we assume PLN 5.3/6.2bn in FY27-28E, respectively). At the same time, we are fairly conservative on margins in the construction segment. After FY24-25, which were disappointing in this respect (the reported gross margin in the construction segment came in at 5.8/6.4%, respectively), we expect better profitability to continue in 2H26E (we see 7.3% for the full year). At the same time, Mirbud's current order intake still appears relatively aggressive to us, which leads us to assume a lower margin in the following years, particularly in FY28E, when, in the environment of higher subcontracting costs that we assume, it may fall to 6.1%. **As a result, despite the very strong revenue growth we expect in FY27-28E (PLN 4.1/5.0bn, respectively, vs. PLN 3.5bn this year), we expect adj. EBITDA to grow by 10/11%, which is below the average of our forecasts for other companies in the sector.**

#MRB: FY26-35E estimates

PLNm	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026E	2027E	2028E	2029E	2030E	2031E	2032E	2033E	2034E	2035E
Revenues	**2,506**	**3,319**	**3,322**	**3,252**	**2,951**	**3,541**	**4,078**	**5,003**	**4,877**	**5,602**	**5,594**	**5,555**	**5,187**	**5,199**	**5,664**
yoy	*102%*	*32%*	*0%*	*-2%*	*-9%*	*20%*	*15%*	*23%*	*-3%*	*15%*	*0%*	*-1%*	*-7%*	*0%*	*9%*
Construction	2,344	3,266	3,127	2,997	2,953	3,457	3,978	4,855	4,729	5,440	5,418	5,363	4,978	4,973	5,420
yoy	*103%*	*39%*	*-4%*	*-4%*	*-1%*	*17%*	*15%*	*22%*	*-3%*	*15%*	*0%*	*-1%*	*-7%*	*0%*	*9%*
Residential	146	132	203	269	126	222	256	293	305	317	329	343	356	371	385
yoy	*28%*	*-10%*	*54%*	*32%*	*-53%*	*76%*	*16%*	*14%*	*4%*	*4%*	*4%*	*4%*	*4%*	*4%*	*4%*
Rental	42	54	62	36	29	31	32	58	61	63	65	68	71	74	77
yoy	*28%*	*29%*	*13%*	*-42%*	*-19%*	*5%*	*5%*	*81%*	*4%*	*4%*	*4%*	*4%*	*4%*	*4%*	*4%*
Other & Elimination	-27	-132	-69	-50	-157	-168	-189	-204	-218	-218	-218	-218	-218	-218	-218
Gross Profit	**232**	**270**	**336**	**291**	**227**	**325**	**356**	**391**	**406**	**470**	**473**	**474**	**452**	**457**	**492**
Gross Margin	**9.2%**	**8.1%**	**10.1%**	**9.0%**	**7.7%**	**9.2%**	**8.7%**	**7.8%**	**8.3%**	**8.4%**	**8.5%**	**8.5%**	**8.7%**	**8.8%**	**8.7%**
Construction	7.4%	6.0%	7.8%	5.8%	6.4%	7.3%	6.9%	6.1%	6.5%	6.8%	6.8%	6.8%	6.8%	6.8%	6.8%
Residential	22.9%	29.2%	24.5%	31.4%	34.6%	32.0%	30.0%	28.0%	28.0%	28.0%	28.0%	28.0%	28.0%	28.0%	28.0%
Rental	54.4%	61.9%	61.2%	42.4%	0.1%	20.0%	30.0%	30.0%	30.0%	30.0%	30.0%	30.0%	30.0%	30.0%	30.0%
EBITDA	**188**	**194**	**243**	**204**	**199**	**221**	**224**	**247**	**254**	**308**	**304**	**308**	**301**	**307**	**329**
EBITDA margin (%)	*7.5%*	*5.9%*	*7.3%*	*6.3%*	*6.8%*	*6.3%*	*5.5%*	*4.9%*	*5.2%*	*5.5%*	*5.4%*	*5.5%*	*5.8%*	*5.9%*	*5.8%*
EBIT	**174**	**178**	**224**	**182**	**168**	**183**	**180**	**199**	**204**	**256**	**249**	**250**	**239**	**241**	**260**
EBIT margin (%)	*7.0%*	*5.4%*	*6.7%*	*5.6%*	*5.7%*	*5.2%*	*4.4%*	*4.0%*	*4.2%*	*4.6%*	*4.5%*	*4.5%*	*4.6%*	*4.6%*	*4.6%*
Net financial costs	**-18**	**-27**	**-54**	**-30**	**-24**	**-26**	**-24**	**-18**	**-15**	**-15**	**-5**	**-5**	**-13**	**-11**	**-10**
Interest income	5	10	1	9	6	5	5	4	7	8	18	17	10	11	13
Interest costs	23	37	55	39	30	31	29	22	22	22	22	22	22	22	22
Net profit	**128**	**119**	**135**	**121**	**112**	**126**	**125**	**144**	**151**	**193**	**195**	**195**	**181**	**184**	**200**
Net profit margin (%)	*5.1%*	*3.6%*	*4.1%*	*3.7%*	*3.8%*	*3.6%*	*3.1%*	*2.9%*	*3.1%*	*3.5%*	*3.5%*	*3.5%*	*3.5%*	*3.5%*	*3.5%*
Backlog	**4,815**	**5,564**	**4,622**	**7,992**	**8,465**	**10,108**	**11,430**	**12,775**	**13,245**	**12,555**	**11,838**	**11,775**	**12,198**	**12,725**	**12,905**
Contracts signed	**2,581**	**4,014**	**2,186**	**6,367**	**3,427**	**5,100**	**5,300**	**6,200**	**5,200**	**4,750**	**4,700**	**5,300**	**5,400**	**5,500**	**5,600**
Residential buildings	58	189	73	101	210	200	200	200	200	200	200	200	200	200	200
Public utility	455	592	704	871	673	1,400	1,600	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,500	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000
Industrial buildings	910	986	502	129	219	1,000	1,000	2,000	2,000	2,050	1,500	1,600	1,700	1,800	1,900
Roads	1,158	2,247	907	5,267	2,220	2,500	2,500	3,000	2,000	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500
Railways	0	0	0	0	104	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OCF	**205**	**133**	**148**	**-48**	**-58**	**16**	**113**	**270**	**155**	**621**	**96**	**261**	**284**	**258**	**275**
CAPEX	**-57**	**-8**	**-150**	**-150**	**-97**	**-95**	**-100**	**-50**	**-50**	**-50**	**-50**	**-50**	**-50**	**-66**	**-70**
DY	**0.7%**	**1.7%**	**2.3%**	**1.5%**	**0.8%**	**1.7%**	**1.9%**	**1.9%**	**2.2%**	**2.3%**	**2.9%**	**3.0%**	**3.0%**	**2.7%**	**2.8%**
FCF Yield	**10.1%**	**8.5%**	**-1.6%**	**-12.4%**	**-10.4%**	**3.3%**	**-1.1%**	**13.4%**	**5.4%**	**60.8%**	**1.8%**	**23.2%**	**32.5%**	**31.7%**	**45.8%**

Source: Trigon

Historical valuation levels

No arguments for a visible re-rating. The EV/backlog multiple presented below is not an optimal proxy for the quality of companies or for their order intake trajectory, but in a relatively unified way it allows the relationships between differences in growth rates to be identified. We note that during the last strong construction boom, construction companies reached their peak valuation multiples in FY07, i.e. on the eve of peak order intake but already after the largest tenders had been announced (looking for analogies, we would point to similar timing in FY27E). The key contractors of that boom, i.e. Budimex, Polimex and PBG, were valued at EV/backlog of 0.5-2.0x, i.e. far above current levels (today, apart from Budimex, the industry trades <0.2x). **We conclude that since Mirbud is neither as well positioned for the rail boom as Torpol, nor for energy capex as Polimex, it is hard to see what could justify a clear multiple premium to these companies - especially as, on both EV/EBITDA and P/E, Mirbud currently trades at a visible premium.**

#MRB: EV / Backlog - prior-cycle leaders (2007–2013) and current leaders (2018–2027E)



Source: Trigon, Companies, historical data based on EOP EV, estimates based on current MC

DCF valuation

DCF. We base our valuation of Mirbud shares 100% on a DCF model. Our assumptions imply a 12-month target price of PLN 13.5 per share, 13% above the last closing price.

DCF valuation assumptions:

i) Risk-free rate of 5.5%.

ii) Market risk premium of 5.5% (Trigon methodology for mWIG40 companies).

iii) Unlevered beta of 1.0x.

iv) Terminal growth rate of 2.5%.

#MRB: DCF valuation

PLNm	2025
Loans and borrowings (+)	450
Cash and cash equivalents (-)	273
Cash adjustment (+)	585
Cash gain on Torpol divestment (-)	73
ND	**689**

DCF (PLNm)	2026E	2027E	2028E	2029E	2030E	2031E	2032E	2033E	2034E	2035E	>2035E
adj. EBIT	**165**	**180**	**199**	**204**	**256**	**249**	**250**	**239**	**241**	**260**	
Tax rate	*20.0%*	*20.0%*	*20.0%*	*20.0%*	*20.0%*	*20.0%*	*20.0%*	*20.0%*	*20.0%*	*20.0%*	
NOPLAT	**132**	**144**	**159**	**163**	**205**	**199**	**200**	**191**	**193**	**208**	
D&A	38	44	48	50	52	55	58	62	66	70	
CAPEX	-95	-100	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-50	-66	-70	
Change in NWC	-154	-79	59	-61	361	-159	2	29	-3	-4	
FCF	**-79**	**8**	**216**	**102**	**568**	**45**	**210**	**232**	**190**	**204**	**209**
Relevered beta	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3
Cost of equity	12.6%	12.6%	12.6%	12.6%	12.6%	12.6%	12.6%	12.6%	12.6%	12.6%	11.1%
After-tax cost of debt	6.4%	6.4%	6.4%	6.4%	6.4%	6.4%	6.4%	6.4%	6.4%	6.4%	4.8%
Debt ratio	25.4%	25.4%	25.4%	25.4%	25.4%	25.4%	25.4%	25.4%	25.4%	25.4%	25.4%
WACC	**11.0%**	**11.0%**	**11.0%**	**11.0%**	**11.0%**	**11.0%**	**11.0%**	**11.0%**	**11.0%**	**11.0%**	**9.5%**
DFCF	**-77**	**7**	**170**	**72**	**362**	**26**	**109**	**108**	**80**	**77**	
Risk-free rate	**5.5%**										
Market premium	**5.5%**										
PV FCF 2026-2035E	934										
Residual growth rate	**2.5%**										
Terminal Value	2,960										
Discounted TV	**1,118**										
EV	**2,052**										
Net Debt	689										
Dividend paid-out	22										
Equity Value	**1,341**										
Shares outstanding (m)	110.1										
Equity Value per share (PLN) as of 09/09	12.2										
12M Target Price (PLN)	**13.5**										
Upside / (Downside)	*13%*										

g \ **WACC**	10.0%	10.5%	**11.0%**	11.5%	12.0%
1.5%	14.9	13.3	12.0	10.8	9.7
2.0%	15.9	14.2	12.7	11.4	10.2
2.5%	17.1	15.2	**13.5**	12.1	10.8
3.0%	18.4	16.3	14.4	12.9	11.5
3.5%	20.1	17.6	15.5	13.8	12.2

Source: Trigon

Scenario analysis

Scenarios. Given the record wave of investment in the domestic construction industry and the resulting limited "visibility" regarding the situation of Polish contractors over the next few years, in addition to our core DCF valuation we also present a scenario analysis valuing two different earnings "paths" for Mirbud Group.

In the optimistic scenario (assumptions in the table below) we value Mirbud Group at PLN 18.5 per share, 54% above current levels. In this scenario we assume:
1) a very well-priced portfolio of road contracts (gross margin 1.1pp above our expectations in the terminal period)
2) partcipation in the narrow group of contractors for CPK projects (road, rail and airport)
3) scaling up JHM to c. 800 units per year (the effect of the land in Poznań).

In the pessimistic scenario (assumptions in the table below) we value Mirbud Group at PLN 9 per share, i.e. 25% below the current market price. In this scenario we assume:
1) an aggressively priced rail and road portfolio (gross margin 0.8pp below our expectations in the terminal period)
2) a marginal role in the CPK construction project (also due to non-price criteria)
3) Marywilska 44 failing to reach "full capacity".

#MRB: Bull / Base / Bear Case assumptions

FY25-30E	BEAR CASE	BASE CASE	BULL CASE
Backlog CAGR	**5.8%**	**8.2%**	**11.9%**
avg. Gross margin	**7.5%**	**8.3%**	**9.4%**
avg. EBITDA margin	**4.7%**	**5.6%**	**6.8%**
Target Price	**9.0 PLN**	**13.5 PLN**	**18.5 PLN**
Upside	**-25%**	**13%**	**54%**

adj. EBIT margi \ Annual Order Intake	3,810	4,560	**5,310**	6,060	6,810
2.4%	9.4	10.0	10.6	11.2	11.7
3.4%	10.4	11.2	12.0	12.9	13.7
4.4%	11.4	12.4	**13.5**	14.6	15.6
5.4%	12.4	13.7	15.0	16.3	17.6
7.4%	13.3	14.9	16.4	18.0	19.6

Beta \ Risk-free rate (bps)	350	450	**550**	650	750
1.4	11.9	10.2	8.8	7.5	6.5
1.2	14.9	12.7	10.9	9.3	8.0
1.0	18.9	15.9	**13.5**	11.6	9.9
0.9	21.5	17.9	15.1	12.9	11.0
0.8	24.8	20.4	17.0	14.4	12.3

Source: Trigon

Peer valuation

Peer valuation. We base our valuation of Mirbud shares 100% on a DCF model, but we also present a peer-based valuation. Our peer group mainly comprises highly diversified construction groups that also have a development arm (Skanska, Budimex). This approach returns a target price of PLN 12.3. Given the phase of the cycle and the record spending on domestic infrastructure, in our view the peer valuation does not add valuation context for Mirbud.

#MRB: relative-based valuation

	Kraj	MC (EUR)	P/E			EV/EBITDA			FCF Yield		
			2025E	2026E	2027E	2025E	2026E	2027E	2025E	2026E	2027E
Mirbud		306	10.5	10.6	9.1	6.8	7.0	5.7	3.3%	-1.1%	13.4%
Peers											
Porr Ag	AUSTRIA	1,461	11.3	10.2	9.4	2.8	2.6	2.4	5.6%	6.2%	7.4%
Polimex-Mostostal SA	POLAND	429	12.0	10.3	9.0	4.7	3.2	2.5	-	-	-
Budimex SA	POLAND	4,325	24.5	19.9	17.9	14.3	11.7	10.6	5.8%	9.5%	8.8%
Skanska AB	SWEDEN	10,324	16.0	14.2	13.4	8.7	7.9	7.5	10.5%	7.2%	7.4%
Peab AB	SWEDEN	2,650	12.7	11.2	10.4	8.1	7.3	6.8	4.7%	6.3%	7.2%
Torpol SA	POLAND	372	17.0	7.1	6.7	8.6	6.5	4.7	-6.3%	12.1%	13.7%
Median			12.7	10.3	9.4	8.1	6.5	4.7	5.3%	8.4%	8.1%
premium/(discount)			*-18%*	*3%*	*-2%*	*-16%*	*7%*	*21%*	*-2pp*	*-9pp*	*5pp*
Implied valuation per share (PLN)			**14.6**	**11.7**	**12.3**	**14.7**	**11.1**	**9.7**			
applied weight (year)			33%	33%	33%	33%	33%	33%			
applied weight (multiple)				50%			50%				
Valuation per share (PLN)			**12.3**								

Source: Trigon, Bloomberg

Market environment

Network expansion continues, but order intake will not grow linearly. At the end of FY25, the total length of motorways and expressways in Poland stood at c. 5.5k km. We assume that in FY26E the network will reach c. 6.0k km, and 7/8k km in FY29E/ FY32E, respectively. That would mean an extension of the network by c. 2.5k km versus FY25. The room for road contractors' activity therefore remains significant, but the pace of new order inflow is determined not by the expansion of the network itself, but by the distribution of tenders over time and their conversion into signed contracts – and it is this second element that we see as today's bottleneck.

#MRB: Total length of motor-and expressways in Poland (km)



Source: GDDKiA, Trigon estimates

Roads an increasingly less important component of the infrastructure segment. In FY25 GDDKiA launched tenders for the construction of c. 390km of roads, with contracts signed for c. 175km. For FY26E we assume c. 360km and 320km, respectively, i.e. a clear rebound in order intake alongside a slightly smaller supply of new procurement procedures. Tender activity should peak in FY27E (c. 435km), while contract signings should peak in FY28E (c. 390km). Further out, our assumptions point to a gradual slowdown in both categories, to c. 200/250km in FY30E – the largest road contractors will therefore face the problem of a shrinking market, while competencies related to road maintenance and resurfacing should gain in importance.

#MRB: Road tenders launched (lhs) and signed (rh) by GDDKiA





Source: GDDKiA, Trigon estimates

A broad but increasingly fragmented workload. In August ’26, c. 116 projects with a total length of c. 1.36k km remained under execution, versus 104 projects and c. 1.47k km in FY24. The average project length has thus fallen to c. 11.7km from c. 14.1km in FY24. The investment pipeline therefore remains broad in terms of the number of contracts, but is becoming more fragmented in kilometer terms - which increases competitive pressure in medium-sized tenders. For general contractors' revenue growth, more important than the number of active contracts as such is the pace at which they move into the works phase and their degree of completion; we treat the fragmentation itself as a risk factor for margins in the road segment, not for volumes.

#MRB: Motor-and expressways under construction (km)



Source: GDDKiA, Trigon estimates

Mirbud remains one of the two main players. As at August ’26, the Group was executing projects for GDDKiA with a total length of 236km and a value of PLN 7.8bn, ranking second both by length and by value of the investments. Budimex remained the leader with 254km and PLN 10.1bn. Mirbud's gap to the leader in kilometer terms was therefore just 18km, with a lead of more than 100km over third-placed Strabag. The scale of the investments under execution confirms MRB's strong position in the road segment, but it does not determine the profitability of future orders. At this scale of operations, we regard the quality of new order intake and bidding discipline as more important than growth in market share as such.

#MRB: Biggest contractors for GDDKiA



Source: GDDKiA, Budimex, Trigon, data as of August 2026

A lasting rebound in output still has to wait. GUS data through July ’26 still show high volatility in construction and assembly output. After double-digit declines at the start of the year and a brief rebound in the spring, the y/y growth rate has again fallen slightly below zero. At the same time, annual producer price growth accelerated from c. 3.5% at the end of FY25 to c. 6% in July ’26. That is still well below the c. 13.5% observed at the start of FY23, but the downward trend in price growth has reversed. At the same time, we do not equate the producer price index with the growth of general contractors' material costs: with steel prices calm, in our view the acceleration is driven primarily by labor and oil derivatives.

#MRB: Construction and assembly production prices and sales



Source: Statistics Poland, Trigon

Steel relatively calm, more uncertainty on the oil side. In recent months, HRC and rebar quotations have hovered around EUR 650–700/t, still well below the FY22 peaks. For now, this does not point to a return to the scale of the price shock seen back then. The situation in the Brent oil market looks different - after a temporary rise above USD 110/bbl, quotations held around USD 90/bbl in the summer of ’26, versus c. USD 60/bbl at the turn of FY25/26. In our view, this justifies greater caution when assessing fuel and asphalt costs. Relatively stable steel therefore does not automatically mean an improvement in general contractors' margins - the timing of material purchases, contract pricing and the scope of indexation protection will remain important.

#MRB: Steel and crude oil prices



Source: Bloomberg, Trigon

Ruling of the Regional Court in Warsaw [negative]

#Ruling
- The Regional Court dismissed the appeal filed by the consortium, which we understand closes the discussion on the contractor that will sign the agreement with PKP PLK for the delivery of the Polish section of Rail Baltica.
- The Track Tec x Intop x Unibep consortium is currently closest to signing the contract, as its bid worth PLN 5.22bn gross has already been selected by PKP PLK.

#Consequences
- As a result of the dismissal of the appeal, Mirbud S.A. is now required to go through the self-cleaning procedure.
- For Torpol, the situation does not carry the above legal and business consequences.

#Background
- As a reminder, the entire case indirectly concerned the bid of the Mirbud x Torpol consortium worth PLN 4.6bn gross in the tender for the construction of the first section of the Polish part of Rail Baltica.
- The National Appeals Chamber (KIO) rejected the consortium's bid due to Mirbud's alleged concealment of a PLN 15k environmental penalty related to the delivery of one of its contracts for GDDKiA.

Comment: *The dismissal of the appeal, i.e. a ruling IN LINE with our expectations, in our view has multi-layered consequences for Mirbud, Torpol and the entire construction sector.*
*For **#TOR**, however, the situation is clear – we did not assume that the Company would deliver Rail Baltica, and given the Group's very conservative bidding, the final dismissal of the appeal validates our model assumptions, in particular the upward trajectory of the gross margin in the coming years.*

*In the context of **#MRB**, we look at the situation along several tracks:*

i) on the one hand, we clearly view negatively the lost opportunity to secure such a large railway contract, which in our view could have lent at least some credibility to the Group's ambitious business plans in this segment. More than 2 years have passed since the SPO, and the proceeds from the issue, which were meant to be used for acquisitions and building scale in the railway segment, have in practice been used to fund current working capital needs. Since then, despite the acquisition of Transkol, the Group has not won a single material railway tender (last year Transkol signed a contract worth PLN 104m, and the company itself had negative equity at the end of June), while in several of them, including Rail Baltica, the consortium's bid was ultimately rejected despite very aggressive pricing. At the same time, the Group – or rather Mirbud S.A. – will be forced to go through the self-cleaning procedure, which, as this year's Budimex example has shown, is relatively problematic under the Polish legal/Public Procurement Law regime and may materially limit the Group's contracting capacity in the coming months. This is all the more negative from a business standpoint given that the selection of the contractor for the CPK Terminal, among others, is coming up shortly. Self-cleaning is not a centralised procedure – each contracting authority assesses the effectiveness of the package of changes separately, which means the Group will be forced to make changes somewhat "blind", without certainty that the situation has already been adequately addressed. Importantly, however, the offence itself committed by Mirbud was classified by KIO as "recklessness or negligence under Art. 109(1)(10)" rather than, as in Budimex's case, "entering into an agreement restricting competition", which is objectively a considerably "lighter" offence and may translate into faster implementation of a solution acceptable to contracting authorities. We assume that Mirbud should successfully complete self-cleaning by the end of FY26E, which may partly result in the Company's bids being rejected in tenders, but should nevertheless allow the order backlog to exceed PLN 10bn at year-end.

ii) on the other hand, we do see positive consequences of this ruling. At the last results conference, the Management Board materially cooled our expectations regarding the FCF trajectory in the second half of the year – according to the CFO's comments, operating cash flow should be close to zero in FY26E, which would mean a 4th consecutive year without positive OCF. Bearing in mind that Mirbud still holds over PLN 500m of NET assets from the valuation of construction contracts, that over the next 3 years it will have to pay a further tranche for the land in Poznań (c. PLN 300m), that Marywilska has already received City Council consent to extend the lease as well as a construction permit (we estimate rebuilding costs at PLN 130m), and that investments in *new asphalt mix plants will cost the Group nearly PLN 80m in FY26-27E, a contract as large as Rail Baltica (c. PLN 2bn attributable to Mirbud), budgeted at a relatively low margin (5% gross margin, on a bid submitted over a year ago), would entail another strong cash outflow in FY26-27E. In the above calculations we do not even touch on potential acquisitions in the railway / power engineering space, which could also involve PLN 300-500m of outlays. Ultimately, therefore, a situation in which Mirbud does not deliver Rail Baltica – given its growing order backlog and still weak cash generation – may be positive news for the Company from the perspective of deleveraging its balance sheet, particularly as in FY27E we expect strong growth in construction and assembly output and the resulting inflation in materials and commodity prices.*

***In summary**, as things currently stand we are inclined to "zero out" the railway segment in our model. The open question is how problematic navigating the self-cleaning procedure will prove for the Company, although from the perspective of the FCF trajectory (we assume FCF close to zero in FY26E) the absence of Rail Baltica in the backlog may support short-term EBITDA/OCF conversion. Another question is how the ruling will affect the behaviour of Mirbud's competitors in tenders – the largest tenders currently involve very aggressive legal / appeal battles between contractors, and the question is whether the Regional Court's ruling will not give Mirbud's competitors further arguments in this area. At the same time, we note that from Torpol's perspective the ruling is neutral/slightly positive – we did not include the contract in our forecasts, and the budgeted 5% gross margin (although, given the different scope of works in Torpol's case, it could have been somewhat higher) is noticeably lower than the level assumed in our FY26-28E forecasts.*

2Q26 Results Review + 2Q26 Conference call highlights [neutral]

2Q26 Preliminary Results Review [neutral]

PLNm	2Q25	3Q25	4Q25	1Q26	2Q26	Y/Y	Q/Q	2Q26E	Cons.
Revenues	720	732	1,002	547	910	26%	66%	857	861
EBITDA	39.5	28.4	99.1	32.9	n.a	-	-	58.1	57.7
adj. EBITDA	**31.1**	**32.9**	**36.3**	**33.9**	**n.a.**	**-**	**-**	**58.1**	
EBIT	31.8	20.4	90.9	23.5	n.a.	-	-	48.6	48.9
Net profit	21.1	14.1	62.0	9.7	35.3	67%	266%	30.3	31.4
Gross Margin	6.3%	7.5%	8.3%	10.2%	8.4%	2.1pp	-1.8pp	9.6%	
Backlog	8,115	8,865	8,465	8,279	8,878	9%	7%		
P/E12M trailing	13.9	13.4	12.7	13.4	11.8				
EV/EBITDA 12M trailing	9.9	9.6	8.1	9.5	-				
EBITDA margin	5.5%	3.9%	9.9%	6.0%	-	-	-	6.8%	6.7%
EBIT margin	4.4%	2.8%	9.1%	4.3%	-	-	-	5.7%	5.7%
Net profit margin	2.9%	1.9%	6.2%	1.8%	3.9%	1.0pp	2.1pp	3.5%	3.6%

Source: Company, Trigon

STANDALONE (PLNm)	2Q25	3Q25	4Q25	1Q26	2Q26
Revenues	468	497	640	424	754
YoY	-1%	8%	58%	28%	61%
Gross Profit	35	45	55	36	60
Gross Margin	7.5%	9.1%	8.6%	8.5%	8.0%
Net profit	24	21	44	10	29
Net profit margin	5.1%	4.2%	6.9%	2.4%	3.8%

Source: Company, Trigon

Net profit 13% above consensus and 17% above our forecasts. We note that at this stage a full assessment of the results is impossible, hence for now we assess them neutrally – in our view, the key element in the reception of Thursday's full report will be the FCF trajectory (in our view the Group may report positive FCF)

***#Construction.** In line with our assumptions, the Group more than made up for the freezing first quarter (standalone revenue up as much as +61% y/y). The standalone gross margin also came in well (8.0%, +50bps y/y); nevertheless, the consolidated gross margin was 120bps below our assumptions, while consolidated gross profit on sales (in nominal terms) proved to be 8% lower than our assumptions.*

***#Residenatial Development.** A strong quarter – JHM handed over as many as 153 apartments (+350% y/y), which in our view translated into strong results and a y/y increase in its contribution, which has already largely been confirmed by the report published by JHM.*

***#Lower lines/group.** Given that gross profit on sales came in below our expectations, while net profit beat our estimates by 13%, the analysis of the lower lines will be key. We expected SG&A to rise by ca. 55% y/y; the question, however, is whether – given the sale of Torpol shares carried out in 3Q26 – the Group decided to revalue its stake to market value, which would have lifted the 2Q26 results by several million PLN.*

***In summary,** at this stage we assess the results neutrally – the analysis of the BS and CF will be key - we note that in our May note (LINK) we pointed to the increase in assets from contract valuation visible in Mirbud's books (this item stood at over PLN 600m at the end of March vs. PLN 337m a year earlier). We would also note that until the Warsaw court announces its ruling on the bid of the Mirbud x Torpol consortium in the tender for the construction of Rail Baltica, visibility on order intake remains extremely limited – at this stage, however, we expect that over the FY26E horizon the Group will post positive FCF, mainly on the back of indexation proceeds and the sale of Torpol shares.*

2Q26 Results Review [neutral]

PLNm	2Q25	3Q25	4Q25	1Q26	2Q26	Y/Y	Q/Q	2Q26P	2Q26E	Cons.
Revenues	720	732	1,002	547	910	26%	66%	910	857	861
Construction	731	731	1,016	505	935	28%	85%		812	
Residential	18	11	59	44	74	320%	66%		70	
Rental	5	12	8	9	8	71%	-7%		5	
Other & Eliminations	-33	-22	-51	-10	-107	-	-		-25	
Other operating activity, net	3.8	-3.8	74.2	-0.4	6.3	63%	-	0.0	0	
Revaluations	4.6	-0.6	-11.4	-0.6	0.1	-98%	-	0.0	0	
EBITDA	39.5	28.4	99.1	32.9	60.7	54%	85%	n.a.	58.1	57.7
adj. EBITDA	**31.1**	**32.9**	**36.3**	**33.9**	**54.3**	**75%**	**60%**	**n.a.**	**58.1**	
EBIT	31.8	20.4	90.9	23.5	51.4	62%	119%	n.a.	48.6	48.9
Net profit	21.1	14.1	62.0	9.7	35.2	67%	265%	35.3	30.3	31.4
Gross Margin	6.3%	7.5%	8.3%	10.2%	8.4%	2.1pp	-1.8pp	8.4%	9.6%	
Construction	5.2%	6.9%	6.6%	7.9%	6.6%	1.4pp	-1.3pp		7.5%	
Residential	34.6%	34.4%	33.4%	33.0%	31.1%	-3.4pp	-1.9pp		32.0%	
Rental	-22%	19.5%	5.2%	10.9%	16.6%	39.1pp	0.5pp		10.0%	
Backlog	8,115	8,865	8,465	8,279	8,879	9%	7%			
OCF	21	-1	251	-266	35	64%	-			
NWC	-52	-29	184	-294	-18	-	-			
FCF	-14	-10	208	-280	13	-	-			
Net Debt	343	365	177	462	436					
P/E12M trailing	12.8	12.3	11.8	12.4	10.9					
EV/EBITDA 12M trailing	9.3	9.0	7.5	8.9	7.9					
EBITDA margin	5.5%	3.9%	9.9%	6.0%	6.7%	-	0.1pp		6.8%	6.7%
EBIT margin	4.4%	2.8%	9.1%	4.3%	5.7%	-	0.3pp		5.7%	5.7%
Net profit margin	2.9%	1.9%	6.2%	1.8%	3.9%	0.9pp	2.1pp	3.9%	3.5%	3.6%

Source: Company, Trigon

The Group's final results came in close to the preliminary figures (although adj. EBITDA ultimately came in weaker than we had expected), which we assessed as neutral.

Relative to the earlier disclosures, we would highlight above all: 1) a gross margin in the construction segment clearly weaker than our assumptions (6.6% vs. 7.5%), though still better y/y,
2) PLN 6mn of other operating activity, which had a positive impact on EBITDA (adj. EBITDA ultimately came in 6% below our assumptions),
3) the sale of the retail pavilion in Starachowice (to date the property had been leased to the operator of a Bricomarché store), which lifted FCF in 2Q26 by PLN 17mn and, above all
4) positive OCF and a cosmetic decline in contract assets from the valuation of construction contracts (from PLN 625mn to PLN 568mn) alongside a clear increase in receivables (from PLN 371mn to PLN 571mn), which in our view indicates that the Group has begun "invoicing" its large road contracts.

***In summary**, we view the results as neutral. At this stage it is difficult for us to estimate the actual cash impact of the signed indexation annexes with GDDKiA on the FCF trajectory – contract assets still represent a very large asset item (netted contract assets less construction contract liabilities correspond to 14% of LTM construction segment revenue vs. 22% at year-end and 13% a year earlier), while the visible increase in receivables bodes well for the second half of the year, when the contracting authorities will take over the bulk of the Group's road contracts and pay the final consideration for completion of the orders. On 4 September we will also learn the ruling of the Regional Court in Warsaw, which, together with the FCF trajectory mentioned above, will have a key impact on the Group's equity story. Assuming that the second half of the year brings a further shift of contracts from construction assets into receivables (and assuming that the Group does not decide to pursue a large M&A deal), Mirbud may positively surprise with the pace of balance-sheet deleveraging, even despite the weaker-than-assumed margins on current production. The balance-sheet position remains far from ideal (particularly in the context of the coming build-up of investment in the domestic construction market), but at this stage, bearing in mind that the annexes with GDDKiA were signed in mid-June and their impact on the Group's FCF should be more visible in 2H26E, we expect the second half of the year to deliver positive FCF.*

2Q26 Conference call highlights [neutral]

#Construction
- In 1H26, a total of PLN 196m of long-term contract remeasurements was settled, largely of an indexation nature. At Kobylarnia, claims on the Gostyń project and the S6 Tri-City Ring Road were settled (>PLN 130m in total), and at Mirbud c. PLN 30m on the S1 Węgierska Górka and c. PLN 30m on the remaining contracts.
- The y/y increase in the gross margin in the construction segment stemmed mainly from higher profitability in the warehouse segment (by almost 2pp y/y).
- In the Management Board's view, funds from the KPO (National Recovery Plan) have already begun to be genuinely spent in the construction industry, which is currently supporting the Group's revenue.
- The situation in the warehouse market has improved recently.
- On the Tri-City Ring Road (OMT), c. PLN 120m of remeasurements was settled in 1H26, with c. PLN 100m remaining (additional works and indexation) – all of it should be settled by the end of FY26E. At Kobylarnia, c. PLN 150-200m of claims still remains to be settled.
- The indexation annexes signed with GDDKiA will not translate directly into results, as part of the indexation is already recognized in capitalized claims. The Management Board estimates indexation revenue at PLN 180-200m (partly already recognized), of which c. half was received in cash in 2Q26, with the remainder expected in 3-4Q26E. The Group will pass on c. half of these payments to subcontractors.
- The amounts quoted represent the maximum values obtainable; part of them relates to the ongoing S74 contract, which has not yet exceeded the indexation thresholds, so settlement there will only take place at the end of the contract, i.e. in FY27E.
- S1 Węgierska Górka: a claim of PLN 412m was filed, of which c. 1/3 was capitalized (c. PLN 130m), and PLN 30m of that was paid in June for site overheads. C. PLN 100m remains to be settled – the second part of the overheads (probably c. PLN 30m) is to be closed still in FY26E, while the part relating to geological differences in 1Q27E.
- S1 Suchy Potok / Dankowice: the claim is valued at above PLN 100m; indexation can only be charged once a time-extension annex is in place, which the Group expects to be concluded in 3Q26E.
- The Group is currently executing 26 active building construction contracts, with a steadily rising share of public utility buildings (construction cycle of c. 3 years), which the Management Board views as favorable. There are still few industrial facilities compared with previous years, although the market is reviving slightly (execution cycle of c. 10-12 months). Residential buildings are constructed almost exclusively for JHM Development – the exception is one contract for an external developer (apartment buildings in the center of Wrocław).

#Order backlog
- The order backlog amounted to PLN 8.9bn, of which PLN 7.2bn is infrastructure contracts and PLN 1.3bn building construction. The net backlog is spread out to 2030 – infrastructure contracts run for as long as 5-6 years, while building contracts are much shorter, which is why, with infrastructure accounting for more than 80% of the backlog, roads generate c. 50-60% of revenue.
- In 1H26 the Group signed contracts worth PLN 1.98bn. In July and August the Group signed contracts worth >PLN 300m.
- In the waiting room (selected bids and most advantageous bids) the Group currently has PLN 3.1bn (vs. PLN 2.5bn a quarter ago).
- In 1H26, 11 contracts were signed: 5 building contracts worth PLN 550m (PLN 736m including the two contracts concluded after the reporting period) and 6 infrastructure contracts, including two further ones, for PLN 1,244m in total.
- The waiting room comprises PLN 832m of pending bids and PLN 2.2bn of most advantageous bids; 8 of the most advantageous bids are not subject to proceedings before the KIO.
- Rail Baltica has not been included in the value of the bids in the waiting room. In the event of a favorable ruling, the Group would like to execute the contract on the terms of the bid submitted, despite its low pricing (c. 5% gross margin) and the increase in materials and subcontracting costs, treating it as an entry into the development of the segment.
- The sale of Torpol shares does not preclude further bidding in consortium with this entity in PKP PLK tenders.
- The bidding success rate (hit ratio) came in at 12% in 1H26 (PLN 1.6bn of contracts signed against PLN 14bn of bids submitted) vs. 7% in FY25, 31% in FY24 and 4% in FY23. The Management Board expects the success rate to improve further by year-end.

- The ruling of the Regional Court in Warsaw (concerning the environmental penalty) is expected on Friday. A favorable decision opens the way for the Group to win the Rail Baltica tender and to an order backlog above PLN 11bn.
- The only new geographic market under consideration is Ukraine – the Group is awaiting the award of a tender for an engineering structure worth c. EUR 30m on the Kyiv-Lviv route, treated as a first step. Power engineering and rail are to be the new business areas.

#JHM / Other
- At the end of June, JHM had 706 units under construction (33k sqm of usable residential floor area in total).
- The offer at the end of June comprised 563 apartments, of which 248 were completed units.
- The Warehouse Park in Bolesławiec is currently 72% commercialized.
- As of today, Marywilska has still not reached agreement with the City of Warsaw on extending the land lease.
- In 1H26 JHM completed three projects and handed over 253 residential units under notarial deeds – more than in the whole of 2025 and clearly more than in 1H24 (in 2025, however, more than 300 sale agreements were signed).
- In 1H26 JHM was executing five projects, and 94 preliminary and development agreements remained on completed projects. In 1H26, 304 preliminary and development agreements were signed, and their number stood at 288 at the end of June.
- The land bank allows for the construction of 8,300 units by 2045. In the case of the land in Poznań, the schedule accounts for the ongoing land preparation phase, so there are no delays as of today – the Group hopes to complete the process in FY26E or at the beginning of FY27E.
- The occupancy rate in Ostróda came in at 95% and in the container town in Warsaw at 100% (fully leased); in Bolesławiec the Group sees a chance of reaching c. 90% as early as next quarter. Ultimately, an exit from the rental segment and the sale of the properties in Ostróda and Bolesławiec are under consideration, with a focus on the core construction and assembly business.
- Marywilska remains without any impact on the Group's financials – contractual terms are being agreed with the city and the expansion has not been started.
- In 2H26E JHM plans to hand over 150-200 units.

#Outlook
- The order backlog at the end of FY26E should exceed PLN 10bn.
- The consolidated revenue target for FY26E is PLN 3.3bn and the Management Board sees no threat to its delivery; c. PLN 3.5bn is even possible, depending on the pace of invoicing of the contracts awaiting a ZRID permit.
- In FY26E the Group plans to build four more Kobylarnia asphalt mix plants – in Recz (for the S10 construction) and in Poznań and Opole (for the S11 construction).
- The gross margin on sales in the construction business in 2H26E is expected at around 7-7.5%, i.e. better than in 1H26 (1Q26: 7.9%, 2Q26: 6.6%). In the road business the Management Board sees room for margin improvement towards 7.5-8%, but mainly from FY27E, once the new contracts enter the phase of intensive execution.
- The reconstruction of Marywilska requires administrative decisions and agreement on changes to the lease agreement – until these are obtained, the Group is holding off on deciding on further steps, and the ball remains in the city's court. The Management Board expects a decision by the end of FY26E, without knowing which way it will go (the process is hampered by the approaching election year and the city's other priorities). If construction does not start in the autumn, it will not be possible to close it before the winter, which would push the entire project back by a year.
- The Group expects positive operating cash flow in the coming quarters; on a cumulative basis, the end of FY26E should come in at around zero.
- Two acquisition processes are being run in parallel: in the rail segment and in power engineering construction. In the Management Board's view, the sale of Torpol shares resulted from market conditions and the opportunity to exit at a profit, and it does not close the door to acquiring an entity from the rail industry – talks are being held with more than one large State Treasury-linked company (which lengthens the decision-making process), and the Management Board assumes the process will be closed and the price agreed by the end of FY26E.
- In the power engineering part, one entity has been selected; the Management Board rates the chances of finalization as high and hopes to expand the group with this segment in FY27E.

We assess the message from the conference as neutral, although in truth our feelings are ambivalent. On the one hand, we take positively the start of the settlement and invoicing of the Group's largest construction contracts, including the Tri-City Metropolitan Ring Road, which from our point of view structurally reduces balance sheet risk and could potentially translate into a deleveraging of the Group. On the other hand, we take negatively the more detailed guidance on the cash inflows related to the indexation annexes, which will indeed amount to the c. PLN 200m we had assumed, but will not be the same as the inflows accruing to the Group – Mirbud will have to pass on c. half of the above amount to the subcontractors it worked with on those contracts. Ultimately, OCF for the whole of FY26E may be close to zero vs. the PLN 150-250m we had previously assumed – after including the sale of Torpol shares, FCF may amount to PLN 40-80m vs. -PLN 335m in total over the last 3 years. It therefore remains an open question how the Group plans to finance the announced acquisitions – especially as the clear declaration regarding two targets in the rail segment (i.e. companies owned by the State Treasury) implies relatively large transactions with tickets of >PLN 500m, and this amount does not even include a potential acquisition in the power engineering segment.

***In summary**, we are waiting for the ruling of the Regional Court in Warsaw, which will be announced on Friday, 4 September. The Group's order intake should exceed PLN 5bn in FY26E, and the order backlog at the end of December may amount to c. PLN 10.2bn, and that assuming Rail Baltica ultimately "goes" to the TrackTec consortium. The margin guidance for the construction segment (7-7.5%) for 2H26E is also shaping up below our previous model assumptions (we saw 7.5-8%), although in our view it is not the second-half results that are currently key for sentiment towards Mirbud, but rather the FCF trajectory and the resolution of the Rail Baltica contract.*

Risk factors

Materials and commodity price risk. An acceleration in the price inflation of key materials (steel, aggregates, cement, asphalt) may have a negative impact on our forecasts, particularly given that the indexation mechanism does not fully compensate general contractors for cost increases.

Risk of workforce outflow. After the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, c. 66% of workers from that country left the Polish construction industry. Construction, particularly in the building segment, has in the past struggled with an insufficient number of qualified workers, and it cannot be ruled out that a similar situation will recur in the future-for example if investment in Germany accelerates.

Competition risk. Historically, road and rail companies have faced price wars in tenders triggered by aggressive bidding from foreign players (including Italian, Chinese and Turkish ones). Given the record plans of GDDKiA, PKP PLK and CPK regarding the supply of contracts over the next 10 years, a change in the competitive environment in the industry cannot be ruled out.

Risk of delays in tender awards. In recent years GDDKiA, PKP PLK, CPK and the PEJ projects alike have encountered significant delays versus their original schedules. Further delays in launching new tenders may lead to intensified competitive rivalry.

FX risk. The EUR/PLN and USD/PLN exchange rates are crucial above all from the perspective of suppliers of materials and commodities to construction companies, and a potential weakening of the PLN may push prices up.

Liquidity risk. The growing scale of operations and the simultaneous execution of numerous large contracts increase the Group's working capital requirements. Payment delays or a deterioration in the cash conversion cycle may require increased external financing and adversely affect liquidity.

Regulatory and administrative risk. The execution of some projects requires environmental decisions, ZRID road investment permits, building permits and other administrative approvals. Protracted procedures or appeals against the decisions issued may lead to delays in project execution and higher costs.

Risk of contractual penalties and claims. The contracts executed by the Group contain strict schedules and warranty obligations. Delays, workmanship defects or disputes with awarding parties may result in penalties being charged, claims being raised or guarantees being called, adversely affecting the Group's profitability and liquidity.

Risk of contract mispricing. The long-term nature of the projects executed means that actual execution costs may differ from the assumptions adopted at the bidding stage. Underestimating costs or the scope of work may lead to a decline in margin and even to losses on individual contracts.

Risk related to acquisitions and expansion into new segments. Business development in rail construction, among others, and potential acquisitions increase integration and operational risk. A lack of the expected synergies or lower profitability of the new areas may reduce the return on capital employed.

Self-cleaning procedure risk. Following the final dismissal of the appeal in the Rail Baltica case, the Company will have to carry out a self-cleaning procedure in order to limit the risk of exclusion from future tenders. If the awarding parties deem the remedial measures applied insufficient, this could result in the Company's bids being rejected and adversely affect the winning of new contracts.

TRIGON DOM MAKLERSKI S.A.

Plac Unii, Puławska 2 st.,
Building B,
02-566 Warszawa

+48 22 330 11 11

recepcja@trigon.pl

LinkedIn

www.trigon.pl

CEE EQUITY RESEARCH

Grzegorz Kujawski — *Head of Research*
Consumer, E-commerce, Financials

Dominik Niszcz, CFA — *Senior Analyst*
TMT, E-commerce

Maciej Marcinowski — *Deputy Head of Research*
Strategy, Banks, Financials

Łukasz Rudnik — *Senior Analyst*
Strategy, Foreign Markets, Industrials

Grzegorz Balcerski, CFA — *Analyst*
Gaming, TMT

David Sharma, CFA — *Senior Analyst*
Construction, Real Estate, Building Materials

Katarzyna Kosiorek, PhD — *Analyst*
Biotechnology

Piotr Chodyra — *Analyst*
FMCG, Defence, Deep tech

Michał Kozak — *Senior Analyst*
Oil & Gas, Chemicals, Utilities, Mining

Kacper Mazur — *Assistant Analyst*

EQUITY SALES

Grzegorz Skowroński — *Managing Director*

SALES TRADING

Paweł Szczepański — *Head of Sales*

Paweł Czupryński — *Senior Sales Trader*

Michał Sopiński, CFA — *Deputy Head of Sales*

Hubert Kwiecień — *Sales Trader*

Disclaimer

General information

The Document has been prepared by Trigon Dom Maklerski S.A. (the “Brokerage House”), for renumeration, on behalf of Warsaw Stock Exchange S.A. (the "WSE"), based on agreement for the provision of services for the preparation of analytical reports (the "Agreement"), which is supervised by the Polish Financial Supervision Authority.
In the first place, the Document is addressed to selected clients of the Brokerage House who use its services in the area of research and recommendations. It may, however, be distributed to a wider public from the date specified therein (by posting it on the Brokerage House website, providing it to entities that may quote it in media, in whole or in parts as they see fit, or otherwise) as a recommendation within the meaning of the Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on market abuse (market abuse regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC Text with EEA relevance (“Regulation”).

Glossary of professional terms:
capitalisation – market price multiplied by the number of a company’s shares
free float (%) – percentage of a company’s shares held by shareholders with less than 5% of total voting rights attached to the shares, reduced by treasury shares held by the company
min/max 52 wks – lowest/highest share price over the previous 52 weeks
average turnover – average volume of share trading over the previous month

EBIT – operating profit
EBITDA – operating profit before depreciation and amortisation
adjusted profit – net profit adjusted for one-off items
CF – cash flow
CAPEX – sum of investment expenditures on fixed assets
OCF – cash generated through a company’s operating activities
FCF – cash generated by a company after accounting for cash outflows to support its operations and maintain capital assets
FCFF - free cash flow, cash generated through the operational activities of the company minus capital expenditures and lease payments
ROA – rate of return on assets
ROE – rate of return on equity
ROIC – rate of return on invested capital
NWC – net working capital
cash conversion cycle – length of time it takes for a company to convert its cash investments in production inputs into cash revenue from sale of its products or services
gross profit margin – ratio of gross profit to net revenue
EBITDA margin – ratio of the sum of operating profit and depreciation/amortisation to net revenue
EBIT margin – ratio of operating profit to net revenue
net margin – ratio of net profit to net revenue
EPS – earnings per share
DPS – dividend per share
BVPS – book value per share
P/E – ratio of market price to earnings per share
P/BV – ratio of market price to book value per share
EV/EBITDA – ratio of a company’s EV to EBITDA
EV – sum of a company’s current capitalisation and net debt
DY – dividend yield, ratio of dividends paid to share price
FCFF yield – free cash flow yield, FCFF divided by EV and adjustments
RFR – risk free rate
WACC – weighted average cost of capital

Recommendations of the Brokerage House
Issuer – MIRBUD S.A.
BUY – we expect the total return on an investment to reach at least 15%
HOLD − we expect the price of an investment to be largely stable, with potential upside of up to 15%
SELL – we expect negative total return on an investment of more than -0%
Recommendations of the Brokerage House are valid for a period of 12 months from their issuance or until the price target of the financial instrument is achieved.
The Brokerage House may update its recommendations at any time, depending on the prevailing market conditions or the judgement of persons who produced a given recommendation.
Short-term recommendations (particularly those designated as speculative) may be valid for shorter periods of time. Short-term recommendations designated as speculative involve a higher investment risk.
Document prepared by: David Sharma

Valuation methods used
The Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) method values a company by estimating its future cash flows and discounting them back to their present value.
- Advantages: future-oriented, flexible when it comes to assumptions, based on the intrinsic value of a company, widely accepted.
- Disadvantages: sensitivity to assumptions, complexity, subjectivity, doesn’t consider market sentiment or short-term fluctuations.

The comparable valuation method values a company by comparing it to similar publicly traded companies.
- Advantages: simplicity, transparency, benchmarking, reflects current market valuations and investor sentiment.
- Disadvantages: lack of specificity, limited comparables, sensitive to market fluctuations, ignoring fundamental differences.

SOTP – sum-of-the-parts method, which consists in valuing a company by valuing its individual business lines separately and then summing them up.

Advantages: different valuation methods can be applied to diverse business lines; the approach is useful for assessing the value of a company e.g. in the case of planned acquisition or restructuring.
Disadvantages: the peer group for individual business lines is usually limited, the method does not adequately account for synergies between business segments.
Risk-adjusted net present value method (rNPV)
Advantages: accounting for probabilities assigned to future cash flows, providing a more realistic assessment of the present value of future cash flows and reflecting business-specific factors, especially in the case of innovative companies.
Disadvantages: subjectivity involved in the adoption of a discount rate, significant reliance on a number of assumptions, high level of complexity in the calculations and exclusion of qualitative factors from the valuation.
Discounted residual income method (DRI)
Advantages: valuation based on the excess of income over risk-adjusted opportunity cost to owners of capital, the method can be applied to companies that do not pay dividends or generate positive FCF.
Disadvantages: significant reliance on subjective judgements and assumptions, as well as sensitivity of the valuation to any changes in those variables.
Discounted dividend model (DDM)
Advantages: accounting for real cash flows to equity owners, the model works best for companies with a long history of dividend distribution.
Disadvantages: the method can be applied to dividend-paying companies only, it is not suitable for companies with a short history of dividend distribution.
Net asset value method (NAV)
Advantages: the approach is particularly relevant to holding companies with significant property, plant and equipment assets, the calculation of NAV is relatively straightforward.
Disadvantages: the method neglects future revenue or earnings potential and may not properly reflect the value of intangible assets.
Target multiple method
Advantages: the method can be applied to any company.
Disadvantages: it involves a high degree of subjectivity.
Replacement value method – it assesses the value of a company based on the costs of replacing its assets.
Advantages: the method is particularly relevant to companies with significant property, plant and equipment assets.
Disadvantages: it may be hard to capture the value of a company's intangible assets, reputation and market potential.
Liquidation value method – the sum of prices that the business would receive upon selling its individual assets on the open market.
Advantages: the method can capture the lowest threshold of a company's value.
Disadvantages: it may be hard to capture the value of a company's intangibles.

Basis of the valuation or methodology and the underlying assumptions used to evaluate the financial instrument or the issuer, or to set a price target for the financial instrument: DCF model.
The valuation, methodology or underlying assumptions have not changed since the date when this Document was completed and first disseminated.
This Document was not disclosed to the issuer and subsequently amended. This Document has remained unchanged since the day it was completed and first disseminated.
The Research Team, which produces recommendations, relies exclusively on verified sources, publicly available as part of commercial knowledge bases and databases (periodic reports of issuers, Bloomberg, Reuters, Statistics Poland), as well as in-house analyses.
For detailed information on the valuation or methodology and underlying assumptions, as well as any previous recommendations concerning the Issuer's financial instruments disseminated during the preceding 12 months, go to the Brokerage House's website at www.trigon.pl/zestawienie-rekomendacji.

Legal disclaimers, disclaimers related to risks
The Brokerage House believes that this Document has been objectively presented, with due care and attention and with the avoidance of potential conflicts of interest. The Brokerage House bears no liability for any inaccuracy or misjudgement that may nevertheless be found in this Document. In particular, the Brokerage House bears no liability for any damage suffered as a result of investment decisions made in reliance on information contained in this Document.
This Document does not address the individual needs or circumstances of any investor, nor is it an indication that any investment is suitable for a given investor. Accordingly, the conclusions drawn based on this Document may prove inappropriate for that particular investor.
The Brokerage House bears no liability for the way in which information contained in this Document is used. Historical data presented in this Document relate to the past, but past performance is no guarantee that similar results will be achieved in the future. Forward looking data may prove inaccurate, as they are merely an expression of the judgement of individuals speaking on behalf of the entity covered by this report or result from the Brokerage House's own judgement.
Anyone intending to use the information or conclusions contained in this Document is advised to rely on their own judgement, consider information other than that provided in this Document, verify the presented information on their own, asses the risks related to decision-making based on this Document; and consider consulting an independent analyst, investment adviser or other professional with relevant expertise.
Unless this Document indicates otherwise, information contained herein should not be regarded as authorised or approved by the entity to which it relates, as the conclusions and opinions contained herein are solely those of the Brokerage House.
Actual or potential conflicts of interest are managed by the Brokerage House through relevant arrangements provided for in the Regulation on Recommendations. In particular, in order to prevent or manage conflicts of interest, the Brokerage House has set up organisational barriers, as required by the applicable laws and regulations, compliance with which is monitored by the Compliance Department.
The key document governing the process of managing potential conflicts of interest at the Brokerage House is the "Conflicts of Interest Policy of Trigon Dom Maklerski S.A." For detailed information on the Policy, go to www.trigon.pl.
The Brokerage House has developed and put in place mechanisms ensuring that conflicts of interest are managed through legal and administrative barriers designed to limit the flow of information between various organisational units/ individuals employed by the Brokerage House or other persons.
In particular, the Research Team operates as an organisationally, functionally and physically separate, independent organisational unit of the Brokerage House.
The Brokerage House believes that the organisational arrangements put in place ensure that the contents of a recommendation remain confidential until it is released.

As at the date of this Document:

- there are no conflicts of interest between the Brokerage House and/or persons involved in producing this Document or having access to this Document prior to its publication (the Brokerage House's employees, service providers and other associated persons) and the Issuer
- the Brokerage House holds shares of Issuer
- the Brokerage House does not act as a market maker for the Issuer's financial instruments
- the Brokerage House does not act as an issuer's maker for the Issuer's financial instruments
- the Brokerage House does not provide the Issuer or its affiliates with financial advisory, investment banking or other brokerage services
- the Brokerage House does not perform the following services with respect to the Issuer's financial instruments covered by this Document
  - research and recommendation services concerning the Issuer's financial instruments
  - offering the financial instruments on the primary market or in an IPO over the 12-month period preceding the publication of this Document
  - buying or selling the financial instruments for its own account in the performance of tasks related to the operation of a regulated market
  - buying or selling the financial instruments for its own account in the performance of standby or firm commitment underwriting agreements

  with the reservation that the Brokerage House may at any time offer or provide its services to the Issuer
- there are no persons among those involved in producing the recommendation, or those who did not take part in its production but had or could have access to the recommendation, who would hold shares in the Issuer representing 5% or more of its share capital or financial instruments whose value is materially linked to the value of financial instruments issued by the Issuer
- no members of the governing bodies of the Issuer or their close persons are members of the governing bodies of Trigon Dom Maklerski S.A.
- none of the persons involved in producing the report serves in the governing bodies of the Issuer, holds a managerial position in, or is a close person of any member of the governing bodies of the Issuer; moreover, none of those persons or their close persons is party to any agreement with the Issuer that would be executed on terms and conditions different from those of other agreements executed between the Issuer and consumers.

The Brokerage House has not received dividends from the Issuer over the previous 12 months.

The remuneration of persons involved in producing this Document is not linked to the financial results achieved by the Brokerage House on transactions in the Issuer's financial instruments performed by the Brokerage House. Employees of the Brokerage House involved in producing the recommendation:

- do not receive remuneration that is directly tied to transactions in the Brokerage House's services set out in Sections A and B of Annex I to Directive 2014/65/EU or other type of transaction the Brokerage House or any legal person that is part of the same group performs, or to trading fees the Brokerage House or any legal person that is part of the same group receives
- do not receive or buy shares in the Issuer prior to a public offering of such shares.

The Brokerage House or its affiliates may take part in transactions related to the Issuer's financing, provide services to the Issuer, intermediate in the provision of services by the Issuer, and have the possibility of executing or execute transactions in financial instruments issued by the Issuer or its affiliates, also prior to the presentation of this Document to its recipients.

There are no other circumstances potentially leading to conflicts of interest that would be subject to disclosure under the Regulation on Recommendations.

The Brokerage House pays careful attention to numerous risks related to investments in financial instruments. Investing in financial instruments carries a high degree of risk of losing some or all funds invested.

It is assumed that each person (organisational unit) that receives, accepts or consents to receiving this Document, by doing so:

- accepts every disclaimer stated above;
- confirms that they have read the Trigon Dom Maklerski S.A. Terms and Conditions of Research and Recommendation Services (available at: www.trigon.pl, referred to as the "Terms & Conditions") and accepts them;
- agrees to be provided with a one-time research and recommendation service by the Brokerage House through receiving access to this Document, in accordance with the Terms & Conditions and subject to the disclaimers contained in or published with this Document, with the proviso that: (1) the service is limited to the free-of-charge provision of this Document and use of this Document by its recipient, (2) the service contract is valid only for the time of using this Document by its recipient.

This Document is not an offer within the meaning of Art. 66 of the Polish Civil Code, does not purport to provide any investment, legal or accounting advice, does not constitute an advertisement, an offer to sell or a solicitation of offers to subscribe for or purchase any financial instruments, nor is it a basis for entering into any other agreement or creating any other obligation.

Date and time when the production of the recommendation was completed: 09.09.2026 7:29.

Date and time when it was first disseminated: 09.09.2026 7:30.

United States: The Analyst that prepared this report is not registered or qualified as a research analyst with FINRA and is not subject to U.S. rules with regards to the preparation of research reports and the independence of analysts. This third-party research report is distributed in the United States ("US") to Major US Institutional Investors (as defined in Rule 15a-6 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended) only by Wedbush Securities Inc. ("Wedbush"), a broker-dealer registered in the US (registered under Section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended). All responsibility for the distribution of this report by Wedbush in the US shall be borne by Wedbush. This report is not directed at you if Wedbush is prohibited or restricted by any legislation or regulation in any jurisdiction from making it available to you. You should satisfy yourself before reading it that Wedbush is permitted to provide research material concerning investments to you under relevant legislation and regulations.
All U.S. persons receiving and/or accessing this report and wishing to effect transactions in any security mentioned within must do so with: Wedbush Securities Inc. 1000 Wilshire Blvd, Los Angeles, California 90017, +1 (646) 604-4232 and not with the issuer of this report.