SWF Monographs on Space Governance

No. 1 – July 2025

Global Space Governance – Pathways to Agreement

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SECURE WORLD FOUNDATION

About Secure World Foundation

The Secure World Foundation (SWF) is a private operating nonprofit foundation dedicated to promoting the secure, sustainable, and peaceful uses of outer space, ensuring its preservation for future generations. As the only organization devoted entirely to space sustainability, SWF collaborates with international partners in governments, industry, and civil society to foster policies and practices that enhance the protection of the space domain. Recognizing the rapid increase in the number of actors in outer space and the urgent need to promote norms of behavior and best practices to ensure sustainable activities in space, SWF is committed to facilitating dialogue, informing policy decisions, and fostering international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space. Through these efforts, SWF strives to ensure that space remains an accessible, safe, and stable operating domain for commercial, military, and civil use by all nations.

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Doc. #PP25.10
Last Update: July 2025

Published July 2025

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1. Framing the Challenge

Space is no longer a frontier on the distant horizon but rather a burgeoning domain of research and commerce as well as political and military competition. With over 12,000 active satellites orbiting Earth and growing international interest in space exploration and exploitation, the governance of space is rapidly moving from a niche policy issue to a central question of global order.

The governance of space will be one of the important challenges of 21st-century diplomacy. The issue of "space governance" will test the ability of international laws and global institutions to adapt to a domain beyond terrestrial boundaries. As with the oceans in the 17th century, or airspace in the 20th, the emergence of space as a contested, commercial, and strategic arena compels us to confront foundational questions of order, legitimacy, fairness and restraint.

This paper explores practical pathways toward a more structured system of global space governance. At the outset, it is important to recognize that the very idea of such a system remains contested. Some argue that space is evolving too rapidly for governance frameworks to keep pace, and that premature regulation could stifle innovation. Others contend that early consensus-building on foundational norms is both feasible and necessary to safeguard the long-term sustainability of space activities. Rather than seek to resolve this debate, this paper aims to identify near-term opportunities for incremental progress and practical steps that can support the continued growth of space activity while laying the groundwork for a more orderly and cooperative space environment.

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2. Key Challenges for International Space Community

Global policymakers and regulators face a variety of challenges as governments and private entities interact in space for civil, research, national security, and commercial purposes. Key challenges include:

SPECTRUM ALLOCATION AND INTERFERENCE

The electromagnetic spectrum is a finite, globally shared resource. With the rise of large constellations, high-throughput satellites, and a diverse range of novel commercial space activities, spectrum competition has intensified, particularly in the Ka and Ku bands. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU), a specialized agency of the United Nations, is chartered to manage spectrum allocation for the global community. However, the ITU has limited authority for other commercial activities such as human spaceflight and lunar resource allocation.

DRAMATIC INCREASE IN COMMERCIAL SPACE ACTIVITY

The current international governance architecture was built around nation-states, yet today's space environment is increasingly driven by commercial actors. The rise of private mega-constellations, autonomous operations, lunar and human space endeavors has outpaced traditional regulatory tools. Without mechanisms to formally integrate non-state actors into norm-setting and coordination processes, governance risks becoming detached from the realities shaping the orbital environment.

ORBITAL CONGESTION AND SPACE TRAFFIC COORDINATION

There are currently over 12,000 satellites in orbit, with tens of thousands more planned. Low Earth Orbit (LEO), particularly below 1,200 km, has seen a dramatic rise in use. No clear global authority exists to regulate constellation size, allocate orbital shells, or ensure equitable access for new space entrants. The ITU's responsibility for frequency coordination can indirectly affect orbital spacing and shell utilization. For example, although the ITU does not assign orbital altitude ranges or shell exclusivity to operators, orbital spacing and shell definition can be the de facto result of operator filings and operator self-allocation. Currently, global space traffic coordination services, which are important for managing increasing space traffic, are poorly coordinated and information sharing among operators is uneven.

SPACE DEBRIS PROLIFERATION

Space debris represents a classic "tragedy of the commons" in that no single space operator bears responsibility for the long-term stewardship of space. Debris has resulted from both unintentional (e.g exploding or malfunctioning satellites or rocket stages) and intentional (e.g., anti-satellite weapons testing) space activities. Although mitigation guidelines exist (largely through the work of Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC)), they are non-binding. National agencies may choose to include these guidelines in licensing conditions, but enforcement varies widely and many legacy systems are exempt or untracked. No remediation fund or coordinated removal effort exists, and no international organization has the authority to address this issue.[1]

NON-EARTH RESOURCES

The 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits national appropriation of celestial bodies but offers little clarity on commercial mining rights or how extracted resources should be governed. The 1979 Moon Agreement attempted to address this but was rejected by major spacefaring powers and remains largely symbolic. More recently, the signatories to the Artemis Accords signaled their support for the extraction and use of space resources while still adhering to the Outer Space Treaty. COPUOS recently established the Action Team on Lunar Activities Consultation (ATLAC) to facilitate the development of recommendations, but the outcome or impact of this work is still unknown.

INCREASING MILITARY SPACE ACTIVITIES

While the Outer Space Treaty mandates peaceful use, it does not prohibit military activities. Today, most space systems, such as navigation, communications, and imaging systems, have dual-use capabilities. These systems are increasingly being provided to the world's militaries by commercial companies. No binding norms exist to regulate proximity operations, rendezvous maneuvers, or kinetic testing. In the absence of such norms, future space operations conducted without notification could lead to strategic instability.

INCREASING COMMERCIAL SPACE ACTIVITIES

The Outer Space Treaty embraces commercial space activity if such activities are done with the "authorization and continuing supervision" of the relevant State party to the agreement. The rapid expansion of new commercial activities – often licensed nationally but operating transnationally – has been challenging for the domestic regulations of certain states. For example, in the United States, there is uncertainty as to the regulatory entity responsible for activities such as satellite refueling, manufacturing in space, and lunar resource extraction. Activities such as these could have potential global impacts in areas where international bodies have no clear mandate.

EQUITABLE ACCESS TO SPACE RESOURCES [2]

Current international governance practices have long favored major government and commercial space actors. For example, the ITU's "first come, first served" principle allocates orbital slots and radio frequency assignments to states based on the chronological order of filing. While not a formal right of ownership, this system gives priority to those who submit and coordinate filings earliest, effectively granting operational advantage and quasi-exclusivity. Similarly, the Artemis Accords supports "safety zones" intended to prevent interference with ongoing surface or subsurface activities on celestial bodies. The concept of "safety zones" may allow powerful states or companies to claim exclusive operational areas on the Moon or asteroids without a widely agreed regulatory framework.

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3. Current Governance Tools for Space

The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) has long stood as the principal diplomatic body for multilateral discussions on broad issues of space law and policy. Established during the early Cold War, its foundational treaties provided the legal bedrock for early space exploration, emphasizing peaceful use and non-appropriation[3]. COPUOS has also led soft law efforts, most notably the Guidelines for the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities (LTS Guidelines). However, its structure, anchored as it is in consensus decision-making among more than 100 states, renders it slow, reactive, and often paralyzed in the face of the urgent contemporary governance challenges discussed above. As geopolitical tensions rise and new space actors proliferate, the very inclusivity that lends COPUOS legitimacy also constrains its ability to respond to rapidly evolving space governance challenges. Finally, COPUOS does not have a current means to include the views of the commercial space industry, an increasingly important element of the evolving space industry.

By contrast, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) plays a highly specific, technically focused role managing radiofrequency spectrum and indirectly, orbital slots. Through its Radiocommunication Sector (ITU-R), the organization wields procedural authority to regulate satellite filings and coordinate frequency use, which is indispensable to satellite operations worldwide. Unlike COPUOS, the ITU operates through a mix of majority voting and technical procedures, making it more efficient in execution. Also, unlike COPUOS, ITU is open to private sector involvement and membership. However, the ITU is not a space policy body per se and lacks the mandate, expertise, or political breadth to engage with broader policy issues. Its narrow focus, while effective in its domain, limits its utility as a venue for broader space governance issues.

The fundamental difference between these two organizations lies in their institutional culture. COPUOS is a broad, deliberative body rooted in political dialogue and legal principle. It excels in establishing normative baselines but struggles with operational coordination or rapid norm development. ITU, in contrast, is a technocratic system manager. It delivers tangible outputs through structured procedures but operates largely below the level of strategic policy. Neither is structurally equipped to bridge the growing divide between public and private space actors, nor to reconcile the competing visions of major space powers in a time of accelerating technological change.

As space becomes a more contested, commercialized, and congested domain, these legacy institutions are straining under the weight of expectations they were never designed to meet. Their historical achievements are significant, but neither COPUOS nor ITU alone can govern the increasingly multi-dimensional reality of modern space activity. The future likely demands new governance models that are more agile, inclusive of non-state actors, and capable of balancing strategic, commercial, and scientific priorities in real time.

Although neither COPUOS nor the ITU is well suited to manage the full scope of future global space governance, other international organizations offer valuable models. The International Maritime Organization (IMO), a specialized UN agency, is widely recognized for its operational effectiveness. The IMO issues binding international conventions—such as SOLAS (Safety of Life at Sea) and MARPOL (International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships)—which are enforced through flag-state and port-state control mechanisms, as well as commercial pressures from insurers and classification societies. While

> The future likely demands new governance models that are more agile, inclusive of non-state actors, and capable of balancing strategic, commercial, and scientific priorities in real time.

its decision-making process favors consensus, it allows for majority voting in certain contexts, giving the organization flexibility to adapt to evolving technological and environmental challenges.

Of course, IMO regulations must ultimately be ratified and implemented through national legislation. However, the organization maintains a Member State Audit Scheme (IMSAS), which promotes structured compliance assessments. As a result, the IMO has built a robust operational ecosystem in which day-to-day maritime practices are strongly shaped by globally harmonized rules. This is an outcome seldom achieved by other UN-linked regulatory frameworks.

The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) provides another example of how global governance can evolve to manage a complex, high-risk, and commercially driven domain. Founded in 1944 under the Chicago Convention, ICAO develops and maintains Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) that govern nearly all aspects of international civil aviation from airworthiness and navigation to security and environmental compliance. These standards are formally adopted by ICAO's Council and implemented through national regulatory systems, but the process is deeply influenced by the aeronautics industry, including aircraft manufacturers, airlines, and service providers. Through industry participation in ICAO's technical committees and consultative bodies (such as the International Air Transport Association, IATA), private-sector expertise directly shapes the technical content of global standards. This public-private collaboration ensures that regulations are both operationally viable and globally interoperable, fostering a stable, predictable environment for investment, safety, and innovation.

In the context of global space governance, ICAO serves not as a direct template but as a demonstration of how a multilateral institution can balance state sovereignty, commercial activity, and technical standardization. Like aviation, space is increasingly shaped by private actors with the capacity to influence operational norms, yet current governance structures lack formal mechanisms to channel their input. If the international community were to embrace some future "Space ICAO," it would need to institutionalize the role of the commercial space sector not just as a stakeholder but as a co-developer of technical norms and safety protocols. This is particularly true in areas such as space traffic management, interoperability, and debris mitigation. ICAO's legitimacy stems not only from its universal state membership but also from its ability to synthesize political consensus and industry expertise into globally adopted operational frameworks. Any serious effort to institutionalize space governance will need to emulate this dual structure and be capable of combining multilateral oversight with meaningful, structured industry participation.

4. Standards–Setting and Technical Bodies

A critical but often underappreciated dimension of global space governance is the role played by technical standards-setting bodies. Organizations like the Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS), the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), and the International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (ICG) have quietly shaped the norms and protocols underpinning space operations. These institutions do not create binding rules or treaties, but they produce interoperable standards and technical guidelines that enable coordination, reduce risk, and facilitate trust across national and commercial boundaries.

The CCSDS, formed by major space agencies, focuses on creating common data formats and protocols that allow spacecraft and ground systems to communicate efficiently. These standards are essential for mission interoperability, especially as multilateral missions and commercial partnerships become more common. The ISO, through its Technical Committee 20 (TC 20), issues global standards for spacecraft design, testing, and safety procedures, thereby providing a common engineering language for an increasingly global supply chain. Both organizations play a foundational role in ensuring that spacecraft, ground systems, and data products are compatible across borders and organizations.

Meanwhile, the IADC has taken a leading role in addressing the urgent issue of orbital debris. Although it does not have regulatory power, its guidelines for debris mitigation have informed national licensing frameworks and international best practices. The International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (ICG), on the other hand, promotes compatibility among global and regional satellite navigation systems, including GPS, Galileo, GLONASS, and BeiDou. In an era of increasing dependence on satellite timing and navigation, this kind of quiet coordination work is essential to avoid signal interference and ensure global reliability. Importantly, these bodies often function through consensus among space agencies, giving their outputs the credibility of expert-driven, non-political solutions.

Despite their technical success, these organizations face structural limitations. They are not policymaking institutions, and they generally operate below the radar of geopolitical conflict. As a result, their outputs are voluntary and lack enforcement mechanisms. Yet, their value to global governance lies precisely in this apolitical, collaborative posture. These organizations generate what might be called "soft infrastructure" - a substrate of shared norms and capabilities upon which more formal political agreements can be built. As space governance evolves, these technical bodies may serve as the connective tissue between national regulators, international institutions, and commercial actors, translating abstract principles into practical, operational rules. Their continued inclusion in any future governance architecture will be essential to ensuring that policy visions remain anchored in technical feasibility and shared functionality.

5. Strategic Governance Pathways

To date, space governance has not emerged as a core diplomatic priority among leading spacefaring nations. Although individual dialogues and initiatives exist, there is little momentum to translate them into a comprehensive multilateral framework. The European Union's proposed Space Law - an effort to harmonize regulatory standards across member states - offers a potential regional model, though its implications for global governance remain uncertain. Absent the interest and efforts of the major space actors, progress is likely to take shape through a pragmatic process in which diverse approaches to coordination, norm-setting, and legitimacy interact over time. Near-term actions will likely emerge through normative coalitions, industry-driven technical standards, and bilateral or multilateral data-sharing agreements.

NORMATIVE COALITIONS

One promising mechanism for rule formation is the coalition model exemplified by the Artemis Accords. These voluntary arrangements allow like-minded states to advance principles related to transparency, lunar resource utilization, and coordination of civil activities. Future iterations could extend to the creation of "operational coordination zones," defined by shared traffic management and communication protocols for the most congested orbits. The strength of such coalitions lies in their flexibility, speed, and shared values, but their legitimacy remains bounded by participation. When major space actors remain outside such arrangements, the risk of fragmented governance increases, as do perceptions of exclusion or normative imbalance.

China, in partnership with Russia and other interested states, has proposed the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) initiative as a parallel effort to the U.S.-led Artemis Accords. The ILRS envisions the cooperative development of a long-term scientific outpost on the Moon's surface, with shared contributions from participating nations. The ILRS is not structured as a legal framework akin to the Artemis Accords and does not specifically address the issue of lunar resource extraction. However, the ILRS functions as a geopolitical and technical alternative to Artemis, emphasizing multilateral collaboration outside U.S.-aligned blocs and reflecting differing interpretations of lunar governance.[4]

TECHNICAL STANDARDS

In parallel, the technical community continues to play a quiet but essential role in building functional coherence across space operations. Organizations such as the CCSDS, ISO, and IADC have developed widely accepted standards for interoperability, safety, and debris mitigation. These standards lack binding legal force, but operate as de facto "soft law," shaping behavior through shared best practices and industry adoption[5]. Their effectiveness rests on credibility, operational utility, and alignment of incentives, rather than enforcement. Still, as with civil aviation and telecommunications, such technical scaffolding is indispensable—it enables basic trust, reduces friction, and lays the groundwork for more formalized governance structures.

AGREEMENTS ON DATA SHARING

A third pathway lies in the continued development of data transparency regimes, particularly in space situational awareness (SSA). The proliferation of satellite constellations has heightened the urgency of data exchange to prevent collisions, manage proximity operations, and coordinate maneuvering. While recent initiatives, such as the World Economic Forum's SSA principles[6], have framed this challenge, progress will depend on future bilateral and regional agreements. Over time, such practices could evolve into a globally distributed model for space traffic coordination, even absent binding multilateral agreements.

Although normative coalitions, technical standards, and data sharing agreements are valuable, there is, arguably, a long-term need for institutions that can serve as custodians of legitimacy and strategic balance in space governance. COPUOS and the ITU represent legacy structures that have, despite their limitations, enabled foundational achievements. Their evolution could involve broader mandates, closer commercial engagement, and enhanced working group structures. In the longer term, the concept of an independent authority focused on safety protocols, dispute resolution, and emergency coordination for space activities may become politically feasible. Such a body would likely take decades to form and would face resistance from states wary of sovereignty erosion or regulatory capture. But its value would lie not in daily operational control, but in anchoring the broader architecture in shared norms, stable procedures, and long-term vision.

This evolutionary model does not promise perfection or immediacy. It is, instead, a blueprint for how disparate actors can cohere into a functional order. This is unlikely to happen in sweeping new agreements, but rather by gradual alignment across layers of governance. Each layer supports the others - normative coalitions create political momentum; technical standards enable interoperability; coordination zones manage complexity, and data sharing ensures safety. Each component of this informal structure lends durability and legitimacy to the broader enterprise. In this vision, governance is not a destination, but a process that is iterative, layered, and ultimately reflective of the world it seeks to organize.

Governance is not a destination, but a process that is iterative, layered, and ultimately reflective of the world it seeks to organize.

6. Conclusion: Space Governance as the Architecture of a New Global Commons

We stand at a unique historical juncture. For the first time, humanity possesses the technological capacity to operate continuously and independently in orbit and soon these capabilities will extend to other celestial bodies. Today we lack the accompanying institutions and norms to ensure that this expansion unfolds in a manner that is stable, predictable, and peaceful. Some have argued that governance may constrain creativity or slow innovation, but history suggests that the absence of governance can foster an instability which is detrimental to the development of a dynamic and resilient commercial space environment. Without purposeful coordination, the space domain will reflect the centrifugal forces of our geopolitical moment and could lead to rivalry among great powers, fragmentation of norms, and privatization of authority without accountability.

In today's political environment, it is hard to imagine a single, unified system of global governance arising spontaneously. Space is unlikely to be governed by a new universal treaty regime. Instead, what is more likely is the evolution of a mosaic of overlapping frameworks. These are likely to begin with soft law norms, technical standards, commercial practices, bilateral understandings, and eventually, institutional mechanisms of oversight and arbitration. This is not necessarily a sign of failure, but perhaps the realistic path by which order has historically emerged - incrementally, imperfectly, and through the accommodation of diverse interests.

The goal of some future global governance is not the imposition of harmony or order, but the management of competing imperatives. Governance, in this conception, is not the endpoint but the scaffolding and the architecture through which a pluralistic world builds a shared stake in a domain beyond sovereignty. The task before us is nothing less than to lay the institutional and normative foundations for humanity's next great expansion. If we succeed, space may become a zone of enduring cooperation, scientific progress, and shared prosperity. If we fail, it may replicate the worst instincts of terrestrial politics in a far more fragile environment.

It is, therefore, the responsibility of nations, intergovernmental bodies, and entrepreneurs to lend their efforts to this endeavor. Space governance is not simply about regulating our activities but rather about shaping our relationship to the new horizon offered by space. As with all grand strategic undertakings, success will require vision tethered to realism, ambition tempered by restraint, and a sense of shared destiny strong enough to endure the turbulent decades to come.

Recommendations for National Policymakers and Regulators

CREATE FLEXIBLE MECHANISMS FOR STRATEGIC DIALOGUE

Develop structured and recurring channels for bilateral and multilateral dialogue on space governance, including technical coordination, civil-commercial harmonization, and national security risk management. These platforms can build trust, reduce miscalculation, and address dual-use challenges without requiring formal agreements.

LEVERAGE MARKET MECHANISMS TO INCENTIVIZE RESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOR

Use public procurement, insurance frameworks, and performance-based incentives to encourage compliance with safety and sustainability norms. Align national licensing and funding with internationally recognized standards to harmonize commercial innovation with global governance goals.

Recommendations for Intergovernmental Bodies

CREATE FORMAL ROLES FOR INDUSTRY AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN GOVERNANCE PROCESSES

Move beyond observer status by establishing advisory panels, working groups, or rotating consultative bodies that include industry, academia, and NGOs. Their input should inform norm-setting, implementation guidance, and compliance monitoring—especially in technically complex domains.

EMBRACE A MORE FLEXIBLE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE

Enable parallel progress through soft law, technical standards, and voluntary coalitions while preserving inclusive multilateralism for core norms. A pluralistic structure allows experimentation and responsiveness while building toward long-term institutional coherence.

Recommendations for Commercial Operators

LEAD VOLUNTARILY WHERE REGULATION LAGS

Commit to publicly adopted standards in debris mitigation, maneuver coordination, and SSA data-sharing. By doing so, commercial operators not only enhance operational safety, but also shape emerging global expectations and demonstrate readiness to behave responsibly in lieu of regulation.

CONTRIBUTE TO GLOBAL NORM-BUILDING THROUGH DATA AND DIALOGUE

Share non-sensitive SSA data and operational lessons with government, commercial, and academic partners. This will enhance industry's role as a governance stakeholder and helps ensure that future rules are grounded in technical and commercial reality.

Endnotes

1. The International Maritime Organization provides an example of how the satellite industry, working with global governments, might deal with damage caused by debris or space operations. The International Oil Pollution Compensation (IOPC) Funds, established under the auspices of the IMO, provide a liability and compensation regime for oil pollution damage resulting from tanker spills. Funded through mandatory contributions from companies that receive significant quantities of oil by sea, the IOPC Funds operate on a polluter-pays principle, offering a clear mechanism to compensate affected parties when damage exceeds the limits of shipowner liability. Crucially, the fund system ensures prompt compensation without protracted legal disputes and encourages responsible practices by internalizing externalities. It represents a hybrid governance tool, combining state treaty obligations with private-sector financing, all under an international regulatory umbrella.

2. The topic of "equity," although important, is beyond the scope of this paper. As mentioned above, the 1979 Moon Agreement attempted to establish global authority over lunar resources, however the Agreement was never signed by the major space powers and is today largely ignored. Today, there are those that argue that equity should be a central concern of international organizations. COPUOS has spent considerable time discussing this topic. Others argue that effective international organizations – such as ICAO and IMO – must be focused on producing tangible benefits (economic, environmental, security, etc.) for the countries and companies that participate.

3. **THE FIVE PRINCIPAL SPACE TREATIES:**

    1. **Outer Space Treaty (OST) - 1967**

       FULL TITLE: Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies | *Establishes foundational principles: non-appropriation of outer space, peaceful use, freedom of exploration, and state responsibility for national activities.*

    2. **Rescue Agreement - 1968**

       FULL TITLE: Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space | *Requires states to assist astronauts in distress and return space objects to their launching state.*

    3. **Liability Convention - 1972**

       FULL TITLE: Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects | *Establishes a liability regime for damage caused by space objects on Earth or in space, assigning responsibility to the launching state.*

    4. **Registration Convention - 1976**

       FULL TITLE: Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space | *Requires states to furnish information to the UN about the orbit and function of their space objects.*

    5. **Moon Agreement - 1979**

       FULL TITLE: Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies | *Expands OST principles to the Moon and other celestial bodies, declaring them the "common heritage of mankind." This Treaty has only a few signatories and has largely been ignored by the major space powers.*

4. In the United States, Congressional legislation (known as the Wolf Amendment) restricts NASA from engaging in bilateral cooperation with China without prior approval. This amendment was introduced in response to longstanding concerns about technology transfer and national security. While these concerns remain relevant, the blanket nature of the prohibition limits opportunities for structured scientific and technical dialogue – specifically in areas such as space traffic coordination. In an increasingly interconnected and strategically contested space environment, complete disengagement can unintentionally foster parallel systems, reduce transparency, and inhibit the development of shared norms. Over time, the absence of communication mechanisms may exacerbate strategic distrust. A more nuanced approach, one that maintains safeguards while allowing for selective engagement, could help balance risk with the broader imperative of fostering stability and predictability in space.

5. Non-binding norms, guidelines, standards, and principles often find their way into domestic regulations, insurance and commercial contracts. So, even though they were not intended to be binding, over time they can appear in legally binding instruments.

6. Space Situational Awareness Data and Information Sharing Principles, https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Space_Situational_Awareness_Data_and_Information_Sharing_Principles_2024.pdf

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SWF Publication: PP25.10
Published: 25.07

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