

Nour Chalhoub

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RESEARCH FIELD

Microeconomic Theory, Mechanism Design, Consumer Theory, Information Disclosure, Repeated Games.

EDUCATION

- **Arizona State University** May 2025
Ph.D. in Economics
- **Arizona State University** May 2021
Masters of science in Economics
- **American University of Beirut** May 2019
Masters of Science in Mathematics
- **American University of Beirut** May 2017
Bachelor of Science in Mathematics
- **American University of Beirut** May 2017
Bachelor of Arts in Economics

PROJECTS

- **“Returns when Product Inspection is a Choice”**

Job Market Paper

This paper examines a seller’s profit maximizing return policy in a setting where consumers can inspect a product before purchasing and return it if it fails to meet their expectations. The model incorporates (1) heterogeneity in customers’ taste preferences, (2) uncertainty about product valuation prior to purchase, and (3) the costs associated with inspection. My result suggests that all these three factors interact in the optimal solution: the buyer’s option to costly inspect the product compels the seller to offer a strictly positive return that changes with the degree of heterogeneity among the buyers. On the seller side, I show that the seller has a strict preference over the buyers’ inspection behavior. Furthermore, I also show that there exists a nontrivial region of parameter values for which the outcomes of the optimal menu weakly improve the outcome of the seller and the buyers as the inspection cost increases.

- **“Signaling with evidence”**

Joint working paper with Marco Escobar

We study the strategic interaction between a developer and an investor interested in completing a fixed project. The investor provides the necessary capital, while the developer owns the technology. A key assumption in our model captures a common feature of certain projects: partial progress can be demonstrated before full completion. Specifically, while the developer can always show less progress than what has actually been made, they can never show more. We demonstrate that this assumption leads to a unique class of equilibria, in which the developer reveals only the minimum advancement necessary to secure continued funding in each period, effectively saving work as a form of insurance for future periods. Despite the presence of asymmetric information and the developer’s ability to withhold progress, this one-sided restriction is sufficient to ensure that projects can be initiated and completed with a positive probability. In contrast, if the investor were unable to monitor partial development or if the developer could misrepresent progress in any direction, the project might not start at all.

EXPERIENCE

- **Lebanese American University** January 2026-present
Part-Time Faculty
- **Arizona State University** August 2019-May 2025
Graduate Assistant
 - Research Assistant for Prof. Micheal Hanemann (August 2019-present)
 - Teaching assistant of Microeconomics 2-Ph.D. level (Spring 2023)

- Teaching assistant of Microeconomics 1-Ph.D. level (Fall 2020 and Fall 2022)
- Research Assistant for Prof. Hector Chade (Summer 2022)
- Teaching assistant of multiple undergraduate courses
 - * Game Theory and Economic Behavior (Fall 2021, Spring 2021, Spring 2022)
 - * Advanced Honors Microeconomics (Fall 2021)
 - * Mathematical Economics (Spring 2022)

- **Arizona State University**

May 2022- December 2023

Instructor

- MathCamp-Ph.D.level (Fall 2023)
- Principle of Microeconomics (Summer 2022)

- **American University of Beirut**

August 2018-May 2019

Graduate Assistant

- Teaching Assistant of Linear Algebra 1 (Spring 2019)
- Teaching Assistant of Calculus 2 (Fall 2018)

PRESENTATIONS

- **American University of Beirut**

May 2025

(Online)

- **Reunion Conference at Arizona State University**

March 2025

(In-person)

- **Istanbul Technical University, Department of Economics**

March 2025

(Online)

- **Budapest University of Technology and Economics, QSMS**

March 2025

(Online)

- **Arizona State University Internal Seminar Series**

August 2020-Present

(In-person)

SKILLS

- **Programming Languages:** STATA, MATLAB, R, MS-office, LATEX
- **Languages:** Arabic (Native), English (Fluent), French (Fluent)

AWARDS AND CERTIFICATES

- **Best Presentation Award**

May 2019

Arizona State University

- **Leadership Certificate**

May 2019

Toastmasters International

REFERENCES

1. **Hector Chade** (*Advisor*)
Professor and Rondthaler Endowed Chair in Economics, Department of Economics
Arizona State University
Email: hector.chade@asu.edu
2. **Alejandro Manelli**
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3. **Mark Whitmeyer**
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4. **Edward Schlee**
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