


Clear and Present Danger

Aspects of Understanding Global Energy Landscape and Preparing for Return of Russian Gas



HARADA Daisuke／原田大輔

Director General


Energy Business Unit

Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security

独立行政法人 エネルギー・金属鉱物資源機構

Japan's Involvements in Russian Upstream Projects

 : Geological Survey
 : Exploration
 : Development & Production



Yamal LNG

Equity holders: NOVATEK 50.1%
 TOTAL 20%
 CNPC 10% Silk Road Fund 9.9%
 Capacity: 16.5MMt (Actual: 19.4MMt)
 Status: Production (Start: 2017)

【Japan's Involvement】

- EPC: JGC and Chiyoda Corp.
- Electrical Engineering: Yokogawa
- Icebreaker LNG tanker: MOL
- Finance: JBIC etc

Arctic LNG-2

Equity holders: NOVATEK 60%
 TOTAL 10% CNPC 10% CNOOC 10%
Japan Arc10%
 Capacity: 19.8MMt Status: Development

【Japan's Involvement】

- Investment: Mitsui and JOGMEC
- Liability Guarantee: JOGMEC
- Finance: JBIC etc

Sakhalin-1

Equity holders: ExxonMobil 30%
SODECO 30%
 ONGC 20% Rosneft 20%
 Production: 240kBD
 Status: Production (Start: 2005)

【Japan's Involvement】

- Investment: Japanese Consortium (METI holds 15% equity substantially)
- Financial Support: JOGMEC
- Finance: JBIC etc

Sakhalin-2

Equity holders: Gazprom 50%+1stake
Shell 27.5-1stake
Mitsui 12.5% Mitsubishi 10%
 Production: 100kBD (crude oil)
 11.6MMt (LNG)
 Status: Production (Start: Oil@1999 • LNG@2009)

【Japan's Involvement】

- Investment: Mitsui and Mitsubishi
- Finance: JBIC etc

South West Sakhalin Offshore

Equity holder: Rosneft 100%
 Status: Exploration

【Japan's Involvement】

- Implementing Joint Study by JOGMEC

INK-Zapad

Equity holders: INK 51%
JASSOC 49%
 Production: 40kBD
 Status: Production (Start: 2016)

【Japan's Involvement】

- Investment: Japanese Consortium
- Gas Chemical Plant: TEC

JOGMEC Geological Survey

Area: Orenburg Oblast


Period: 1996

JOGMEC Geological Survey

Area: East Siberia



Period: 1995~1996

Shale Revolution



- Caused by Price Hike, Futures
- Giant consumer US becomes exporter
- Changing Balance in Middle East Geopolitics

Fukushima




- Global Allergy to Nuclear Power
- Focus on LNG as an Alternative Fuel
- Attention again in Carbon Neutrality era. Will it make a comeback?

Decarbonization

Target Year	Announcement
By 2050 Carbon Neutral	EU Green Deal <December 2019> Long Term Strategy <March, 2020> Ahead of schedule by 2045
By 2050 Carbon Neutral	Ten Point Plan for a Green Industrial Revolution, Long Term Strategy <March, 2020>
By 2050 Carbon Neutral	Election Pledges <July, 2020> Climate Leaders Summit <April, 2021>
By 2060 Carbon Neutral	United Nations General Assembly Speech <September, 2020> 14th Five Year Plan <November, 2020>
By 2050 Carbon Neutral	Prime Minister's General Policy Speech <October, 2020>
By 2050 Carbon Neutral	Long Term Strategy Long Term Low Emission Development Strategy <December, 2020>
By 2050 Carbon Neutral	President's Speech at Earth Day <April, 2021>
By 2050 Carbon Neutral	Climate Leaders Summit <April, 2021>
By 2050 Carbon Neutral	Canadian Net-Zero Emissions Accountability Act <November, 2020> Cooperation on Climate Ambitions with US <February, 2021>
By 2060 Carbon Neutral	Net Zero Scenario by MED <August, 2021> Presidential Speech <October, 2021>
By 2060 Carbon Neutral	Crown Prince's Speech <October, 2021>
By 2050 Carbon Neutral	Prime Minister's Speech 'Australian Way' <October, 2021>
By 2070 Carbon Neutral	Prime Minister's Speech at COP26 <November, 2021>


- Driven by Covid-19
- Spotlighted as one of the measure for Economic Recovery by EU
- How long can it last after the 'Boom'?

Framework for Formulating the 7th Basic Energy Plan



In February 2025, the 7th Basic Energy Plan has been approved

Image of Energy Demand and Supply Outlook



Analyzing Risk Scenario

Nuclear: Restart & New Deploy

Increasing Demand for Electricity, while decreasing Final Energy Consumption

LNG: 54-60MMt@2040, increasing 74MMt@Risk Scenario

Billion kL	FY2013	FY2022	FY2040
Final Energy Consumption			
TOTAL	0.36	0.31	0.26 to 0.27
Industry	0.17	0.14	0.14 to 0.15
Service	0.06	0.05	0.04 to 0.05
House-use	0.05	0.05	0.04 to 0.05
Transport	0.08	0.07	0.03 to 0.04


Primary Energy Supply			
TOTAL	0.54	0.47	0.42 to 0.44
Renewables	0.05	0.07	0.11 to 0.13
Nuclear	-	0.01	0.05
Hydrogen etc	-	-	0.02
Natural Gas	0.13	0.10	0.08 to 0.09
Oil	0.23	0.17	0.09 to 0.12
Coal	0.14	0.12	0.04 to 0.05

*Hydrogen etc: including NH₃, Synthetic fuels and Synthetic methane.

Energy Sufficiency	6.5%	12.6%	30 to 40%
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Japan: Outlook of Primary Energy Supply toward 2030

@2010FY before Earthquake & Fukushima



Renewable:

3%→7%

Hydro: 3%→4%

Nuclear:

12%→21%

Natural Gas:

15%→14%


Coal: 21%→18%

LPG: 3%→3%

Oil: 43%→33%

68%

@2015FY



Renewable

+Hydro:

→13%-14%

Nuclear:

→11%-10%

Natural Gas:

→18%

Coal: →25%

LPG: 3%→3%

Oil: →30%

76%

@2018FY:

Supply for Electricity

- ＜主な施策＞
- 再生可能エネルギー
[震災前10%→30年22~24%]
・主力電源化への布石
・低コスト化、系統制約の克服、火力調整力の確保
 - 原子力 [震災前25%→30年22~20%]
・依存度を可能な限り低減
・不断の安全性向上と再稼働
 - 化石燃料 [震災前65%→30年56%]
・化石燃料等の自主開発の促進
・高効率な火力発電の有効活用
・災害リスク等への対応強化
 - 省エネ [実質エネルギー効率35%減]
・徹底的な省エネの継続
・省エネ法と支援策の一体実施
 - 水素/蓄電/分散型IT材料の推進

Renewable

+Hydro:

→22%-24%


Nuclear:

→22%-20%

Fossil Fuel:


→56%

Change of Electricity Supply by Source



Source: MOF, METI-Japan

Steep Increase of LNG Import after 2011




Russia once held the Key for Japan's Energy Security


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Source:MOF-Japan





Crude Oil Suppliers



LNG Suppliers







Energy flow from Russia: Legacy West vs Growing East






Current Status of Russian Upstream Projects with Japanese Investors 9

★ Russian Upstream Projects with Japanese Investors

Project	JV format	Partners		Production Scale		What Japan can do		
		Foreign Investors	Russian Investors			Import Oil	Import LNG	Provide Engineering Service
S-1	Unincorporated JV Currently being transferred to a Russian entity by EO723	'Unfriendly Countries' ExxonMobil: 30% <i>(Withdrawing)</i> SODECO: 30% <i>(METI+ Itochu+ Marubeni+ INPEX+ JAPEX)</i> 'Friendly Countries' ONGC Videsh: 20%	Rosneft: 20% Sakhalin Mor Neftegaz- Shelf (11.5%) RN-Astra (8.5%) 	Crude Oil 230,000BD 270,000BOED Gas 265mmcf/d		X	O	O
S-2	Incorporated Currently being transferred to a Russian entity by EO416&2	'Unfriendly Countries' Shell: 27.5%-1share <i>(Withdrawing)</i> Mitsui: 12.5% Mitsubishi: 10.0%	Gazprom: 50%+1share 	NGL 87,000BD 357,000BOED Gas 1590mmcf/d (10.8MMt+LNG)		O	O	O
Arctic LNG-2	Incorporated (Russian entity)	'Unfriendly Countries' TOTAL: 10% Mitsui/JOGMEC: 10% 'Friendly Countries' CNPC: 10% CNOOC: 10%	NOVATEK: 60% 	NGL Expected 2-20,000BD 450,000BOED Gas 868mmcf/d @2024max (6.6MMt+LNG)		X	O	O
INK-Zapad	Incorporated (Russian entity)	'Unfriendly Countries' JASSOC: 49% <i>(Itochu+ INPEX+ JOGMEC)</i>	INK: 51% 	Crude Oil 15,000BOED		X	—	X


★ Crude Oil Flow by Countries



★ Long-term Contracts of S-2


Buyers	Volume (10000t)	Term of Contracts	Price Condition
JERA	50	2011 ~2026	DES
Hiroshima Gas	21.4	2008 ~2028	FOB
Saibu Gas	6.5	2014 ~2028	DES
KOGAS	150	2008 ~2028	FOB
Shell	100	2009 ~2028	DES
Gazprom	100	2009 ~2028	DES
JERA	150	2009 ~2029	FOB
Tohoku Electric	42	2010 ~2030	FOB
Kyushu	50	2009 ~2031	DES
Osaka Gas	20	2008 ~2031	FOB
Tokyo Gas	110	2009 ~2031	FOB
Toho Gas	50	2009 ~2033	DES

Is this under their calculation?: Russia is losing golden market




Mid and Long Term Outlook: Upcoming Ups and Downs


★ Mid Term Supply Additions by FID Base



★ Mid Term: upcoming valley and mountain




★ Long Term: Demand & Supply gap starts from 2030s





G7-agreed "International Mechanism to Support Ukraine" and Funding Sources 12

Breakdown of Russian government foreign exchange reserves (Billion USD)



VS

Foreign assets volume in Russia counted by Russian government (Billion USD)



Russian Government has already started seizing Western assets

① Wintershall and OMV's West Siberian Upstream Assets

- On 19th December, 2023, Russian Presidential Administration issued two new presidential decrees (No. 965 and No. 966) ordering the transfer of shares in project companies related to the upstream development (development of the Achimov formation of South Russkoye deposit and Urengoy deposit), that Wintershall Dea (Germany) and OMV (Austria) have been the partners with Gazprom.
- Wintershall Dea and OMV can only take limited action in response to the Russian government's directive. It is presumed that all of the targeted project companies are Russian-registered companies, and the shareholders' agreements may stipulate that any disputes that arise will be resolved under the judicial system of the Russian Federation. It is unclear whether a fair and transparent third-party trial will be held even if a dispute is filed.

- The first case of upstream asset confiscation.
- 'Russian-registered companies' may be the basis of this action.
- It may also be a tribute to China in connection with "Power of Siberia 2"

② Shell's Share in New Sakhalin-2 Russian Entity

- On 25th March, 2024, Russian government officially announced that it would sell the shares of a new Russian entity 'Sakhalinskaya Energia' (27.5% minus 1 share, equivalent to Shell's shares), that had been considered a likely buyer for NOVATEK, to Gazprom not NOVATEK. The sale price was 94.8 billion RUB (approximately 1 billion USD).
- On 4th October, 2024, the Supreme Prosecutor's Office of Russia filed a lawsuit against Shell in the Moscow Commercial Court, seeking compensation for damages caused. The compensation is expected to be more than 90 billion RUB.

③ ExxonMobil's Share in New Sakhalin-1 Russian Entity

- On 9th October, 2024, Prime Minister Novak stated that the government was working on selling ExxonMobil's shares in the Sakhalin-1.
- On 11th October, an observational article reported that the government was considering raising the "exit tax" for foreign companies from 15% to 35%.

- Two major companies have retained the rights of the former corporations. They are preparing to appeal to international courts.
- The key is whether the Russian government will hand over the profits from the sale.

Wintershall and OMV's West Siberian Upstream Assets

対象プロジェクト会社	ロシア企業株主	外資株主	譲渡先ロシア企業
南ルスコエ鉱床			
セヴェルネフチェガスプロム	ガスプロム： 40%	Wintershall Dea： 34.99% OMV： 24.99% （注 1）	SOGAZ （注 2）
ガスプロム YuRGM トレーディング	公開情報なし （注 3）		
ガスプロム YuRGM デベロップメント			
ウレンゴイ鉱床におけるアチモフ層開発			
アチム・ディヴェロップメント	ガスプロム： 74.99%	Wintershall Dea： 25.01%	Gas Technologies （注 4）
アチムガス	ガスプロム： 50%	Wintershall Dea： 50%	
アチム・セールス	公開情報なし （注 3）		

注1: Wintershall Dea GmbH 及び OMV Exploration & Production GmbH でドイツ登記。

注2: SOGAZ: ガスプロム傘下の保険会社。

注3: ガスプロム YuRGM トレーディング及びガスプロム YuRGM デベロップメントはセヴェルネフチェガスプロム又はガスプロムの子会社。アチム・セールスはアチム・ディヴェロップメント及びアチムガスの子会社と考えられているが、シェアや資本構造は明らかになっていない。

注4: Gas Technologies については現時点で出資者等の情報は無いが、ガスプロムに何らかの形で関係する会社と想定されている。


Russian Government and Majors' Actions on S-1 and 2 (at present)

	ロシア政府の動き	サハリン1及び2を巡る動き
2月	2月21日東部二州独立承認・24日ウクライナ侵攻開始	2月28日シェルが撤退プロセス開始を発表
3月		3月1日ExxonMobilが撤退プロセス開始を発表
4月		4月8日G7及びEUによる石油禁輸措置発動。LNG機器禁輸の禁輸も盛り込まれる
5月	5月25日ヴォロージン発言(サハリン2)	4月26日ExxonMobilがS-1生産量の縮小を開始 (Rosneft 発表)
6月	6月15日ヴォロージン発言(サハリン1・2) 6月30日大統領令第416号 (サハリン2: 非友好国義務違反・新ロシア法人への移管)	G7(5月8日)及びEU(6月3日)による石油禁輸措置発動 義務違反とは何か? 英国制裁からの保護が目的? 大統領令発出から新ロシア法人設立までの1か月の猶予
7月	ロシア政府・Gazprom、外資の交渉	
8月	8月2日政府令第1369号 (新ロシア法人設立・外資に対する期限は1か月後に) 8月5日大統領令第520号 (サハリン1を含む指定会社株式取引を年末まで禁止) 8月30日・31日ロシア政府が三井物産・三菱商事の新ロシア法人移管申請を承認	8月2日シェルCEOは新ロシア法人の移管は「unlikely」 8月4日Rosneft「サハリン1生産は事実上停止している」 8月25日三井物産及び三菱商事が新法人への移管を決定 8月下旬Exxonがロシア政府へ書簡(撤退承認を要請) シェルは新ロシア法人の移管申請しないことをロシア政府に通知
9月	9月6日政府令第1566号 (シェル分権益の継承資格明示。LNG生産・経験実績を求める)	
10月	10月7日大統領令第723号 (サハリン1: 非友好国義務違反・新ロシア法人への移管)	
今後	S-1・2権益の継承者「選別作業」(対価・損害賠償額査定)	シェル・ExxonMobilによる国際調停・提訴の可能性

Russian LNG Flow at present


★ Export Volume of Russian LNG

29.8MMt @2021 → 32.3MMt @2022 → 31.6MMt @2023 → 31.7MMt @2024




★ Sakhalin-2 LNG

10.1MMt @2021 → 11.2MMt @2022 → 9.9MMt @2023 → 9.4MMt @2024



★ Yamal LNG

19.0MMt @2021 → 20.1MMt @2022 → 19.6MMt @2023 → 19.9MMt @2024



★ Russian LNG Share by Countries

	2022	2023	2024		2022	2023	2024
Japan	21%	19%	17%	Indonesia	0.7%	-	-
China	18%	21%	16%	Portugal	0.7%	0.9%	0.7%
France	16%	11%	19%	Finland	0.6%	0.5%	0.4%
Belgium	11%	15%	12%	Greece	0.4%	1.9%	0.4%
Spain	11%	16%	14%	Kuwait	0.4%	0.2%	0.7%
Korea	6%	5%	6%	Italy	0.4%	0.2%	0.2%
Netherlands	5%	2%	4%	Sweden	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%
Taiwan	3%	1%	0.9%	Thailand	0.2%	-	-
UK	1.1%	-	-	Lithuania	0.2%	-	0.01%
Turkey	0.9%	3%	1.4%	Norway	0.04%	0.2%	0.05%
India	0.9%	1%	0.2%				

★ S-2 LNG buyers

	2022	2023	2024
Japan	60%	58%	56%
China	18%	25%	28%
Korea	16%	17%	16%
Taiwan	5%	-	-
Indonesia	1%	-	-

★ Yamal LNG buyers

	2022	2023	2024		2022	2023	2024
France	26%	18%	31%	Portugal	1.1%	1.5%	1.1%
China	19%	20%	18%	Korea	0.9%	0.4%	2.1%
Spain	18%	25%	20%	Turkey	0.7%	2.6%	0.4%
Belgium	17%	23%	18%	Kuwait	0.7%	0.4%	1.1%
Netherlands	9%	3.7%	7%	Italy	0.7%	0.3%	0.4%
Taiwan	3%	2.2%	1.4%	Indonesia	0.6%	-	-
UK	2%	-	-	Thailand	0.4%	-	-
India	1.4%	2.1%	0.4%	Japan	0.3%	0.7%	0.4%

Putin's Visit to China: Agreed on POS-2 finally?



Upstream Stake

- In Jan 2024, Wintershal and OMV's asset in West Siberia were nationalized.
- Achim Development
- Achimgas
- Sever Nefte Gazprom




Gas Price

- China insists the same and less level of gas price than current POS condition.
- Russia is required to cover the transit cost via Mongolia.
- Price factors include the domestic coal price in China and Yamal LNG offtake price.



Less Volume

- Russia aims to replace EU market (155BCM) by proposing the expansion of POS (38 to 61BCM), POS-2 (50BCM), Far East new PL (10BCM), and further sales via Central Asia.
- If China were to accept those full amount, its dependence on Russian gas would exceed 40%.



100 BilUSD Loan

- POS-2 will be the world's longest and most expensive PL built on permafrost.
- Russia would like to hold hostage from China by advance in the form of a loan-purchase-gas agreement.
- On the other hand, Chinese loans will mean that China can control the PL substantially, upstream, middle and downstream processes.



Downstream Stake

- Gazprom has been exploring the possibility of participating in China's downstream market, but progress has been slow.
- Controlled retail gas prices, Monopolies such as CNPC, Sinopec and Pipe China makes Gazprom unattractive

Can Russia replaced its European Market by others

Point 1

China & India cannot replace European market.

Point 2

EU's ban on LNG equipment export will have a critical impact on Russia.



PL+LNG Export

155BCM

EU is heading for
Zero hydrocarbon from
Russia by 2027

EU's embargo on
LNG equipment
(5th Package@8th April 2022)

LNG Export

PL Export

SKV+New Far East PL: **12BCM**
Power of Siberia 2: **50BCM**

Point 3

Russia will rush to build Power of Siberia 2 Pipeline in order to connect West & East.

Point 4

China will press Russia for gas price discount, but limits max volume up to 35BCM.

Demand Increase@2030

+73BCM

<Breakdown>

Domestic: 30BCM

PL: —

LNG: 43BCM

※Not including TAPI-PL (Turkmenistan) import.



Demand Increase@2035

+124BCM



<Breakdown>

Domestic: 58BCM

PL: 35BCM

LNG: 31BCM


国内生産対輸入=47:53
内、輸入:PL対LNG=54:46

Comparison of Prices of PL & LNG suppliers in China



Presidential meeting
in 4th Feb 2022

	Myanmar PL	10.30USD
	Central Asia PL	6.91USD
	Russia PL	6.30USD




PL	Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025 at present	Average
	Turkmenistan	9.11	11.01	10.08	10.23	7.64	5.14	5.41	6.38	7.27	5.89	5.75	8.03	7.92	7.74	7.51	7.67
	Uzbekistan		9.63	9.27	9.03	6.63	4.40	5.06	6.03	6.48	5.11	4.88	7.05	7.36	7.45	7.15	6.82
	Kazakhstan (China border)							5.08	5.83	6.10	5.27	4.97	6.89	7.39	7.48	7.12	6.24
	Myanmar			12.44	12.17	11.14	9.39	9.43	9.75	10.39	9.50	9.39	10.00	10.14	9.86	10.28	10.30
	Russia									5.61	4.36	4.06	7.32	8.16	7.58	7.01	6.30


LNG	Country	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025 at present	Average
	Qatar	16.45	18.17	17.18	17.32	10.91	7.83	8.37	10.28	10.48	7.72	10.14	13.79	11.56	10.77	9.78	12.05
	Australia	3.55	3.46	3.48	3.69	5.76	6.11	7.03	9.39	9.24	6.96	10.26	14.32	12.00	11.18	10.23	7.78
	Indonesia	3.93	4.06	3.81	6.10	8.09	6.03	7.28	9.16	8.70	6.40	10.09	15.37	13.18	11.49	10.86	8.30
	Malaysia	8.69	8.26	8.28	8.64	7.54	6.24	6.79	8.49	7.65	5.62	9.68	18.18	11.60	9.79	9.51	9.00
	Nigeria	14.81	14.86	16.35	15.99	10.69	6.91	8.48	10.37	8.90	5.61	12.29	11.69	12.33	11.72	11.20	11.48
	Trinidad Tobago	15.21	11.63	17.78	15.05	10.37	8.08	7.73	10.72	9.27	6.73	14.71	15.16	11.16	9.91	13.76	11.82
	Papua New Guinea				14.70	10.89	7.09	8.42	10.51	10.01	7.26	10.59	15.63	14.60	13.46	12.03	11.27
	US	16.09					7.64	8.25	9.98	8.57	6.74	13.55	20.51	13.07	11.37	11.80	11.60
	Russia (S-2 & Yamal)	15.21	17.43		13.00	11.05	6.42	7.74	10.72	8.85	6.65	11.97	20.55	12.61	11.77	11.48	11.82
	Average Price of all LNG	9.02	10.62	11.16	11.69	8.50	6.61	7.47	9.64	9.20	6.75	10.86	15.91	12.19	11.10	10.35	10.07

PL	Russian Gas Price for Europe	10.52	11.47	11.79	10.05	6.82	4.56	5.72	7.68	4.80	3.24	3.85	40.34	14.09	10.70	13.14	10.58
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

★ Case A: Existing LNG Contract Base




★ Case B: Portfolio • Spot + Resale & Export




Comparison of Alaska LNG Project and Qilak LNG Project

	Alaska LNG Project	Qilak LNG Project
Concept	 <p>Natural gas produced in Prudhoe Bay to be transported across Alaska via a new trans-Alaska pipeline, liquefied at Nikiski near Kenai.</p>	 <p>Offshore PL to be constructed 20km from Point Thomson, and LNG plant (GBS) to be built offshore (under federal jurisdiction). Exports via the Northern Sea Route.</p>
LNG	Max 20MMt	Starting from 4MMt. Max 20MMt
Cost	CAPEX: 38.7Billion USD OPEX: 740MM USD	1250USD/t (evaluating AK-LNG: 1850USD/t)
Interests	Alaska Gasline Development Corp	Llyoid Energy (Singapore • UAE)
Upstream	Though there is no confirmed information at this time, natural gas will be procured from mining areas owned by ExxonMobil, HilCorp and ConocoPhillips.	Point Thomson Block owned by ExxonMobil
Challenges	The complexity of investment structure (separation of upstream, mid-stream and downstream) means that a stable supply cannot be ensured, and there is uncertainty about raising huge investments for PL.	How can sea exports be made possible given the limited number of icebreakers available from Prudhoe Bay, where ice accumulates? Environment concerns.
At Present	Export License was obtained again in April 2023. FID is scheduled for 2025, with operations expected to start in 2028 for domestic and in 2030 for export.	HOA signed with ExxonMobil in September 2019. Aiming for FID in 2025 and start of operations in 2029.

Alaska LNG Project Price Estimate



Qilak LNG Project Price Estimate




Planned construction site for the Kenai Peninsula LNG shipping terminal 20

Proposed route of the Alaska Gas Pipeline

<Pipeline Specs>


- Total length: **807 miles**
(**1,299 km**)
- 42-inch diameter
- Parallel installation with Oil PL to Fairbanks
- Compressor stations: 8
- Transport capacity:
Max 3.3 bcfd
(**34 BCM per year / 25MMt**)



出典: Alaska Gasline Development Corporation



Relationships among LNG projects: Alaska LNG and Qilak LNG



Deployment of Russian Nuclear Icebreaker Fleets Holds Another Key 22

- Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG-2 charters 32 ARC7 ice-breaking LNG tankers in total.
- A convoy of up to eight groups to be organized, with four vessels in each. Six groups will head to Asia and two to Europe.



50 Let Pobedy
(2007)
In service



Yamal
(1993)
In service



Arctika • Sibir • Ural • Yakutiya
(2020 • 2021 • 2022 • 2024)
In Service


**Chukotka • Leningrad
Stalingrad • Rossiya**
Under construction

**Murmansk
Transshipment
Terminal**































**Kamchatka
Transshipment Terminal**



- By allowing convoys to pass through constantly, NSR corridor would be maintained so that tankers can pass through at 10 knots even in winter.
- When sea ice conditions are severe, deployed nuclear icebreakers maintain the corridor.



Russia is still as a Reasonable LNG Supplier for Japan

1000yen/ton	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	Average	USD/MMBTU
 Oman	53.2	48.8	65.4	33.6	32.3	39.5	48.9	57.3	62.7	51.9	44.1	47.8	52.1	49.9	46.3	54.4	96.5	98.1	85.9	56.2	9.36
 Russia	-	-	-	32.1	38.3	52.7	59.5	71.5	83.3	62.7	37.2	42.9	53.7	52.7	41.0	56.7	98.6	97.6	96.4	61.1	10.16
 USA	36.2	36.7	41.3	40.7	55.5	54.2	65.9	-	85.4	47.9	-	66.9	60.8	53.3	47.1	66.8	137.9	87.7	85.6	62.9	10.47
 Australia	38.8	42.0	61.4	42.9	52.2	61.2	65.6	75.6	86.3	63.4	41.0	47.5	58.4	58.3	44.4	57.9	118.3	107.5	96.1	64.1	10.67
 Malaysia	39.1	47.2	68.2	46.0	53.7	64.1	73.6	86.6	93.5	67.4	38.3	46.0	54.2	52.7	40.1	52.8	106.9	98.1	92.0	64.2	10.69
 Brunei	35.2	38.4	69.3	50.3	52.7	63.1	72.9	84.0	92.3	69.9	43.0	48.9	57.9	58.7	44.1	52.0	97.9	98.9	94.6	64.4	10.72
 Trinidad Tobago	69.2	63.8	86.6	46.5	45.6	42.7	52.6	80.3	92.7	70.4	46.4	47.0	58.5	-	-	-	80.0	68.9	75.2	64.2	10.67
 Nigeria	72.9	63.9	91.7	56.0	38.1	54.8	66.9	81.4	90.5	67.0	41.9	47.3	48.1	38.9	37.5	68.2	126.0	-	104.4	66.4	11.05
 Yemen	-	-	-	-	36.0	60.0	68.1	83.9	84.8	58.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	65.1	10.84
 Indonesia	48.7	51.4	62.2	36.3	42.7	62.2	75.1	87.8	94.2	68.0	42.2	48.9	57.4	58.5	44.1	55.1	131.8	105.7	100.2	67.0	11.14
 Qatar	45.8	49.5	71.7	53.0	56.4	64.6	71.8	84.6	92.2	66.5	35.6	44.2	57.4	58.4	41.4	52.3	139.6	119.3	98.8	68.6	11.41
 UAE	40.7	43.6	60.6	43.3	52.8	63.3	71.7	85.0	91.4	62.7	37.2	46.4	59.9	57.1	44.1	57.4	190.9	131.1	97.7	70.4	11.71
 Papua New Guinea	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	78.3	64.5	40.1	48.8	60.5	57.9	44.2	63.4	129.2	102.2	100.4	71.8	11.94
 Angola	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	84.4	86.6	-	-	41.7	54.3	-	-	-	82.7	-	-	70.0	11.64
 Algeria	60.8	61.6	94.8	-	34.3	58.5	70.6	79.9	91.9	58.8	41.8	71.1	-	40.8	-	75.7	152.4	-	77.1	71.3	11.87
 Egypt	67.4	66.3	87.3	87.6	60.1	65.0	72.8	83.2	93.3	-	36.0	41.8	60.1	56.3	46.8	72.6	143.3	167.8	-	76.9	12.80
 Peru	-	-	-	-	-	57.2	68.1	86.6	104.6	82.6	-	49.1	55.4	53.9	43.4	46.2	120.1	159.6	110.3	79.8	13.27
 Equator Guinea	-	58.9	87.9	56.9	58.4	71.2	75.4	87.7	99.6	64.6	39.4	46.3	44.1	52.7	-	68.1	117.3	229.1	91.7	79.4	13.21
 Mozambique	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	91.1	72.5	81.8	13.61
 Korea	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	52.9	34.0	33.8	-	-	32.4	-	-	118.9	-	54.4	9.05
 Singapore	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	51.9	36.5	42.6	58.6	-	-	223.1	88.0	-	108.4	87.0	14.48
 France	-	-	-	-	-	-	71.7	86.1	-	54.6	39.4	45.2	59.7	-	-	171.3	-	-	-	75.4	12.55
 Brazil	-	-	-	-	-	-	63.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	63.9	10.63
 Spain	-	-	-	-	-	-	69.2	83.7	79.9	67.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	75.0	12.48
 Norway	-	-	94.6	-	-	54.1	64.8	87.8	84.3	74.6	-	-	62.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	74.6	12.42
 Netherlands	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	101.2	-	-	-	64.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	82.8	13.77
 Belgium	-	-	-	-	-	-	64.8	-	101.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	83.0	13.81
 China	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	31.9	-	-	167.6	113.4	116.1	107.2	17.84
 Thailand	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	92.2	-	-	-	92.2	15.34
 Canada	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	189.8	189.8	31.57
Cameroon	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	93.3	93.3	15.52


Earthquake & Fukushima

Comparison of conditions for oil and gas development in Russia and Alaska

	Russia	Alaska
Hydrocarbon Potential	<u>273 billion BOE</u> <u>Natural gas: 240.9 billion barrels</u> <u>Oil: 23.1 billion barrels</u> <u>Condensate: 9 billion barrels</u>	<u>29.8 billion BOE</u> <u>Natural gas: 6.8 billion barrels</u> <u>Oil: 22.1 billion barrels</u> <u>Condensate: 900 million barrels</u>
Government involvement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Large-scale government initiatives and subsidies. ➤ Priority for offshore mining areas goes to state-owned companies. ➤ Development accelerates as a political strategy towards Europe and to supplement dwindling reserves. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ The government was heavily involved until World War II. ➤ Offshore mining areas were under direct federal control. ➤ State's initiative to secure revenue.
Tax Incentives	<p style="text-align: center;">◎</p> <p style="text-align: center;">(Huge tax deductions = Government guarantees?)</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">×</p> <p style="text-align: center;">(Market-based/private sector-led basically)</p>
NSR Infrastructures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Operating nuclear icebreakers with government subsidies ➤ Promoting ARC7 LNG tankers' transshipment scheme 	<p style="text-align: center;">×</p> <p style="text-align: center;">(Undeveloped/Difficult due to whale preservation area)</p>
Upstream Infrastructures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Sufficient infrastructure onshore ➤ Untouched offshore development and technology 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Upstream infrastructure is mature. ➤ Huge investment required for natural gas PL construction ➤ Economics is the issue for upstream suppliers (EOR or PL+LNG)
Environmental Sensitivity	Low	High
Indigenous Sensitivity	Low	Low, but politicized
Restraining factors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Western sanctions following the annexation of Crimea in 2014 target the Arctic Ocean, which has "future potential for refined oil production." ➤ Prohibition of new energy resource investments due to the 2022 Ukraine war (G7 and others). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Depending on the government's decision, there is a possibility that huge upside potential (NPRA) will be activated. ➤ With the global trend towards decarbonization, additional development will be put on hold.
CCS Potential	◎ (Depleted gas fields in Western Siberia)	◎ (Cook Inlet depleted gas fields)

Actual Utilization of the NSR from Yamal LNG project

★ Yamal LNG & Arctic LNG-2



★ Upstream Stakeholders

Yamal LNG		
NOVATEK		51%
TOTAL		20%
CNPC		20%
Silk Road Fund		9.9%

Arctic LNG-2		
NOVATEK		60%
TOTAL		10%
CNPC		10%
CNOOC		10%
Japan Arctic LNG		10%


★ Buyers of Yamal LNG Supply Contracts

Long Term Contracts concluded with Yamal LNG

TOTAL		330万t	20%
Naturgy		250万t	15%
CNPC		300万t	28%
(Silk Road Fund)		160万t	
Gazprom		300万t	18%
ENGIE		100万t	6%
Shell		90万t	5%

他、NOVATEKも販売。

★ New LNG transportation scheme from Arctic by NOVATEK



Year	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
Destination	8.30MMt	18.5MMt	18.6MMt	19.6MMt	20.1MMt	19.6MMt	19.9MMt
France	34.9%	14.2%	27.5%	20.1%	26.2%	17.5%	30.5%
Belgium	7.0%	8.0%	22.7%	8.8%	16.9%	22.6%	18.3%
Spain	7.0%	7.0%	11.8%	13.3%	17.8%	25.4%	19.6%
Netherlands	32.5%	9.5%	11.4%	8.6%	8.6%	3.7%	6.6%
UK	11.6%	3.4%	10.9%	10.7%	1.8%	—	—
Norway	—	54.0%	3.0%	24.4%	—	—	—
Portugal	—	—	2.5%	0.2%	1.1%	1.5%	1.1%
Italy	—	—	—	—	0.7%	0.3%	—
Kuwait	—	—	—	—	0.7%	0.4%	1.1%
Turkey	—	—	—	—	0.7%	2.6%	0.4%
China	7.0%	3.8%	8.1%	3.7%	19.1%	20.4%	18.3%
Taiwan	—	—	0.9%	1.4%	2.8%	2.2%	1.4%
Japan	—	—	0.8%	3.9%	0.3%	0.7%	0.4%
Korea	—	—	0.4%	3.4%	0.9%	0.4%	2.1%
Bangladesh	—	—	—	0.5%	—	—	—
Singapore	—	—	—	0.5%	—	0.3%	—
India	—	—	—	0.5%	1.4%	2.1%	0.4%
Indonesia	—	—	—	—	0.6%	—	—
Thailand	—	—	—	—	0.4%	—	—

Actual usage of the Northern Sea Route




West bound: 77.6%

- Most of flow has been delivered to Europe.
- Transshipment (Norway, Belgium & Netherlands) includes the LNG export for China, indicating that East bound has difficulties to forecast delivery schedule.


East bound: 22.4%

- Transportation via the Northeast Passage (Bering Strait) has restrictions due to the unpredictable climate condition.

US, Norway and Russia: 3 Gigantic Areas for Oil and Gas Development



Comparison of Production Cost in Frontier



Behind Arctic Resource Development: Politics & Oil Price hold the key 27


➤ The development of Arctic resources in Russia has been influenced by 3 factors

- (1) 2008 Strategic Foreign Investment Restriction Law (2) EU Third Energy Package
(3) Western sanctions in 2014 after Crimea Annexation


- Crude oil prices above a certain level and the application of tax incentives are essential for project execution.
➤ Projects currently underway during the period of high oil prices from 2011 to 2014 are bearing fruit. That means, the launch of subsequent projects may be delayed or stagnant under low price level.
➤ Even though the price of oil is high due to the invasion of Ukraine, new projects involving foreign investment have been suspended. There is also the possibility that Western companies will accelerate their withdrawal from existing projects.

Year	Price	Foreign Entities	Target	Russia	Notes	Source: JOGMEC-Research
2007	72	TOTAL Statoil	Arctic, Shtokman field in Barents Sea	Gazprom	Politically decided between Russia and France. Inevitable Statoil's experience	
2008	97	'Strategic Investment Law' signed by President Putin → Promising Blocks in Continental Shelf are monopolized by Gazprom and Rosneft				
2009	62	No particular events, due to the influence under 'Lehman Shock' and decline of oil price				
2010	80					
2011	111	Adoption of 'Third Energy Package' by EU → Stipulates the 'Unbundling', separation of energy suppliers and transporters, targeting Gazprom's monopoly.				
		BP	Arctic development	Rosneft	Cancelled by shareholders of TNK. Exxonmobil took over the role. Consequently, Rosneft purchased TNK-BP and BP became 20% shareholder of Rosneft.	×
		TOTAL	Yamal LNG Project	NOVATEK	Politically reflected by Sarkozy's visits, decided to firm in 20%.	◎
2012	112	President Putin re-elected for the third term (2012-2018)				
		ExxonMobil	Arctic development	Rosneft	In 2014, wild-cat drilled under the Sanction, confirming potentials of gas and oil.	-
		Statoil	Arctic, Okhotsk development Shale formation in Caucasus	Rosneft	In 2016, wild-cat in Okhotsk resulted dry.	×
			WITHDRAWAL, Shtokman	Gazprom	In response to the suspension by Gazprom.	×
		ENI	Arctic, Black Sea	Rosneft	In 2018, wild-cat in Black Sea is under planning.	×
2013	109	CNPC	Yamal LNG Project	NOVATEK	Politically and strategically, decided to firm in 20%.	◎
2014	99	'Annexation of Crimea' by Russia and Intensification of conflicts in Eastern Ukraine → Sanctions by EU & US				
2015	52	TOTAL	WITHDRAWAL, Arctic, Shtokman field in Barents Sea	Gazprom	In response to the suspension by Gazprom and influence of the Sanctions	×
		Silk Road Fund	Yamal LNG Project	NOVATEK	Politically, decided to firm in 9.9%.	◎
2016	44	No particular events, decline of oil price				
2017	52	No particular events				
2018	72		Arctic LNG-2 Project	NOVATEK	Decided to participate in 10% (opt. +5%).	◎
2019	65	CNPC, CNOOC, and JOGMEC & Mitsui	Arctic LNG-2 Project	NOVATEK	Decided to participate in 10% each, total 30%.	◎
2020	43	Trafigura	Vostok Oilプロジェクト	Rosneft	Decided to participate in 10% (opt. on offtake contract) → Withdrawal	×
2021	71	Vitol, Mercantile & Maritime	Vostok Oilプロジェクト	Rosneft	Decided to participate in 5% (opt. on offtake contract) → Withdrawal	×
2022	99	Ukraine Invasion by Russia and Imposition of Western Sanctions				
2023	84e	-	-	-	-	


★ Comparison of Potentials among Coastal States



- ## ★ Comparison of Arctic sea ice conditions



- **Reduction in sea ice due to climate change has created ice-free conditions along the Russian coast during the summer window. The northwestern Barents Sea does not freeze even in winter due to the Gulf Stream.**
- **On the other hand, sea ice grows and exists in the eastern Barents Sea during winter.**



Source: Public information from each projects, IHS-JOGMEC Research

Started from US-Russia Summit in Alaska on August 25, 2025?



15th August

US-Russia Alaska Summit

Russia Presidential Decree 556 related to S-1

27th August

US imposes secondary tariffs on India

Arctic LNG-2 "Shadow LNG Fleet" begins southward journey

31st Aug & 1st Sept

SCO (Tianjin)

China's Terminal receives sanctioned LNG for the first time

2nd September

China-Russia Summit (Beijing)

No Sanctions in place despite continuous LNG offloading

13th September

Trump: Ready to impose additional sanctions if G7 and NATO countries stop buying Russian oil

Signed 'Legally Binding MOU' on POS2

<RDIF Chairman Dmitriev & US Presidential Envoy Vitkoff: Proposal for US-Russia Arctic Energy Cooperation>



Dmitriev: 'US has lost hundreds of billions of dollars in investment opportunities due to sanctions against Russia. This time, we have proposed joint investment plans for Arctic development and rare earth exploration in Russia. These joint plans include the development of LNG in the Arctic and the joint development of resources in the Urals and the Donbas region of Ukraine.

➤ Specific examples of realistic U.S.-Russia Arctic energy cooperation

Based on past events, following two upstream development projects might have been immediately proposed by Russian side.

Revival of JV between Rosneft and ExxonMobil in the Arctic (Kara Sea)

Investing in Vostok Oil, the world's largest Rosneft's E&P project

➤ Tech, knowledge, and infrastructure that Russia can provide for Arctic energy development

While the Trump administration is interested in developing Alaska and acquiring Greenland, Russia possesses three tech, knowledge, and infrastructure that are ahead of US and that US government might find attractive:

Nuclear icebreakers and fleets for Northern Sea Route

Construction of GBS platform (ex: Arctic LNG-2)

Arctic Cascade

On the same day of US-Russia Summit in Alaska, Russia Squeezes S-1 Project³⁰



УКАЗ

ПРЕЗИДЕНТА РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

О внесении изменений в Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 7 октября 2022 г. № 723 "О применении дополнительных специальных экономических мер в топливно-энергетической сфере в связи с недружественными действиями некоторых иностранных государств и международных организаций"

1. Внести в Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 7 октября 2022 г. № 723 "О применении дополнительных специальных экономических мер в топливно-энергетической сфере в связи с недружественными действиями некоторых иностранных государств и международных организаций" (Собрание законодательства Российской Федерации, 2022, № 41, ст. 7055; 2023, № 15, ст. 2664; 2024, № 16, ст. 2213; № 51, ст. 8009) следующие изменения:

а) подпункт "ж" пункта 1 изложить в следующей редакции:

"ж) доля в уставном капитале общества, решение о передаче которой принято Правительством Российской Федерации, незамедлительно передается иностранной стороне консорциума, в отношении которой в соответствии с абзацем третьим подпункта "е" настоящего пункта принято решение о такой передаче, при подтверждении соблюдения данной стороной консорциума всех условий, определенных пунктом 1¹ настоящего Указа, а управление Правительством Российской Федерации этой долей прекращается:";

б) дополнить пунктом 1¹ следующего содержания:

"1¹. Условиями передачи доли в уставном капитале общества в соответствии с подпунктом "ж" пункта 1 настоящего Указа являются:




Presidential Decree No.599 on 15th August 2025

Regarding several amendments to the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on 7th October 2022, "On Additional Special Economic Measures in the Fuel and Energy Sector in Connection with the Unfriendly Activities of Certain Non-Friendly Countries and International Organizations"


Defining Three Conditions for S-1 Equity Transfer

- The foreign participants in the consortium, or legal entities or natural persons authorized by them, will **transfer the funds** to the account of the new Russian legal entity.
- The foreign participants in the consortium will **conclude contracts for the supply of foreign-made equipment and parts and technical cooperation** necessary for the implementation of the PSA.
- The foreign participants in the consortium will **take actions (including filing lawsuits if necessary) that will lead to the lifting of political and economic sanctions** imposed by foreign countries that are negatively affecting the implementation of the PSA.




US Sanctions targeting Arctic LNG 2 and Northern Sea Route


Why US started targeting Arctic LNG-2?

Date	Events and Contents of Sanctions	US Targets
19 th May 2023	G7 Joint Statement in Hiroshima 'We will continue to reduce Russia's revenue by financing its illegal aggression by taking appropriate steps to limit Russia's energy revenue and future extractive capabilities. ' https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2023/05/19/g7-statement-on-ukraine/	Atomflot , Gazprom Vnigaz, SNIIGGIMS, Gazpromneft Noyabrsk, Vygon Consulting, Gubkin Univ. etc.
20 th July 2023	DOS is designating multiple entities involved in expanding Russia's ability to finish construction of key future energy projects , as well as entities engaged in exploratory drilling throughout Russia. Russian shipping company that has provided key logistical support to multiple Russian future energy projects. https://www.state.gov/record-2023-07-20/	Nipigaz SASCO 
14 th Sept 2023	DOS is imposing sanctions on over 70 entities and individuals involved in expanding Russia's energy production and export capacity. https://www.state.gov/record-2023-09-14/	5 entities & 2 FSUs related to Arctic LNG-2
2 nd Nov 2023	CONSTRAINING RUSSIA'S FUTURE ENERGY PRODUCTION AND EXPORT CAPACITY https://www.state.gov/record-2023-11-02/	Arctic LNG 2 LLC 3 entities related to Ust-Luga LNG
12 th Dec 2023		
23 rd Feb 2024	DOT imposed additional sanction related to Arctic LNG-2. https://www.dhs.gov/record-2024-02-23/	NOVATEK Murmansk , Smart LNG , Zvezda Shipyard , JSC Sovcomflot
1 st May 2024	DOS imposed additional sanction related to Arctic LNG-2. https://www.state.gov/record-2024-05-01/	Red Box Energy Services (Singapore), AUDAX , PUGNAX , CFU Shipping Co Ltd (Hongkong), Hunter Star , Nan Feng Zhi Xing , Eko Shipping LLC , Transstroy LLC , Modmer Trading Uluslararası İthalat Ve İhracat Ltd Şirketi (Turkey)
12 th June 2024	DOS imposed additional sanction related to Arctic LNG-2. https://www.state.gov/record-2024-06-12/	RusGazDobycha , Arktik SPG 1 , Obssky Gas Chemical Complex , Gazprom Invest , Arktik SPG 7 , ARC7 LNG tankers , 運業巨海海洋工程重工業有限公司 (China), LLC Murmansk LNG , YAMALDORSTROY (Vostok Oil Project related)
23 rd Aug 2024	DOS imposed additional sanction related to Arctic LNG-2. https://www.state.gov/record-2024-08-23/	ZARA SHIPHOLDING CO , OCEAN SPEEDSTAR SOLUTIONS , 3 LNG tankers NOVATEK CHINA HOLDINGS CO LTD , EKROPROMSTROY , WATERFALL ENGINEERING LTD , WHITE FOX SHIP MANAGEMENT FZCO , 4 LNG tankers
5 th Sept 2024	DOT imposed additional sanction related to Arctic LNG-2. https://www.dhs.gov/record-2024-09-05/	Gotik Energy Shipping Co , Pilo Energy Cargo Shipping OPC PVT LTD , 2 LNG tankers
30 th Oct 2024	DOS imposed additional sanction related to Arctic LNG-2. https://www.state.gov/record-2024-10-30/	SMART SOLUTIONS LTD (related to GBS construction and transportation) LNG ALPHIA SHIPPING PTE LTD , NEW TRANS SHIPMENT FZE , LNG BETA SHIPPING PTE LTD , LNG DELTA SHIPPING PTE LTD , LNG GAMMA SHIPPING PTE LTD

Counteraction by Russia: Trial Export in 2024 but failed



Shadow LNG fleet and its direction as of today



China Beihai LNG Terminal



Stakeholders	Capacity	Tanks	Volume	Start Year	CAPEX
PipeChina : 80% 広西北部湾 国際港務集団 : 20%	6	4	0.64 MMkL	2016	17.78 Bil RMB