



**GIIGNL**

International Group Of Liquefied  
Natural Gas Importers

# **Technical Study Group**

## **Incident identification database**

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**April 8-9, 2026, Puerto Rico**

# Our Incident & Near-Miss Database

- **Link to access the secure web-based platform :**  
**<https://incidents-giignl.org>**
- **A shared, anonymous database to report incidents and near-misses**
- **Designed to transform individual incidents and near-misses into collective learning**

# Incident Database – Upcoming improvements

- **Automatic reminders to moderators**
  - **An automatic reminder is sent when an incident remains pending validation for more than 9 days, administrators included in copy**
- **Post-validation incident modification**
  - **Incidents can now be modified after validation. Any modification automatically re-triggers the existing workflow. All changes are fully traceable, using the current historization mechanism.**
- **Incident number search correction. Issue affecting the search by incident number has been fixed.**

# Current Status of the Database

- 495 incidents registered in the database

**Number of database connections  
in 2026**

Asia	1
Americas	0
Europe	21

**Number of incidents created by  
region in 2026**

Asia	0
Americas	0
Europe	5

## **Latest incidents recorded : incident N° 1944**

- **The incident occurred during the recommissioning phase of truck loading bays, following extensive automation works.**
- **At the time of the event, bay No. 1 was not in operation: no truck was present, the loading hose was not connected, and the drain valve to the atmospheric safety vent pipe was open.**
- **During the safety lock-down test on bay No. 2, the supply valves were closed and the drain valve to the atmospheric safety vent pipe was opened. The safety vent pipe is common to both bays.**
- **As a result, LNG flowed back through the common safety vent pipe towards bay No. 1 and leaked through the hose, leading to the formation of a gas cloud.**
- **No ignition of the gas cloud occurred and no injury was reported.**

# Latest incidents recorded : incident N° 1944

- A new HAZOP study was carried out to address this issue.
- It was decided to modify the loading bays in order to physically separate the safety venting lines of each bay, thereby eliminating any possible interconnection.
- In addition, an awareness campaign was launched for project managers to reinforce the need for strict compliance with HAZOP procedures throughout project design and execution.
- The incident demonstrated that :
  - The atmospheric safety vent pipe linked to the truck connection hose shall be dedicated exclusively to this function and shall not be interconnected with other vent lines.

# Latest incidents recorded : incident N° 1946

- Leaks detected on Brazed Aluminum Heat Exchangers (BAHX) of LPG recovery unit in a LNG Plant. External crack due to stress corrosion cracking and internal crack due to thermal fatigue
- Heat Exchangers operated in severe conditions, with two-phase flow on both cold and hot sides and frequent temperature cycling :
  - ❑ startup events (~ 10 cycles per year at 10 to 30 ° C/min)
  - ❑ pressure fluctuations (~ 4 cycles per day at 2 to 5° C/min)
  - ❑ Backflushes (~ several per year, 2 to 5° C/min)
- All 6 BAHXs in the plant have been replaced.

# Latest incidents recorded : incident N° 1947

- During disconnection of the Butane liquid loading arms from the receiving marine vessel, a Butane loss of containment occurred from the loading arm coupling (QC/DC).
- Four personnel were in the immediate vicinity and were enveloped in hydrocarbon. No injuries occurred as a result of the loss of containment and subsequent exposure.
- Procedure: Ships Manifold Drain valve was closed by ship crew without authorization from Loading Master.
- Management of Change: The introduction of a hold point to allow shift change during vessel loading activity (area unattended for ≈1 hour).
- Verification: After handover of the task, the incoming crew did not doublecheck the status of the equipment prior to recommencing activity.

# Latest incidents recorded : incident N° 1948

- Propane Loss of Primary Containment occurred in Train-2, forming a vapor cloud.
- The incident was caused by trapped liquid propane leading to thermal overpressure, combined with a design gap whereby the line was not protected by a thermal-relief TSV and wall thinning from corrosion under pipe supports (CUPS).
  - Conduct design review of propane storage / transfer loops to address the identified issue/gap.
  - Review the normal operating procedures to ensure step-by-step guide is written for all operations starting with the transfer operations to storage bullets.
  - Create a program for inspection and repair of corrosion under pipe supports across the whole plant.

# Latest incidents recorded : incident N° 1949

- LNG truck driver was returning with an empty trailer from a customer.
  - His truck had a gas vapor release coming out from a back valve.
  - The driver immediately used a gallon of water he had on hand to pour over the frozen valve.
  - Ice removal with water on the valve then valve closure. This action fully eliminated the gas leak from the trailer.
- Valves were not hermetically sealed due to the presence of ice.
  - Lack of minimum watering time for hoses during the LNG offloading procedure.

# **Thank You for Sharing – A Collective Responsibility**

- **Many thanks to the members who take the time to report incidents and near-misses.**
- **These shared experiences are risks avoided and injuries prevented for all of us.**
- **Near-misses are often as valuable as serious incidents for learning.**
- **We also encourage those who have not yet contributed, even when it feels uncomfortable or time-consuming.**
- **The more we share, the safer and stronger we become — together.**