

PERM KRAI. POLITICAL CONTEXTS

as of October 2025




Perm, Market Square (1913)

Demographic and socioeconomic situation

As of the beginning of 2025, the population of Perm Krai amounted to almost [2.5 million](#) people. More than three-quarters of them are urban residents. The population of the region is distributed across the territory very unevenly. The main part of the inhabitants is concentrated in the southwestern part, where Perm and the large cities of the agglomeration are located. In contrast, the northern and eastern parts are characterized by low population density and a sparse network of settlements.

Over the past decades, the region has been experiencing steady [depopulation](#). During the period 2014–2024, the population decreased by 5.5%. The governor of the krai plans to ensure an [increase](#) in population by 50 thousand by 2035 — primarily by increasing life expectancy.

**Population dynamics of Perm Krai
for the period 2000–2024, million people**



By age and gender structure, the population of Perm Krai differs little from the overall Russian trends. A typical for Russia [imbalance](#) in favor of the female population can be observed. The age structure is characterized by an increasing share of the [elderly population](#) and a decrease in the number of younger generations.

The population of the krai is notable for its multiethnic [composition](#): Russians (80%), Tatars (4%), Komi-Permyaks (2%), Bashkirs (1%), Udmurts (0.5%), Ukrainians (0.2%), and representatives of other ethnic groups live here. At the same time, throughout the entire second half of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century, Russians have consistently held a dominant position.

In the economy of Perm Krai, oil refining and the chemical industry, as well as the production of mineral fertilizers, play a key role. It is precisely the dependence on the export of petroleum products and potash fertilizers that determines the region's vulnerability: sanctions restrictions led to a 7% decline in manufacturing output in 2022–2023, and a 2% [decrease](#) in total industrial production. Thus, Perm Krai found itself

among the regions with [negative dynamics](#), unlike a number of other military-oriented regions that showed growth.

At the same time, the region maintains relatively high investment activity: in 2023, investment growth of about 7% was recorded, as well as an increase in investment in housing construction (the volume of commissioned housing increased 1.5 times) and the public utilities sector (+39% investments, associated with preparations for the 300th anniversary of Perm).

The industrial and production complex remains an important element of the region's economy: it provides about 2% of Russia's industrial output (13th place among the regions).

The financial policy of the Krai is characterized by a low level of debt burden. The region transfers [72.5% of its revenues](#) to the federal budget.

The socio-economic situation remains tense: according to official data, almost 9% of the region's population live below the poverty line, while according to the assessment of economic geography expert Natalia Zubarevich, in Perm Krai such people make up [more than a quarter](#).

Thus, Perm Krai keeps general Russian trends: the vulnerability of traditional export industries and the need to adapt to long-term demographic challenges.

Evolution of the political process

The evolution of the political process in Perm Krai over the three decades following the collapse of the USSR reflects general Russian trends but also has a number of specific features. On the one hand, the development of regional politics here demonstrates a gradual transition from the Soviet tradition to a model of [technocratic governance](#), from the personalist regimes of “managers” and entrepreneurs to more controlled structures directed by the center. On the other hand, the relative distinctiveness of the regional political scene is preserved, determined by the strength of [local elites](#).

Governors of Perm Krai



Stages of the political process in the region:

1) Yeltsin Period (1990s)

Representatives of the Soviet economic elite came to leading positions—people well integrated into the local administrative system but at the same time loyal to the federal center. **Boris Kuznetsov** and **Gennady Igumnov** reproduced the logic of “managers” with Komsomol and Communist party backgrounds.

2) Stage of the “wild” capitalists (early 2000s)

Yuri Trutnev, an [entrepreneur](#) and former mayor of Perm, became the embodiment of a mixed model in which the economic interests of business elites were directly integrated into power institutions. The formation of stable networks combining administrative and business resources was an important consequence of this. The transitional nature of power was vividly reflected in the subsequent governorship of **Oleg Chirkunov**. His period was marked by a movement from a purely economic course toward experiments in the field of [cultural policy](#). The “Perm Cultural Project” sought to transform the region into a laboratory of cultural modernization; however, due to the lack of systematic planning and the growing conflict with local elites, it ended in symbolic and political failure. Thus, this stage proved contradictory: it created conditions for the liberalization of the political climate but revealed the structural weakness of the regional authorities in matters of economy and governance.

3) Stage of the *varyags* (mid-2010s)

The [appointment](#) of **Viktor Basargin** by Dmitry Medvedev and the arrival of numerous outsiders signified the strengthening of federal control and the Kremlin’s attempt to reset regional politics. However, the lack of deep knowledge of the Prikamye’s (Perm Krai’s) specifics and the absence of their own political capital led to a decline in trust toward the regional authorities. **Maksim Reshetnikov**, although of local origin, built his career in Moscow and later [returned to the center](#), leaving behind the impression of a “temporary acting official”. The *varyag* period demonstrated that imported leadership without organic ties to the region does not promote elite consolidation.

4) Elite consolidation (since 2020)

The appointment of a local governor became a compromise solution that combined the center’s demand for effective and predictable governance with the region’s need for “its own” leader.

In summary, the Prikamye has become an example of how regional elites retained the ability to adapt to new political conditions, gradually forming a modern model of governance in which the governor’s local roots are combined with integration into the federal political order.

Main centers of power in the region

Administration

The administrative system in Perm Krai has several characteristic features: 1) it is highly sensitive to federal signals; 2) it is totally centralized and personified.

(Executive power)



Dmitry Makhonin (Governor) was born, was educated, and worked in Perm Krai, but at the same time he has an experience of working in the [Federal Antimonopoly Service](#), which formed his reputation as a technocrat with managerial skills in the field of market regulation.

His appointment to the governor's post in 2020 took place during the pandemic, when the focus was on local governance and minimizing dependence on Moscow, which helped him quickly establish communication with local elites and municipalities. In the first year of his tenure, Makhonin rose in the national [rankings](#) of governors from the "second" to the "first" echelon, forming the image of a non-confrontational manager capable of consolidating various groups of influence.

By 2023, his style was characterized by consensus-building; however, a gradual course toward centralization and strengthening of personal power began to emerge. In May 2023, a [decision](#) was made that secured for the governor the right to control personnel policy in municipalities and the areas of culture, education, and energy. The [conflict](#) with the mayor of Perm, Aleksey Dyomkin, which ended with the latter's resignation, became a symbolic episode: it demonstrated Makhonin's readiness for tough decisions and at the same time caused a wave of discontent among part of the local business groups. In response, [inspections](#) in several regional ministries were initiated (procurement, social development, property relations), which can be regarded as an element of administrative pressure on his team. At the end of the same year, he officially [joined](#) "United Russia", finally integrating himself into the federal party.

During 2024–2025, Makhonin's activities were defined primarily by the electoral cycle and preparation for the gubernatorial elections (held in September 2025 and resulting in his victory with 71% of the vote). He regularly demonstrates loyalty to the center through participation in federal events and personal contacts with ministers and politicians. Symbolically, emphasis is placed on completing long-term construction projects — the [zoo](#) and the [art gallery](#) — whose openings were timed to coincide with the election campaign. In 2024, the "Perm in Order" and "Green Ring" [urban wellbeing programs](#) were launched, aimed at greening, developing courtyards, and improving public spaces. Funding was also increased for the [resettlement](#) of the inhabitants of dilapidated houses and the improvement of adjacent territories. Significant attention was given to [education](#): during the previous term, 36 schools were built, and plans for another 30 over the next five years were announced.

The governor's influence is reinforced by integration into the national political framework, but within the region he is forced to balance between the strengthened control of law enforcement structures and the interests of business elites. As a result, he has the image of a leader who combines technocratic traits with administrative toughness.



Aleksander Smertin (Head of the Governor's Administration). In 2021 he was appointed Acting Head of the Governor's Administration, which became the subject of numerous insider comments. Formally, this was explained by the lack of approval from the Kremlin, since, according to [sources](#), Smertin's candidacy had not been approved during the interview at the Presidential Administration. On the other hand, the personnel base for this position in Perm Krai was limited, and Makhonin apparently had no alternative figure with a sufficient level of competence and loyalty.

As of 2024–2025, Smertin coordinates all internal policy of the krai, maintaining administrative stability during periods of external pressure, particularly during the inspections of regional ministries in 2023–2024. His style is distinguished by an orientation toward “invisible efficiency”: he does not belong to public politicians, but within the administrative system he is perceived as one of the key stabilizers.



Olga Antipina (First Deputy Chair of the Government) — oversees the financial and budgetary sector and controls the krai's debt policy. Under her leadership, the region avoided deficits despite increased spending on social programs in 2024–2025.



Aleksey Chibisov (Deputy Chair of the Government, Minister of Industry and Trade) — belongs to the category of “long-term officials” in the regional executive branch. He has been working in the team since previous administrations, which demonstrates his administrative flexibility and ability to maintain his position despite changes of governors. His portfolio covers the industrial and trade sector, which has strategic importance in Perm Krai due to the concentration of large defense-industrial enterprises (including aircraft engine manufacturing),

as well as the chemical industry and oil refining. In 2024, Chibisov was able to stabilize the work of subordinate sectors after a series of crisis situations, including the [bankruptcy](#) of the “Perm Pig Complex”, which in previous years had caused sharp political disputes and public discontent. Against this backdrop, he demonstrated the ability to “resolve conflicts”. At the same time, Chibisov managed to establish communication with federal structures through the scientific-educational center “Rational Subsoil Use”, which allowed him to secure 250 million rubles in [grants](#) in 2024 for projects in aircraft engine manufacturing,

chemistry, and energy. This solidified his position as a key coordinator of federal-industrial projects in the region.



Aleksander Borisov (Deputy Chair of the Government for Natural Resource Management and Security) — progressed from working in the Main Directorate of Internal Affairs of Perm Krai to administrative positions in regional agencies and a mandate as a deputy of the Legislative Assembly. Since 2020, he has held the position of Deputy Chair of the regional government. In 2023, Borisov twice traveled on [business trips](#) to a sister city in the occupied Luhansk Oblast as part of territory restoration programs. At the same time, his reputation was affected by a [road incident](#): in August 2023, he was involved in a traffic accident on the Polazna–Chusovoy highway, in which four people were injured. Despite media criticism, this incident did not lead to his dismissal.



Sergey Nikiforov (Deputy Chair of the Government for Social Protection and Healthcare) — oversees one of the most sensitive sectors for the population (social and medical). Before joining the regional administration, he worked on projects related to improving the efficiency of public administration and the healthcare system, including coordinating the implementation of the “Lean Polyclinic” [program](#) in the occupied Sevastopol. Previously, he [headed](#) the Department of Production Systems Development at the UEC-Perm Engines Corporation, where he gained experience in optimizing large organizational processes. No significant public scandals or high-profile accusations against him have been recorded.



Dmitry Samoylov (Deputy Chair of the Government for Education, Culture, and Sports) — has held the position since 2020. After the 300th anniversary of the city of Perm, his sector lost part of its funding, and public activity significantly decreased. His reputation was negatively affected by a [corruption scandal](#) surrounding the reconstruction of the Youth Palace: in 2022, the director of “Trust No. 6” gave a bribe of 5.45 million rubles to the then leadership of city structures for the acceptance of work, and in 2025 the contractor was sentenced to five years in a high-security colony. Although Samoylov was not directly implicated in the case, his supervisory sector became associated with poor oversight of contractors, which negatively affected perceptions of his effectiveness within the executive system.



Ekaterina Tkhor (Minister of Finance) — before her appointment to the ministerial role in 2021, she worked in the krai’s financial system: she managed the budget policy department, handled budget planning, and oversaw the main areas of budget document formation and execution. In 2025, she and her team presented the [report](#) on the implementation of the 2024 budget, in which revenues were approximately 15% higher than the planned figures. In April 2025,

Putin [awarded](#) Tkhor with the distinction “For Impeccable Service for 30 Years”.



Tatyana Chuksina (Minister of Economic Development and Investment) — headed the ministry in 2024, having previously served as First Deputy. Her influence in regional politics is growing due to the ministry of economic development’s central role in addressing key investment issues in the Prikamye.



Anna Bykova (Minister of the Agro-Industrial Complex) — a new figure in regional politics. She headed the ministry in March 2025 following the resignation of Pavel Noskov, who provided agricultural [exports](#) growth by one-third (egg production exceeded the population’s needs by [200%](#)). Bykova seeks to maintain the high standards set by her predecessor: new [measures to support](#) dairy farming are being developed in the krai.



Aleksey Zarubin (Minister for Procurement and the Contract System) — since 2014, he served as Deputy Minister, and in 2020 he headed the ministry. In 2024, he was awarded an [honorary diploma](#) for organizing procurements in Perm Krai (under his leadership, the region allegedly “saved” about 5.5 billion rubles in tenders). At the same time, Zarubin became involved in a public conflict with the prosecutor’s office over the purchase of an apartment in Sochi, registered under his mother and declared by him as a “disputed transaction” — the prosecutor’s office claims that he did not report 27 million rubles of income used to buy the property in his declaration. In

June 2025, Perm Krai prosecutor’s office initiated the [confiscation](#) of the Sochi apartment and a country house near Perm owned by Zarubin.



Dmitry Belanovich (Minister of Natural Resources, Forestry, and Ecology) — has headed the ministry since 2021. Previously, he worked for a long time in the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources and served as an advisor to the minister at the federal level. Under his leadership, in 2024 the ministry fully met its [budgetary obligations](#): nearly 3 billion rubles were received by the regional budget, and 1.72 billion by the federal budget. In September 2025, he received the functions of the Chief State Inspector for Environmental Protection

following the [liquidation](#) of the environmental inspection. It strengthened the ministry’s control over environmental compliance and aligning with the general trend of centralizing environmental oversight in the country.



Larisa Vedernikova (Minister of Property Relations and Urban Development) — has extensive experience in regulating land relations and has headed the regional ministry since 2020. The initiation and promotion of the idea of synchronizing the commissioning of housing and social infrastructure facilities through comprehensive territory development agreements is one of her achievements. In 2024, Vedernikova joined the party “United Russia”.



Sergey Veshnyakov (Minister of Transport) — has held the position since 2022. Previously, he worked as Head of the krai’s Directorate of Roads and Transport; before that, he was First Deputy Head of the Administration of the Leninsky District of Perm. Under his leadership, a number of large-scale infrastructure projects were launched, including the start of reconstruction of the [Chusovoy Bridge](#). In addition, Veshnyakov announced the construction of a four-lane tunnel under the Trans-Siberian Railway within Perm.



Pavel Fokin (Minister of Social Development) — responsible for social assistance, pension payments, support for families, „SMO” participants, the home-based social service program, and employment support measures. Fokin initiated the development of the [social district service](#), which conducts visits to elderly, large and low-income families; this service covers all municipalities in the region, providing assistance to over 10,000 people.



Anastasia Kruten (Minister of Health) — progressed from a practicing physician to the head of large medical institutions, earning a reputation as a specialist who understands the internal logic of the healthcare system. Being the head of the ministry, she has focused on increasing access to medical care, deploying infrastructure projects in [remote districts](#), and developing oncology services through [telemedicine](#) and mobile care units. Despite objective sectoral challenges (staff shortages, underfunding, etc.), Kruten has managed to [stabilize](#) key indicators, reduce mortality from cardiovascular diseases, and demonstrate the ability to maintain control in a socially sensitive area. In the regional political landscape, she is primarily perceived as a competent administrative executor.



Piotr Shilovskikh (Minister of Information Development and Communications) — belongs to the technocratic type of managers, combining experience in both business and government structures. Before his appointment, he worked in telecommunications and IT companies, as well as within the ministry itself. Under his leadership, the ministry implemented several significant initiatives, including providing [broadband internet](#) to settlements with several hundred residents and projects for the digitalization of public services.



Albert Mardanov (Acting Minister of Territorial Security) — assumed the position in February 2025 following Viktor Batmazov's decision to step down. Mardanov has shown himself as an active official: he participates in resolving administrative matters during mobilization periods, travels to „SMO” zone, actively comments on events in the media, and began integrating into the party system by joining “United Russia” in August 2025. At the same time, [sources](#) indicate that Mardanov “handles business matters” through law enforcement structures, raising concerns about the opacity of his practices.



Raisa Kassina (Minister of Education) — a long-term administrator with many years of experience in leadership positions (she has served as Deputy Minister and head of departments). In 2024, a [new school subject](#), “Fundamentals of Safety and Defense of the Fatherland”, was introduced into the curriculum in Perm Krai. In terms of reputation, Kassina is perceived as a stable executor, capable of promoting educational initiatives and supporting the sector.



Alla Platonova (Minister of Culture) — assumed the position with many years of experience in the theatrical field: she worked at the Perm Opera and Ballet Theatre, initially in marketing, then in leadership roles in the development department and endowment fund. In February 2025, a [video](#) appeared online showing Platonova allegedly reacting physically and verbally to a subordinate, which led to an administrative case.



Eduard Sosnin (Mayor of Perm) — originally from Lisva, before becoming mayor he headed the Ministry of Economic Development and Investment of Perm Krai. Earlier, he was engaged in entrepreneurial activities, including the production of household goods, and worked in trade in Moscow. In 2018, he won the “Leaders of Russia” [competition](#), which positively influenced his

career growth. Sosnin has gained a reputation as a city mayor who seeks to address residents' everyday problems directly through inspection visits to districts, responding to infrastructure failures, and similar measures. In the region, he is perceived as a politician strongly dependent on the regional authorities.



Aleksander Rusanov (Mayor of Solikamsk) — assumed office in 2024. After his election, Rusanov [announced](#) his intention to conduct an “open, honest dialogue with residents”. He pays notable attention to communal services and responds to crises, such as issues with heating and other utilities, which previously caused public dissatisfaction in Solikamsk.

(Legislative power)



Valery Sukhikh (Chair of the Legislative Assembly) — one of the most stable political actors in the region, remaining active in public politics for over three decades. He has headed the Legislative Assembly under various governors — from Yuri Trutnev to Dmitry Makhonin — demonstrating high adaptability and ability to avoid conflicts with the administrative system.

Despite the stability of his position, Sukhikh has repeatedly been the target of [information attacks](#). In 2024, fraudulent messages were circulated in his name, which the Legislative Assembly officially denied, and rumors and audio recordings attributing inappropriate statements to him appeared in the media. These claims were not officially confirmed but they indicate attempts to influence his reputation.



Pavel Cherepanov (Deputy of the Legislative Assembly, Advisor to the Governor on Construction Issues) — one of the prominent members of the regional parliament, combining legislative activity with functions in the executive system. It makes him a key figure in the region's construction and infrastructure policy.

At the same time, Cherepanov's image has some controversial aspects. In 2023, the FSB conducted an [inspection](#) of structures connected to the regional leadership, during which searches were also carried out at Cherepanov's premises. This episode caused significant resonance in the media and among experts, casting a shadow over his political reputation, although no official conclusions regarding his personal responsibility were published.



Armen Garslyan (Deputy of the Legislative Assembly) — has been a member of the deputy corps since 2006. Since 2024, he has chaired the Budget Committee in the Legislative Assembly, receiving support from the majority of deputies. Garslyan represents business interests: for a long time, he chaired the board of directors of the chemical company [“Metafraks”](#) until its nationalization, after which he joined the management of the [“Tashir”](#) group of companies as Vice President.



Georgy Tkachenko (Deputy of the Legislative Assembly, President of PJSC “Morion”) — in June 2025, he was elected First Deputy Chair of the Budget Committee of the Legislative Assembly of Perm Krai. In this position, he participates in the formation of the region’s budget documents, influences the allocation of financial resources, and also impacts infrastructure development initiatives.



Eduard Avetisyan (Deputy of the Legislative Assembly) — member of the [Committee](#) on Industry, Economic Policy, and Taxes. Professionally connected to big business: he is Deputy Director for Government Relations at PJSC [“Uralkaliy”](#), which gives him leverage in matters of regulatory policy and industrial cooperation.



Vagarshak Sarksyanyan (Deputy of the Legislative Assembly) has been a deputy since 2011. He participates in [working groups](#) on road activities, construction, land use, and regional infrastructure development. In addition to his political work, he heads the regional public [organization](#) “Center of Armenian Culture of Perm Krai”.

Sarksyanyan is also known for his involvement in industrial management as Executive Director of PJSC “Motovilikha Plants”. In 2023, a [bankruptcy case](#) was initiated against him due to a debt of over 84.5 million rubles to a subsidiary of “Kamastal”. Subsequent developments highlighted the complexity of interactions between business and legal mechanisms: the debt was put up for auction and sold for a symbolic amount of about 6 million rubles, while the prosecutor’s office opposed the bankruptcy procedure, citing doubts about the legitimacy of the grounds for declaring insolvency.



Aleksander Boychenko (Deputy of the Legislative Assembly) — a stable figure in the political life of Perm Krai, a long-term deputy of the regional parliament whose career is closely tied to the region's industrial sector. For a long time, he headed one of the key [enterprises](#) in the pulp and paper industry — the Perm Pulp and Paper Plant, where he held positions as CEO and Chairman of the Board of Directors. In the Legislative Assembly, Boychenko chairs the Committee on State Policy and Local Self-Government, so he is an influential moderator of relations between the authorities and municipalities.



Yuri Borisovets (Deputy of the Legislative Assembly) — one of the most influential members of the regional political elite, who has consistently served in the regional parliament since 2001 (with a hiatus for work in the [State Duma](#) from 2007 to 2011). He is considered close to Yuri Trutnev, which reflects his integration into the broader political-administrative context. Borisovets' economic base is multi-sectoral: his [assets](#) include industrial and construction companies, commercial and entertainment infrastructure, the restaurant business, as well as a significant portfolio of real estate and land plots. This combination of political and business resources makes him a prime example of a regional actor consolidating influence through control over both institutional and economic channels.



Veronika Kulikova (Deputy of the Legislative Assembly) — has been in the regional parliament since 2021 and heads the faction of the party “Just Russia — Patriots — For Truth”. Previously (2016–2021), she was a deputy of the Perm City Duma, where she led the “Just Russia” faction and served on the Committees on Economic Development and on Urban Planning and Territorial Development. Kulikova is known as one of the opposition voices against regional authorities' initiatives: she [criticizes](#) improvement projects (for example, the “Green Ring” in Perm) and advocates prioritizing the resolution of dilapidated housing issues and residents' social needs when forming the budget.



Aleksander Tretyakov (Deputy of the Legislative Assembly) — works on social and economic development, investment policy, and the agro-industrial complex issues. His political role is complemented by a public sports background: Tretyakov is known as an honored [master of sports](#) in Greco-Roman wrestling.



Ksenia Aytakova (Deputy of the Legislative Assembly) — leader of the regional branch of the CPRF and Deputy Chair of the regional parliament. In 2025, Aytakova [ran for governor](#) as the CPRF candidate and received approximately 10.3% of the vote, placing second. Her regional reputation combines the image of an “opposition figure” with that of an experienced legislator who knows how to work within the system’s frameworks without overstepping them.



Andrey Silaev (Deputy of the Legislative Assembly) — combines his parliamentary work with a corporate career (Director of Security at PJSC [“Uralkaliy”](#), one of the region’s key industrial enterprises). In the past, he worked in law enforcement and later in the metallurgical sector, including at the “Mechel” group in Chelyabinsk.



Maria Konovalova (Deputy of the Legislative Assembly) serves on the Committee on Industry, Economic Policy, and Taxes. It allows her to influence legislation related to business, industrial development, and the regional economy in general. Additionally, she is a public relations advisor of the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the chemical company [“Metafraks”](#). Her position in regional politics is defined by a combination of institutional representation in parliament and connections to one of the krai’s leading industrial enterprises, providing her access to both political and economic resources.



Dmitry Malyutin (Chair of the Perm City Duma) — before being elected Chair of the City Duma in 2021, he served as a deputy for several convocations. Malyutin is also a member of the Presidium of the regional branch of the party “United Russia” in Perm Krai. His political style is characterized by stability, control over the party structure in the city, and the ability to mobilize the deputy corps.



Maksim Spiridonov (Deputy Chair of the Perm City Duma) — from 2006 to 2021, he worked as an assistant to Legislative Assembly Deputy Nikolay Dyomkin. In the City Duma, Spiridonov focuses on addressing local residents’ issues — roads, sidewalks, lighting, education and healthcare infrastructure. His influence is primarily based on “bottom-up” work, including citizen appeals and oversight of city services.



Vladimir Plotnikov (Deputy of the Perm City Duma) — his political weight in the city is reinforced by activity in the sports community (he is the Vice President of the Judo Federation of Russia and chairs the Council of the Judo Federation of Perm Krai). He is considered the “shadow” mayor of Perm.

In 2024 he was awarded the [title](#) of Honorary Citizen of Perm. At the same time, his public reputation has negative aspects: media reports mention the controversial nature of his connections with authorities, his “shadow” influence, and debates over the appropriateness of granting honorary titles to individuals with substantial commercial assets.

(Judicial power)



Aleksander Sukhankin (Chair of the Perm Krai Court) — head of the regional branch of general courts since March 2022. He is a member of the Council of Judges of the Russian Federation, which strengthens his institutional resources and horizontal connections within the judicial corps.



Evgeny Shaykhutdinov (Chair of the 17th Arbitration Court of Appeals, Perm) — appointed by presidential decree in 2024, he transferred from the position of Head of the Arbitration Court of Chelyabinsk Oblast. The transfer of experience between regions increased the manageability of the Court of Appeals in business-related cases.

Security block

Security block is one of the key centers of influence on regional politics. Its institutional weight has increased due to several factors: 1) the general trend of strengthening the role of security structures in the Russian political system after 2022; 2) the focus on combating corruption and controlling local elites, which in Prikamye was manifested through high-profile [inspections](#) of ministers, heads of state structures, and municipal officials; 3) the growing mobilization agenda.



Andrey Lyapkin (Head of the FSB Directorate for Perm Krai) — Major General, has [headed](#) the regional directorate since 2023 (appointed by presidential decree). Previously, he worked in the FSB directorates of Kaliningrad Oblast and the occupied Crimea.



Pavel Bukhtoyarov (Prosecutor of Perm Krai) — has headed the regional prosecutor's office since 2021. At the end of 2023, Bukhtoyarov and his subordinates received a [reprimand](#) from the General Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation following an inspection conducted by Moscow auditors. The inspection revealed "numerous serious deficiencies" in the criminal-law sphere of their work. In October 2024, he gave a major interview reporting on the results of prosecutorial oversight.



Denis Golovkin (Head of the Investigative Directorate for Perm Krai) — Colonel of Justice, has led the regional directorate of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation since 2022, appointed by presidential decree. Previously, he held leadership positions in investigative units in various regions, including Kirov and Kursk.

His influence in the region is determined by control over investigations of key criminal cases and coordination with other security structures.


At the level of institutional weight, he is perceived as one of the main arbiters in the criminal-law sphere, capable of influencing the balance between business, authorities, and law enforcement agencies. The effectiveness of his work is assessed ambiguously: on one hand, the directorate [demonstrates](#) large-scale activity and public visibility; on the other, in 2023 he and his subordinates were subjected to an [internal inspection](#) due to systemic deficiencies.



Yegor Shmyrin (Prosecutor of Perm) — appointed in 2023. He has worked in the prosecutor's office since 2007. Under his leadership, the Perm prosecutor's office more actively [records violations](#) in the municipal sphere, responds to citizen appeals, conducts field receptions, and initiates inspections based on online submissions. This increases the visibility of the prosecutor's institution in the city and strengthens its influence among local authorities.



Aleksander Kokovin (Military Commissar of Perm Krai) — has headed the military commissariat since 2020, overseeing the local system of military registration, conscription, and coordination with federal military structures. His authority covers a segment that is critically important during periods of mobilization, when issues of conscription and fulfillment of military duties gain high public sensitivity and scrutiny.



Aleksander Urusov (Head of the Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations for Perm Krai) — in office since March 2022. His previous career included the position of First Deputy Head of the Ministry of Emergency Situations for Penza Oblast. Urusov's effectiveness is perceived through the relative absence of high-profile scandals.

Federal curators and representatives

This group in the political sphere of Perm Krai has a dual nature. On one hand, these are federal curators who set the framework for local elites, control the legitimacy of political processes, and minimize the risks of autonomous local maneuvering. On the other hand, this group includes individuals from Prikamye who have built political careers in federal structures. Their presence provides Perm Krai with channels to lobby interests in the center while simultaneously forming reference points for the local establishment.



Sergey Polovnikov (Chief Federal Inspector for Perm Krai) — in 2024-2025, his activity combined two formats of work: participation in key security and administrative [meetings](#), and maintaining direct contact with the local population. His appearances at the meetings of the board of the regional Ministry of Internal Affairs and work with the Regional Management Center demonstrate involvement in monitoring the implementation of federal priorities, while field receptions of citizens show a “feedback” function between the center and local communities. Overall, his role appears more restrained and arbitrate: without direct interference in political conflicts, but sending a clear signal of federal-level presence and oversight.



Igor Komarov (Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Volga Federal District) — formerly headed [Roscosmos](#). In 2024-2025, his visits to Perm were related to preparations for the presidential elections, the development of social programs and family policy, as well as discussions of investment and infrastructure projects in housing, healthcare, education, and culture.



Yuri Trutnev (Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District) — assumed office in 2013. Previously, he was Governor of Perm Krai, later Minister of Natural Resources, and Assistant to the President. Today, he remains one of the most prominent figures among those originating from Prikamye. His influence on the region is defined more by the long-standing shadow of political authority accumulated during his governorship. For Perm elites, Trutnev serves more as a symbol of a “possible future” — an

example of how regional politicians integrate into the federal sphere. Yuri Trutnev's son, Dmitry Trutnev, is involved in regional politics as a representative of the business sector, serving as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the company Neftegaztekhnika.



Maksim Reshetnikov (Minister of Economic Development of the Russian Federation). His career unfolded precisely from Perm Krai, where he progressed from a regional official to governor, and then to a member of the government. In 2024, despite rumors of a possible resignation, he retained his seat in the cabinet, which confirmed his ability to maintain positions even in turbulent conditions. For Perm Krai, his presence in the federal center has both symbolic and practical significance: on the one hand, it confirms the “personnel weight” of the region, and on the other — it serves as a channel for potential lobbying of investment and economic interests of Prikamye. At the same time, Reshetnikov's political image has some controversial aspects: his name was associated with a high-profile [scandal](#) around the “Assistance — XXI Century” fund, when the former head reported large-scale financial manipulations aimed at diverting funds for the minister's personal needs. Although these accusations did not lead to direct legal consequences, they cast a shadow over him.

The deputies of the State Duma from Perm Krai include “long-standing” figures of regional politics, business-originating individuals, and new faces connected to federal structures. **Igor Shubin**, former mayor of Perm and a parliamentarian with many years of experience, embodies the “long shadow” of regional political experience: despite past [reputational scandals](#), he maintains the status of an influential figure while being integrated into the cultural and educational field. **Roman Vodianov**, a deputy since 2021, is closely linked to the [business group](#) of Andrey Kuzyaev and exemplifies the institutionalization of entrepreneurial capital within the parliamentary dimension; at the same time, his public activity has decreased in recent years. **Dmitry Skrivanov**, whose career was based on media resources and [opposition](#) to certain gubernatorial teams, lost his information presence after selling his holding. He stays in the parliament more as a formal representative of the region. **Anton Nemkin**, originating from security structures and an entrepreneur in the digital technology sector, secured his position in the Duma due to the importance of information security, which gained additional relevance in 2024–2025 and contributed to strengthening his influence. **Irina Ivenskikh**, a [candidate](#) put forward by Yuri Trutnev, continues to develop the social and humanitarian spheres, combining parliamentary activity with active support of nationwide policy — particularly in the context of election campaigns and promotion of patriotism. Overall, the deputies from Perm Krai demonstrate the absence of a single ideological line, reflect a combination of old political elites, business lobbying, and manifestations of institutional loyalty to the federal center.

Deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation from Perm Krai**Ігорь Шубін****Роман Водянов****Дмитрій
Скріванов****АНТОН НЕМКІН****Іріна Івенськіх**

The senators from Perm Krai embody a specific type of representation, where the formal functions of members of the Federation Council are combined with active participation in ideological and propaganda practices at the federal level. **Andrey Klimov**, a senator since 2012, heads the commission on the protection of state sovereignty and countering external interference. His activities focus on labeling “foreign agents”, and in his public rhetoric he concentrates on the defending Russian statehood from “external threats”. In 2018, Klimov advocated for the blocking of Telegram, and after the start of the full-scale aggression against Ukraine, he extended the concept of “foreign agents” on Russian emigrants. At the same time, open sources contain information about his links to offshore structures in Cyprus and the Virgin Islands, which sharply contrasts with the senator’s public rhetoric and raises questions about double standards in his activities. **Aleksey Pushkov**, a senator since 2016, is also known as a television host. He heads the commission on information policy and media interaction, builds his discourse on criticism of the West and exposing “information threats”. His show “Postscriptum” on the TV-Center channel has served for many years as a tool of propaganda influence, and Pushkov himself is among the highest-paid media propagandists in Russia. Overall, both senators not so much represent Perm Krai, they rather demonstrate loyalty to the federal agenda, being key figures in the ideological support of Kremlin policy.

Senators from Perm Krai**Андрей Клімов****Алексей Пушков**

Industrial-financial groups

A rather influential segment of regional politics, which is not limited to the economic sphere alone. Their influence extends to political processes through an extensive lobbying: key companies have their representatives in the Legislative Assembly, city Dumas, and in the governor's team. Figures such as Eduard Avetisyan and Andrey Silaev ("Uralkaliy"), Georgy Tkachenko ("Morion"), Armen Garslyan ("Tashir"), Maria Konovalova ("Metafraks Chemicals"), and others combine a business identity with parliamentary mandates, turning large enterprises into direct players in the regional political field.

□ **Chemical industry**

The chemical industry of Perm Krai is one of the foundational sectors of the regional economy and, at the same time, an important factor in shaping the political architecture of the region. Its undisputed leader is "**Uralkaliy**" — a global producer of potash fertilizers; a significant portion of tax revenues depends on this company. In the political field, the company is represented directly: Legislative Assembly deputies **Eduard Avetisyan and Andrey Silaev** combine their business roles with parliamentary mandates, providing the corporation with a direct channel of influence over decision-making. This makes the company the most integrated industrial player in power, whose reputation is reinforced both by its global financial scale and its direct presence in regional politics.

The second center of power in the sector is "**Metafraks**". The enterprise, long associated with the Garslyan business group, [came under state control](#) in the 2020s, significantly altering the balance of influence. Despite this, the company has maintained a political presence in the region thanks to **Maria Konovalova**, a Legislative Assembly deputy and advisor to the chairman of the board of directors. Her role demonstrates that even after a change of ownership, the company seeks to maintain its voice in the political life of the region.

The reputational background of the chemical industry remains controversial. "Uralkaliy" sometimes finds itself at the center of [scandals](#) related to competitive struggles in the fertilizer market, and it also faces criticism due to the [environmental consequences](#) of production. "Metafraks", in turn, is associated with the history of ownership changes and the redistribution of political influence between private owners and the state.



Віталій Лаук
Генеральний директор



Андрей Сілаєв
Директор з безпеки,
депутат Закзібрання



Едуард Аветісян
Голова GR-служби «Уралкалія»,
депутат Закзібрання, член комітету
з промисловості, економічної
політики та податків








Марія Коновалова
Директор зі стратегічних
комунікацій компанії,
депутат Закзібрання



□ Construction and development

Unlike the spheres of raw materials or defense, where key roles are played by federal corporations, in construction, significant influence is retained by local business groups closely connected to regional elites and municipal authorities. One of the leading representatives of this segment is **Armen Garslyan**, vice president of the “Tashir” group and a deputy of the Legislative Assembly. He combines the roles of businessman and politician, representing the interests of the construction and development business within government structures. It gives him direct influence over regional politics. Another significant center of power is formed by **Valery Garaev and Oleg Starodubtsev**, co-owners of the “PMD” group and the Amaks Hotels & Resorts chain. Although they formally do not hold government positions, their economic scale and participation in key infrastructure projects provide them with substantial informal influence.

A special role in combining business and politics is played by **Aleksey Raev and the Dyomkin family**. Raev, head of the supervisory board of the company “Rozvitie” (part of the “PMD” group) and a deputy of the Perm City Duma, directly combines the interests of the development business with political activity at the municipal level. **Nikolay Dyomkin**, a former politician and now chairman of the supervisory board of the “Perm Silicate Panels Plant”, maintains influence through control over one of the largest residential construction enterprises in the krai. His son, **Aleksey Dyomkin**, a former mayor of Perm, now works at the Trading House of the “Perm Silicate Panels Plant” and retains positions in influential rankings thanks to a combination of political experience and business resources.

„Tashir”		Armen Garslyan Vice President of the group of companies, deputy of the Legislative Assembly
„PMD”		Oleg Starodubtsev Co-owner of the group of companies
	—	Valeriy Garaev Co-owner of the group of companies
„Rozvitie”		Aleksey Raev Chairman of the Supervisory Board, deputy of the Perm City Duma
„Perm Silicate Panels Plant”		Nikolay Dyomkin Chairman of the Supervisory Board
		Aleksey Dyomkin Head of the Trading House, former Mayor of Perm (had a conflict with the governor of the Krai)

□ Defense-industrial complex

The region's defense-industrial complex has traditionally been one of the system-forming sectors, providing the region with strategic significance at the federal level.

A central position is held by the corporation “**ODK-Aviadvigatel**”, headed by Chief Designer **Aleksandr Inozemtsev**. Under his leadership, the development of the PD-14 aviation engines and the prospective PD-35 is carried out, which are critically important for the Russian aviation industry. Although Inozemtsev does not directly participate in political life, the strategic nature of the enterprise and regular contacts with federal structures make him one of the key “shadow” players in regional politics.

Another center of power is the “**Perm Scientific-Production Engineering Company**”, led by **Aleksey Andreev**. After a partial transfer of the company's shares to the corporation “Tactical Missile Armament”, Andreev became an intermediary between the federal defense sector and regional authorities. His role in Perm Krai is further strengthened by the fact that he serves as an advisor to the governor.



Aleksandr Inozemtsev (Chief Designer of “ODK-Aviadvigatel”). In Perm Krai, he is often called the “voice of the aviation industry”, and at the federal level, he remains one of the few figures capable to communicate directly with the authorities on behalf of the entire sector. Inozemtsev has [met with Putin](#) multiple times, which demonstrates the personal involvement of the head of “Aviadvigatel” in strategic decisions, as well as the level of trust from the federal authorities.



Aleksey Andreev (CEO of the “Perm Scientific-Production Engineering Company”, advisor to the governor). At the beginning of 2024, he significantly increased his share in the company’s ownership structure. In Perm Krai, Andreev is perceived as a technocrat with a pronounced lobbying capacity, capable of simultaneously representing the interests of the defense industry, local manufacturing, and the regional administration in negotiations with the federal center. This multi-level integration ensures his status as one of the most influential industrial figures in the region.

□ Telecommunications and information technologies

A relatively young but well-structured segment of the regional economy. Its significance goes beyond purely economic activity; digital infrastructure defines the technological image of the region. Leading players here include „**Morion**” group and „**ER-Telecom Holding**”. Their activities combine business, media influence, and direct representation in government, allowing this sector to be one of the most integrated into regional politics.



Andrey Kuzyaev (CEO of „ER-Telecom Holding”, shareholder in „Morion”) is one of the most well-known and wealthiest [businessmen](#) in Perm Krai. The brand “[Dom.ru](#)” is one of the largest Russian operators of broadband internet access and cable television, operating in dozens of cities across the country. Within the „Morion” group, enterprises are concentrated on the production of telecommunications equipment, software solutions, and technologies for “smart” communication systems. „Morion” has its own research and production division, as well as influence over the media environment — in the past, the company controlled a number of regional media and information platforms.

Formally, Kuzyaev does not hold government positions, but his role in regional politics is evident. Through control over key media and communication assets, Kuzyaev can influence public opinion and participate in shaping the political agenda. His position is further strengthened by the presence of his own representatives in Perm Krai Legislative Assembly — primarily through the company „Morion” and its director Georgy Tkachenko. In this sense, Kuzyaev serves as a classic example of a businessman-curator who operates through a network of loyal managers and politicians while remaining in the shadow of formal governmental processes.



Georgy Tkachenko (President of „Morion”, deputy of the Legislative Assembly). In 2025, he became the First Deputy Chairman of the Budget Committee in the regional parliament. As head of „Morion”, he represents the political interests of Andrey Kuzyaev’s business group, combining corporate management with parliamentary work. His activity in government is primarily linked to the financial-economic sector, allowing him to lobby for the interests of the IT and telecom industries through [regional budgetary](#) and digitalization projects.

Election infrastructure and political technologies

This sphere in the Perm political landscape provides organizational and technological control over political processes. It includes both official institutions—primarily the regional election commission, which sets the rules and procedures for voting, and informal centers managing the political scene (the governor’s administration with its internal and information policy curators, regional headquarters and branches of leading parties, as well as key political technologists and experts). The significance of this block became particularly evident in 2024–2025, as both electoral cycles overlapped and created a high-paced operational environment.

The 2024 presidential elections served as a “dress rehearsal” for the election infrastructure of Prikamye: the regional election commission demonstrated loyalty and technological coordination, while political administrative resources were tested for mobilization, control of the information space, and legitimization of results. In 2025, this same system moves to an even more critical stage—the gubernatorial elections. Here, the weight of the governor’s administration, party headquarters, and political technologists increases, since it involves not only the technical conduct of the campaign but also the construction of the region’s political configuration, determining the positions of key influence groups, and reshaping the balance of power.

The main figures within this segment are as follows:



Igor Vagin (head of the Perm Krai Election Commission). Under his leadership in 2024, the presidential and municipal campaigns were conducted without major scandals. He was also tasked with preparing for the 2025 [gubernatorial elections](#), which elevated his influence to a new level. In 2024, Vagin was [awarded](#) for his participation in organizing elections in „new territories”, which demonstrates his proximity to the federal agenda.



Firdus Aliyev (spin doctor) — one of the most influential political technologists, who left a noticeable mark in Perm Krai, heading Governor Oleg Chirkunov’s administration in 2010-2012 amid a sharp [bureaucratic struggle](#) with Yuri Trutnev’s group. After Chirkunov’s resignation, Aliyev was removed, but later joined the leadership of the Expert Institute of Social Research — a key pro-Kremlin “think tank”. In

2024, he managed Vyacheslav Fedorishchev's gubernatorial campaign in Samara, and in Perm Krai he maintains positions as an informal consultant for several politicians, including the mayor of Perm.



Yekaterina Nabatova (Deputy Head of the Administration for Information Policy). Her area of responsibility covers control of the information space, coordination of work with regional and federal media, operational response to crisis situations, as well as shaping a positive image of the governor and regional authorities, especially during election periods.



Vyacheslav Grigoryev (First Deputy Secretary of the regional branch of "United Russia") — a key manager of the party infrastructure in the krai, responsible for mobilizing the party base and ensuring stable election results. In 2023, he received a [commendation](#) from Putin, which increased his weight among regional elites. In 2024, Grigoryev further strengthened his positions, demonstrating the manageability of the party machinery during the presidential campaign and withstanding reputational challenges, such as the [arson](#) of the "United Russia" office.

In the context of the 2025 gubernatorial elections, his influence grew as a guarantor of the party's support for the current authorities.

Conservative social sphere

During election campaigns, this group of actors acquires particular weight, as it ensures the mobilization of mass support outside the scope of administrative resources. Religious figures create a moral and value-based foundation for the legitimization of elections, appealing to unity, responsibility, and patriotism. Cultural institutions and sports brands generate a positive emotional background, organizing mass events that foster the "correct" moods in society and increase turnout. Civic activists function as communication channels with the population, translating social demands into a safe channel and demonstrating the "feedback" of the authorities. As a result, this group becomes an important instrument not so much of political competition as of the symbolic inclusion of voters in a shared narrative, allowing the authorities to strengthen legitimacy and demonstrate broad societal consent. The following actors are noteworthy here:



**Митрополит
Мефодій**



Анвар Аблаєв
(муфтії Пермського
краю)



Сергей Кущенко
Президент Єдиної
ліги ВТБ (символ
спорту в Пермі)



Ігор Сапко
уповноважений з
прав людини

Civil society, opposition, media environment

The public sector in Perm Krai is represented rather by loyal “social” structures integrated into state programs supporting families, „SMO” veterans, or youth initiatives. The opposition in the classical sense has practically lost influence. In the regional parliament and local dumas, there are formal representatives of the CPRF (Ksenia Aytakova, a “competitor” of Dmitry Makhonin in the gubernatorial elections in September 2025), “Just Russia” (Veronika Kulikova), and LDPR, but their activity is limited to participation in controlled discussions. There are no strong independent leaders in the region.

The opposition segment in Perm Krai has suffered significant losses in recent years. Systemic figures who once tried to compete with “United Russia” either left the region completely or came under pressure from law enforcement agencies. **Konstantin Okunev**, a former deputy of the Perm City Duma and the regional parliament, who created the [“Choice”](#) movement and ran as a gubernatorial candidate, after multiple [fines](#) for “discrediting the army” and “insulting the president”, [moved](#) from Perm to Saint Petersburg with his family and ceased his activity. Another notable figure is **Sergey Ukhov**, former head of Navalny’s Perm headquarters, who received the status of “foreign agent” and was [declared wanted](#) at the federal level. He now lives abroad, from where he runs the investigative journalism project [“Perm 36.6”](#), focusing on corruption, social issues, and healthcare.

The [“Fourth Sector”](#) was another attempt to create an independent information resource in the region. It was founded in 2017 by three Perm journalists — **Anastasia Sechina**, **Vladimir Sokolov**, and **Mikhail Danilovich**. The project worked on topics of the local economy, corruption scandals, and abuses of power, but after being added to the “foreign agents” registry in 2021 and the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine, its activity [ceased](#): part of the team left Russia, some left the profession, and others launched new initiatives (“New Tab”, “Blue Capybaras”, “Mushroom Network”, GLUSH media talent search service). The closure of the “Fourth Sector” became a telling example of how even moderate critical initiatives cannot withstand censorship pressure.

The media field in Perm Krai today can be characterized as semi-controlled. Major information resources (59.ru, Properm.ru, “New Companion”, “Rifey”) maintain editorial

recognition but are forced to operate within cautious criticism, without crossing the boundaries of what is permitted.

A significant part of the market, especially in the segments of cable television, internet, and advertising platforms, is controlled by business structures associated with Andrey Kuzyaev and the “Morion” group. First, through the television network controlled by Kuzyaev’s holding, broadcasting packages are formed, and the technical solutions of the provider determine which resources reach the mass user. In addition, “Morion” has for many years operated as an advertising operator: it controlled the main outdoor advertising spaces and a significant portion of internet advertising, which allowed not only earning revenue but also maintaining influence over the editorial policies of publications that must consider advertising contracts. Finally, Kuzyaev has direct connections with a number of regional editorial offices and media projects that were created with the financial or organizational participation of “Morion”.

Thus, the civil and media space of Perm Krai exists in a state of controlled stability, where genuine political competition is almost absent, and independent initiatives survive only in the form of emigrant projects. Formal multiparty presence and loyal “social” structures only emphasize the dominance of administrative and business control, while an alternative agenda exists on the periphery.