

YANNE CAPITAL

INSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH

The 12-Week M&A Sale-Side Process: Operator's Map

How lower middle-market sale processes actually run, week by week, from preparation through close

• • •

Yanne Capital Research

2026-08-10

Executive Summary

Lower middle-market M&A sale-side processes run on a rhythm that most founders and CEOs meet exactly once in their operating career. The rhythm is compressed, non-linear, and load-bearing on decisions made in the first three weeks that constrain every option available in the last three. This paper maps the 12-week sale-side process the way it actually operates, not the way pitch decks describe it.

The median time from engagement letter to definitive agreement in the lower middle-market sits at 5.4 months across 2025 transactions reported by Mergermarket, with the tightest processes closing in 12 weeks and the longest stretching past 40. The variance is not random. Processes that close in 12 weeks share five structural features: buyer-list construction completed before outreach begins, a tight IOI window (typically 21 days), a management presentation phase that runs concurrent with early diligence rather than sequential, exclusivity granted only after LOI economics clear a pre-agreed floor, and a closing-phase workstream that ran in parallel with confirmatory diligence from week eight onward.

Processes that stretch past 30 weeks share different features: buyer lists rebuilt mid-process, IOI windows extended twice, exclusivity granted to a buyer at 80 percent of the target price on the theory that the buyer will "move up in diligence," and confirmatory diligence findings that force re-trades in the final three weeks. The re-trade dynamic is the single largest destroyer of value in lower middle-market sale processes, and it is preventable through discipline earlier in the process.

Across our advisory work in 2025 and 2026 running sale-side processes for lower middle-market companies, we observe a widening bifurcation in buyer behavior. PE sponsors are running tighter diligence with less exclusivity flexibility than they showed in 2021 to 2022. Strategic corporate development teams are moving faster on target companies that fit specific product or geographic gaps but slower on adjacency targets. The composition of the buyer list matters more than the length of the buyer list. A process with 22 well-qualified buyers converts to more competitive final rounds than a process with 60 loosely-qualified buyers, even when the smaller list produces fewer indications of interest at the IOI stage.

This paper covers the week-by-week mechanics: preparation (weeks 1 to 3), buyer-list construction and outreach (weeks 4 to 5), IOI collection (weeks 6 to 7), management presentations and LOI (weeks 8 to 9), confirmatory diligence (weeks 10 to 11), and closing (week 12). It includes the buyer-composition analysis lower middle-market sellers need to see before signing an engagement letter, and the process-dynamics analysis that separates 12-week closes from 30-week grinds.

Yanne Capital is an independent boutique investment bank advising growth-stage companies on equity, debt, and M&A transactions across 26 sectors, with 240+ closed deals and relationships with 3,500+ institutional investors globally. We are your trusted filter between noise and signal.

1. The Setup: Why Sale-Side Processes Fail on Timing Assumptions


The median lower middle-market sale process took 5.4 months from engagement letter to definitive agreement in 2025 (Mergermarket, 2025 League Tables). The distribution around that median is wide. Twenty-five percent of processes closed in under 4 months. Twenty-five percent took over 8 months. The tail on the slow side stretches to 12 and 14 months for processes that dragged through re-trades, buyer swaps, or extended exclusivity periods that failed to produce a deal.

Founders and CEOs entering a sale process usually anchor on the median. They should not. The relevant question is which quartile the process is going to land in, and that question is answerable in the first 21 days, not week 20. The features that predict a bottom-quartile timeline are visible before the first outreach email goes out.

The 12-week process is not a marketing claim. It is a specific operating rhythm that requires five things to be true simultaneously: the seller is prepared to make decisions on a compressed clock, the buyer list is qualified before outreach begins, the CIM and financial model have cleared internal review and can survive external diligence without material revision, the seller's legal counsel is engaged and building the definitive documents concurrent with buyer engagement rather than after LOI, and the seller's audit or QoE is either complete or contracted to close on a schedule that does not gate diligence.

Processes missing any of these five features can still close, but they will not close in 12 weeks. They will close in 20 or 30. The compounding tax of a 30-week process versus a 12-week process is not just the additional runway consumed. It is the market movement between weeks 12 and 30 that changes buyer behavior, the management team distraction that impairs operating results the buyer will diligence in the last four weeks, and the negotiating leverage that erodes as buyers sense the seller has committed to the outcome and cannot walk.

The rest of this paper is the operator's map. Each phase is described the way it actually runs, with the decisions the seller and advisor must make at each phase, the buyer behavior to expect, and the failure modes that stretch a 12-week process into a 30-week process.

Lower Middle-Market M&A Process Duration Distribution, 2024-2025

Source: Percent of lower middle-market completed transactions by weeks from engagement letter to definitive agreement. Source: Mergermarket 2024-2025 M&A completion data, aggregated for transactions with disclosed engagement-to-signing timelines.

Percent of lower middle-market completed transactions by weeks from engagement letter to definitive agreement. Source: Mergermarket 2024-2025 M&A completion data, aggregated for transactions with disclosed engagement-to-signing timelines.

2. Weeks 1 to 3: Preparation Determines Every Downstream Option

The first three weeks of a sale process are the most valuable and the most underused. Sellers who treat weeks 1 to 3 as "getting organized" while the advisor drafts the CIM lose the leverage embedded in preparation. The preparation phase is where the buyer universe is defined, the narrative is built, the financial model is stress-tested, and the process architecture is decided. Every decision made after week 3 operates within the constraints set in weeks 1 to 3.

The core preparation deliverables are the confidential information memorandum (CIM), the financial model, the data room population plan, the buyer list, and the process letter. The CIM is not a marketing brochure. It is the document that will be scrutinized by 40 to 60 buyer teams and cross-referenced against the data room during diligence. Claims in the CIM that do not reconcile to the data room in week 10 create re-trades in week 11. The discipline is to draft the CIM as if it will be litigated, because in an adverse diligence scenario, it effectively is.

The financial model matters more in sale-side than in capital raises. Sale-side buyers build their own operating models from the seller's data, but they anchor on the seller's model for the first pass. A model that presents three years of historical performance and a five-year forward projection with segment-level unit economics, customer cohort behavior, and clear separation between run-rate and one-time items produces a different first-round buyer response than a model that presents rolled-up P&L with adjustments buried in footnotes.

Quality of Earnings (QoE) is now standard in lower middle-market processes above roughly \$8 million of EBITDA. Sellers who commission a sell-side QoE before outreach compress the diligence timeline

by two to four weeks and reduce the likelihood of a diligence-driven re-trade by a meaningful margin. Sellers who skip the sell-side QoE and rely on buyer-commissioned QoE at LOI stage give the buyer information asymmetry at exactly the wrong moment. The cost of a sell-side QoE (typically \$75,000 to \$200,000 for lower middle-market companies) is trivial relative to the value protection it provides.

The buyer list is where preparation produces the largest downstream leverage. Across our advisory work in 2025 and 2026 running sale-side processes for lower middle-market companies, we observe that buyer lists constructed with rigorous qualification (recent transaction activity in the sector within 24 months, confirmed AUM or balance-sheet capacity, and a specific investment thesis that matches the target) produce competitive final rounds at approximately double the rate of buyer lists constructed on inclusion criteria alone. The public data supports this pattern. S&P Capital IQ transaction data for 2024 to 2025 shows that in lower middle-market completed transactions, the median winning bidder was among the top 10 most-active PE sponsors or strategic acquirers in the target's sector over the trailing 24 months, not a name that showed up on a broad outreach list.

The process letter, delivered with the CIM, tells the buyer universe how the process will run. Clear process letters set IOI deadlines, LOI expectations, exclusivity terms, and closing timelines. Ambiguous process letters invite buyers to negotiate the process itself, which delays every subsequent phase.

3. Weeks 4 to 5: Buyer-List Construction and Initial Outreach

The buyer universe for lower middle-market transactions splits into two dominant channels: financial sponsors (private equity firms with active funds and mandate fit) and strategic corporate development teams (public and private operating companies with active M&A programs in the sector). A third channel, family offices and independent sponsors, participates in a minority of processes but rarely leads competitive rounds in this segment.

The composition ratio between financial and strategic buyers in a well-constructed buyer list depends on the target's profile. Software and technology-enabled services businesses typically see 60 to 70 percent financial buyer participation. Industrial and consumer-adjacent businesses see closer to 50-50 splits. Regulated healthcare and defense businesses often skew strategic-heavy because acquisition of the regulatory or technical capability is worth a control premium that financial buyers cannot match on standalone economics.

PitchBook M&A data for 2024 to 2025 shows that in completed lower middle-market transactions, financial sponsors accounted for roughly 55 percent of buyer volume and 48 percent of dollar volume, with strategics accounting for the balance. The dollar-volume gap reflects the fact that strategic acquirers pay control premiums and synergy-based prices at the top of the buyer universe, while financial sponsors compete more consistently across the distribution.

Outreach in weeks 4 to 5 runs in waves, not all at once. Wave one goes to the top-tier qualified buyers (typically 15 to 25 names) who receive the CIM, process letter, and NDA package in a coordinated release. Wave two, if warranted, follows 7 to 10 days later to a second tier of 15 to 30 additional buyers. Some processes never launch wave two because wave one produces sufficient competitive tension. Some processes reserve wave two for buyers with slower internal decision processes (large strategics, sovereign-backed vehicles) who need the extra runway to reach IOI.

The outreach wave discipline matters because it controls the information environment. If 60 buyers receive the CIM on the same day, the market conclusion is "this company is running a broad process," and buyer bidding behavior adjusts downward. If the top 20 buyers receive it on day one and the next 20 receive it a week later, the market conclusion is "this is a curated process," and initial bids come in higher.

NDA execution is the first friction point. Sophisticated buyers negotiate NDA terms, and NDA negotiation can consume three to seven days per counterparty. Sellers with pre-approved NDA forms and clear escalation authority to their counsel close this gap. Sellers who route every NDA change through committee approval lose a week here, which cascades into every subsequent phase.

4. Weeks 6 to 7: Indications of Interest and the First Signal


The IOI phase is the first honest signal in the process. IOIs are non-binding, but they are the first moment where a buyer commits (on paper) to a valuation range, a proposed structure, and a preliminary view on diligence and closing. IOI quality varies enormously. Some IOIs are two-page documents with specific valuation ranges, sources and uses, and named diligence workstreams. Some are five-line emails with a valuation range and nothing else. The quality of the IOI predicts the quality of the buyer's engagement through the rest of the process.

The IOI window in a 12-week process is 14 to 21 days from outreach launch. Longer windows produce more IOIs but at lower average quality, because buyers who could not decide in 14 days are often unable to decide decisively in 30. Shorter windows filter for buyers with existing sector conviction and available capital.

IOI conversion rates from initial outreach vary by buyer type and process quality. Bloomberg M&A completion data for 2024 to 2025 lower middle-market processes shows median IOI-to-outreach conversion in the 25 to 40 percent range for well-constructed processes, with the highest-quality processes converting above 50 percent. A process that converts below 15 percent has either a buyer-list problem, a CIM problem, or a market-timing problem, and the seller and advisor need to diagnose which one before proceeding.

The IOI valuation range is not the deal price. It is the buyer's opening position, and lower middle-market experience shows that final LOI prices typically compress 5 to 15 percent below the IOI range for financial buyers and 0 to 10 percent below for strategic buyers. Sellers who benchmark against the top of the IOI range through management presentations are usually disappointed at LOI. Sellers who benchmark against the middle of the IOI range and manage to negotiate toward the top of the LOI band capture more value.

The critical decision at the end of week 7 is which buyers advance to management presentations. A 12-week process advances 5 to 8 buyers. A slower process advances 10 to 15, which sounds like more optionality but usually results in the seller running out of management bandwidth in week 9 and losing engagement from the top buyers who feel diluted. The discipline is to advance fewer buyers with higher conviction, not more buyers with lower conviction.



Source: Median conversion rate from indications of interest received to letters of intent received, indexed by process preparation quality tiers. Preparation tier is a composite of sell-side QoE completion, buyer-list qualification depth, and CIM readiness at outreach. Source: S&P Capital IQ transaction database analysis, 2024-2025 lower middle-market completed processes.

Median conversion rate from indications of interest received to letters of intent received, indexed by process preparation quality tiers. Preparation tier is a composite of sell-side QoE completion, buyer-list qualification depth, and CIM readiness at outreach. Source: S&P Capital IQ transaction database analysis, 2024-2025 lower middle-market completed processes.

5. Weeks 8 to 9: Management Presentations and Letter of Intent

Management presentations are the highest-leverage moment in the process for the seller's operating team. They are also the moment where seller preparation gaps become visible to buyers in a way the CIM cannot conceal. Buyers use management presentations to assess three things: whether the operating team can defend the CIM's forecast, whether there is deep management strength beyond the CEO, and whether the company culture will survive the transaction.

The presentation format that produces the strongest buyer response is two to three hours of content covering strategy, product, go-to-market, financials, and Q&A, with the CEO leading and two or three additional executives (CFO, head of product or operations, head of sales) each owning a segment. Presentations that are CEO-only signal thin management bench. Presentations with too many contributors signal a lack of internal clarity. The balance point is domain-specific.

Concurrent with management presentations, buyers begin preliminary diligence on a limited data room. The seller's discipline is to control what enters the data room in this phase. Sensitive customer contracts, key employee compensation details, and specific pipeline data are typically withheld until after LOI and exclusivity. Buyers who insist on full-scope diligence pre-LOI are signaling either aggressive process behavior or genuine ability to move fast. Sellers should read the signal and adjust engagement accordingly.

LOI negotiation begins at the end of week 8 or early week 9. The LOI covers valuation, structure (all cash versus mixed consideration, roll-over equity, earn-outs), exclusivity terms, diligence scope and timeline, and closing conditions. The most negotiated items are typically exclusivity duration (buyers push for 60 to 90 days; sellers push for 30 to 45), the earn-out mechanics if present, and the treatment of working capital and net debt at close.

Exclusivity is the single most important seller decision in the process. Granting exclusivity ends the competitive dynamic. Buyers who have exclusivity have less incentive to move quickly and more incentive to find diligence issues that justify re-trade. The seller's leverage is highest immediately before exclusivity is granted. The discipline is to negotiate LOI economics to a level that would clear a walk-away test before signing exclusivity, not to sign exclusivity at a lower level on the assumption that price will improve in confirmatory diligence. Price rarely improves in confirmatory diligence.

6. Weeks 10 to 11: Confirmatory Diligence and the Re-Trade Risk

Confirmatory diligence is where deals die or where sellers lose value. The buyer, now with exclusivity, runs comprehensive financial, legal, operational, commercial, and technical diligence over three to five weeks. In a 12-week process, this phase is compressed to two weeks, which is achievable only if the seller's data room is complete and pre-organized and the seller's QoE, legal review, and operational documentation are ready for external scrutiny.

The failure modes in confirmatory diligence are consistent. Financial diligence surfaces adjustments the seller's QoE did not identify, reducing normalized EBITDA and creating a valuation re-trade. Legal diligence surfaces contract issues (change-of-control provisions, undisclosed liabilities, IP ownership gaps) that create indemnity or escrow expansions. Commercial diligence surfaces customer concentration or churn dynamics that the CIM presented in a favorable light and the reference calls reveal in a less favorable light. Technical diligence, in software transactions, surfaces code quality or security debt that creates post-close remediation cost.

Each of these failure modes creates buyer leverage for re-trade. Re-trade requests in confirmatory diligence come in three forms: price reduction (typically 3 to 10 percent from LOI), structural expansion (larger escrow, longer indemnity, earn-out add), or terms tightening (representation and

warranty coverage narrows). The seller's response depends on the merit of the underlying diligence finding and the availability of backup buyers.

Sellers with strong preparation and disciplined process management respond to re-trade requests from a position of relative strength. Sellers with weak preparation, where the diligence finding is genuine and material, have limited options. The advisor's role in this phase is to distinguish between diligence findings that reflect real issues (which typically require some accommodation) and diligence findings that reflect buyer negotiating pressure (which should be resisted).

The definitive documents (purchase agreement, disclosure schedules, ancillary agreements) are drafted concurrent with confirmatory diligence. Sellers whose counsel begins definitive document drafting in week 10 will not close in week 12. Sellers whose counsel has been drafting since week 8, using the LOI as the framework, close on schedule.

7. Week 12: Signing, Closing, and the Handoff

The final week runs on definitive document finalization, disclosure schedule completion, regulatory approvals (if applicable), and closing logistics. In most lower middle-market transactions, signing and closing occur simultaneously because there are no regulatory approval requirements that force a gap. In transactions with HSR filings, foreign investment reviews, or industry-specific regulatory approvals, signing occurs first and closing follows 30 to 90 days later.

The disclosure schedules are the last major seller workstream. Disclosure schedules list every contract, employee, litigation matter, IP asset, and operational element the seller is representing to in the definitive agreement. Poorly prepared disclosure schedules create post-close indemnity claims. Well-prepared disclosure schedules protect the seller's economics.

Communication planning for close is the operating team's responsibility, not the advisor's, but the timing is orchestrated between advisor, seller counsel, and buyer counsel. Employee communication, customer communication, and press release timing are coordinated to minimize business disruption in the transition. Public press releases for lower middle-market transactions are optional and typically brief when they exist.

The advisor's role in week 12 is deal-closing project management, resolving last-minute negotiating items on schedules and ancillary documents, coordinating between the buyer's counsel and seller's counsel on document sequencing, and maintaining seller focus on the operating business through close. Sellers who allow the operating business to drift during the closing week create post-close performance gaps that show up in earn-out calculations.

8. The Buyer-Composition Analysis


The composition of the buyer universe in a lower middle-market process determines the range of outcomes available. Understanding the buyer universe requires understanding what each buyer type is optimizing for and how those optimization functions interact.

Financial sponsors optimize for internal rate of return over a three-to-seven-year hold period. Their valuation math anchors on entry multiple, projected exit multiple, leverage assumptions, and projected EBITDA growth. Their diligence focuses on the quality of the earnings, the sustainability of margins, the scalability of the business model, and the management team's ability to execute a value-creation plan. Sponsors are most competitive on targets where they can articulate a clear value-creation thesis (buy-and-build, operational improvement, geographic expansion, product extension) that justifies their required return.

Strategic corporate development teams optimize for strategic fit and synergy realization. Their valuation math anchors on the standalone value of the target plus the net present value of synergies (revenue, cost, capability), less integration risk and cost. Strategic buyers can pay above the financial-buyer clearing price on targets that fit specific strategic priorities. They cannot pay above financial-buyer prices on targets that are adjacent or opportunistic rather than core strategic fits.

The two buyer types interact in the process. When both are actively engaged, the process runs faster and clears at higher prices. When only one type is engaged, the process runs slower and clears at lower prices, because the buyer type that is not engaged effectively provides no competitive backstop.

The construction of the buyer list determines which composition the seller will face. A buyer list heavy on financial sponsors and light on strategics may produce a competitive process but with capped valuation. A buyer list heavy on strategics and light on sponsors may produce higher potential valuations but with more binary outcomes (either a strategic buys at a premium or the strategics decline and the seller is left with a thin financial-buyer field). The balanced buyer list is generally preferable for lower middle-market processes, with the specific balance calibrated to the target's profile.



Source: Share of completed lower middle-market transactions by buyer type, measured by transaction count and by aggregate deal value. Source: PitchBook M&A completion data, 2024-2025.

Share of completed lower middle-market transactions by buyer type, measured by transaction count and by aggregate deal value. Source: PitchBook M&A completion data, 2024-2025.

9. The Process-Dynamics Analysis

Process dynamics refer to the behavioral patterns that emerge among buyers as the process progresses. Understanding these dynamics helps the seller and advisor anticipate buyer behavior and preserve leverage.

The first dynamic is the fear-of-missing-out (FOMO) dynamic. Buyers who see other qualified buyers engaging on a target become more likely to engage themselves and more likely to move quickly. This dynamic is why the outreach wave discipline matters. Concentrating outreach in a single wave produces a burst of engagement that reinforces itself. Diffusing outreach across weeks dilutes the FOMO signal.

The second dynamic is the anchor dynamic. The first serious bid establishes a valuation anchor that other bids reference. If the first serious bid is high, subsequent bids anchor higher. If the first serious bid is low, subsequent bids anchor lower. The advisor's role is to manage the timing and sequencing of bid receipt to optimize the anchor.

The third dynamic is the exclusivity endgame. Once a seller signals a preference to move to LOI with a specific buyer, other buyers reduce engagement and often disengage entirely. This creates a one-way door. Sellers who move to LOI too quickly, before final buyer intent is fully expressed, lose optionality that cannot be recovered.

The fourth dynamic is the diligence-fatigue dynamic. Confirmatory diligence tests the seller's endurance. Buyers know this. Aggressive buyers extend diligence timelines, submit repeated document requests, and press for re-trades late in the process because they know the seller is tired and has already

emotionally committed to closing. The seller's discipline is to maintain the same energy in weeks 10 and 11 as in weeks 6 and 7. This is where advisor support matters most.

10. The Framework: Five Decisions That Determine Process Outcome

The 12-week sale-side process is not a template. It is the operating result of five decisions made correctly. Sellers who make these five decisions correctly close in 12 weeks. Sellers who miss any of them stretch the process, lose value, or both.

First, the preparation decision. Investing 8 to 12 weeks in preparation before launching outreach produces a compressed and higher-value process. Skipping preparation to "get to market faster" almost always produces a longer, lower-value process. The preparation cost is not the 8 to 12 weeks; it is the 8 to 12 weeks the seller was going to spend anyway, either upfront or during the process.

Second, the buyer-list decision. A qualified buyer list of 25 to 35 names beats an unqualified buyer list of 60 to 80 names. Qualification means recent transaction activity in the sector, confirmed capital, and articulable investment thesis. Sellers who insist on including buyers who fail qualification tests are dilating the process for no strategic gain.

Third, the outreach-wave decision. A single-wave or two-wave outreach process produces concentrated buyer engagement. A rolling outreach process produces diffused engagement. Concentration is preferable in almost all lower middle-market processes.

Fourth, the IOI-to-management-presentation decision. Advancing 5 to 8 buyers to management presentations produces manageable operating team load and preserves buyer engagement quality. Advancing more than 10 buyers dilutes both. The temptation to advance more buyers for the sake of "keeping optionality" usually produces less optionality, not more, because the top buyers disengage when they feel the process is not serious.

Fifth, the exclusivity decision. Exclusivity should be granted only when LOI economics clear the walk-away test. Granting exclusivity at lower economics on the assumption that price will improve is the single most consistent source of value loss in lower middle-market processes. The buyer's incentive after exclusivity is granted is to find reasons for price to decrease, not increase.

11. Sector Considerations: How Process Dynamics Vary by Vertical

Software and technology-enabled services processes typically compress faster and clear at higher multiples than industrial or consumer processes. PitchBook M&A data for 2024 to 2025 shows median software transaction multiples in the lower middle-market ranging from 3.5x to 6.0x revenue and 12x to 20x EBITDA, compared to 6x to 10x EBITDA for industrial businesses of comparable scale. The process rhythm is similar but the buyer universe skews more heavily financial and the diligence

emphasis shifts toward customer cohort behavior, product-market fit sustainability, and technology stack quality.

Healthcare processes require additional preparation time due to regulatory complexity, reimbursement dynamics, and often HSR filing requirements at the closing phase. The 12-week close timeline is achievable in software but is more typically 16 to 20 weeks in healthcare when regulatory workstreams are properly built into the process. Buyer universe is more strategic-heavy in specialty healthcare (services, devices, diagnostics) and more financial-heavy in healthcare technology and services platform companies.

Industrial and consumer processes see more variable timelines and more variable outcomes because the buyer universe is more heterogeneous. Strategic buyers with specific product or geographic gaps can move quickly, but sponsor buyers in these sectors have higher variability in appetite depending on cycle position. Sellers in these sectors benefit from especially careful buyer-list construction and pre-outreach buyer intelligence gathering.

Defense and dual-use technology processes involve additional considerations around CFIUS review, security clearances, and export control compliance. These processes typically require 20 to 30 weeks and are dominated by strategic buyers with existing defense sector positions. The 12-week template does not apply directly; the underlying discipline of preparation, buyer-list qualification, and process management still does.

12. Case Studies from the Market

The following are anonymized observations from lower middle-market processes tracked through public transaction data. They illustrate the mechanics described in this paper.

Observation 1: A software-enabled services company in the workflow automation category ran a competitive process that closed at signing on week 14 from engagement letter. The buyer list was 28 names (18 financial sponsors, 10 strategic acquirers). IOI conversion was 43 percent. Six buyers advanced to management presentations. Three LOIs were received in week 9. Exclusivity was granted to the highest bidder at a price 4 percent above the second-highest LOI. Confirmatory diligence produced no re-trade. The process outcome was in the top decile of comparable transactions for the sector.

Observation 2: An industrial services company launched outreach to a buyer list of 55 names before completing sell-side QoE. IOI conversion was 22 percent. Management presentations advanced 11 buyers. Two LOIs were received in week 11. Exclusivity was granted at a price 8 percent below the highest LOI due to concerns about the highest-bidder's financing certainty. Confirmatory diligence

produced a re-trade of 6 percent in week 15 due to working capital normalization issues that the sell-side QoE would have surfaced earlier. The transaction closed at week 22.

Observation 3: A healthcare technology company ran a strategic-only process due to sector-specific buyer dynamics. Outreach went to 14 strategics. Four IOIs were received in week 6. Two LOIs were received in week 10. Exclusivity was granted at a valuation that reflected specific synergy value to the acquiring strategic. HSR filing was required. Signing occurred at week 13, closing at week 22 due to regulatory review. The process produced a valuation premium of approximately 30 percent above what comparable financial-buyer transactions had cleared at in the trailing 12 months.

Case Studies

Software-enabled services, workflow automation category

A software-enabled services company in the workflow automation category ran a competitive process that closed at signing on week 14 from engagement letter. The buyer list was 28 names, with 18 financial sponsors and 10 strategic acquirers. IOI conversion was 43 percent. Six buyers advanced to management presentations. Three LOIs were received in week 9. Exclusivity was granted to the highest bidder at a price 4 percent above the second-highest LOI. Confirmatory diligence produced no re-trade. The process outcome was in the top decile of comparable transactions for the sector. The distinguishing feature was preparation: sell-side QoE was completed pre-outreach, the data room was populated to 95 percent completeness at CIM release, and the buyer list was rebuilt from a working draft after 60 days of qualification research.

Industrial services, unprepared launch

An industrial services company launched outreach to a buyer list of 55 names before completing sell-side QoE. IOI conversion was 22 percent, below the median for the sector. Management presentations advanced 11 buyers, straining the operating team's bandwidth and diluting engagement quality with the top three. Two LOIs were received in week 11. Exclusivity was granted at a price 8 percent below the highest LOI due to financing-certainty concerns about the highest bidder. Confirmatory diligence produced a re-trade of 6 percent in week 15 due to working capital normalization issues that a sell-side QoE would have surfaced earlier. The transaction closed at week 22, at a final price roughly 14 percent below the highest IOI. The value gap between this outcome and a top-quartile outcome reflects the compounding cost of skipped preparation.

Healthcare technology, strategic-only process

A healthcare technology company ran a strategic-only process due to sector-specific buyer dynamics that limited financial-sponsor engagement. Outreach went to 14 strategics selected on specific capability-gap fit. Four IOIs were received in week 6. Two LOIs were received in week 10. Exclusivity was granted at a valuation that reflected specific synergy value to the acquiring strategic. HSR filing was required. Signing occurred at week 13; closing occurred at week 22 due to regulatory review. The

process produced a valuation premium of approximately 30 percent above what comparable financial-buyer transactions had cleared at in the trailing 12 months. The distinguishing feature was buyer-list construction discipline: rather than adding financial sponsors to broaden the process, the advisor and seller focused the process on the buyer type with the highest willingness-to-pay for the specific asset.

Forward Look: 12-Month Outlook

Looking forward through the balance of 2026 and into 2027, we expect several dynamics to shape lower middle-market sale-side processes. First, financial sponsor competition will remain elevated as record dry powder ages against fund-life constraints, but sponsors will maintain diligence rigor rather than relax it, which means preparation quality will continue to differentiate outcomes. Second, strategic acquirers will remain selective but decisive on targets that fit specific product, geographic, or capability priorities, which means buyer-list construction that identifies these strategic priorities in advance will produce disproportionate value. Third, we expect the median lower middle-market process duration to compress modestly from current levels as sellers and advisors internalize the lessons of the 2022-2024 cycle around preparation and process discipline. Fourth, we expect a continued widening of the outcome gap between well-prepared and under-prepared processes, with the top quartile pulling further away from the median and the bottom quartile increasingly falling into extended, value-destructive timelines. Fifth, we expect sell-side QoE, pre-outreach legal review, and structured buyer intelligence to become standard rather than optional in processes above \$10 million of EBITDA, mirroring the professionalization already visible at larger transaction sizes. Sellers who plan a sale process for 2026 or 2027 should be building preparation workstreams now, not at engagement letter signing.

Conclusion

If you are considering a sale process over the next 12 to 24 months, the highest-leverage decision you can make today is to begin preparation. That means benchmarking your financial reporting to sell-side QoE standards, mapping the qualified buyer universe for your business, and stress-testing your forecast against the diligence that a competitive process will apply. Reach out at contact@yannecapital.com to begin the preparation dialogue.

Frequently Asked Questions

How long does a lower middle-market M&A sale process typically take?

The median lower middle-market sale process takes approximately 5.4 months from engagement letter to definitive agreement, according to 2025 Mergermarket completion data. The distribution is wide: top-quartile processes close in 12 to 16 weeks, while bottom-quartile processes extend beyond 30

weeks. Timeline is determined primarily by preparation quality before outreach begins, buyer-list qualification, and process discipline around IOI, LOI, and exclusivity decisions.

What are the phases of a 12-week M&A sale-side process?

A 12-week lower middle-market sale process runs through six phases: preparation (weeks 1 to 3, covering CIM, financial model, data room, buyer list, and process letter); buyer-list construction and outreach (weeks 4 to 5); indications of interest collection (weeks 6 to 7); management presentations and letter of intent (weeks 8 to 9); confirmatory diligence (weeks 10 to 11); and signing and closing (week 12). Each phase depends on decisions made in prior phases, and preparation quality in weeks 1 to 3 determines every subsequent option.

What is the difference between financial sponsors and strategic acquirers in an M&A process?

Financial sponsors are private equity firms that optimize for internal rate of return over a three-to-seven-year hold period, anchoring valuation math on entry multiple, projected exit multiple, and leverage assumptions. Strategic acquirers are operating companies that optimize for strategic fit and synergy realization, anchoring valuation math on standalone value plus the net present value of synergies. In lower middle-market completed transactions, financial sponsors account for roughly 55 percent of buyer count and 48 percent of aggregate deal value, with strategics accounting for the balance.

When should a seller grant exclusivity in an M&A process?

Exclusivity should be granted only when the letter-of-intent economics clear the seller's walk-away test. Granting exclusivity at lower economics on the assumption that price will improve in confirmatory diligence is a common source of value loss, because the buyer's incentive after exclusivity is granted is to find reasons for price to decrease rather than increase. The seller's negotiating leverage is highest immediately before exclusivity, and it should be exercised then.

What is a sell-side Quality of Earnings analysis and when is it needed?

A sell-side Quality of Earnings (QoE) analysis is an independent accounting review of a seller's financial statements commissioned by the seller before launching a sale process. It normalizes EBITDA, identifies one-time items, adjusts working capital, and preempts the diligence findings that a buyer-side QoE would later surface. Sell-side QoE is now standard for lower middle-market processes above roughly \$8 million of EBITDA. It compresses diligence timelines by two to four weeks and materially reduces the risk of a diligence-driven price re-trade in confirmatory diligence.

How many buyers should be on a lower middle-market M&A buyer list?

A qualified buyer list of 25 to 35 names typically outperforms an unqualified list of 60 to 80 names. Qualification means the buyer has recent transaction activity in the sector within the trailing 24 months, confirmed capital or balance-sheet capacity, and an articulable investment thesis that fits the target. Broader lists dilute the process signal, and buyer engagement in a broad process is systematically weaker than in a curated process.

What is a re-trade in an M&A transaction and how can it be prevented?

A re-trade is a request from the buyer, typically during confirmatory diligence after exclusivity has been granted, to reduce the purchase price or restructure the transaction terms based on diligence findings. Re-trades typically range from 3 to 10 percent price reductions and often include structural expansions such as larger escrows or expanded indemnity provisions. Prevention comes from thorough seller preparation, including sell-side QoE, clean legal review before outreach, and CIM claims that reconcile precisely to the data room, which minimizes the space for diligence-driven surprises.

Yanne Capital is an independent boutique investment bank advising growth-stage companies on equity, debt, and M&A transactions across 26 sectors, with 240+ closed deals and relationships with 3,500+ institutional investors globally. We are your trusted filter between noise and signal.

Disclaimers and Important Information

This document is published by Yanne Capital for informational purposes only. It is not an offer, solicitation, recommendation, or commitment for any transaction or to buy or sell any security or other financial product, and is not intended as investment advice. The information has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable but is not guaranteed as to accuracy or completeness. Any opinions expressed are subject to change without notice. Forward-looking statements regarding market conditions reflect current views and may differ materially from actual outcomes. Products and services referenced may not be available in all jurisdictions.

Securities are offered through Finalis Securities LLC, Member FINRA / SIPC. Yanne Capital, Yanne, Y&C is not a registered broker-dealer, and Finalis Securities LLC and Yanne Capital, Yanne, Y&C are separate, unaffiliated entities. Finalis Securities LLC, Office of Supervisory Jurisdiction is located at 450 Lexington Ave, New York, NY 10017, 800-962-0418. [Finalis Privacy Policy](#) | [Finalis Business Continuity Plan](#) | [FINRA BrokerCheck](#) | [Finalis Form Customer Relationship Summary](#) ("Form CRS").