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Angola Summary 21 September 2022

*The ruling **Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA)** wins Angola's 24 August general elections with a considerably reduced majority of 51.17% of valid votes cast. The MPLA will have 124 deputies in Angola's **Assembleia Nacional (parliament)**. Principal opposition party **União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA)** won 43.95% of the vote and a total of 90 deputies. **João Lourenço (2017-present)** is sworn in for his second and final five-year term of office on 15 September. **Esperança Maria Eduardo Francisco da Costa** takes office as vice-president, the first woman to hold the position. The election sees the highest abstention rate ever at 55.12% of the electorate. UNITA protests the outcome of the vote, taking the results to the constitutional court, but effectively withdraws its challenge a few days later. Allegations of electoral fraud have traction because of the relative lack of independence of two key institutions, the **Comissão Nacional Eleitoral (CNE)** (electoral commission) and the **Tribunal Constitucional (TC)** (constitutional court), and the perception that they favour the MPLA. Reform of these bodies should be a priority for the next parliament. Former president **Jose Eduardo dos Santos (1979-2017)** is buried in Luanda on 29 August in the **Praça da Republica**. His legacy in Angola remains contentious.*

MPLA wins Angola's general election with reduced majority

The ruling **Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA)** won the 24 August general elections with a considerably reduced majority of 51.17%¹ The MPLA received 10% fewer votes than the 61% it obtained in 2017, losing approximately one million votes from 4.11 million to only 3.16 million votes. The MPLA will have 124 deputies in Angola's **Assembleia Nacional** (parliament).² Opposition **União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA)** obtained 43.95% of the vote and a total of 90 deputies in parliament. The MPLA still has a working majority, but UNITA now has enough seats to function as a fully-fledged opposition party and challenge MPLA hegemony.

João Lourenço (2017-present) was sworn in for his second and final five-year term of office as president on 15 September. **Esperança Maria Eduardo Francisco da Costa**, previously the fisheries secretary of state, was sworn in as Lourenço's deputy on the 15 September, making her the first woman to take office as vice-president of Angola.³

The results produced some surprises. UNITA, for the first time, obtained seats in many provinces previously controlled by the MPLA. UNITA won with a very large margin in the capital, **Luanda**, obtaining 62.52% of the vote against the MPLA, which won 33.31%.⁴ Luanda is the youngest and most urbanised province in the country; many of the new voters were born after the civil war ended and do not have the older generation's traditional ties to the MPLA. The youth are also the most marginalised sector of Luanda's population, with a high unemployment rate.⁵ Approximately a third of new voters

¹ Expansao, 29 Aug 2020

² Expansao, 29 Aug 2020

³ Jornal de Angola, 15 Sep 2022

⁴ Expansao, 25 Aug 2020

⁵ Deutsche Welle, 6 May 2022

registered last year were in Luanda.⁶ UNITA also won four seats in the northern oil province of **Cabinda** but is not the majority in its own traditional heartlands in central Angola.⁷

The MPLA retained three out of five possible members of parliament (MPs) in **Lunda Norte** and **Lunda Sul**, the politically volatile northern diamond mining provinces. **Convergência Ampla de Salvação de Angola–Coligação Eleitoral (CASA-CE)** lost its 16 seats, and three smaller political parties failed to gain any seats. The new **Partido Humanista de Angola (PHA)** gained two seats.⁸

Composition of Angola's parliament	
Party	No of MPs
MPLA	124
UNITA	90
Partido da Renovação Social (PRS)	2
Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA)	2
PHA	2
Total seats	220

These elections had the highest abstention rate ever, at 55.12% of the electorate. Despite the electoral base growing by 56% to 14.4 million voters, only 6.45 million people of the 9.5 million expected to vote did so.⁹ There are also ongoing allegations that the electoral roll contains 2.7 million ghost voters, which the MPLA would allegedly have used to ensure its victory.¹⁰ There were also reports that voters were unable to find the locations of their polling stations, as these had changed since 2017.¹¹ Votes were counted at the polling stations, overseen by a representative from each party and 1,300 national and international observers. The **Tribunal Constitucional** (constitutional court) certified the election results, which stand unless overturned following a successful challenge to the results by another party.

The results show that the MPLA is losing popularity under Lourenço but also that over 55% of the electorate does not support any of the existing political parties. The MPLA's losses have been attributed to a disastrous media strategy, in failing either to engage voters, or to give enough airtime to opposition parties, provoking a protest vote.¹²

... as opposition parties dispute results

UNITA's trope of the stolen election, begun earlier this year, continued in earnest as soon as the initial results were announced, but was effectively withdrawn a few days later. UNITA initially claimed that its parallel vote count on election day suggested it had won a majority, garnering 49.5% of the vote to the ruling MPLA's 48.2%, based on 94% of result sheets from 13,200 polling stations. UNITA leader **Adalberto da Costa Junior** spoke on **RTP-Rádio e Televisão de Portugal** (Portuguese television and radio) after the election, stating that he did not contest the electoral defeat, but rather the provisional results presented by the **Comissão Nacional Eleitoral (CNE)** (national election commission):

⁶ Economist Intelligence Unit, 8 Aug 2022

⁷ Deutsche Welle, 6 May 2022

⁸ Expansao, 25 Aug 2020

⁹ Expansao, 24 Aug 2022

¹⁰ African Arguments, 15 Sep 2022

¹¹ Expansao, 25 Aug 2020

¹² Expansao, 26 Aug 2022

"...we have evidence with signed minutes that give us more mandates".¹³

Da Costa claimed that the party's parallel vote count showed they should have more deputies in three provinces, Luanda, **Moxico** and **Cuanza Sul**.¹⁴ Da Costa did not say how many deputies he thought UNITA should have won in these provinces, but at the time of writing UNITA had three out of five deputies in Luanda Province, and one out of five in Cuanza Sul and Moxico provinces. Even winning four out of five seats in each province would not have secured a majority for UNITA or unseated the MPLA. Opposition constitutional lawyer **Rui Verde**, writing for anti-corruption campaigner **Rafael Marques' Maka Angola** website, says:

"Even the opposition's most optimistic scenario points to a technical draw or a tiny margin of victory for one party over the other."¹⁵

UNITA took the matter to the constitutional court, calling for a recount and a comparison of the official results with its own count.¹⁶ The constitutional court said on 8 September it had no jurisdiction over UNITA's complaints, due to lack of evidence.

Fear of widespread major post-election violence have not been realised, despite the claims of a stolen election. Verde noted:

"Any uprising would simply set one half of the Angolan people against the other half - the situation that existed in 1975 and which resulted in a 27-year civil war."¹⁷

Verde is also not convinced by the claims of electoral fraud:

*"If UNITA can prove fraud, this would be an historic moment, an unprecedented paradigm, revealing the MPLA to be the most incompetent election-rigger in **African** history, organising a disastrous defeat in the capital, Luanda, and almost certainly delivering the opposition party an easy victory next time around, in 2027."¹⁸*

The same argument also applies to the MPLA's loss of political control over the two major oil producing provinces, Cabinda, and Zaire. Oil remains the keystone of Angola's economy.¹⁹ Whether fraud allegations will be proven is moot, but the widespread belief that this is the case risks political instability in Angola, with political fault lines still dividing the country in two, 20 years after the civil war ended in 2002.

There have been sporadic street protests in cities across the country with police, including the riot police, deployed to keep public order.²⁰ In Cabinda, MPLA activists and the police confronted UNITA supporters when the election results were announced.²¹ The interior ministry mobilised 80,000 police during the elections and the army was put on alert.²² At the time of Lourenço's inauguration, the army moved heavy artillery into Luanda, said by the government to be there to take part in the parade celebrating the inauguration. UNITA claimed the army was present to repress protests.²³

Fraud allegations show need for demonstrably independent electoral institutions

The allegations of electoral fraud have received great traction because of the relative lack of independence of two key institutions, the CNE and the constitutional court, and the perception that they favour the MPLA. Angola's general election law, the **Lei Orgânica das Eleições Gerais**, specifies

¹³ Expansao, 26 Aug 2022

¹⁴ Expansao, 26 Aug 2022

¹⁵ Maka Angola, 8 Sep 2022

¹⁶ African Arguments, 15 Sep 2022

¹⁷ Maka Angola, 8 Sep 2022

¹⁸ Maka Angola, 8 Sep 2022

¹⁹ Deutsche Welle, 6 May 2022

²⁰ Maka Angola, 8 Sep 2022

²¹ Deutsche Welle, 24 Aug 2022

²² Jornal de Angola, 23 Aug 2022

²³ Voice of America, 13 Aug 2022

how the official result tally is determined, and how any doubts or challenges should be handled. The stages that were in dispute were those relating to the CNE's presentation of the final voting count and the referral to the constitutional court for adjudication.²⁴

Two parties have followed this legal route to challenge the election results. CASA-CE rejected the final results of the general elections, in which the coalition lost all 16 of its MPs, elected in 2017.²⁵ Veteran politician **Abel Chivukuvuku** was the leader of the CASA-CE in 2017.²⁶ The party has had two new leaders since 2019, one of whom the coalition sacked in 2021.²⁷

Nine out of 11 constitutional court judges denied a CASA-CE petition challenging the official result on 7 September. However, Judge **Josefa Neto**, UNITA's nominee on the constitutional court, said she had been denied access to the original vote tallies relied upon by the CNE. Neto called for the CNE to publish the tallies in the interests of proving its impartiality and independence from the ruling MPLA party.²⁸

Political parties have a burden of proof when challenging the CNE.²⁹ The CNE said it found in the specific cases of UNITA and the **Democratic Bloc**, that the evidence did not support their claims. The constitutional court also said on 8 September it had no jurisdiction over UNITA's complaints and rejected the appeal filed by UNITA.³⁰

UNITA took up its seats in parliament following the challenge to the election results. UNITA returned to the constitutional court on 17 September to protest the breaking of an agreement with the MPLA that UNITA deputy leader **Arlete Chimbinda** would take up the post of second vice president of parliament in view of UNITA's larger presence there. UNITA walked out of parliament in protest and has asked the constitutional court for a ruling on the legitimacy of the MPLA's decision.³¹

Former **Angolan Bar Association** president **Inglês Pinto** hopes that the new balance of power in parliament will lead to more independent electoral organs, noting that the make-up of both the CNE and the constitutional court includes "*party interests*". Pinto referenced constitutional court president **Laurinda Cardoso**, previously a member of the MPLA political bureau:

*"I do not doubt the technical capacity of my colleagues who are part of these bodies, but we have to reformulate it so that this climate of suspicion gradually moves away...eventually we will have to have another practice."*³²

Improving the political neutrality and transparency of both key electoral bodies would be an important step towards improving the perception of free and fair elections among opposition groups. It would also contribute to political stability in Angola.

Jose Eduardo dos Santos is buried in Luanda

Former president **Jose Eduardo dos Santos** (1979-2017) was buried in Luanda on 29 August, on what would have been his 80th birthday, five days after Angola's elections. His body arrived in Angola from **Spain** on 21 August, following his death there on 8 July. The repatriation of his body and his funeral was delayed by conflict between his exiled daughters, his estranged widow, and the Angolan state, over when and where he should be buried.³³

²⁴ Maka Angola, 31 Aug 2022

²⁵ Angop, 30 Aug 2022

²⁶ Deutsche Welle, 9 Sep 2022

²⁷ VerAngola, 9 Feb 2021

²⁸ Maka Angola, 8 Sep 2022

²⁹ Maka Angola, 31 Aug 2022

³⁰ Maka Angola, 8 Sep 2022

³¹ Deutsche Welle 17 Sep 2022

³² Deutsche Welle, 9 Sep 2022

³³ Al Jazeera, 21 Aug 2020

Dos Santos was buried in the **Praça da Republica**, following a funeral service on 28 August. His tomb is next to the mausoleum of Angola's first president, **Agostinho Neto** (1975-1979).³⁴ Lourenço, who had not yet been declared head of state again, did not attend the funeral service but was at the burial. Portugal's President **Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa** (2016-present), **South Africa's** President **Cyril Ramaphosa** (2018-present), **Democratic Republic of the Congo's** President **Felix Tshisekedi** (2019-present) and **Namibia's** former president, **Sam Nujoma** (1990-2007), were all present at the service.³⁵

Dos Santos' older children were not in attendance due to the conflict and controversy surrounding them. His eldest daughter, **Isabel dos Santos**, who is the subject of multiple international investigations over alleged corruption and liable to arrest if she returns to Angola, was not present at her father's funeral. Her sister, **Tchizé dos Santos**, also in exile, did not return for the funeral and son **Zenu dos Santos** is currently imprisoned for fraud related to Angola's sovereign wealth fund.³⁶

Dos Santos' reign was marked by a 27-year on-and-off civil war against **United States**-backed rebels from UNITA, whom he defeated in 2002. Under dos Santos, Angola became a major **African** oil producer, but his family and political cronies benefited far more than Angola's people.³⁷

Dos Santos had a post war political reputation as an architect of peace. Nujoma spoke of dos Santos as a "*statesman and devoted pan-Africanist*" to the hundreds who gathered to attend the funeral.

Marcolino Moco, former prime minister of Angola, said of dos Santos:

*"After being considered an architect of peace, in which he protected the integrity of Angola against South Africa, the last years of José Eduardo dos Santos are an authentic disaster."*³⁸

Dos Santos, instead of building broad-based development based on Angola's oil wealth, ensured that wealth flowed mainly to family members and an inner circle of political elites, and the companies that benefitted from government contracts. Patronage sustained popular political support for the MPLA.³⁹

Dos Santos' successor, Lourenço, came to power when the oil price had collapsed and MPLA patronage was falling away. Lourenço is unpicking much of the corruption of his predecessor's regime. Generals **Manuel Hélder Vieira Dias Júnior (Kopelipa)** and **Leopoldino Fragoso de Nascimento (Dino)**, two of the "*Triumvirate*", the three powerful men closest to dos Santos until he stepped down in 2017, were accused by the public prosecutor's office on 4 July of a range of crimes.⁴⁰ The crimes are related to the **Angolan China International Fund Angola Ltd**, which was used to defraud the state of hundreds of millions of dollars from **Chinese** loans, granted for post-war reconstruction from 2003 onwards.⁴¹ The indictment lists 233 separate clauses detailing the alleged crimes, and citing 36 named witnesses to be called to testify.

Kopelipa was head of the **Gabinete de Reconstrução Nacional** (national reconstruction office), created to manage the credit lines from China and the post-war rebuilding of Angola until 2011 and was head of military office of the presidency.⁴²

Dino was similarly close to the president, as head of communications in the president's office, and Lourenço believes that he is the key to recovering the ex-president's money. The third closely involved member of the triumvirate is **Manuel Vicente** who served as Angola's vice president between 2012 and 2017. Vicente was also previously director of state oil company **Sonangol** and was directly involved in the China International Fund and other alleged illicit transactions but had

³⁴ Deutsche Welle, 29 Aug 2022

³⁵ Deutsche Welle, 29 Aug 2022

³⁶ Deutsche Welle, 29 Aug 2022

³⁷ Deutsche Welle, 29 Aug 2022

³⁸ Voice of America, 27 Sep 2022

³⁹ Good Governance Africa, 18 Jul 2022

⁴⁰ Deutsche Welle, 12 Jul 2022

⁴¹ Deutsche Welle, 12 Jul 2022

⁴² Deutsche Welle, 12 Jul 2022

immunity until the elections that have just taken place.⁴³ No charges have yet been announced against him.

The corrupt post-war legacy of dos Santos is at least being unravelled in part. His death was timely for the MPLA, giving it five years to undo some of the damage. Angola is currently a lower middle-income country as of 2021 and is expected to become a middle-income country by 2027, despite the collapse of oil revenues and inflation in the country, showing that it has a broader range of development than under dos Santos.⁴⁴

Planner

2019-2022 **(Angola) Programa de Privatizações (PROPRIV)** (privatisation programme) to manage government divestment of 138 companies ending in 2022;

2022 **Siberia (Russia) Russian-Angola** joint venture **Angosat-2** satellite is in the final stages of testing in Siberia and expected to be launched from **Baikonur, Kazakhstan**;

Dec 2022 **Luanda (Angola)** Angola becomes chair of the **Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS)** during the Summit of Heads of State and Government from 6-9 Dec;

2022 **(Angola)** Angola is president of the **African Petroleum Producers Organization (APPO)**, after being elected in 2021;

2022 **(Angola)** First local and municipal elections are in the planning stages, but implementation is delayed by **Covid-19** and an election date will be set;

2022 **Talatona, Luanda (Angola) Huawei Technology Park** to be completed;

2022 **Luanda (Angola) Jose Filomeno dos Santos** and other defendants appeal sentences in the "*case of \$500 million*", to be heard in the **Supreme Court**;

2022 **London (United Kingdom)** Hearing of **UNITEL SA v Unitel International Holdings (UIH)** takes place at the **London Court of Arbitration**, to resolve issues of UIH's alleged debt of \$400m to **UNITEL**;

2022 **Luanda (Angola) Angolan Diamond Exchange** to open on a preliminary basis;

29 Nov-1 Dec 2022 **Luanda (Angola) Angola Oil & Gas 2022 Conference** and exhibition;

10-13 Dec 2022 **(Angola)** Angola to host 10th **African, Caribbean and Pacific Group** summit;

Dec 2022 **Namibe (Angola)** Caraculo photovoltaic (solar) power plant in Namibe Province comes online, producing an initial 25 megawatts of power, with a further 25 megawatts to follow;

2022 **(Angola)** End date for **Banco Poupança e Crédito's** recovery plan;

2020-2025 **(Angola) World Bank** to provide funding to increase economic diversification for a five-year period;

2023 **Luanda (Angola)** Angola and the **European Union (EU)** to open negotiations for a trade agreement after Angola was approved for membership of the trade mechanism signed in 2016 between six countries in the **Southern African Development Community (SADC)** region and the EU;

Jul 2023 **Luanda (Angola)** Angola's sole purpose-built gold refinery expected to open in **Viana, Luanda**;

⁴³ Maka Angola, 14 Jul 2022

⁴⁴ VerAngola, 20 Jul 2020

Dec 2023 **Luanda (Angola)** The new international airport, now named **Aeroporto Internacional Dr Antonio Agostino Neto**, is expected to open;

2023 **(Angola) Luaxe** mine (**Lunda Sul**) expected to produce 5.7 million carats of diamonds;

Dec 2024 **Cabinda (Angola)** Completion of deep-water port **Porto do Caio** (Cabinda Province) is expected;

2025 **(Angola)** Three major refineries at **Lobito** with capacity to refine 200,000 barrels/day, **Soyo** (100,000 barrels/day) and **Cabinda** (60,000 barrels/day), are expected to give Angola crude oil refining capacity of 360,000 barrel per day this year, meeting domestic needs and ending fuel imports;

2027 **(Angola)** State-owned oil company **Sonangol's** Strategic Exploration and Production Plan 2020-2027 gives Sonangol 10% of national production by this date, producing 120,000 barrels per day.

Chronology

16 Sep 2022 **Luanda (Angola)** *Jornal de Angola*. Newly elected members of parliament take office in the fifth legislature;

16 Sep 2022 **Luanda (Angola)** *Jornal de Angola*. Sale of state oil company **SONANGOL's** 25% shareholding in **Banco Caixa Geral Angola (BCGA)** ends;

15 Sep 2022 **Luanda (Angola)** *Jornal de Angola* **United States** sends delegation representing President **Joe Biden** to attend President **João Lourenço's** inauguration;

15 Sep 2022 **Luanda (Angola)** *Jornal de Angola*. Dredging begins at Angola's new deep-water port of **Caio (Cabinda province)**, removing 400,000 square metres of seabed in a two-month period;

14 Sep 2022 **Luanda (Angola)** *Expansao Empresa*. **Pública de Águas de Luanda** (Luanda public water company) cuts off the water supply to the domestic terminal of the international airport **Aeroporto Internacional 4 de Fevereiro** after the airport fails to pay its water bills for six months;

14 Sep 2022 **Luanda (Angola)** *Jornal de Angola*. **Angola** exports 33.6 million barrels of oil at the average price of \$111.30 in August, generating total revenue for Angola of 584.1 billion kwanzas (\$1.2 billion);

14 Sep 2022 **Luanda (Angola)** *Jornal de Angola*. **Agência Angolana de Regulação e Supervisão de Seguros** (agency for insurance regulation and supervision) presents the draft regulatory standards for insurance companies, following the discovery last year of a \$1 billion fraud by the head of major Angolan insurance company **AAA**;

12 Sep 2022 **Luanda (Angola)** *Expansao*. **Azule Energy**, the **Angola**-based joint venture between **Italian** oil company **ENI** and **British** oil company **BP**, is to sign a letter of intent with **Malaysia**-based **Yinson Holdings** for a floating oil production, storage and unloading ship (FPSO) for the deep water **Agogo** oil field in block 06/15;

10 Sep 2022 **Luanda (Angola)** *Jornal de Angola*. Economy and planning minister **Mário Caetano João** invites more **Chinese** investment in agriculture, noting that total Chinese investment in Angola has already reached \$20 billion;

9 Sep 2022 **Luanda (Angola)** *Jornal de Angola*. **Angola** state-owned airline **TAAG** and **United States**-based **Boeing** aircraft manufacturer announce agreement on TAAG's debt relating to the suspended purchase of Boeing 787-8 planes in 2019, without disclosing the amount;

9 Sep 2022 **Lisbon (Portugal)** *Jornal de Angola*. **United Nations Organization for Drugs and Crime** are to train 16 **Angolan** experts in money laundering, illicit financial flows and confiscation of

assets, in partnership with the **Institute of Judicial Police and Criminal Sciences** and the **Attorney General's Office of the Republic of Angola**, aiming to develop an effective system to combat illicit financial flows;

8 Sep 2022 **Luanda (Angola)** *Jornal de Angola*. **Bank BAI Micro Finanças** is placed in voluntary liquidation after its licence expires;

7 Sep 2022 **Luanda (Angola)** *Jornal de Angola*. **Portugal**-headquartered construction company **Mota-Engil**, **Switzerland**-based trader **Trafigura** and **Belgian** railway company **Vecturis**, which jointly tendered successfully for **Angola's Lobito Corridor concession**, are negotiating with the government of the **Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)** to reopen the 456 km of railway that connects **Luau** (Angola) to the Congolese city of **Kolwezi**, and thus reactivate the 1,800-km railway corridor between **Lobito** and the main copper and cobalt mines of the DRC;

6 Sep 2022 **Luanda (Angola)** *Jornal de Angola*. **Australian** mining company **Lucapa Diamond Company** announces discovery of a 160-carat white diamond, the 28th very rare diamond over 100 carats to be extracted from the **Lulo Mine**;

5 Sep 2022 **Luanda (Angola)** *Expansao*. **Instituto Nacional de Estatistica** (national institute of statistics) says that only 2.4 million **Angolans** are in formal employment, with over 9 million working in the informal sector and 4.9 million unemployed, with an unemployment rate of 30.2%;

4 Sep 2022 **Luanda (Angola)** *Jornal de Angola*. State-owned oil company **Sonangol** reports that its accounts for 2021 indicate that the company made a profit of \$2.1 billion, a growth of 152% compared to 2020, and reported a consolidated turnover of \$8.9 billion at the end 2021, 46% more than in the previous year;

1 Sep 2022 **Luanda (Angola)** *Jornal de Angola*. **Banco Nacional de Angola** (central bank) imposes a fine of 30 million kwanzas (\$70,000) on **Banco Keve** for non-compliance with rules and procedures in carrying out foreign exchange operations, following an inspection;

29 Aug 2022 **Luanda (Angola)** *Expansao*. State diamond company **Endiama UEE** says that 21 of the 42 mining projects in which it has shares are paralysed, five are in prospecting and only 11 are already in production, as it seeks investment in four of the operating mines;

26 Aug 2022 **Luanda (Angola)** *Jornal de Angola*. Economic coordination minister **Manuel Nunes Júnior** states that **Angola** has recovered more than \$20 billion of stolen and embezzled assets, seized both internally and externally, with 3,000 cases of corruption, money laundering and other commercial crimes opened since 2017;

23 Aug 2022 **Luanda (Angola)** *Jornal de Angola*. **United Arab Emirates (UAE)** Sheikh **Mohammed Bin Maktoun Bin Juma Al Maktoum** visits **Angola's Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Luanda – Bengo** and announces that the UAE is interested in increasing investment in Angola, with agriculture, tourism and innovation being targets for immediate investment;

21 Aug 2022 **Luanda (Angola)** *Jornal de Angola*. **Agence Française du Développement** (French development agency) operationalises a financing line of €35m (\$34.9m) to support agricultural and rural training in Angola;

21 Aug 2022 **Kinshasa (DRC)** *Jornal de Angola*. **Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)** finance minister **Nicolas Kazadi** and the first vice-president of the **African Development Bank (AfDB)** **Bajabulile Tshabalala**, hold discussions on the project to build a road corridor between the DRC and Angola, which, in the first phase, includes the **Mbuji-Mayi-Kananga** section, in **Kasai-Oriental**;

20 Aug 2022 **Luanda (Angola)** *Jornal de Angola*. **World Bank** announces the appointment of **Cameroonian Albert Zeufack** to the post of World Bank director for **Angola** and **Costa Rican Juan Carlos Alvarez** as resident representative from 1 July;

20 Aug 2022 **Luanda (Angola)** *Jornal de Angola*. **Angola** announces a balance of payments surplus of \$4.7 billion in the first quarter of 2022, which represents 18.1% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and is an increase of \$1.8 billion over Q4 of 2021;

17 Aug 2022 **Luanda (Angola)** *Jornal de Angola*. **United States**-based financial rating agency **Fitch Ratings** changes the assessment of **Banco Angolana Investimento (BAI)** (Angolan investment bank) from "*stable*" to "*positive*" and sets its long-term debt assessment at "B-".

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