

AFRICA RISK CONSULTING

Guinea Monthly Briefing October 2015

Guinea Summary 30 October 2015

President Alpha Condé (2010- present) wins re-election for a second five-year term with a strong mandate. Condé's well-financed campaign secures victory in his Haute-Guinée stronghold and electoral battlegrounds. Second-placed opposition leader Cellou Dalein Diallo fails to draw significant support outside his ethnic Peul community. International election monitors endorse the election despite organisational problems. The opposition alleges electoral fraud and highlights irregularities. The election passes without major security incident and security forces' discipline improves markedly, indicating Guinea's increasing political stability. However, isolated security incidents indicate continuing ethnic tensions. Political actors jockey for positions in the next Condé government. Following his election victory, Condé turns to the economy but the persistence of the Ebola virus continues to hold back recovery.

Condé secures re-election with strong mandate

President **Alpha Condé** (2010-present) convincingly won re-election for a second five-year term in the first round presidential election on 11 October. On 17 October, the **Commission Nationale Electorale Indépendante (CENI)** (national independent electoral commission) released preliminary results confirming that Condé won 57.9% of votes (2.29 million), avoiding a second round election.¹ The **Constitutional Court** is expected to ratify Condé's victory on 2 November.² The 77-year-old's official inauguration is scheduled for 21 December.

Condé's **Rassemblement du Peuple Guinéen (RPG)** ran a visible and "massively financed"³ campaign focused on infrastructure improvements including the inauguration of the **Kaléta** hydropower dam.⁴ Condé convincingly won his ethnic **Malinké** stronghold, **Haute-Guinée**, which recorded a high turnout, and the **Forestière Region**.⁵ Condé also won large areas of the capital **Conakry** and **Basse Guinée**, including **Boké** and **Kindia**.⁶ Electoral support for the main opposition leader **Cellou Dalein Diallo**, the candidate for the ethnic **Peul**-based **Union des Forces Démocratiques de Guinée (UFDG)**, decreased significantly from the last election. Diallo came second with 31.4% of votes (2.29 million).⁷ In the second round presidential election in 2010 he secured 47% of votes (against Condé's 53%). Diallo failed to win a significant share of votes outside his **Moyenne-Guinée** stronghold and some Peul-dominated neighbourhoods in Conakry.⁸ Voter turnout was 66%.⁹

*"The key, as usual, is to understand that the 'ethnic' vote in Guinea is only 'ethnic' in two regions: Haute-Guinée and Moyenne-Guinée. Condé recorded strong results in the rest, particularly Conakry and the Forestière and to a lesser extent the Coast (Basse Guinée). Remember Condé is from Boké, the bauxite town, where he just launched a **Chinese**-run bauxite operation, his mother is **Soussou** (dominant in Basse Guinée) and his father is **Malinké**."¹⁰*

¹ RFI, 17 Oct 2015.

² Source, several

³ Source, political and security researcher, Guinea

⁴ See also ARC Briefing for Guinea, Sept 2015.

⁵ RFI, 19 Oct 2015.

⁶ Jeune Afrique, 17 Oct 2015.

⁷ RFI, 17 Oct 2015.

⁸ RFI, 19 Oct 2015.

⁹ RFI, 17 Oct 2015.

¹⁰ Source, Guinea-focused political researcher, Conakry

International election monitors endorsed the election despite organisational, technical and logistical problems. **Frank Engel**, head of the **European Union (EU)** election observer mission, praised the conduct of the election and said the mission received no reports of voter intimidation.¹¹ The EU mission confirmed several problems at polling stations including technical problems with the electoral register and a lack of voting materials resulting in the late opening of stations.¹² The EU mission said the problems indicated CENI's unpreparedness rather than electoral fraud, and it did "not smear the regularity of the vote".¹³ The **African Union** mission echoed these views, stating the vote was transparent despite some organisational issues.¹⁴

Opposition candidates made several unspecific allegations of fraud concerning the electoral register and other irregularities. Before voting closed on 11 October, Diallo and the other opposition candidates called for the cancellation of the vote due to alleged "massive"¹⁵ electoral fraud including ballot stuffing.¹⁶ The third-placed candidate, **Union des Forces Républicaines (UFR)** leader **Sidya Touré**, also made vague allegations of electoral fraud and, along with Diallo, refused to recognise the results.¹⁷ However both Diallo and Touré opted not to appeal the election results with the Constitutional Court.¹⁸ Only three minor opposition presidential candidates lodged appeals with the Constitutional Court – **Faya Millimono (Bloc Libéral)**, **Papa Koly Kourouma (Génération pour la Réconciliation, l'Unité et la Prospérité)** and **Lansana Kouyaté (Parti de l'Espoir pour le Développement National)**.¹⁹ The constitutional court is expected to issue its final electoral ruling on 2 November.²⁰

In the lead up to the vote, Condé rejected calls from all seven opposition candidates to postpone the election over claims the government had not executed the terms of a 20 August agreement on the organisation of the election.²¹ The opposition cited delays in delivering voting cards and irregularities around the electoral register, including large increases in the number of registered voters in Condé's stronghold of Haute-Guinée compared to other regions.²² However, the opposition withdrew its threat to boycott the vote on 7 October.²³

*"The opposition is convinced of electoral fraud but it's difficult to reach this conclusion without concrete proof. There was certainly a high turnout in Condé's stronghold in Haute-Guinée and the number of null votes in Haute-Guinée is insignificant compared to some other opposition areas. It's difficult to say... maybe they received better voting instructions there."*²⁴

*"It appears Condé used a contrived numerical advantage in his strongholds [and incumbent] advantage during the campaign which allowed him to hog the campaign limelight and a few real accomplishments – electricity is a huge thing in Conakry – to win. That, and the relentless negative campaigning by the opposition."*²⁵

...marking another stability milestone for Guinea

The presidential election passed without major security incident, indicating Guinea's increasing political stability. The election took place in a mostly calm atmosphere throughout the country,²⁶ in contrast to the high levels of political and street violence involving heavy-handed security force

¹¹ Jeune Afrique, 13 Oct 2015.

¹² Reuters, 13 Oct 2015.

¹³ Bloomberg, 11 Oct 2015.

¹⁴ Reuters, 13 Oct 2015.

¹⁵ Jeune Afrique, 12 Oct 2015.

¹⁶ Jeune Afrique, 12 Oct 2015.

¹⁷ Guinée News, 21 Oct 2015; Vision Guinée, 17 Oct 2015.

¹⁸ Guinée News, 21 Oct 2015.

¹⁹ RFI, 27 Oct 2015.

²⁰ RFI, 27 Oct 2015.

²¹ Reuters, 8 Oct 2015.

²² RFI, 7 Oct 2015.

²³ RFI, 7 Oct 2015.

²⁴ Source, political and security researcher, Guinea

²⁵ Source, Guinea-focused political researcher, Conakry

²⁶ Source, several

interventions that marked the 2010 presidential election and 2013 parliamentary elections. Soldiers remained in barracks throughout the election period and there were considerably fewer reports of security forces' indiscipline. Violent incidents in the fragile Forestière Region, a potential security flashpoint, remained isolated. There were no legitimate reports involving a possible planned coup or other military or stability risks before, during or after the election.

*"Before the election there were some reports that if Condé lost the army would react... but this was just speculation and a Condé victory was never in doubt."*²⁷

The margin of Condé's victory dissipated the appetite of militant opposition supporters to hold violent street protests. Electoral authorities publicly released provisional results during counting, which made the public aware of Condé's large lead and subsequently reduced tensions around the announcement of the provisional results on 17 October. The main political actors, notably Condé and Diallo, called on their supporters to avoid violence.²⁸ Diallo made several statements during voting and following the announcement of results urging his supporters to demonstrate restraint.²⁹ Immediately following the vote, Diallo refrained from calling on his supporters to demonstrate despite his criticism about the conduct of the election (see above). He called for "*peaceful protests*"³⁰ after the announcement of results on 17 October, but his supporters failed to heed the call in significant numbers. International and regional actors also played a key role in reducing tensions. The **Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)**³¹ and EU³² monitoring missions urged the opposition to seek legal recourse rather than pursue street demonstrations. In addition, **International Criminal Court** chief prosecutor **Fatou Bensouda** issued a statement on 14 October warning of potential prosecution for individuals involved in or instigating violence.³³

International media and human rights monitors recorded a number of isolated security incidents before, during and after the vote. **Amnesty International** recorded 13 deaths related to election violence, alleging that security forces killed three unarmed civilians.³⁴ Government spokesperson **Damantang Camara** claimed that the security forces had launched an internal investigation into the deaths.³⁵ In June 2015 the **Assemblée Nationale** passed a law aimed at regulating security forces use of firearms and reducing electoral violence.³⁶ There were several other reports of security incidents around the election:

- On 4-5 October in regional capital **N'Zérékoré** (Forestière Region) clashes between supporters of Condé and Diallo during Condé's campaign visit resulted in 29 people injured, including some with gunshot wounds, another 80 admitted to hospital and an unverified report of one death.³⁷ Violence started when Peul traders supporting Diallo reportedly refused to close shops for Condé's campaign event.³⁸ Authorities restored calm on 5 October following arrests and a nighttime curfew.³⁹
- On 8 October, the eve of the election, clashes between supporters of Condé and Diallo in Conakry's **Madina** neighbourhood marked Diallo's return to the capital after a campaign tour.⁴⁰ Security forces blocked Diallo's supporters' attempted march into **Kaloum** (city centre) and used tear gas to disperse crowds, although local media reported some clashes into the night.⁴¹

²⁷ Source, political and security researcher, Guinea

²⁸ Jeune Afrique, 11 Oct 2015.

²⁹ Guinée News, 25 Oct 2015.

³⁰ Conakry Actu, 17 Oct 2015.

³¹ Guinée News, 13 Oct 2015.

³² Including the EU mission, see Jeune Afrique, 13 Oct 2015.

³³ Guinée Time, 14 Oct.

³⁴ Amnesty International, 22 Oct 2015.

³⁵ Reuters, 22 Oct 2015.

³⁶ Reuters, 22 Oct 2015.

³⁷ Reuters, 5 Oct 2015.

³⁸ RFI, 4 Oct 2015.

³⁹ RFI, 6 Oct 2015.

⁴⁰ Media Guinée, 8 Oct 2015.

⁴¹ Media Guinée, 8 Oct 2015.

- On 12 October unknown gunmen fired two shots at CENI offices where vote counting was taking place.⁴²
- On 14-15 October security forces used teargas and fired warning shots to disperse Diallo's supporters protesting in Peul neighbourhoods in Conakry including **Koloma, Bambéto, Cosa** and **Hamdallaye**.⁴³

*"There were some incidents both prior to and post-election mostly between supporters of Condé and Diallo and with a clear ethnic dimension. It shows the ethnic dimension is still there but in terms of Guinean standards, the level of violence was subdued."*⁴⁴

*"Among the opposition there is still a sense of victimisation... they still believe elections are stolen. Since 2013 there has been little desire from the authorities to reach out to the opposition."*⁴⁵

...as Condé turns to his next government and the economy

Following the announcement of results, Condé's attention immediately turned to improving the economy and forming his next administration. In particular, the next government will face immediate and mounting pressure to improve economic opportunities for the 70% of the population under 25-years-old.⁴⁶ Since 2014 the **Ebola** outbreak and mining downturn have impeded Condé's economic recovery plans. An economy ministry report released in October claimed that political tensions had also reduced investment during Condé's first term.⁴⁷ The report states that economic growth reduced from 2.3% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2013, to 1.1% in 2014 due primarily to the Ebola outbreak.⁴⁸ The government now forecasts 0.9% growth in 2015,⁴⁹ up from a **World Bank** estimate in April of -0.2%.⁵⁰

Persistence of the Ebola virus continues to hold back the economic recovery. On 27 October authorities recorded three new cases in **Kindoyah, Forécariah**.⁵¹ As at 28 October there were nine Ebola patients in Guinea, all from the same transmission line.⁵² The Ebola death toll in Guinea stands at over 2,500 people.⁵³ The **World Health Organisation** declared **Liberia** Ebola free on 3 September.⁵⁴ It will declare **Sierra Leone** Ebola free on 7 November if no new cases are recorded there.⁵⁵ Guinea needs to wait 42 days after its last Ebola patient tests negative twice.⁵⁶

Condé remains reliant on mining to boost the economy estimated at \$6.6 billion GDP in 2014.⁵⁷ Prior to the election, Condé reportedly asked **Rio Tinto** to submit feasibility studies before December 2015 for its \$20 billion **Simandou South** (blocks 1 and 2) iron ore mine and infrastructure project.⁵⁸ During his re-election campaign Condé pledged to complete another 500 megawatt hydroelectric dam at **Souapiti** in his second term in order to power an aluminium smelting sector.⁵⁹

Condé will draw on his solid international diplomatic and business contacts to increase foreign investment. Condé felt comfortable enough with the post-election security environment to travel to **France** and **India** on 26 October. He met with French president **François Hollande** (2012-present)

⁴² Media Guinée, 13 Oct 2015.

⁴³ Guinée58, 14 Oct 2015; Guinée News, 15 Oct 2015.

⁴⁴ Source, political and security researcher, Guinea

⁴⁵ Source, political and security researcher, Guinea

⁴⁶ Le Monde, 16 Oct 2015.

⁴⁷ Reuters, 28 Oct 2015.

⁴⁸ Reuters, 28 Oct 2015.

⁴⁹ Reuters, 28 Oct 2015.

⁵⁰ See ARC Briefing for Guinea, Apr 2015.

⁵¹ Guinée News, 27 Oct 2015.

⁵² Reuters, 28 Oct 2015.

⁵³ Reuters, 28 Oct 2015.

⁵⁴ Reuters, 28 Oct 2015.

⁵⁵ Reuters, 28 Oct 2015.

⁵⁶ Reuters, 16 Oct 2015.

⁵⁷ World Bank

⁵⁸ Reuters, 28 Oct 2015.

⁵⁹ Bloomberg, 21 Sept 2015.

ahead of the 2nd **Forum Économique de la Francophonie** on 27 October in **Paris**.⁶⁰ Condé was also a “surprise”⁶¹ participant at the 3rd **India-Africa Forum Summit** (26-30 October).

In Conakry, several prominent political actors are jockeying for positions in the next Condé administration. Condé has indicated he might wait two months until his inauguration – scheduled for 21 December – to appoint a new government.⁶² Local speculation is focused on the possible replacement of prime minister **Mohamed Saïd Fofana** and that the position might provide a springboard to succeed Condé, who is required to step down after two terms in 2020 under the constitution.⁶³ This followed Condé’s statements at an RPG post-election meeting on 24 October that competence will be the sole criteria for new government appointments.⁶⁴ This led some observers to suggest that Condé might break with appointing figures from Basse Guinée to the prime minister post.⁶⁵ However, the local press continues to link key ethnic Soussou figures from Basse Guinée to the position, particularly those linked to the era of former military ruler **Lansana Conté** (1984-2008) who remain prominent under Condé and who played a key role in his re-election. They include the current secretary general of the presidency **Naby Youssouf Kiridi Bangoura**,⁶⁶ a young former campaign manager for Conté and Condé; and the current minister of state for private investment **Ibrahima Kassory Fofana**,⁶⁷ a former finance minister and presidential adviser under Conté from the same **Moriah-Soussou** clan based in Forécariah as current prime minister Mohamed Saïd Fofana. Kassory Fofana has instigated a media campaign to support his bid for the position, highlighting his success as Condé’s campaign manager for the 11 October election.⁶⁸

The third placed presidential candidate, opposition figure Sidya Touré, is also repeatedly linked to the prime minister post. These links resurfaced following a reported meeting between Condé and Touré in Conakry on 23 October.⁶⁹ Touré has notably toned down his criticism of the election and Condé following the announcement of the election result. Touré has a good standing among foreign investors and a strong record on the economy and power sector as prime minister during the mid-1990s under Conté.⁷⁰

*“I don’t think there will be major government changes... Condé did not need alliances or negotiations to win the election (as in 2010, after which he was forced into awarding key government posts to second round alliance partners). He has been awarded more power. However, it has been said that Condé would like (mines minister **Kerfalla Yansané**) to pursue more contracts.”⁷¹*

Implications

The electorate has awarded Condé a strong second term mandate to pursue further stability gains and an economic recovery. Condé has sidelined the opposition as well as avoided a run-off election and the uncomfortable political alliances during the 2010 run-off election that increased government tensions at the start of his first term in power. However, to add further stability and reduce political and ethnic tensions, Condé may need a more conciliatory approach that would require opposition and broader ethnic and regional representation in the next government.

In the context of Guinea’s recent elections and military rule, the significantly reduced election violence and improved discipline of the security forces significantly marks a stability milestone for Guinea. The election also highlights the regional and international commitment to improve Guinea’s stability.

⁶⁰ Media Guinée, 26 Oct 2015.

⁶¹ Jeune Afrique, 26 Oct 2015.

⁶² Guinée News, 25 Oct 2015.

⁶³ Guinée News, 25 Oct 2015.

⁶⁴ Guinée News, 25 Oct 2015.

⁶⁵ Guinée News, 25 Oct 2015.

⁶⁶ Guinée Conakry, 20 Oct 2015.

⁶⁷ Guinée News, 29 Oct 2015.

⁶⁸ Guinée News, 29 Oct 2015; Guinée 7, 28 Oct 2015.

⁶⁹ Media Guinée, 26 Oct 2015.

⁷⁰ Guinée News, 29 Oct 2015.

⁷¹ Source, political and security researcher, Guinea

Isolated security incidents highlight the continuing ethnic tensions in Guinean politics. In addition, further transparency in the electoral apparatus and improvements in the organisation of the elections is required to raise the confidence of political actors and reduce tensions.

Condé is hoping a new government focused on the economy in place by the end of December will coincide with the end of the Ebola outbreak. The election passing without major incident will also reduce Guinea's headline political risks and pave the way for increased foreign investment.

About Africa Risk Consulting:

Africa Risk Consulting (ARC) is a pan-African consulting company that provides timely, relevant information and advice that enables its clients to take informed investment decisions and to safeguard their reputations.

ARC's core consulting services include integrity due diligence and corporate investigations, political advisory and country assessments, opportunity monitoring and reputation risk management. Most relevant to private equity firms is ARC's integrity due diligence and corporate investigations capability. Specifically, ARC offers pre-deal integrity checks to highlight red flags before negotiations start; full detailed multi-jurisdictional reputation due diligence; and supplier and senior hire vetting and repeat due diligence for compliance programmes. ARC is unique in that it offers a 10-day delivery for a routine integrity due diligence. ARC also offers a suite of corporate investigations services from immediate investigation, evidence gathering, e-discovery, forensic accounting and whistleblower support on one end to crisis media management and regular monitoring on the other.

www.africariskconsulting.com

About ARC Briefing:

ARC Briefing is ARC's essential online business information service.

Companies at any stage in their Africa expansion, whether building or communicating an Africa strategy, investing directly, expanding current operations, financing other investors, doing the legal leg-work or researching the Africa growth trend, need ARC Briefing.

ARC Briefing is an online information service keeping you:

- Up to date with Country Chronologies of business-critical events
- In the know via Country Briefings on political, economic, business and operating trends. Written in-country, ARC experts analyse and comment
- Ahead with Country Planner which details future elections, budgets, regulatory changes etc.

www.briefing.africariskconsulting.com

Getting in touch

Please contact us by email info@africariskconsulting.com or call + 44 (0) 20 7078 4080

Follow us on Twitter: [@ARCBriefing](https://twitter.com/ARCBriefing)