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United States (US) blacklisted Paul Makonda returns to politics on 22 October as ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi's (CCM) head of ideology and publicity. Chadema opposition party leaders declare an end to reconciliation talks with the CCM, accusing the ruling party's efforts to increase multi-party politics as insincere. Dissent is also growing in Zanzibar with ACT-Wazalendo leader Othman Masoud Othman demanding electoral reforms. The United Kingdom (UK) and Sweden update their Tanzania travel advice on 30 October and 1 November respectively, warning citizens of an increased risk of terrorist attacks, particularly in Mtwara and Lindi regions. The Tanzanian government plans to ban unrefined lithium exports from 31 May 2024.

Controversial figure Paul Makonda back in politics after three-year hiatus

The ruling **Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)** party on 22 October appointed **Paul Makonda** as the party's head of ideology and publicity, a role in which he will act as the party's mouthpiece and chief liaison to the media. Under Makonda's predecessor **Sophia Mjema's** tenure, which lasted less than one year, the CCM party has had to increasingly go on the defensive amid rising criticism and growing oppositional political activity. Mjema was transitioned to be an advisor to the president on women, children, and special groups.¹

Makonda is a divisive figure in Tanzanian politics and although political analysts say his "*combative*" style was suited to late president **John Magufuli's** (2015-2021) presidential style, it marks a departure from President **Samia Suluhu Hassan's** (2021-current) commitment to political reconciliation efforts.² Due to rising opposition sentiment, Hassan likely expects Makonda to have a heavier hand in dealing with the opposition. On his first day, Makonda warned party leaders that they needed to deliver to public expectations or risk punitive measures.³ He further minimised the role of opposition parties as mere "*senders of information to the public.*"⁴

For the last three years, Makonda has been side-lined from the main political stage following a failed attempt at vying for CCM's **Kigamboni** parliamentary seat during the 2020 elections. Between 2016 and 2020 he served as the **Dar es Salaam** regional commissioner (RC) and was considered a close confidante of Magufuli.⁵ As he re-enters the political fold in his role as publicity secretary Makonda may have a mixed reception - he has a tumultuous relationship with current information minister **Nape Nnauye** who was, at the time of Makonda's reign as RC, information minister under Magufuli. In March 2017 CCTV captured Makonda storming into **Clouds Media Group (CMG)**'s office with armed police officers to allegedly demand the airing of a video discrediting a local pastor **Josephat Gwajima**. Gwajima had challenged Makonda's credibility by accusing him of falsifying diplomas⁶ and using the false identity for nefarious purposes.⁷ Nnauye subsequently launched an inquiry into the alleged raid and days later Magufuli fired him from his ministerial seat. Magufuli appeared to endorse Makonda's bullying tactics until his campaign against LGBT individuals led to international pushback. In November 2018 Makonda announced plans to create a task force to identify, track down, and arrest

¹ The Citizen, 22 Oct 2023

² The Citizen, 29 Oct 2023

³ Daily News, 27 Oct 2023

⁴ Pan African Visions, 28 Oct 2023

⁵ The Citizen, 22 Oct 2023

⁶ The Citizen, 13 Mar 2017

⁷ BBC News, 21 Jul 2020

gay people in **Dar es Salaam** going so far as to tell citizens “*if you know any gays ... report them to me.*”⁸ Makonda’s statements and actions led to the forced recall of the **European Union (EU)** ambassador **Roeland van de Geer** and **Denmark** withholding \$9.8m in aid.^{9,10}

On 31 January 2020 former **United States (US)** secretary of state **Mike Pompeo** blacklisted Makonda and his wife from the US due to his involvement in “*gross violations of human rights*”.¹¹ The US State Department highlighted Makonda’s implicated involvement in the oppression of the political opposition, crackdowns on freedom of expression and association, and the targeting of marginalised individuals as regional commissioner.¹² Following international condemnation, the government also distanced itself from Makonda’s call for anti-gay patrol squads and said that the crackdown does not represent official government policy.¹³ Although five years have passed, Makonda’s name remains synonymous with repression and bullying.

The appointment of Makonda with such a contentious history of upholding international human rights marks a notable change in Hassan’s strategy. With the upcoming 2024 local and 2025 general elections, it appears that to protect CCM party authority in line with her presidential goals Hassan is departing from her former reconciliatory approach to a more aggressive ‘us vs. them’ ideology and it is likely to lead to an increase in hostilities between CCM and opposition parties.

...prompting opposition to increase pressure

Makonda’s appointment, the shelving of constitutional reviews, and the controversial deal with **United Arab Emirates (UAE)**-headquartered **DP World** ports deal, which is perceived to benefit CCM members, have added fuel to opposition parties’ grievances with the CCM.¹⁴ Whilst the beginning of 2023 had a positive outlook on the increasing multi-party political landscape with the lifting of the ban on political gatherings (*See ARC Briefing Tanzania Jan 2023*), the main opposition parties have become disillusioned with what they perceive as a lack of sincerity and commitment on behalf of the CCM government to mend fences.¹⁵

On 30 October, **Chadema** opposition party leader **Freeman Mbowe** and deputy **Tundu Lissu** formally declared an end to the reconciliation talks. Mbowe stated that during the talks CCM had rejected all of Chadema’s proposals related to the new constitution, establishing an independent electoral system, and reforming laws which restrict opposition parties’ activities during election times.¹⁶ Lissu said that “*the entire electoral system is in a worse state than most people think*” and cited numerous problems not limited to processes such as election overseeing, voter registration, securing police permits and protection and vote counting.¹⁷

Both Chadema leaders have been on the charm offensive in recent weeks, largely appealing to the Tanzanian diaspora and international actors. US ambassador to Tanzania **Michael Battle** said on 3 November that it was “*great*” to meet with Mbowe to discuss efforts to build a more “*inclusive democracy*”.¹⁸ Lissu has also been travelling throughout the US speaking to the Tanzanian diaspora and guest lecturing at universities on topics such as corruption.¹⁹

Government dissatisfaction is not restricted to the mainland as **Zanzibar**’s first vice president in the **Government of National Unity (GNU)** and member of opposition party **ACT-**

⁸ Vox, 9 Nov 2018

⁹ CNN, 7 Nov 2018

¹⁰ BBC News, 15 Nov 2018

¹¹ United States Department of State, state.gov, 31 Jan 2020

¹² BBC News, 16 Jul 2020

¹³ BBC News, 5 Nov 2018

¹⁴ The Chanzo, 21 Jul 2023

¹⁵ The East African, 30 Oct 2023

¹⁶ The East African, 30 Oct 2023

¹⁷ The East African, 30 Oct 2023

¹⁸ Ambassador Michael Battle, X, 3 Nov 2023

¹⁹ Tundu Antiphas Lissu, 21 Oct 2023

Wazalendo, Othman Masoud Othman, accused the CCM of monopolising governance in Zanzibar. In an interview with France-headquartered media outlet **The Africa Report**, Othman stated that Zanzibar's President **Hussein Mwinyi** (2020-present) has isolated the opposition in decision-making, hinting at escalated political unrest if significant electoral reforms are not secured before the 2025 general election.²⁰

Although it is one year before local elections and two years before the general election, the stage is being set for a full-scale contest. Although CCM has been in power since Tanzania's independence in 1961 and has maintained dominance longer than any current ruling party on the **African** continent, a lot can still happen to strengthen the opposition's chances of challenging it. Similarly, a lot can happen in Hassan's camp and with the recent appointment of Makonda it is likely that harsh treatment of political opponents will increase.

Updated travel advisories put spotlight on terrorist risk in southern Tanzania

The **United Kingdom (UK) Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO)** on 30 October updated its Tanzania travel advisory to include a warning against "*all but essential travel*" to areas within 20 kilometres (km) of Tanzania's border with **Mozambique's Cabo Delgado** province and cautioned that "*terrorists are very likely to try to carry out attacks in Tanzania in the near future.*"²¹

The risk of terrorism is due to past attacks by groups linked to Islamic extremism such as the **Ahlu-Sunnah Wa-Jama (ASWJ)** militants which operate out of Mozambique. The last large-scale terrorist attack in Tanzania was the 7 August 1998 bombing of the US embassy in Dar es Salaam which killed 11 and injured 85 people.²² Since then, there have only been several smaller-scale attacks predominately targeting local security forces (*see ARC Briefing Tanzania October 2022*). Risk management and security consultancy **SF Group** reported that there have been 5 attacks from 2020 onwards that can be attributed to Tanzania's involvement in counter-terrorism operations in Cabo Delgado.²³ SF Group noted that the southern regions of **Mtwara** and **Lindi** continue to face an elevated terrorism risk due to their proximity to ASWJ's strongholds in Mozambique.

In their update, the FCDO further warned about an increased risk of kidnapping for ransom and political purposes.²⁴ Although the UK government did not elaborate on the threat it is likely related to the armed robbery and abduction of **Han Nooh Hussein** (unconfirmed nationality) on 16 October while driving in an affluent area 8km north of Dar es Salaam. She was robbed of \$1,874, abducted, and held for \$3.5m ransom for four days before police rescued her on 19 October.²⁵ Police arrested and charged seven men with armed robbery and kidnapping, and they are currently awaiting sentencing.²⁶

Sweden's foreign affairs ministry updated its Tanzanian travel advice on 1 November for similar reasons citing an "*elevated threat of terrorist attacks in Tanzania.*"²⁷ The Swedish government highlighted that the **Koran** burnings in Sweden in addition to the **Islamist State (IS)** claimed 17 October targeted killing of two Swedish nationals in **Brussels (Belgium)** have increased the threat level on Swedish interests.²⁸ An **Africa Risk Consulting Briefing (ARC Briefing)** source working with the Swedish diplomatic mission to Tanzania noted that the foreign affairs ministry recalled a large number of Swedish staff and their families from the Tanzanian embassy and has increased security measures as part of their response to the increased threat.

²⁰ The Africa Report, 23 Oct 2023

²¹ Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office, gov.uk, 30 Oct 2023

²² National Museum of American Diplomacy, diplomacy.state.gov, 3 Aug 2023

²³ SF Group, Tanzania Monthly Security Report, October 2023

²⁴ Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office, gov.uk, 30 Oct 2023

²⁵ SF Group, Tanzania Monthly Security Report, October 2023

²⁶ The Citizen, 31 Oct 2023

²⁷ Embassy of Sweden, Swedenabroad.se, 1 Nov,

²⁸ Embassy of Sweden, Swedenabroad.se, 1 Nov,

The US has kept its travel advisory for Tanzania the same since its last update on 31 July, which cautioned US citizens about crime, terrorism, and targeting of LGBTQ+ persons.²⁹ In an interview with Tanzanian newspaper **The Citizen**, British high commissioner to Tanzania **David Concar** downplayed the UK's updated advisory as a "routine update on travel advice" rather than a security warning. He noted that Tanzanian and Mozambican forces were collaborating well on containing terrorist threats and that risks remained, however, the travel advisory doesn't seek to alarm people, and the FCDO has "a responsibility to reflect the overall picture and keep our citizens updated."³⁰

In October 2022 the France-based **Financial Action Task Force (FATF)** grey listed Tanzania due to the country's ineffective capacity to detect and sanction money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing.³¹ Since then Tanzania has increased its regional and international cooperation with other countries and global organisations to address these issues. The government has signed several bilateral agreements with other countries, most recently a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with **India** to increase counterterrorism cooperation, and has been working closely with the **East African Community (EAC)**, the **Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)**, and the **Southern African Development Community (SADC)** to enhance security capacities.³² However, the coordinator of SADC's **Regional Counter Terrorism Centre (SADC-RCTC)** Colonel **Mumbi Mulenga** stated that more could be done to treat terrorism as a regional threat. He advised member states to increase efforts to share information to deal with the problem more effectively.³³

Tanzania to ban raw lithium exports in May 2024

The Africa Report on 2 November reported that Tanzania will ban unrefined lithium exports from May 2024, citing a letter sent by the minerals ministry on 8 June to miners in the country which stated that from 31 May 2024, lithium stakeholders need to have established refining plants within Tanzania to increase the value of the minerals by at least 5% before being granted export licenses.³⁴ This move will see Tanzania join the ranks of other African countries that have banned unprocessed mineral exports to different degrees such as **Nigeria**, **Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)**, **Zimbabwe**, **Namibia**, and **Ghana**.³⁵

The decision also comes at a time when demand for critical minerals such as lithium is increasing due to their use in renewable energy technologies, namely lithium-ion batteries for electric vehicles and other emerging technologies. An **International Energy Agency (IEA)** report published in July 2023 shows that the demand for lithium tripled between 2017 and 2022 which prompted a 30% increase in overall investment in critical mineral development in 2022.³⁶ Tanzania's shift towards processing lithium minerals locally has the potential to alter the existing global supply chain for renewable energy technologies and could attract investments and economic activities to Tanzania and the wider **East African** region. It could also boost revenue, create jobs, and encourage local industry development.³⁷ However, it will be crucial that the government ensures transparency in governance and procurement processes to allow for sustained benefits to the Tanzanian population.

Foreign companies that have already made significant lithium discoveries in Tanzania are US-based **Titan Lithium Inc**, Australia's **Liontown Resources**, and fellow Australian mining company **Cassius Mining Ltd**.³⁸

Germany-based StraMin – Africa Limited, which acts as an intermediary buyer of minerals from small and medium-sized (SME) miners in Tanzania, also stands to benefit greatly from increased

²⁹ United States Department of State, travel.state.gov, 31 Jul 2023

³⁰ The Citizen, 7 Nov 2023

³¹ Institute for Security Studies, ISSAfrica.org, 23 Oct 2023

³² India Today, 9 Oct 2023

³³ Daily News, 21 Oct 2023

³⁴ The Africa Report, 2 Nov 2023

³⁵ News 24, 30 Sep 2023

³⁶ Critical Minerals Market Review 2023, IEA.org, 11 July 2023

³⁷ Mining Business Africa, 6 Nov 2023

³⁸ Mining Business Africa, 6 Nov 2023

critical mineral activity and has exclusive offtake rights with miners holding 70 primary licences in Tanzania.³⁹ StraMin chairman **Mark van den Arend** stated that requiring lithium value addition is “*the right strategy*” and would not be surprised if Tanzania extends the requirement to other critical minerals.⁴⁰ The company recently appointed former permanent secretary (PS) in the energy and minerals ministry **Juliana Pallangyo** to its advisory board.⁴¹

Establishing lithium processing facilities in Tanzania and on the African continent works towards US and **European** interests to reduce reliance on **China**, which refines 59% of lithium globally.⁴² Reorienting supply chains away from China could be the foundation for new economic and strategic relationships between Tanzania and other countries. While the upcoming ban on raw lithium presents many business and investment opportunities, stakeholders should keep in mind the upcoming elections and whether Hassan’s current investor-friendliness sentiments will continue past the next election cycle.

Planner

20 Oct - 9 Nov 2023 **Arusha (Tanzania)** 77th ordinary session of the **African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR)**;

11-13 Dec 2023 **Arusha (Tanzania)** **European Alliance for Innovation (EIK)** international conference on emerging technologies for developing countries;

2023 **(Tanzania)** Commencement of construction of **Bagamoyo Port**;

2024 **(Tanzania)** Local elections;

2025 **(Tanzania)** Expected commencement of construction of **Lindi**-based LNG project;

2025 **(Tanzania)** General elections;

Chronology

8 Nov 2023 **Arusha (Tanzania)** *Daily News*. **World Investment Report 2023** shows foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows into the **East African Community (EAC)** increased 9% to \$3.8 billion in 2022;

7 Nov 2023 **Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)** *The Citizen*. **Petroleum Upstream Regulatory Authority (Pura)** management tells a media briefing that it and **Mozambique’s National Institute of Petroleum (INP)** are close to signing an agreement on the equal share of the natural gas reservoir in their shared border area;

7 Nov 2023 **Arusha (Tanzania)** *The Citizen*. Tanzania, **Kenya** and **Ethiopia** have validated and adopted the regional policy for Technical and Vocational Education Training (TVET) framework which will help facilitate mutual recognition of qualifications and increase mobility of a skilled labour workforce;

6 Nov 2023 **Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)** *The Citizen*. **Uganda** and **Bahrain**-headquartered **Vitol Bahrain** choose to import oil through **Dar es Salaam Port** as part of efforts to promote economic relations between Tanzania and Uganda;

³⁹ BNE Intellinews, 3 Nov 2023

⁴⁰ The Africa Report, 2 Nov 2023

⁴¹ StraMin – Africa, LinkedIn.com, 25 Oct 2023

⁴² Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Industrial Policy, Trade, and Clean Energy Supply Chains”, csis.org, 24 Feb 2021

6 Nov 2023 **Dodoma (Tanzania)** *Daily News*. Finance minister **Mwigulu Nchemba** pegs the 2024/25 budget at TSh47.42 trillion (\$18.9 billion) and says that 72.6% will be collected from domestic sources;

6 Nov 2023 **Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)** *Ahram Online*. Egypt-based **Elsewedy Industrial Development** announces the launch of **Elsewedy Industrial City (EIC)** in Tanzania which seeks to attract over \$400m in investments and generate over 50,000 jobs;

6 Nov 2023 **Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)** *The East African*. The **Tanzania Communication Regulatory Authority (TCRA)** reports internet subscriptions have increased by almost 45% in the past five years;

5 Nov 2023 **Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)** *Daily News*. Permanent secretary in the transport ministry **Godius Kyaharara** says Tanzania is ready to serve the **Central Corridor** countries (**Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Sudan** and the **Democratic Republic of Congo**) through the **Kwala Dry Port**, noting that each of these countries has already been allocated areas for storing transit cargo;

4 Nov 2023 **Zanzibar (Tanzania)** *Daily News*. **Zanzibar's** President **Hussein Mwinyi** states that the island's economy is growing at 7.1% following the execution of various development projects, including agriculture and infrastructure for the provision of services;

3 Nov 2023 **Dodoma (Tanzania)** *Mwananchi*. Transport and construction minister **Innocent Bashungwa** states that **Tanzania Roads Agency (Tanroads)** expects to sign 15 contracts for the construction of asphalt roads and bridges worth TSh1.034 trillion (\$412.2m) to improve infrastructure services in the country;

3 Nov 2023 **Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)** *IMF*. **International Monetary Fund (IMF)** announces it has reached a staff-level agreement with authorities on its second review of Tanzania's **Extended Credit Facility (ECF)**, allowing Tanzania to access approximately \$150m from its \$452.7m programme;

2 Nov 2023 **Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)** *BBC News*. German president **Frank-Walter Steinmeier** expresses "shame" for the colonial atrocities his country inflicted on Tanzania and asks for the country's forgiveness;

1 Nov 2023 **Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)** *EWURA Press release*. **Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority (EWURA)** publish November's fuel cap prices and announce reductions in petrol prices in the **Dar es Salaam** region from Tsh 3,281 (\$1.30) to Tsh 3,274 (\$1.30);

1 Nov 2023 **Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)** *The Citizen*. The government launches the **Tanzania Agricultural Development Bank's** medium-term strategy for 2023-2027 with three financial products aimed at expanding access to agricultural finance and raising farmer's guarantees by up to 75%;

1 Nov 2023 **Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)** *The Citizen*. **Japan** announces a \$500,000 grant to the **United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)** in Tanzania to assist with the influx of asylum seekers from **Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)**;

31 Oct 2023 **Zanzibar (Tanzania)** *The Citizen*. Free economic zones director at **Zanzibar Investment Promotion Authority (ZIPA)** **Halima Wagao** states that the Zanzibar government has registered foreign direct investments worth \$4.5 billion in the three years of Zanzibar President **Hussein Ali Mwinyi's** administration;

31 Oct 2023 **Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)** *The Citizen*. Tanzania's 13 first-tier banks report a 33% increase in profits over the past nine months, indicating a significant upswing in the banking sector's performance;

31 Oct 2023 **Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)** *The Citizen*. The **Chinese** government announces the selection of **China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC)** to negotiate a concession to operate the Tanzania-Zambia Railway line (Tazara);

30 Oct 2023 **Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)** *The Citizen*. **Germany's** president **Frank-Walter Steinmeier** arrives in Tanzania for a three-day visit alongside a delegation of government officials and investors from 12 large companies;

30 Oct 2023 **Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)** *BBC News*. **Israel's** foreign ministry names **Joshua Loitu Mollel** and **Clemence Felix Mtenga** as two Tanzanian nationals who were taken hostage by **Hamas** in **Gaza** on 7 October;

29 Oct 2023 **Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)** *The Citizen*. Tanzania votes in favour of the **United Nations (UN)** resolution for an "*immediate humanitarian truce*" in **Gaza**;

28 Oct 2023 **Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)** *The East African*. Heavy rains demolish 30 houses in **Kalambo** district (**Rukwa Region**), leaving some 150 people homeless;

27 Oct 2023 **Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)** *The East African*. National assembly speaker **Tulia Ackson** is elected president of the **International Parliamentary Union (IPU)**, becoming the 31st leader of the international body representing legislators from across the world;

26 Oct 2023 **Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)** *The Citizen*. **Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA)** reports that the coverage of 3G internet broadband increased from 77% in June to 83% in September 2023, while that of 4G increased from 65% to 74% during the same period as the government and telecommunication companies move forward with infrastructure investment to improve the quality of internet access and speed;

26 Oct 2023 **Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)** *The Citizen*. **Agence Française de Développement (AFD)** (French development agency) and **European Union (EU)** will contribute \$154m for the construction of the **Kakono Hydropower Plant** on the **Kagera River**, which represents about half of the total cost of the project;

26 Oct 2023 **Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)** *The Citizen*. **China's** ambassador to Tanzania **Cheen Mingjian** says she is optimistic that China will remain Tanzania's "*largest and most significant*" trading partner due to the successes of **Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)** projects;

26 Oct 2023 **Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)** *The Citizen*. President **Samia Suluhu Hassan** and her **Zambian** counterpart **Hakainde Hichilema** sign eight memoranda of understanding including a cooperation deal for the development of a natural gas export project. The new pipeline will transport liquefied natural gas from Tanzania to Zambia and is part of expansion plans of the **Tazama** oil pipeline;

23 Oct 2023 **Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)** *Business Daily*. International consulting firm **KPMG** reports that a survey of 150 C-suite level and senior executives in the region indicates that they would consider investing in Tanzania before **Kenya** in the next two years;

22 Oct 2023 **Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)** *The Citizen*. Tanzania and **Dubai**-headquartered **DP World** officially sign a 30-year concession agreement that will see DP World invest \$250m to upgrade **Dar es Salaam Port**. Under the contract is the **Host Government Agreement (HGA)**, the lease and operation of berths four to seven and the joint operation of berths zero to three between **Tanzania Ports Authority (TPA)** and DP World;

20 Oct 2023 **Harare (Zimbabwe)** *The Herald*. **Tanzania's** ambassador to Zimbabwe, **Simon Sirro** opens a **Tanzania Ports Authority (TPA)** office in **Harare** to assist the importation of cars and other goods from Tanzanian **Indian Ocean** ports into Zimbabwe and reduce the cost of trade between the two countries;

19 Oct 2023 **Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)** *US Department of Commerce*. **United States (US)** department of commerce announces the official launch of the **US-Tanzania Commercial Dialogue** following the signing of a memorandum of cooperation by the US secretary of commerce **Gina Raimondo** and Tanzania's industry and trade minister **Ashatu Kijaji**. The commercial dialogue will focus on four key

areas: the digital economy, market access, regulatory and business climate reform, and trade missions and trade fairs;

19 Oct 2023 **Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)** *The Citizen*. **United Nations World Tourism Organisation** formally admits the **Tanzania Association of Tour Operations (TATO)** as a new affiliate member, increasing Tanzania's tourism profile;

18 Oct 2023 **Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)** *Business Wiz*. **Standard Bank Group** says that negotiations on the \$4 billion **East Africa Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP)** can conclude as Tanzania has settled a disagreement with **Chinese** funders on a separate matter;

17 Oct 2023 **Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)** *The Citizen*. Government reaches an agreement with **Canadian** mining company **Winshear Gold Corp** to pay it \$30m to settle an investment dispute;

16 Oct 2023 **Zanzibar (Tanzania)** *The Citizen*. Zanzibar government announce plans to establish a Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC) that will be responsible for monitoring, detecting, responding to, and mitigating cyber security threats and incidents;

15 Oct 2023 **Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)** *The Citizen*. President **Samia Suluhu Hassan** lays the foundation stone for the first 56.57 km of the road linking **Mkiwa-Itigi** and **Noranga (Singida Region)**. The road will eventually run 413 km and link Tanzania and **Zambia**, which Hassan says will help spur trade between Tanzania and the **Southern African Development Community (SADC)**;

15 Oct 2023 **Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)** *Xinhua*. The Tanzanian government announces plans to evacuate its citizens from **Israel** due to the ongoing **Palestinian-Israeli** conflict;

13 Oct 2023 **Dar es Salaam (Tanzania)** *The Citizen*. **Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA)** issues a directive to individuals and companies using Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) to declare their VPN usage and provide all relevant information, including their Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, to the authority before the 30 October;