

AFRICA RISK CONSULTING

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Guinea Summary 19 December 2025

Lacklustre campaigning appears to be going on for the 28 December presidential election with the principal candidate, junta leader Mamadi Doumbouya (2021-present), largely absent from the campaign trail. Prime minister Oury Bah announces the rehabilitation of the Conakry-Kan Kan railway, once a vital piece of infrastructure for passengers and goods, but inoperative since 1985. Guinea's ailing education sector sees more strike action over working conditions, pay, career prospects and job security, provoking riots in which one student dies.

Presidential elections to go ahead on 28 December

[Campaigning](#) for the presidential election got under way on 28 November and is expected to last for 30 days, with candidates touring the country. In addition to this, all candidates get equal air time on the state broadcaster **Radiodiffusion television guinéenne (RTG)** for their campaign. However, some candidates, most notably the outspoken liberal politician **Faya Milimouno**, have [openly mentioned](#) interference with their campaign events.

On 4 December, Milimouno's party, **Bloc Libéral**, issued a statement about the [disappearance](#) of its campaign manager, **Massa Douago Guilavogui**, qualifying it as "an odious act carried out by unidentified individuals". Milimouno himself [condemned](#) the act in public at a rally in the southern town of **Macenta**. The suspected abduction is part of a long series of similar acts that includes the pro-democracy activists **Oumar Sylla** (also known as **Foniké Menguè**) and **Mamadou Billo Bah**, who disappeared on 9 July 2024, and the journalist **Marouane Camara**, who masked men abducted from his car on 3 December 2024. There are more examples, including that of the exiled reggae singer **Elie Kamano**, whose two sons, nephew and brother were taken from their home by masked men on 16 November. Kamano went public and [directly accused](#) the junta of being responsible. In response, the public prosecutor's office in **Conakry** on 4 December published a [statement](#) to the effect that any public communication that links what it terms "the public authorities" to one or more of these abduction cases will be considered libellous and punishable by law.

Attendance at campaign rallies appears to vary but observers [agree](#) that there has, so far, been limited enthusiasm. Another significant development has been an overall absence of the principal candidate who is widely expected to win the election, junta leader General **Mamady Doumbouya** (2021-present), from rallies. Prime minister **Oury Bah** made an attempt to [explain](#) these absences, citing state duties and other obligations but it is questionable whether these will serve to convince; it rather appears that Doumbouya feels no need to engage in extensive campaigning because none of the retained candidates will be able to put his victory in jeopardy.

The **Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)** summit in **Abuja (Nigeria)** on 14 December decided to send observers to Guinea for the next elections but was generally [very mild](#) in its assessment of the transition process, requesting the authorities ensure the process is transparent. The most plausible reason for this is that the regional body has limited leverage over Guinea, as the country's main sources of revenue lies outside ECOWAS, and it does not need the organisation to survive economically, politically, or diplomatically.

Prime minister announces the rehabilitation of the Conakry-Kan Kan railway

While attending a [ceremony](#) on 29 November for the reconstruction of the road between **Mamou** and **Labé**, the two principal towns in the **Moyenne Guinée Region**, Bah [announced](#) that the railway

between Conakry and one of the country's largest interior cities, **Kan Kan**, would be rehabilitated. Citing the fact that no one believed the **Simandou** project could ever be realised, Bah said that this railway was a piece of infrastructure of equal value, which, once rehabilitated, would contribute enormously to Guinea's economic development.

The 660km narrow gauge railway was a colonial-era project but also a vital artery for the transport of passengers and goods. [Construction](#) happened during the first 15 years of the 20th century and was originally destined to continue to **Bamako (Mali)** and on to **Niger**, but the **French** did not pursue the project beyond Kan Kan, which is now linked to relatively nearby Bamako by a trunk road.

Upon Independence in 1958, French engineers left Guinea, provoking an immediate crisis in terms of maintaining the infrastructure and the rolling stock, all of which France refused to supply. The Guinean government [turned to](#) the then **German Democratic Republic** to keep the railway operational. However, over the ensuing decades the railway and the services making use of it [deteriorated](#) steadily. Under the advice of the **International Monetary Fund (IMF)**, former president **Lansana Conté** (1984-2008), saw no need to revitalise the service and the entire operation [ended all activity](#) in 1985. Virtually the entire infrastructure (rails, station buildings, rolling stock) was [dismantled and sold](#) while the railway's main station and building became peoples' homes.

There have been previous announcements to re-build the railway, at a cost that was estimated to be \$1 billion in 2011, when the then stakeholders in one part of the Simandou iron ore mines, **Brazil's Vale** and **Israel-based Beny Steinmetz Group Resources** [promised](#) to rebuild it, which never happened. Whether this latest announcement will fare any better remains to be seen. One major challenge is the original decision to lay narrow gauge rails which are no longer compatible with other railways, including Guinea's new railways. In addition, the ability to source new rolling stock and switch to standard gauge would be imperative, while costs are likely to prove once again prohibitive.

A teachers' strike provokes violence in the capital and elsewhere

On 16 December the three principal teachers unions, **Syndicat national de l'éducation (SNE)**, **Fédération syndicale des professionnels de l'éducation (FSPE)**, and **Syndicat libre des enseignants et chercheurs de Guinée (SLECG)**, once again [met](#) representatives of the labour and civil service ministries to discuss working conditions, pay, and demands that an estimated 4,500 educators be integrated into Guinea's **Fonction publique** (civil service).

Guinea's education system has been [in crisis mode](#) for much of the country's existence, with overcrowded classes, low pass rates, perennial shortages of teaching staff, poor working conditions, low salaries and frequent salary arrears as commonly recurring issues. Guinea's first government under former president **Ahmed Sékou Touré** (1958 – 1984) turned education into a state-led indoctrination system, leading to an exodus of qualified teachers to countries such as **Liberia** and **Côte d'Ivoire**. Education was not a priority for any of the successive governments after the Sékou Touré-led First Republic and the results are that Guinea has some of the lowest education levels in West Africa.

Part of the permanent crisis is the frequent recurrence of teachers' strikes, usually over back pay, poor salaries, lack of career prospects, and low job security. This appears to be at the heart of [this year's strike](#). Another immediate issue was that SLECG [broke ranks](#) with the other two and signed a separate accord with the government, which omitted to address the issue of the 4,500 educators who have so far been unable to become part of the civil service. Guinea faces acute teachers' shortages at all levels and so, the other two unions – FSPE and SNE - [argue](#) that the authorities should be pleased with such a large number wishing to join. They also point out that many of these teachers work in Guinea's least accessible areas, providing a service to the [62% of the population](#) that does not live in towns and cities.

In response, the FSPE and SBNE called a strike that led to [widespread disruptions](#) in schools across the country, also provoking riots by students demanding that school reopen. Clashes occurred on the [streets](#) of Conakry and in several schools, in which one student died.

Doumbouya [intervened](#), ostensibly to prevent [disruptions](#) during the presidential campaign, but as of 15 December, schools were closed and will remain closed until 5 January 2026. In the meantime, the two striking unions [decided](#) to suspend their action, likely as a result of mediation and/or government pressure and agreed to a full meeting with all three unions. SNE secretary general **Michel Pépé Balamou** expressed the hope that this meeting would result in an all-inclusive accord but decried the government's unwillingness to come to the table on the date suggested by his union.

2026 outlook

The main political development in 2026 will be the composition of the new government and who the likely winner, Doumbouya, will opt to keep in and move out of government. Government policy will also probably remain within the framework of **Simandou2040**, which resides under the direct supervision of the head of state. The expectation is that there will be little room for government policies that do not relate to the plans laid out in Simandou2040 and that the autonomy of the ministries involved, including the finance, budget, agriculture, geology, mining, education, healthcare, posts and telecommunications, will be to a greater or lesser degree limited.

The shrinking of the civic space is also likely to continue and unexpected abductions are expected to continue. The fact that the public prosecutor's office has now officially threatened legal action against anyone accusing the most obvious suspects - groups connected to the ruling junta - deepens the democratic deficit crisis the country finds itself in. The possible elections of a new parliament, in which only government-approved parties will be allowed to take seats is unlikely to improve matters on the political front.

The third issue to watch is the ongoing development of the Simandou project. Simandou will not work at full capacity until probably 2028. After the initial publicity surrounding the first delivery of the ore on 11 November, the mining operations will be allowed to expand out of the limelight. Safety concerns and the opacity surrounding the contracts the government signed with the mostly Chinese operators will linger.

Planner

28 Dec 2025 **(Guinea)** Presidential and legislative elections

2026 **(Guinea)** 4th **Guinea Investment Forum**

Chronology

18 Dec 2025 **Mamou (Guinea)** *Vision Guinee*. Presidential election candidate **Abdoulaye Yéro Baldé** launches his campaign in Mamou, pledging to transform the city into the 'Silicon Valley of Guinea' by leveraging technology, education, agriculture, livestock, and tourism;

16 Dec 2025 **Conakry (Guinea)** *Reuters*. Government is reportedly in talks with **United Arab Emirates (UAE)**-headquartered **Emirates Global Aluminium** over a possible bauxite supply agreement that would see the company source the aluminium feedstock from state-owned **Nimba Mining**;

16 Dec 2025 **Conakry (Guinea)** *Vision Guinee*. **Direction Générale des Élections (DGE)** (general directorate of elections) launches a national training programme for polling station staff ahead of the 28 December presidential election, aimed at ensuring effective transmission of electoral procedures nationwide;

11 Dec 2025 **Conakry (Guinea)** *AfDB*. **African Development Bank (AfDB)** approves additional financing of \$25.79m for Guinea for the 225 kV **Guinea-Mali** electricity interconnection project;

7 Dec 2025 **Kissidougou (Guinea)** *Guinee News*. Presidential candidate **Mohamed Nabé** draws a significant crowd in Kissidougou (**Faranah Region**) during his campaign visit, with streets and the local stadium filled with supporters;

6 Dec 2025 **Conakry (Guinea)** *Guinee News*. **Office Guinéen de Publicité (OGP)** (Guinean advertising office) finalises its first five-year strategic plan (2026–2030), outlining the institution’s vision, mission, priorities, and resources and aims to increase annual revenue from 60m GNF (\$6.9m) to 150m GNF (\$17.3m);

5 Dec 2025 **Conakry (Guinea)** *Jeune Afrique*. Opposition **Bloc liberal** leader **Faya Millimono** says condemns the alleged abduction of one of his campaign directors, denouncing a “*strategy of terror*” aimed at “*stifling dissenting voices*”;

29 Nov 2025 **Conakry (Guinea)** *Vision Guinee*. Prime minister **Bah Oury** announces the rehabilitation of the **Conakry-Kankan-Niger** railway;

29 Nov 2025 **Conakry (Guinea)** *Jeune Afrique*. Sources report that police have arrested several associates of former president **Alpha Condé**;

29 Nov 2025 **Conakry (Guinea)** *Vision Guinee*. **Haute Autorité de la communication (HAC)** (high authority for communication) issues the framework for media coverage of the 28 December presidential election campaign by private media outlets, including a formal ban on publishing opinion polls;

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