

AFRICA RISK CONSULTING

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Guinea Summary 28 November 2025

The supreme court on 12 November publishes the list of nine candidates who will contest the forthcoming presidential elections, which junta leader General Mamady Doumbouya (2021-present) is widely projected to win. The first iron ore cargo from the Simandou mining project is exported on 11 November. Simandou is projected to produce 120 million tonnes of iron ore per year and the government has promised that the revenues will be used to kickstart other sectors of the economy, including agriculture, healthcare, education and IT. Guinea uses the hosting of the Transforming Africa Summit to raise its own profile as a future digital hub. However, numerous practical obstacles remain.

Supreme Court validates Doumbouya's candidacy for the presidency

The supreme court announces on 12 November that it has approved [nine candidates](#) to contest the 28 December presidential elections, including the clear frontrunner, junta leader General **Mamadi Doumbouya** (2021-present), who also enjoys the advantage of incumbency. Spontaneous [support groups](#) for his candidacy have reportedly sprung up across the country. Notably, the former president **Lansana Conté's** (1984-2008) **Parti de l'unité et du progrès (PUP)** has [declared](#) its support for Doumbouya. Prime minister **Oury Bah** has [asked](#) the nation to regard the incumbent's achievements – most notably **Simandou** – and his stabilising presence in a volatile neighbourhood, implicitly demanding that Guineans forget Doumbouya's initial promise that he would not run for the presidency, as written into the **Transitional Charter**. If elected, Doumbouya is widely expected to rule until at least 2040.

The other candidates include:

- Former **World Bank** and **Global Alumina** official, ex-education minister, and former **Banque centrale de la République de Guinée (BCRG)** governor **Abdoulaye Yéro Baldé**;
- Former agriculture and foreign minister and diplomat, **Makalé Camara**;
- Trained economist and former official at a major commercial bank **Société Générale**, **Mohamed Nabé**;
- Veteran politician, former campaign manager for **Abé Sylla's** 2010 presidential campaign and since 2013 the vocal and high-profile **Bloc liberal** leader, **Faya Milimouno**;
- Businessman and brief energy minister under this junta, **Ibrahima Abé Sylla**;
- Businessman and aspiring politician, **Abdoulaye Kourouma**;
- Businessman and former member of parliament, **Bouna Keïta**;
- Gold and diamonds trader, **Mohamed Chérif Tounkara**.

Combined they may have some chance of faintly challenging Doumbouya's bid and Milimouno [has called](#) for such a coalition in the face of what he describes as an electoral process that is “*opaque, under complete junta control*” and happening in “*a climate of fear, manipulation, in a democratic space that has been shut down*”. However, the chances of a such a coalition materialising are slim.

[None](#) of the former mainstream politicians, including former president **Alpha Condé** (2010-2021), former prime ministers **Cellou Dalein Diallo** and **Sidya Touré**, former finance minister **Ousmane Kaba** and long-serving career diplomat **Lansana Kouyaté**, will be running for the presidency on 28 December 2025; the supreme court declared them not eligible either for reasons of age and/or absence from the country.

The first iron ore export transported from Simandou

The first iron ore cargo from **Simandou** [arrived by train](#) at the port of **Morébaya** on 11 November, an occasion which the government marked with a ceremony attended by Doumbouya, alongside **Comité stratégique de Simandou** (Simandou strategic committee) president **Djiba Diakité** and **China's** vice premier **Liu Guozhong**. The delivery procedure involves the ore being loaded onto barges and then taken to cargo ships anchored offshore that will take it to its final destination, **China's** steel giant **Baowu**.

Doumbouya, who has made Simandou his government's flagship project, also invited two of his [closest presidential friends](#) to Morébayah, **Rwanda's** President **Paul Kagame** (2000-present) and **Gabon's** President **Brice Clotaire Oligui Nguema** (2025-present). Doumbouya likes Nguema for seizing power in a coup and then reinventing himself as a civilian president, the same trajectory Doumbouya has reserved for himself. Doumbouya also admires Kagame for his rigidly disciplinarian style of governance, reflected in the way Guinea's junta has imposed and enforced its timetable on the two conglomerates involved in exploiting Simandou, **Winning Simandou Consortium (WSC)** and **Rio Tinto Simfer**. WSC consists of **Singapore-based Winning Shipping**, **China's Shandong Weiqiao Group** and **United Mining Supply Group**, owned by **Franco-Lebanese-Guinean** businessman **Fadi Wazni**, **Rio Tinto Simfer** is a joint venture between **Australia's Rio Tinto** and **China Aluminium Iron Mine Co. Baowu Steel**, based in **Shanghai**, is the key player at Simandou, holding a 49% stake in WSC and in Simfer through its 20% stake in China Aluminium Iron Mine Co.

The delivery timetable has everything to do with the forthcoming presidential elections on 28 December, which Doumbouya plans to win on the strength of the progress made at the Simandou project. Local media [described](#) the ceremony a Morébayah as "*having the hallmarks of a presidential campaign*". The government has made Simandou not only the cornerstone of its publicity campaigns at home and abroad, but it also hinges [Guinea's entire economic future](#) on the success of the project. The government has punted the project's potential to transform infrastructure, agriculture, education, health care and the country's entire economy. Simandou contains the largest untapped high grade iron ore reserves in the world. When fully operational it will be able to export up to [120 million tonnes](#) annually to China, which [consumes](#) 70% of global ore supply.

Guinea presents itself as a regional digital hub but obstacles remain

From 12 to 14 November, Guinea [hosted](#) the 7th **Transforming Africa Summit (TAS)**, an annual event and an initiative of the **Smart Africa Alliance (SAA)**, a top-down effort originating in **Rwanda**, which aims to place digital technology at the centre of Africa's development. Notably, Kagame also attended this event, reported to be the largest of its kind ever. The SAA board [consists](#) of heads of state from across the continent, including Doumbouya, whose **Simandou 2040** development project has a digital dimension, which was launched during the event.

[Discussions](#) at TAS featured, among other things, ethical and regulatory issues related to the introduction and use of Artificial Intelligence (AI), and how AI could improve logistics and deliver better government services.

Guinea was the [first West African nation](#) to host the event, made to fit with its government's ambition to raise Guinea's profile as a principal player in the effort to achieve [digital sovereignty](#) on the continent. Guinea provided an example of what this means earlier in the year, when it [opened](#) a **Data Center** that will securely house all public and private data belonging to Guinea, in-country.

Also placed within the framework of TAS was the [opening](#), on 10 November, of the offices for the main centre of the **West African Network of Backbone Managers**. A [backbone](#) is core internet infrastructure, typically consisting of high performance fibre optic cables and routers transporting data and servicing Internet Service Providers (ISPs). The **Conakry** backbone will be tasked with optimising interconnectivity among the eight participating countries - **Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Mali, Burkina Faso** and **Niger**. Posts, telecommunications and digital economy minister **Rose Pola Pricemou** [said](#) at the opening:

“Guinea reaffirms its commitment to power the digital transformation of the continent and turn digital technology into a lever for development, growth, employment and cohesion.”

The [objective](#) is not only to increase connectivity but also lower prices for internet users.

The TAS event also saw the signing of a [bilateral agreement](#) with **Senegal**, currently not in the backbone, aimed at sharing interconnections and infrastructure. [Discussions](#) regarding the same issues are ongoing with the two remaining direct neighbours not yet part of the backbone, **Guinea Bissau** and **Liberia**. Among the requirements to turn these intentions into reality is the large-scale extension of the fibre optic cable network, currently limited to 12,000km. There is no clarity on when this will occur and who will finance it.

The idea that digital technology can contribute to development is not new but the intense and explicit [linking](#) of the digital economy to the Simandou-related projects is unique to Guinea. Building the digital economy has been dubbed ‘The Third Pillar’ of Simandou 2040, to be financed by the revenues from Simandou iron ore exports. Pricemou and Diakité gave speeches during TAS and promised [opportunities](#) in the digital economy, especially jobs for the youth in Guinea - [40% of Guinea’s population](#) is between 13 and 34 years old. SAA will establish a **Smart Africa Digital Academy**, which will work with (among others) the **Simandou Academy**, a presidential initiative aimed what the presidency terms “*tomorrow’s elites*”, through intensive training and education.

Considering these plans and ambitions, it is useful to be reminded of the realities on the ground, digital and otherwise. At the end of 2024, internet penetration in Guinea [stood at 26.5%](#), below the regional average of around 30%. Like everywhere else, the overwhelming majority of Guinea’s three million internet users are consumers of social media, with **Facebook** outperforming all others [by a wide margin](#), followed by **TikTok** (they have three million and two million users respectively). However, getting youth interested in the IT sector so they can be trained to become active in the digital economy in various capacities will require incentives, especially in the light of the government’s ambition to [double](#) the contribution of IT to Guinea’s GDP, from 5% now to 10% in a mere two years.

Other practical hurdles include the poor performance of the Guinean electricity sector, the government’s tendency to restrict social media and internet usage in times of difficulty, such as a presidential elections, and the issue of personnel. **Fédération Syndicale Autonome des Télécommunications (FESATEL)** (union of telecom workers) on 14 November [raised the alarm](#) concerning working conditions in the sector, particularly about the non-implementation of an agreement between the unions, the employers – mostly individual companies - and the government, signed on 21 August 2021. The agreement was aimed at creating a framework to discuss the many dysfunctions in the sector, guarantee job security, improve working conditions, address violations of the **Labour Code** and what FESATEL considers the “*opaque*” practice of acquiring telephone companies. FESATEL [went on strike](#) over these issues in July but states that nothing has been addressed or solved.

FESATEL qualifies the situation as “*alarming*” and [demands](#) the creation of a dialogue committee for the telecoms sector, frequent missions to the enterprises in the sector from labour inspectors and the creation of a structure for the employers in the sector (for instance an association), so that the unions have an entity to engage with for collective bargaining. Failing this, FESATEL will once again consider its options and it warns that the future of the entire sector is at play. There is little doubt that the union timed this statement in this way, to put the government’s high internet ambitions laid out during the TAS event in sharp perspective. **Confédération guinéenne des entreprises (CHE-GUI)** (Guinean federation of enterprises) [invited](#) FESATEL to a meeting at its offices but no details have been provided.

Planner

28 Dec 2025 (**Guinea**) Presidential and legislative elections

2026 (Guinea) 4th Guinea Investment Forum

Chronology

20 Nov 2025 **Conakry (Guinea)** *Reuters*. Supreme Court clears junta leader **Mamadi Doumbouya** to run as an independent in the presidential election on 28 December, following a new constitution that allows a seven-year term;

19 Nov 2025 **Conakry (Guinea)** *Vision Guinea*. The **Mouvement Cellou Baldé–Mamadi Président (MOCEB-MP)** officially launches in **Sonfonia** (Conakry), with hundreds attending to support youth minister **Mamadou Cellou Baldé** and President **Mamadi Doumbouya** ahead of the 28 December presidential election;

16 Nov 2025 **Conakry (Guinea)** *Vision Guinea*. **United States**-headquartered technology company **Cybastion**, establishes operations in Guinea, marking a major step in its African expansion;

13 Nov 2025 **Conakry (Guinea)** *Vision Guinea*. Supreme court rejects appeals from opposition party **Parti des Démocrates pour l'Espoir** leader and former finance minister **Ousmane Kaba**, confirming his disqualification from the 28 December presidential election;

10 Nov 2025 **Conakry (Guinea)** *Reuters*. Supreme court clears junta leader **Mamady Doumbouya** to run in the presidential election scheduled for 28 December;

6 Nov 2025 **Bamako (Mali)** *APA News*. **Forces Armées Maliennes (FAMA)** (FAMA) (Malian armed forces) announces that it carried out “successful” airstrikes on terrorist positions in **Donièna, Kouen, and Bessina**, in the **Kolondièba** district of the **Sikasso Region** - a key corridor from **Côte d'Ivoire** and **Guinea** - with the stated aim of securing tanker transport and maintaining the continuity of hydrocarbon supplies;

4 Nov 2025 **Conakry (Guinea)** *Reuters*. Junta leader **Mamady Doumbouya** declares his candidacy for the presidential election on 28 December;

3 Nov 2025 **Conakry (Guinea)** *Vision Guinea*. Opposition civil society coalition **Forces Vives** calls on supporters to mobilise against junta leader, Colonel **Mamady Doumbouya**'s candidacy for the December presidential election;

31 Oct 2025 **Conakry (Guinea)** *Agence Ecofin*. Guinea and the **United Nations (UN) Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)** sign a new \$34.7m country framework for 2024-2028;

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