

AFRICA RISK CONSULTING

Côte d'Ivoire Monthly Briefing February 2026

Côte d'Ivoire Summary 26 February 2026

President Alassane Ouattara (2010-present) re-appoints almost all the key figures from his previous government to his new cabinet on 23 January. Ouattara also creates the new debated post of deputy prime minister, appointing his younger brother, and defence minister, Téné Birahima Ouattara, to the role. Falling world prices for cocoa and the accumulation of cocoa stocks in the country, partly the result of speculative activity, compels the state to buy back what may amount to 700,000 tonnes of unsold cocoa through its regulatory body, Conseil café-cacao. New offshore oil discoveries and new permits for gold mining activity confirm the government-approved trend of moving towards an economy that will principally rest on commercial agriculture and the extractive sector. Niger accuses Côte d'Ivoire of sponsoring an attack on its international airport.

New government is oriented towards continuity

President **Alassane Ouattara** (2010-present) appointed his new cabinet on 23 January, choosing continuity through the re-appointment of almost all the key figures in his former cabinet, including [retaining](#) one of Côte d'Ivoire's most seasoned politicians, **Robert Beugré Mambé**, as prime minister. The only [key exception](#) was agriculture minister **Ahoussou Kobenan Adjoumani**, who may have been punished for his real or perceived role in the cocoa crisis (see below). He has been assigned a new role as special advisor to the president.

The most notable change is the creation of the debated new position of [deputy prime minister](#), an innovation that according to several observers [has no basis in law](#). Even more significantly, Ouattara [appointed](#) his younger brother, and defence minister, **Téné Birahima Ouattara**, into the newly created position. Given the difficult geopolitical situation, with problematic neighbours in the **Sahel** and **Russian** destabilisation activities in the wider **West African** region, the government has attached considerable importance to maintaining security and the resultant prominence of Téné Birahima.

In addition, opposition media has taken to speculating that this is the clearest signal yet of a beginning of a succession trajectory for Téné Birahima and as a logical result of that, the creation of a political dynasty. Since the premature deaths of two prime ministers - **Amadou Gon Coulibaly** in July 2020 and **Hamed Bakayoko** in March 2021 - the ruling **Rassemblement des houphouëtistes pour la démocratie et la paix (RHDP)** has effectively stopped the search for a successor to Ouattara, now 83 years old.

Among other significant changes is the appointment of former communications ministers, government spokesman, and former housing minister, **Bruno Nagbané Koné** into Adjoumani's post. Similarly, **Nialé Kaba** moves from the planning and development docket to foreign affairs; trade and commerce minister, **Souleymane Diarrasouba**, replaces her. General **Vagondo Diomandé** retained his position as internal security and civil protection minister while mines, oil and energy minister, **Mamadou Sangafowa-Coulibaly** also retained his position, rewarding their effectiveness in their posts and their visibility as a loyal campaigners for both president Ouattara and the RHDP.

The main [job](#) of the new cabinet will be to carry out the 2026 – 2030 National Development Plan, details of which are not available. The sparse outlines that state media has provided mentions a continued emphasis on building more strategic infrastructure, such as full countrywide availability of electricity by 2030, and modernising the agriculture sector. In line with government policies

regarding local content and the concerns over youth unemployment, there will be greater emphasis on and resources directed towards education, training and job creation. The development plan needs [115 trillion](#) FCFA (\$209 billion) in investment, 70% of which will come from the private sector while the remainder will be assured by the state. The expectation is that the financing targets are realistic and can be met.

States moves in to address the mounting cocoa crisis

The [decline in world market prices for cocoa](#) and the realisation that prices will not recover in the foreseeable future has triggered a severe crisis in **Côte d'Ivoire's** cocoa sector, especially when on 2 February, the world market price dipped under the government-guaranteed farmgate price of 2,800 FCFA (\$5,05) per kg. Earlier, port authorities had noticed the late arrival of ships supposed to take the produce out amid reports of financial shortfalls, meaning that buyers and/or exporters could not release stocks, since they had not yet been paid.

A constant aggravating factor is the presence of rogue buyers, with or without connections within the **Conseil café-cacao (CCC)**, the sector's regulatory body, which allows them to get away with paying produce at artificially low prices. These buyers held onto stocks while anticipating world market prices recovering (or producing the kind of spikes that had occurred in the two preceding harvesting seasons). When this did not happen these buyers sat on very large volumes of cocoa they could no longer sell, let alone at a profit. As the crisis intensified through January, it eventually fell to the state to save the harvesting season and prevent collapse. CCC general director, **Yves Brahim Koné**, [ordered](#) the start of a state buyback targeting a potential volume of 700,000 tonnes that had remained blocked in ports and warehouses, some 40% of total production.

However, nothing about this forced buying spree suggests a durable solution to the [long-standing problems bedevilling a sector](#) on which between six and seven million Ivorians rely for a living. These problems include ageing plantations that are not being structurally replenished; the resultant falling production; climate change's aggravating effects that cause damage to crops through flooding and erratic rainfall; the severe lack of transformation capacity in the country and an opaque and (as this crisis clearly demonstrates) dysfunctional marketing system, where middlemen and multinational exporters determine the value of the exported crop, which may or may not conform to what the CCC has told farmers the price should be.

Without comprehensive and rigorous enforcement, a system of pre-season contractual purchasing at fixed prices, intended to protect producers against price fluctuations on the global market, leaves farmers short-changed. Following **Ghana's** [lead](#), Côte d'Ivoire may also be [considering](#) lowering the [farmgate price](#) for cocoa for the rest of the harvesting season, reversing a measure that proved popular among farmers.

The crisis has not had major political ramifications, other than the presumed forced departure of Adjoumani but opposition politician and failed presidential candidate **Don Mello Ahoua** has begun [questioning](#) the whereabouts of what could be anywhere between 3 billion FCFA (\$5.4m) and 6 billion FCFA (\$10.8m) supposedly kept in a reserve fund to compensate producers and exporters in situations like these.

Investments and discoveries in the extractive sector accumulate

On 16 February, local media [reported](#) another offshore oil discovery, the third in the continuing partnership between the **Italy**-headquartered **ENI** and the Ivorian state-run **Petroci**. [Provisional projections](#) at the new field, dubbed **Calao South**, put oil reserves at 1.4 billion barrels. The find follows earlier discoveries of **Baleine** in September 2021 and **Calao** in March 2024. Production at the Baleine field commenced in August 2023; the field is estimated to hold 2.5 billion barrels of oil and 33 trillion cubic metres of gas. Calao is smaller and not yet in production but projections put the reserves at a maximum of 1.5 billion barrels.

Cabinet on 4 February also granted [gold mining permits](#) to two entities, **Etruscan Resources Côte d'Ivoire** and **Ampella Mining Côte d'Ivoire**. The entities will be mining gold in the **Koun Fao** area in eastern Côte d'Ivoire and near **Doropo** in the northeast respectively. The lifespan of these mines is estimated to be 19 years in the case of Etruscan Resources and 14 years for the Ampella Mining operation. Government reported that [investments](#) for the two projects will be a combined 733 billion FCFA (\$1.3 billion). There are currently [13 gold mines](#) operational in the country and more are expected to come onstream.

These developments fit well within the government strategy [unveiled](#) on 13 February at the mines, oil and energy ministry. The strategy is known as **Politique intégrée des ressources minérales et de l'énergie (PIRME)** (integrated mineral resources and energy policy), and its objective is to increase the economic weight of the extractive sector. Notably, this has been a long-standing government policy but has now been formalised in a policy document. **Sangafowa-Coulibaly** [stated](#) at the unveiling:

"PIRME's objective is to double the national wealth in the next 15 years and ensure that, next to agriculture, the extractive industries and energy sector becomes the second pillar of our economy."

A key part of the strategy is to render Côte d'Ivoire an attractive destination for the mining community. This was the gist of a [presentation](#) on 10 February at the annual **Mining Indaba in Cape Town (South Africa)**. The mines, oil and energy ministry's general director for mines and geology, **Seydou Coulibaly**, highlighted the growth of Côte d'Ivoire's extractive sector and recalled that Côte d'Ivoire is considered among the best of the mining jurisdictions in West Africa, according to the **Canada**-headquartered think tank, the **Fraser Institute**. The presentation detailed the points of attraction, which include political stability, security, functioning infrastructure (including electricity), and the presence of the human resources the industry needs. In addition, Côte d'Ivoire is working on adapting its **Mining Code** and modernising its mining registry. It is also an active participant in the **Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)**.

It should be noted that the government's presentation was intended to promote the country, and nuance is necessary. Political stability exists largely on the back of the exclusion of key opposition figures from the formal democratic process and large-scale repression of protests; this is not a sustainable trajectory. Infrastructure is largely in place in the urban south, and the cities elsewhere in the country, but there are areas that are still badly served by unpaved roads, poor electricity provision, and unreliable mobile phone coverage. The ambition is there to rectify this but the country is not there yet. The same applies to human resources; while progress has been made in terms of professional and vocational training, there remains a need to source personnel outside the country, and qualified individuals may include Ivorians who have left the country because of a lack of opportunities or the relevant networks needed to obtain positions.

Following the Indaba, Sangafowa-Coulibaly [travelled](#) to **Botswana** to prepare for a comprehensive cooperation agreement regarding the management of the extractive sector and its revenues. Botswana is considered an African showcase when it comes to responsible management of its mineral assets; prudent handling of its diamond reserves has turned the country from one of the poorest on the continent in the 1960s into a middle income jurisdiction two decades later. The ministerial visit to Botswana seems to indicate that Côte d'Ivoire seeks to emulate the Botswana example, learning from its experience and cooperating on management-related issues. Botswana will be the [guest of honour](#) on the next **Salon International des Ressources Extractives et de l'Énergie (SIREXE)**, Côte d'Ivoire's own extractive showcase trade fair, planned for November.

Niger accuses Côte d'Ivoire of sponsoring attack on its airport

Islamic State in the Greater Sahel (ISGS) claimed an [attack](#) on the **Diori Hamani International Airport in Niamey (Niger)** between 28 and 29 January, with video footage showing the attackers walking around the facility, setting fire to a military drone and causing damage to three civilian

aircraft, one of them an **Airbus** belonging to **Air Côte d'Ivoire**, which was parked there for the night. The company issued a statement on 1 February saying that the damage to the aircraft was being assessed; it has since been [repatriated](#) and is undergoing those repairs.

However, it was the Nigerien junta's response to the attack that [provoked the ire](#) of the Ivorian government. Reiterating his usual posture on these issues, Nigerien junta leader General **Abdourahmane Tiani** [accused France, Benin](#) and Côte d'Ivoire of having prepared the attack, directly accusing Ouattara of being involved. Foreign minister Kaba [expressed outrage](#) and summoned the Nigerien ambassador to Côte d'Ivoire to provide explications while government spokesman Coulibaly articulated the government's response in an [unusually strongly worded statement](#), saying the limit was drawn at any attempt to besmirch the reputation of Ouattara. It was a signal that a line had indeed been crossed and that patience on the part of the Ivorians was running out. The spat provoked threats on social media against Nigeriens living in Côte d'Ivoire, which some local media outlets were quick to [condemn](#).

Planner

16 - 18 Ap 2026 (**Côte d'Ivoire**) Fashion and Textiles Expo Côte d'Ivoire

9 - 11 Jun 2026 (**Côte d'Ivoire**) Build Expo

8 - 10 Sep 2026 (**Côte d'Ivoire**) **Salon international de l'énergie, de l'électricité et des technologies en Côte d'Ivoire** (power and electricity expo)

18 - 22 Nov 2026 (**Côte d'Ivoire**) Second edition of **Salon Internationale des Ressources Extractives et Energétiques (SIREXE)** (international exhibition of extractive and energy resources)

Chronology

23 Feb 2026 **Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire)** *Fratmat*. Agriculture, rural development and food production minister **Bruno Nabagné Koné** thanks the **French** authorities and organisers of the 2026 **Paris International Agricultural Show** for naming Côte d'Ivoire guest of honour, expressing readiness to deepen agricultural cooperation with France;

21 Feb 2026 **Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire)** *Fratmat*. **Thailand** will send a delegation of 12 rice industry experts to Abidjan to strengthen trilateral cooperation with Côte d'Ivoire and pan-African intergovernmental research organisation **AfricaRice**;

19 Feb 2026 **Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire)** *Fratmat*. **Türkiye** reaffirms its commitment to support Côte d'Ivoire's **2026-2030 National Development Plan**, pledging to mobilise public and private financing for key sectors including health, industry, infrastructure and digitalisation;

18 Feb 2026 **Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire)** *Reuters*. According to two government sources, Côte d'Ivoire is considering cutting the price it pays farmers for cocoa beans to align with **Ghana**, as the world's biggest producers of the chocolate ingredient face a major crisis;

17 Feb 2026 **Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire)** *APA News*. Côte d'Ivoire launches its National Development Plan (PND) for 2026-2030, targeting an ambitious annual growth rate of 7.2% backed by an investment of 114 billion FCFA (\$207.38 billion);

17 Feb 2026 **Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire)** *APA News*. Côte d'Ivoire launches its National Development Plan (PND) for 2026-2030, targeting an ambitious annual growth rate of 7.2% backed by an investment of 115 trillion FCFA (\$209 billion);

16 Feb 2026 **Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire)** *Fratmat*. Mines, petroleum and energy ministry announces a significant commercial discovery of light oil, natural gas, and condensates at the **Calao South** field on block **CI-501**;

14 Feb 2026 **Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire)** *All Africa*. Côte d'Ivoire's annual inflation rate rises to 1.4% in January, driven primarily by a 1.62% increase in food prices and a 3.66% rise in urban rents;

14 Feb 2026 **Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire)** *Fratmat*. Foreign affairs minister **Nialé Kaba** represents Côte d'Ivoire at the **African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council** meeting, where ministers discussed the crises in **Sudan** and **Somalia** ahead of the 39th AU summit;

11 Feb 2026 **Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire)** *Koaci*. President **Alassane Ouattara** grants a presidential pardon to **Malian** politician **Mamadou Hawa Gassama**, who was released on 10 February after serving seven months of a three-year sentence for insulting the head of state;

10 Feb 2026 **Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire)** *Fratmat*. **Commission Electorale Indépendante (CEI)** (independent election commission) announces that legislative elections will be rerun on 21 February in the **Toumodi** and **Dualla-Massala** constituencies, after the constitutional council annulled the previous results;

4 Feb 2026 **Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire)** *Fratmat*. Council of ministers approves major measures including a €128.6m (\$152m) **International Development Association** loan to accelerate digitalisation, multiple gold exploration and mining permits, amendments to the **Songon** 372 MW thermal power plant concession, and state participation in a new Ivorian-**Chinese** mining exploration company;

1 Feb 2026 **Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire)** *Fratmat*. **Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)** senior vice president **Ando Naoki** praises progress on Japan-funded infrastructure projects in Côte d'Ivoire, reaffirming JICA's long-term commitment to Côte d'Ivoire as a key regional hub, with plans to expand cooperation into areas such as basic infrastructure, governance and drinking water;

29 Jan 2026 **Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire)** *Reuters*. **Niger's** military ruler, **Abdourahamane Tiani**, accuses **France**, **Benin** and Côte d'Ivoire of sponsoring a "terrorist attack" on **Niamey's** international airport, where gunfire and explosions caused minor aircraft damage but no civilian casualties, without providing evidence;

26 Jan 2026 **Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire)** *Agence Ivoirienne de Presse*. President **Alassane Ouattara** reappoints **Cissé Ibrahima Bacongo** as minister-governor of Abidjan;

24 Jan 2026 **Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire)** *Fratmat*. President **Alassane Ouattara** chairs the first **Conseil des ministres** (council of ministers) meeting of the new government, which prime minister **Robert Beugré Mambé** says marks the end of the political cycle and the start of a new phase;

22 Jan 2026 **Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire)** *Agence Ecofin*. **Italy's Eni** signs a binding agreement with the **Azerbaijani** public oil company **SOCAR** for the sale of 10% of its stake in the **Whale** project, the main offshore development in Côte d'Ivoire;

21 Jan 2026 **Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire)** *Fratmat*. Côte d'Ivoire's investment promotion agency **Centre de Promotion des Investissements en Côte d'Ivoire (CEPICI)** and **Benin's Agence de Promotion des Investissements et des Exportations (APIEx)** agree to strengthen cooperation on promoting and facilitating cross-border investments;

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