

AFRICA RISK CONSULTING

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Mozambique Summary 15 June 2026

The opposition Aliança Nacional para um Moçambique Livre e Autónomo (Anamola) party confirms that it will hold its first national convention in June, during which Anamola leader Venancio Mondlane will be reaffirmed as the head of the party. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) reveals that it had revised its projection for Mozambique's economic growth downward from 1.5% to 0.5% in 2026 due to negative economic externalities. In a related development, the central bank, Banco de Moçambique (BdM), maintains the main monetary rate at 9.25% and the prime lending rate at 15.5%. The government agrees to partially fund the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) deployment in Cabo Delgado Province after the European Union (EU) elected not to resume its support for this deployment.

Opposition party to hold elective conference

The **Aliança Nacional para um Moçambique Livre e Autónomo (Anamola)** opposition party [will hold](#) its first national convention from 20 to 22 June in **Nampula Province**, during which 400 party delegates will elect its leaders and office bearers, and approve the party's policy platform. Anamola's national convention is politically significant as the party is Mozambique's leading opposition force.

Anamola does not have any legislative representation as it was only created in April 2025, six months after the October 2024 national general election. Former independent presidential candidate **Venancio Mondlane**, who is Mozambique's singularly prominent opposition figure, founded the party. The country's official opposition, **Partido Otimista pelo Desenvolvimento de Moçambique (Podemos)**, achieved this status by partnering with Mondlane ahead of the election. As such, Podemos' current political power and legislative presence is actually a reflection of Mondlane's popularity and not the party's own organic support – prior to the October 2024 election, Podemos did not have any legislative representation. However, Mondlane and Podemos fell out in the wake of the election after Podemos took up its seats in the **Assembleia da República** (Mozambique's legislature) (see *ARC Briefing Mozambique Feb 2025*). Mondlane responded to his fallout with Podemos by creating his own political movement, which would become the Anamola political party.

Anamola is still establishing the offices and structures needed by a political party and recruiting local leaders and members. In April, the party [appointed](#) its provincial coordinators who were tasked with establishing provincial officers and driving recruitment efforts. The upcoming national convention is the next important step in establishing and formalising Anamola as a functional political party.

Although Anamola is officially holding its leadership election during the conference, Mondlane is assured of being elected as party leader given his total control over Anamola. Similarly, Mondlane's preferred candidates will be elected to the other senior leadership positions. However, the process itself is significant, as it will confirm Anamola's internal functioning and stand in stark contrast to Mozambique's erstwhile dominant opposition party, **Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Renamo)**, whose leader, **Ossufo Momade**, is actively delaying an elective conference despite Renamo's disastrous 2024 election results and Momade's own unpopularity. As such, the Anamola national convention will likely cement Anamola as the real opposition force in Mozambique and highlight Renamo's decline. This is especially the case given that many of the delegates are expected to be former Renamo members and supporters who have defected to Anamola.

IMF revises down economic growth forecast

The **International Monetary Fund (IMF)** [revealed](#) on 3 June that it had revised its projection for Mozambique's economic growth in 2026 to 0.5% of real GDP, down from an initial forecast of 1.5%. This revelation was made at the launch of the IMF's latest **Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa** report. Notably, the IMF's forecast is still more optimistic than that of the **Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE)** (national statistics institute), which expects Mozambique's GDP to grow by only 0.2%.

The lower economic growth projections are a consequence of the current negative economic headwinds faced by Mozambique due to the global macroeconomic environment, specifically the surge in global energy prices caused by the ongoing conflict in the **Middle East**. The higher fuel prices have both led to supply constraints in Mozambique and exacerbated the country's perennial foreign exchange challenges. These negative effects were further compounded by the economic damage caused by the severe flooding that hit southern and central Mozambique at the start of the year.

Lower economic growth in 2026 indicates that Mozambique's economic recovery has faced serious setbacks. The economy is still reeling from the impact of the post-election civil unrest, which caused a sharp economic contraction in the fourth quarter (Q4) of 2024 and the first two quarters of 2025. Illustrative of this economic harm, Mozambique's real GDP grew by 5.5% in 2023, which fell to 2.1% in 2024 and -0.5% in 2025.

The IMF does expect Mozambique's economy to gradually recover its trajectory over the coming year but several risks remain, including continued uncertainty in energy markets and the threat of further extreme weather events. Furthermore, the full impact that the Middle Eastern war has had on fertiliser supplies has still not been fully established. Fertiliser shortages will have a long-term impact on the agriculture sector, which could lead to negative economic externalities over the next two years at least. Mozambique depends on agriculture to sustain its rural economy, and any major shock to this sector will have serious ramifications for the national economy.

Central bank maintains interest rate

Given the uncertain economic environment faced by Mozambique, it is unsurprising that the central bank, **Banco de Moçambique (BdM)**, [maintained](#) its main monetary rate at 9.25% and the [prime lending rate](#) at 15.5%. In its statement, the central bank's **Monetary Policy Committee (MPC)** specifically cited the high uncertainties regarding the duration of the Middle East conflict and the consequent impact on the logistics chain and the supply of goods, as well as on international and domestic fuel and food prices as the reasons for its decision to maintain the current interest rates.

Policymakers are not sure what the full extent of the fuel price shock will have on the economy. Higher fuel and fertiliser prices will almost certainly lead to higher inflation rates. Initial indicators suggest that this is driving a major spike in prices in Mozambique. Since the war in Iran began on 28 February, consumer price inflation has increased from 3.2% in February to 3.4% in March to 4.41% in April and 7.22% in May. The MPC has adopted its cautious monetary policy stance in anticipation that it may need to hike interest rates in the coming months if inflation continues to rise.

The BdM has a hawkish approach towards monetary policy and aggressively uses interest rates to target inflation. This approach has produced dividends over the past five year, bringing inflation down from a high of 12.1% in August 2022 to 3.04% in February 2026. Accordingly, the central bank is expected to respond assertively to any further increase in consumer price inflation. However, this will place negative pressure on economic activity in the country as higher interest rates discourage consumer spending and investment.

Government to finance Rwandan deployment

The **Rwandan** government [announced](#) on 21 May that the Mozambican government had agreed to finance the operational costs of the continued deployment of the **Rwanda Defence Force (RDF)** in

Cabo Delgado Province. The RDF has maintained a military presence in Cabo Delgado ever since mid-2021, when it deployed troops to support the Mozambican military's fight against Islamist insurgents in the province. This was precipitated by the insurgents' assault on the town of **Palma** in March/April of that year; this attack led most major liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects in the province to declare force majeure. The largest of these, which is led by the **French** energy giant **TotalEnergies**, only resumed in late 2025.

The **European Union (EU)** partially funded RDF's deployment and has [provided](#) the RDF with at least \$46m worth of funding since 2022, equating to around \$11.5m a year. However, the EU elected against renewing this funding after the last arrangement expired in May. This was due to two main factors: firstly, European states are under pressure to prioritise their own defence spending, and secondly, the **United States (US) Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)** sanctioned the RDF on 2 March. These sanctions were a punishment for the RDF's continued support for the **March 23 Movement (M23)** rebel group in the **Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)**. These sanctions have complicated the EU's support for the RDF, as the provision of these funds could violate the US sanctions, and as such, financial institutions may decline to facilitate the transfer of these funds.

In response to the EU's decision against renewing support for the RDF in Mozambique, Rwanda threatened to withdraw its forces from Cabo Delgado (*see ARC Briefing Mozambique Apr 2026*). This caused major concern in Mozambican defence circles as the RDF is viewed as critical to the counterinsurgency effort, particularly the security of Palma district. The Mozambican military does not have the capacity to combat the insurgents on its own, and the loss of the better-trained and equipped Rwandan forces will provide an opening for the insurgents to expand their operating environment and carry out more high-impact attacks.

Mozambique essentially acknowledged this on 29 May when the government spokesperson, **Inocêncio Impissa**, [claimed](#) that the state would provide funding to ensure that the RDF remained in Cabo Delgado to give the Mozambican military time to train and reorganise its security forces to assume full responsibility for the province's security. Assuming full control of the security environment in Cabo Delgado has been a stated goal for the military for over five years, and Mozambican security forces still lack the training, equipment, and capacity to do so. It is unclear when the military will be ready to manage the insurgency without external support.

Although it is currently unclear exactly how the government intends to fund this additional defence expense, the funding will most likely come from Mozambique's LNG exports. This is worthwhile over the short term, as the sudden withdrawal of the RDF could have been a severely destabilising event, but it does underscore Mozambique's dependency on both the RDF and its gas revenue.

Planner

20-22 Jun 2026 **Nampula (Mozambique)** Opposition **Aliança Nacional para um Moçambique Livre e Autónomo (Anamola)** national convention

31 Aug 2026 – 6 Sep 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique) Feira Internacional de Maputo (FACIM 2026)** (Maputo international fair);

Chronology

10 Jun 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique) AIM.** President **Daniel Chapo** receives **Portugal's** minister of state reform **Gonçalo Saraiva Matias**, during which they discuss Mozambique's relationships with Portugal and the **European Union (EU)**;

9 Jun 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique) AIM.** Mozambique and the **European Union (EU)** sign financing agreements worth \$205.7m during the **European Global Gateway Initiative and 2nd Mozambique-European Union Business Forum**, which is being held in Maputo;

8 Jun 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique) AIM**. The **United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)**, the UN's refugee agency, reports insurgent activity displaced over 1,200 people in April and May;

8 Jun 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique) Club of Mozambique**. The **Mozambique-Italy Business Forum** is held in Maputo, during which Italy confirms plans to invest \$116.2m in the development of green cities in Mozambique;

8 Jun 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique) Club of Mozambique**. The **International Monetary Fund (IMF)** conducts a review mission to Mozambique;

2 Jun 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique) AfDB**. The **African Development Bank (AfDB)** approves a \$1m emergency relief grant to support Mozambique's flood relief efforts in the central and southern regions;

31 May 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique) AIM**. Recently reinstated opposition **Renamo** member, **Antonio Muchanga**, calls on party leader **Ossufo Momade** to resign, claiming Momade is causing an internal crisis within Renamo;

28 May 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique) AIM**. The **Council of Ministers** approves increasing the 2026 State Budget by around \$56.1m, which will be funded by gas revenues;

28 May 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique) AIM**. The **United Nations (UN) Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)** reveals it needs at least \$107.6m to finance its operations in Mozambique;

27 May 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique) AIM**. President **Daniel Chapo** promulgates new media and broadcasting regulations as part of the state's efforts to update the country's media legal framework;

25 May 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique) AIM**. Insurgents fire mortars at Mozambican soldiers positioned on the outskirts of **Macomia** town in **Cabo Delgado Province**;

22 May 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique) AIM**. The **German** embassy in Maputo pledges to disburse EUR 4m (\$4.6m) to support climate resilience, food security, and post-flooding recovery efforts in southern Mozambique;

20 May 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique) AIM**. The labour, gender, and social action ministry reveals that over 1.3 million people need humanitarian assistance in northern Mozambique;

20 May 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique) TimesLive**. **Italian** energy giant, **Eni**, reveals it is considering a third floating liquefied natural gas (FLNG) platform alongside its **Coral Sul** and **Coral Norte** platforms in Mozambique's **Rovuma Basin**;

19 May 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique) AIM**. President **Daniel Chapo** meets with **Kyrgyz** foreign minister **Zheenbek Kulubaev** to discuss advancing Mozambique-Kyrgyzstan bilateral relations;

19 May 2026 **Bern (Switzerland) TimesLive**. **Swiss** prosecutors begin a money laundering trial into **CreditSuisse** bankers implicated in Mozambique's 2016 so-called 'tuna bond' scandal which was central to Mozambique's illicit debt controversy.

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