

AFRICA RISK CONSULTING

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Wiper Patriotic Front (WPF) leader and former vice president Kalonzo Musyoka positions himself as a credible 2027 opposition contender, using a governance and cost of living platform alongside post-2024 protest mobilisation to argue that he is best placed to challenge President William Ruto (2022-present). His viability remains conditional on opposition consolidation to determine whether he becomes a serious national challenger or remains one of several competing anti-Ruto candidates. Ruto uses his attendance at the Group of Seven (G7) summit in France to argue that Africa is mispriced by lenders and to gain support for reforms on guarantees, blended finance, and debt transparency. However, Kenya's debt and budget pressures, as well as criticism that Ruto is focused on global diplomacy while economic strain rises domestically, weakens his message. Kenya's proposed KSh784.5 billion (\$6.1 billion) education budget signals a major funding commitment amidst deadly school fires, emergency closures and ongoing student and teacher unrest.

Kalonzo Musyoka outlines 2027 presidential platform

Wiper Patriotic Front (WPF) leader and former vice president (2008–2013), **Stephen Kalonzo Musyoka**, [launched](#) his 2027 presidential campaign platform on 6 June, positioning himself as an opposition contender against President **William Ruto** (2022–present) ahead of the 2027 general election. As part of his campaign, Kalonzo unveiled a 13-point presidential [agenda](#), focusing on governance, cost of living, and fiscal discipline.

Kalonzo was born in **Tseikuru (Kitui County)** in 1953 and is a lawyer and [veteran](#) politician. He was first [elected](#) to **Parliament** in 1985, served as deputy speaker of the **National Assembly** from 1988 to 1992, and held senior cabinet posts under President **Daniel arap Moi** (1978–2002) and President **Mwai Kibaki** (2002–2013), including the foreign affairs, education, environment and home affairs dockets. His [alignments](#) have included the **Kenya African National Union (KANU)**, **National Rainbow Coalition (NARC)**, **Orange Democratic Movement (ODM)**, **Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD)**, **National Super Alliance (NASA)**, **Azimio la Umoja–One Kenya** and the **United Opposition**, now branded by some leaders as the **United Alternative Government**.

His campaign [platform](#) describes itself as “a comprehensive policy framework anchored on the restoration of good governance, the rule of law and constitutionalism”, with commitments on anti-corruption, lower taxation on basic goods, public-service reform, professional policing, regional integration and an ‘interest-based’ foreign policy. In response to the national budget, presented on 10 June, the United Alternative Government [presented](#) a so-called ‘People’s Budget’, proposing to cut spending to KSh 4.318 trillion (\$33.37 billion) and reduce the deficit to 2.8% of GDP. Kalonzo is also seeking to attach his candidacy to post-2024 youth mobilisation. During a 23 May [speech](#) in **Thika (Kiambu County)**, he told supporters that the opposition would return to the streets on 25 June to commemorate young people killed during the 2024 **Finance Bill** protests and oppose the Finance Bill 2026/27.

A recent **Trends and Insights for Africa (TIFA)** [poll](#) into citizens’ preferences placed Ruto at 24%, Kalonzo at 19%, **Fred Matiang’i** at 14%, **Edwin Sifuna** at 10% and former deputy president **Rigathi Gachagua** at 9%; TIFA assessed the race as “highly fluid”. The same poll showed Kalonzo leading among the **Kamba** community in lower eastern Kenya, particularly **Kitui**, **Machakos** and **Makueni** with 78%, while also registering 30% at the coast. Although Kalonzo’s campaign prospects have

[improved](#) compared with previous election cycles, his competitiveness still depends on the opposition's ability to remain united and agree on a common strategy.

Notably Gachagua, Matiang'i and Karua were absent from Kalonzo's 7 June campaign launch. When [questioned](#) about their attendance, Kalonzo said that they were strategically not invited so he could launch his own platform. He [reassured](#) supporters that the opposition coalition remained united and focused on its goal of challenging Ruto and the **Kenya Kwanza** administration. In December 2025, Kalonzo [announced](#) that the United Opposition would unveil its presidential flagbearer by March 2026 but it has so far missed its deadline and members remain [unresolved](#) about whether they should use a poll-based selection [method](#) over negotiated consensus to choose their leader. On 17 June, **Kibra** member of parliament (MP) **Peter Orero** [endorsed](#) Kalonzo during a television interview:

"The person who has contested and has run as a presidential candidate is Kalonzo Musyoka, and given his massive experience, and once served as a vice president, obviously he is the one who could be given the flag bearer position as a great opposition candidate,"

However, Kalonzo is not liked across the board. Treasury cabinet secretary (CS) **John Mbadi** accused Kalonzo in May 2026 of misleading Kenyans over the current finance bill, specifically challenging him to identify alleged land-tax clauses in the bill. Separately, in 2025, senior Kenya Kwanza figure and [former](#) ally **Moses Wetang'ula** [accused](#) Kalonzo of fuelling tribal and regional animosity that could undermine national unity ahead of the elections.

Critics have long portrayed Kalonzo as politically indecisive, opportunistic or overly transactional. Kenyan newspaper **The Standard** [reported](#) in October 2025 that he was "*once derided as indecisive, a fence-sitter, and famously nicknamed a 'watermelon'*" while at the same time noting his resurgent popularity ahead of the 2027 polls. The 'watermelon' nickname comes from the 2010 constitutional referendum in which the campaign supporting the new constitution was associated with the colour green, while opponents were associated with red. Kalonzo publicly supported the draft constitution (green) but critics alleged that he was privately sympathetic to the red camp. Opponents used the watermelon image to suggest Kalonzo was politically ambiguous or two-sided.

Ruto's camp appears to be treating Kalonzo as manageable when isolated, but, as the TIFA polls indicate, Kalonzo could pose a more serious threat if he becomes the vehicle for opposition consolidation, especially if he chooses his running mate strategically.

Ruto promotes Africa's finance case at G7 Summit

Ruto attended the **Group of Seven (G7) Summit** in **Évian (France)** between 15 and 17 June, using Kenya's invitation to [press](#) for reforms that would lower Africa's borrowing costs, even as Kenya faces delayed multilateral disbursements and a reported **World Bank** [refusal](#) to provide emergency rapid-response funding. Ruto framed Africa as an investment partner rather than an aid recipient, [telling](#) leaders that "*a guarantee, though not money, is confidence*" and arguing that outdated risk assessments have produced "*capital injustice*" for African borrowers. Although the intervention gave Kenya a prominent diplomatic platform on the international stage, it also highlighted the nation's continued reliance on **Bretton Woods** structures to finance domestic government operations.

This tension was central to Ruto's G7 message. His core argument was that Africa's risk profile is mispriced, leaving governments to borrow at higher rates than comparable economies despite significant growth potential. Speaking at the summit, he [said](#):

"We must sort out the issue of access to concessional resources to unlock the potential of Africa. Africa continues to borrow from the international community at significantly high interest rates, even higher than comparable economies in the world. We must deal with a mispriced Africa"

He urged G7 states to support guarantees, risk-sharing instruments and African institutions such as the **African Trade and Investment Development Insurance (ATIDI)**. He also called for African pension funds, insurance pools and reserves, [estimated](#) by Ruto at more than \$4 trillion, to be mobilised for long-term investment.

The 2026 leaders' [declaration](#) on mutually beneficial international partnerships partly [supported](#) this agenda. Leaders [endorsed](#) debt-reform language, greater transparency in debt data and lending practices, and stronger use of blended finance, guarantees and instruments such as the **Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)**. The declaration [recognised](#) the need to support countries whose debt remains technically sustainable, but whose high debt-servicing costs are limiting investment in growth. This places Kenya within a broader category of middle-income economies seeking earlier relief before fiscal pressure turns into a deeper debt crisis.

The summit also [backed](#) infrastructure investment through the **Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII)** and the **European Union's (EU) Global Gateway** and [supported](#) local value addition in critical minerals. Kenya was also named alongside **South Korea** as a partner country supporting the G7 declaration, giving Ruto's financing-reform agenda a degree of formal summit-level recognition.

The difference between long-term financial reform and short-term fiscal pressure was underscored by Kenya's parallel and ongoing talks with the World Bank. During the summit Ruto [held](#) bilateral talks with World Bank president **Ajay Banga**, and prior to the summit, on 11 June, **Central Bank of Kenya (CBK)** governor **Kamau Thugge** [said](#) the government had held "*good discussions*" with the World Bank but confirmed that the \$750m **Development Policy Financing (DPF)** had not yet been disbursed. The World Bank's board is [scheduled](#) to vote on 26 June on Kenya's DPF.

Kenya faces a KSh1.1 trillion (\$8.44 billion) [deficit](#) in the 2026/27 budget, with total expenditure projected at KSh 4.79 trillion (\$36.06 billion) and 27% of the budget allocated to interest payments. According to [reports](#), debt service consumed about 69% of ordinary revenue in the last fiscal year, more than double the IMF's 30% comfort threshold. The IMF [terminated](#) Kenya's previous programme in March 2025, leaving KSh 109.7 billion (\$8.42m) undisbursed after Kenya failed to meet some of the lender's reform conditions. Sources from within the government [state](#) that Kenya will not seek to commit to a new IMF arrangement until 2028.

Domestically, Ruto's **Europe** trip coincided with reports that Kenya would [miss](#) out on emergency World Bank funding it had sought to cushion the economy from **Middle East**-linked oil and foreign-exchange shocks. This increased criticism that he was absent during a period of economic pressure and insufficiently focused on the economic 'emergency' at home. While emergency [funding](#) would have provided faster liquidity against oil-price and balance-of-payments pressure, the DPF is budget support tied to government reforms. World Bank [documents](#) put Kenya's public debt at 68.8% of GDP in FY2024/25, after peaking at 73.5% in FY2022/23, and note that recent social unrest showed that fiscal consolidation perceived as inequitable is "*politically difficult to sustain.*" The same document rates the operation's residual risk as substantial, citing macroeconomic vulnerabilities, political-economy dynamics and stakeholder contestation.

This creates a political contradiction for Ruto; internationally he is seeking to reframe Africa as a bankable growth market whose borrowing costs are inflated by outdated perceptions of risk while domestically his government remains [dependent](#) on the policy credibility, reform conditions, and disbursement timelines of the same institutions he is asking to reform.

Although the G7 achievements support Ruto's case for cheaper capital it does not remove the policy conditions facing Kenya's government, such as pressure to reform stronger tax administration, domestic resource mobilisation, sustainable borrowing, and private-sector-led investment. The timing of Ruto's travel created an opening for critics to frame the president as more focused on international diplomacy than domestic economic strain. Online criticism of his travel frequency has also intensified, with commenters using labels such as '[Flying King](#)' and '[King of the Sky](#)'.

Education funding rises amid school safety crisis

A dormitory [fire](#) at **Utumishi Girls Academy Senior School** in **Gilgil (Nakuru County)** killed 16 students and injured 79 on 28 May, turning a wider pattern of school unrest into a national safety issue. The education ministry subsequently suspended the academy's principal for failing to comply

with school fire-safety regulations. In the days following, education CS **Julius Migos Ogamba** [stated](#) that various forms of unrest had affected 204 senior schools across Kenya, while maintaining that figure represented under 2% of senior schools nationally. Separately the **Kenya Red Cross** [said](#) it had responded to 47 school-fire incidents since the start of 2026, 16 taking place after the Utumishi tragedy. The disruption following the recent fire has manifested in forced school closures, vandalism, student walk-outs in solidarity, interrupted learning, and increased anxiety among parents seeking assurance that boarding facilities are safe.

Ogamba [said](#) investigations into Utumishi found the incident was “*a criminal act orchestrated by some students*” and that nine suspects had been arraigned. Police have [reportedly](#) arrested eight students on suspicion of arson but also noted that the school had safety failures, including overcrowded dormitories and a locked emergency exit. School fires are unfortunately a recurrent problem in Kenya, whether caused by arson, weak safeguarding, or poor enforcement of safety standards. The deadly 2024 fire at **Hillside Enderasha Academy** in **Nyeri County** [killed](#) 21 with the **Kenya Union of Post Primary Education Teachers** research finding weak enforcement of school-safety policies (*see ARC Briefing Kenya Sep 2024*).

The broader education sector has long been a recurring source of social conflict. In April, junior secondary school intern teachers [demonstrated](#) over employment terms, **Social Health Authority (SHA)** cover and delayed confirmation, with 44,000 educators demanding permanent and pensionable terms. Schools have also [faced](#) delayed capitation, rising operating costs and complaints over funding pressures, while the Competency-Based Curriculum has increased infrastructure, teacher-training and materials requirements. The **National Treasury’s Education Sector Report** had already identified inadequate infrastructure, human-resource gaps, human conflicts, inadequate capitation and the implementation of curriculum reforms as core sector challenges.

The government has recently approached these pressures with a fiscal response. Mbadi [allocated](#) KSh784.5 billion (\$6.1 billion) for education in the 2026/27 budget, equivalent to 26.4% of ministerial spending and 49% above the 2021/22 allocation. This includes KSh424 billion (\$3.3 billion) for the **Teachers Service Commission**, KSh54.6 billion (\$422m) for free day secondary education, KSh30.7 billion (\$237m) for junior secondary capitation, and KSh4.1 billion (\$32m) for primary and secondary school infrastructure.

However, the budget is unlikely to resolve unrest on its own. Higher education still faces a [reported](#) KSh72 billion (\$556m4) shortfall in student loans and scholarships, potentially affecting nearly 689,000 university and Technical and Vocational Education and Training students. Governance failures, poor boarding conditions, examination anxiety, drug and alcohol abuse, peer influence and weak grievance channels also drive school violence. These are structural problems that require enforcement, supervision and credible grievance mechanisms, not only higher budgetary allocations.

The fires reinforce wider concerns over state capacity, youth welfare and public safety under Ruto while the government is also managing other forms of unrest, including protests in **Nanyuki (Laikipia County)** against a planned **United States**-linked **Ebola** quarantine unit at **Laikipia Air Base**, where three [deaths](#) were reported amid clashes. These issues are likely further material for opposition politicians seeking to challenge Ruto’s governance record and weaken his positioning ahead of the 2027 general election.

Planner

Jul 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** Construction to begin on new airport at **Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA)**

1 Jul 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** AmCham State of Trade Forum 2026

8-10 Jul 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** MINEXPO Kenya 2026

20-22 Jul 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** World Energy Council Kenya Powering Futures 2026 Conference

29-31 Jul 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** Power & Energy Africa – Kenya 2026

9-10 Sep **Nairobi (Kenya)** AmCham Business Summit 2026

14-16 Oct **Nairobi (Kenya)** Fintech Festival Kenya

19 Jun – 17 Jul 2027 **(Kenya)** Kenya to co-host **Africa Cup of Nations (AFCON)** alongside **Tanzania**, and **Uganda**

10 Aug 2027 **(Kenya)** General election

Chronology

17 Jun 2026 **Evian (France)** *Reuters*. On the sidelines of the **Group of Seven (G7)** Summit in **Evian, France**, President **William Ruto** states that **Kenya** is close to sealing a critical minerals deal with the **United States (US)** under which it would process its own resources domestically;

17 Jun 2026 **Mombasa (Kenya)** *Reuters*. **Taiwan's** government accuses Kenya of deporting Taiwanese delegation members en route to attend the **Our Ocean Conference** over yielding pressure from **China** but foreign affairs minister **Korir Sing'oei** defends the decision, stating that Kenyan foreign policy "*recognises only one China*";

17 Jun 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *Business Insider Africa*. Controversial **Zimbabwean** businessman **Wicknell Chivayo**, who is alleged to maintain close ties to President **William Ruto**, secures a stake in the \$2.9 billion expansion of **Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA)**;

17 Jun 2026 **Evian (France)** *Kenyan Diaspora*. Kenya joins a **Group of Seven (G7)** backed international initiative aimed at intensifying the global fight against migrant smuggling, amid rising concern over Kenyans being lured into high-risk trafficking schemes abroad, including deceptive recruitment into the **Russian** military and coercive cybercrime operations linked to **Myanmar**-based scam compounds;

16 Jun 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *Tech Cabal*. **KCB Group**, Kenya's largest bank by assets, dismisses 60 employees linked to fraudulent schemes targeting both the bank and its customers in 2025;

15 Jun 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *The Standard*. Nominated Senator **Hamida Kibwana** calls on the **Senate Committee on National Security, Defence and Foreign Relations** to investigate the integrity of Kenya's identification and immigration systems following allegations of widespread fraud; the concerns follow a **KTN** investigative [report](#) alleging that foreign nationals from **Somalia, Ethiopia, Burundi**, and **Uganda** are illegally obtaining Kenyan IDs, passports, and birth certificates for as little as KSh 15,000 (\$115.36), with the involvement of rogue officials.

15 Jun 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *Semafor*. **Joshua Oigara**, East Africa chief of **South Africa's Standard Bank**, reveals the company aims to be Kenya's biggest lender by 2030 noting that Kenya's market scale, payment flows, and corporate landscape make it a leading regional player;

14 Jun 2026 **Evian (France)** *Daily Nation*. French President **Emmanuel Macron** invites President **William Ruto** to participate in the **Group of Seven (G7) Summit in France**, scheduled for 15 – 17 June, making Kenya the only African country represented at this year's meeting;

12 Jun 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *Daily Nation*. A group of individuals disrupt a post-budget review meeting at **All Saints Cathedral** attended by civil society leaders, religious figures, lawyers and members of the public. **National Police Service (NPS)** officers responded

promptly after receiving reports of the disturbance and managed to restore order at the scene;

12 Jun 2026 **Johannesburg (South Africa)** *Eastleigh Voice*. **Kenyan Diaspora in South Africa (KEDASA)** Secretary General **William Thegeya** says that over 40 Kenyans across various South African provinces have registered to be repatriated to Kenya following rising anti-migrant sentiments;

10-11 Jun 2026 **Helsinki (Finland)** *President of the Republic of Finland*. President **William Ruto** meets with **Finland's** President **Alexander Stubb** in **Helsinki** (Finland) to deepen bilateral relations between Finland and Kenya, strengthen cooperation in international forums, and promote trade between the two countries;

10 Jun 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *BNE Intellinews*. **United States (US)** technology and e-commerce group **Amazon** selects Kenya as the location for its first African satellite internet ground station; its local subsidiary **Amazon Kuiper Kenya Limited** has applied to **Communications Authority (CAK)** for a licence to operate communications infrastructure and is awaiting regulatory approval;

10 Jun 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *Daily Nation*. Government introduces a 2026/27 budget featuring modest tax adjustments to proactively manage public tension ahead of the anniversary of the **2024 Finance Bill** protests, with the newly proposed budget including increased funding allocations for key areas such as county revenue and a national maternal health initiative;

9 Jun 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *BBC*. Kenyan court upholds the 2024 impeachment of former deputy president **Rigathi Gachagua**, barring him from holding public office;

9 Jun 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *Business Daily*. **Central Bank of Kenya** leaves its benchmark lending rate unchanged at 8.75% for a second consecutive meeting, citing uncertainty caused by the **Iran** conflict and the risk that higher global oil prices could fuel inflation and undermine Kenya's economic recovery;

8 Jun 2026 **Brussels (Belgium)** *The Star*. President **William Ruto** secures €139m (\$1.07m) worth of major economic and digital partnerships during high-level engagements in **Belgium**, including funding and policy agreements aimed at accelerating Kenya's digital transformation, trade, and regional connectivity;

8 Jun 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *People Daily*. **Law Society of Kenya (LSK)** president **Charles Kanjama** confirms that former chief justice **David Maraga** was released on bond after Nairobi police officers arrested him and eight other activists during protests plans to excise part of **Nairobi National Park** for a car wash project;

4 Jun 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *Daily Nation*. Despite protests, court orders and opposition leaders and civil society's heavy criticism regarding secrecy and a power imbalance, **United States (US)** experts arrive at a US-backed **Ebola** facility in Kenya, while lawmakers face pressure to reconsider the agreement;

2 June 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *The Citizen*. A Kenyan court extends an order blocking the construction of a **United States (US)**-backed, 50-bed **Ebola** quarantine facility at a domestic air force base following public protests in **Nanyuki**;

1 Jun 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *The Standard*. Concerns emerge over a diesel shipment after experts flagged irregular fuel quality checks, raising questions about compliance with regulatory standards in the energy sector after the government relaxed fuel standards, as energy cabinet secretary (CS) **Opiyo Wandayi** reassures the public that Kenya is not facing any fuel shortage despite renewed geopolitical tensions in the **Middle East**;

1 Jun 2026 **Wajir County (Kenya)** *KBC*. President **William Ruto** reaffirms his commitment to equal development across all regions and emphasises efforts to address historical exclusion and promote inclusive national growth during his **Madaraka Day** speech in **Wajir County**;

1 Jun 2026 **Kisumu (Kenya)** *Daily Nation*. Internal power struggles within the opposition **Orange Democratic Movement (ODM)** are exposed after several senior party figures, including **Millie Odhiambo** and **Junet Mohammed**, boycott a major weekend rally led by **Oburu Oginga**;

31 May 2026 **Garissa (Kenya)** *Riskline*. Local sources state that a **United States (US)** citizen was fatally injured during a robbery by a known criminal in **Bula Mzuri (Garissa County)**;

30 May 2026 **Arusha (Tanzania)** *The East African*. A new funding formula adopted by **East African Community (EAC)** regional leaders revises its budget model to be based on GDP per capita rather than equal contributions; under the new model **Kenya's** contribution increases by 67% to \$11.6m;

28 May 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *Daily Nation*. The **United States (US)** commits Sh1.7 billion (\$12.98m) to support Kenya's preparedness against **Ebola**;

27 May 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *Africa Confidential*. President **William Ruto** expresses confidence in winning the 2027 general election by a wide margin, betting on his record of international engagement and development projects;

26 May 2026 **Washington DC (US)** *US Department of State*. US Secretary of State **Marco Rubio** speaks with President **William Ruto** to discuss the ongoing **Ebola** outbreak and US-Kenya coordination on public health response efforts;

26 May 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *Kenyans*. **Estonia's** non-resident ambassador to Kenya **Daniel Erik Schaer** announces that he will travel to Nairobi in September 2026 to oversee the launch of Estonia's physical embassy in Kenya, noting that the move signals a new and more committed chapter in relations between the two countries;

26 May 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *Daily Nation*. **United States (US)** urges Kenyan lawmakers to pass the **Strategic Goods and Control Bill, 2026**, stating that the legislation is necessary for the country to fulfil its international obligations;

25 May 2026 **Kisumu (Kenya)** *Capital FM*. The opposition **Orange Democratic Movement (ODM)** signals that it may not field a presidential candidate in the 2027 general election, with party leader **Oburu Oginga** indicating that the party will instead focus on strengthening its bargaining power within a broad-based coalition arrangement;

25 May 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *BBC*. Police chief, **Douglas Kanja Kirocho**, orders a reshuffle of President **William Ruto's** security team after a man breached multiple protective layers to briefly embrace the president at a public event;

25 May 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *Capital FM*. **Parliament** concludes public participation on the **Finance Bill 2026** following the lapse of the two-week window period that saw consultations with stakeholders, industry groups and members of the public on the proposed tax measures shaping the 2026/27 fiscal framework;

21 May 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *Reuters*. Following deadly protests and a two-day public transport strike over soaring living costs, President **William Ruto** announces a government cut to diesel prices by KSh 10 (\$0.08) for the upcoming June–July cycle;

20 May 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *People Daily*. The **National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC)** swears in a new team of commissioners, chaired by **Kepha Nyamweya**, who have pledged to intensify the fight against hate speech, ethnic intolerance, and political incitement;

20 May 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *Al Jazeera*. A nationwide public transport strike in Kenya is suspended for one week to allow for government negotiations after surging fuel prices triggered mass protests that left four people dead;

18 May 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *Daily Nation*. Interior cabinet secretary **Kipchumba Murkomen** confirms four deaths, 30 injuries, and 348 arrests following violent protests in Kenya over rising fuel prices;

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