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Prime minister Abiy Ahmed's (2018-present) Prosperity Party (PP) wins a supermajority in the House of People's Representatives following the 1 June general election, assuring Abiy's continuation as prime minister. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) reaches a staff-level agreement with the government on the fifth review of its Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement. Senior government figures accuse the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) of planning to attack the federal government, the latest indicator of the worsening security environment in northern Ethiopia. The threat of a resumed conflict is further highlighted by the United States (US) State Department's decision to sanction some TPLF figures for undermining peace in the region.

Ruling party wins landslide in general election

Prime minister **Abiy Ahmed's** (2018-present) **Prosperity Party (PP)** once again [won](#) a super majority in the 1 June general election, with **National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE)** results on 21 June indicating that the PP won 438 of the available seats in the **House of People's Representatives**, the country's lower house of parliament. This was equal to approximately 90% of the seats that were contested during the election. Importantly, not all of 547 seats in the House of People's Representatives were contested during the election, as NEBE was forced to cancel voting in the **Tigray Region** and several districts in the **Amhara Region** due to security concerns. Regardless, the PP won 80% of parliamentary seats and thus retained its supermajority, ensuring it maintains the ability to govern Ethiopia and amend the constitution if needed. The PP's victory has also guaranteed that Abiy will continue to lead the government for another five-year term.

The PP's victory had been expected (*see ARC Briefing Ethiopia May 2026*). The PP, and its predecessor, the **Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)**, has always maintained tight control over the Ethiopian state. It was also the only party with the resources and personnel to contest all constituencies in the country; at least 64 electoral districts had no opposition candidates on the ballot. The party has also been accused of abusing state power to suppress the political opposition. In the build-up to the election, opposition parties accused the PP-led government of harassment and alleged that election preparations had been marred by numerous irregularities.

Ahmed's resounding victory ensures policy and legislative continuity in Ethiopia. The country's investors and creditors will welcome this as it provides greater stability and makes it easier to engage with the government. However, the PP's dominance in the election should not be conflated with political stability as Ethiopia continues to face serious political and security challenges. In fact, the scale of the PPs' victory has really just affirmed the existing status quo rather than indicated a shift to a more unified and stable Ethiopia.

The fact that the NEBE was unable to organise voting in the entirety of Tigray and at least eight districts in Amhara underscored the limits of the federal government's control. In addition to these cancelled elections, voting was suspended at least 143 polling stations in Amhara and **Oromia** regions due to security concerns related to nationalist militia groups in Ethiopia's two largest regions. However, the absence of voting in Tigray confirmed that the **Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF)** is the dominant power in that region. Both the TPLF and the Amhara nationalist (Fano) militias that are fighting the government in Amhara will be emboldened by this capitulation.

Ultimately, Ethiopia's 1 June election cemented Abiy's control over the PP and the wider Ethiopian state, but the election also highlighted a worrying trajectory in the country at present. Ethiopia's coherence as a unified state is under strain, and the government is increasingly struggling to enforce its control and monopoly on violence outside of the country's urban areas. Ethiopia's rural areas, especially those in Amhara and Oromia, are increasingly impacted by armed nationalist militia groups. Meanwhile, Tigray, under the TPLF, is essentially acting as a semi-autonomous enclave that rejects the federal government's control. Collectively, these forces indicate that Ethiopia is growing less stable despite what the election results would suggest.

IMF reaches staff-level funding agreement

The **International Monetary Fund (IMF)** [announced](#) on 3 June that it had reached a staff-level agreement with the government on the fifth review of its **Extended Credit Facility (ECF)** arrangement, recommending that the IMF executive board approve the next tranche payment of around \$468m to Ethiopia under the ECF.

The IMF review of Ethiopia's progress under the ECF-backed programme was generally positive. In its review, it praised the government for its continued progress on key reforms, specifically, the **Homegrown Economic Reform Agenda**, which has driven favourable macroeconomic outcomes over the past month. Furthermore, Ethiopia's output indicators, exports, reserves, and government revenue all improved through early 2026, while inflation rates declined in the first quarter from 9.7% in December 2025 to 9.4% in March. The IMF team also [expressed](#) satisfaction that Ethiopia has continued to make progress towards "*securing a comprehensive external debt treatment that will restore debt sustainability*". The government is still in debt restructuring negotiations with its official creditors and bondholders. Concluding this debt restructuring is a priority for the IMF and was a central term when the ECF arrangement was first reached in July 2024. In practice, the ECF arrangement was a financial bailout necessitated by Ethiopia's [defaulting](#) on its debt in December 2023; as such, maintaining progress on debt restructuring is essential for Ethiopia to maintain access to its ECF funding. The fact that the IMF team has recommended the release of a tranche payment indicates it is satisfied with the country's progress thus far.

However, the IMF did raise concerns about Ethiopia's economic resilience in the face of increased global macroeconomic uncertainty. The IMF was particularly concerned about the potential impact of the **Middle East** conflict on Ethiopia. The conflict has caused a global spike in commodity prices over the past three months and is set to have a long-term negative effect on fertiliser costs and supplies.

Ethiopia should be able to weather this external shock if it is not a prolonged economic disruption, but the IMF urged authorities to maintain a tight monetary policy stance to constrain inflation and maintain strong policy implementation to consolidate macroeconomic stability. It also called on the government to [commit](#) to a greater effort to "*enhance the functioning and transparency of the foreign exchange market*" and noted that Ethiopia needs to continue to pursue domestic revenue mobilisation reforms to "*help safeguard fiscal sustainability while responding to new spending pressure*".

The IMF board typically follows the ECF review team's recommendation, and Ethiopia's tranche payment is expected to be approved in the coming weeks. This will be a welcome development as the funding disbursement will help the government fund its budget and finance the ongoing structural reform programme, which will alleviate some pressure on the country's finances and balance of payments.

Government officials accuse TPLF of planning attacks

Ethiopia's **National Intelligence and Security Service** director general, **Redwan Hussein**, and minister advisor for East African affairs, **Getachew Reda**, [published an article](#) on 11 June accusing the TPLF of planning to "*launch an offensive against the federal government in the coming days*". The two senior officials claimed that the TPLF, Fano militias, and the **Eritrean** government had formed an alliance intended to restart a conflict in northern Ethiopia. Redwan and Getachew further called on

any actors in the international community that have “*leverage or influence*” over the TPLF or Eritrea to pressure them against taking any such action.

As of 25 June, this alleged planned assault has not taken place. However, Redwan and Getachew’s allegations are the latest indicator that the tensions between the TPLF and the federal government are coming to a head. Both sides have accused the other of violating the **Pretoria Peace Accords**, which ended the 2020-2022 **Tigray War**. Ethiopia’s deteriorating relationship with Eritrea has exacerbated these tensions - Ethiopia has accused its neighbour of interfering in its sovereign affairs, while Eritrea claims that Ethiopia is planning to instigate a war in an effort to capture its ports and coastline.

Over the past year, a series of developments has increasingly pushed the TPLF and the federal government towards a potential conflict. The NEBE refused to recognise the TPLF’s disputed conference, which saw pre-war party leader **Debretsion Gebremichael** restored as TPLF chairman and Reda ousted as a member of the TPLF executive and as Tigray’s interim president (*see ARC Briefing Ethiopia Aug 2024*). As a result of NEBE refusing to acknowledge the TPLF conference and its requirement that the TPLF register as a political party, the TPLF was excluded from contesting the 1 June election.

Given the TPLF’s dominance in Tigray, the NEBE was forced to cancel elections in the region due to security concerns. The situation further escalated in April when the TPLF announced that it had recently restored the **Tigray Regional Council**, which subsequently elected Debretsion as Tigray regional president on 4 May (*see ARC Briefing Ethiopia Apr & May 2026*). This was a direct challenge to the federal government’s authority, which had not recognised either the reconstituted **Tigray Regional Council** or Debretsion as regional leader. Neither the TPLF nor the federal government has shown a real interest in meaningful political negotiations, and at present, it is unclear how the matter could be resolved without a return to armed conflict.

Although the imminent attack claimed by Redwan and Getachew did not occur, there are indicators that the TPLF is preparing for a new war. On 9 June, [local reports claimed](#) that the party had drafted a proclamation to introduce military conscription in the region and impose penalties on any individual or organisation that discourages men from being drafted into the **Tigrayan Defence Force (TDF)**. The federal government has also claimed that the TPLF is stockpiling arms; foreign minister **Gedion Timotheos** [repeated](#) these claims in an address before the **United Kingdom’s (UK) Chatham House** on 17 June. The TPLF itself has also [warned](#) on 4 June that “*a devastating war could break out*”, accusing the federal government of undermining peace and calling on Ethiopia’s partners to intervene to avoid such a conflict.

Overseas diplomatic and intelligence agencies clearly view the TPLF’s threat of aggression as real. The **United States (US) State Department** on 18 June [announced](#) that it would impose visa sanctions on “*hardline members of the TPLF and their immediate family members.*” As per the US State Department’s statement, these visa restrictions target those “*who are responsible for, or complicit in, undermining resolution to the crisis in the Tigray region.*” The US did not identify exactly which TPLF figures have been subject to these sanctions, but the measure is aimed at undermining the TPLF’s capacity to travel, fundraise, and even secure external support and supplies.

Despite both the TPLF and the federal government claiming they want to avoid a new conflict, both sides are adopting offensive postures, including reported troop movements. Most notably, the TPLF has accused the **Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF)** [of carrying out](#) drone strikes on TDF positions. The most recent of these allegedly occurred on 8 June and killed one TDF member. If this is accurate, it would indicate that low-level hostilities have already begun, and the TDF may be compelled to retaliate in the near future.

Any new conflict would be potentially devastating for northern Ethiopia. The last Tigray War resulted in at least 100,000 fatalities and displaced over 2.5 million people. Any new conflict would likely be just as severe, potentially worse if it leads to an interstate conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Planner

15 Jul 2026 **Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)** The National Dialogue Forum

Chronology

23 Jun 2026 **Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)** *Fama MC*. Foreign affairs minister **Gedion Timothewos** meets with British secretary of state for foreign, commonwealth and development affairs **Yvette Cooper**, during which the two senior diplomats reaffirm their respective commitment to strengthen bilateral cooperation;

23 Jun 2026 **Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)** *Channel Africa*. **African Union (AU) Commission** chairperson **Mahmoud Ali Youssouf** congratulates Ethiopia on the completion of the general election;

22 Jun 2026 **Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)** *Addis Standard*. The **United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Refugees, Barham Salih**, warns that funding shortfalls are placing humanitarian services in Ethiopia under severe strain;

20 Jun 2026 **Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)** *Borkena*. The **Amhara Fano National Movement (AFNM)** claims to have secured a battlefield victory in the **Wollega area (Oromia Region)**, killing as many as 300 Ethiopian soldiers;

18 Jun 2026 **Washington DC (United States)** *The Reporter*. The **United States (US)** government confirms that Ethiopia is included among the over 40 countries that will benefit from its \$1 billion humanitarian and disaster response funding package that will be facilitated by the **United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)** and the UN's **World Food Programme (WFP)**;

15 Jun 2026 **Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)** *Al Jazeera*. At least 31 people die when a bus crashes into a ravine in the **Amhara Region**;

12 Jun 2026 **Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)** *ENA*. The **Second Ethiopia–European Union (EU) Roundtable** is held, during which delegates review the EU's ongoing support for Ethiopia's institutional reform agenda;

12 Jun 2026 **Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)** *ENA*. The **Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission** confirms that the **National Dialogue Forum** will commence on 15 July;

11 Jun 2026 **Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)** *The Reporter*. The Ethiopian and **Nigerian** governments sign a prisoner transfer agreement that establishes a legal framework for the transfer of sentenced persons between the two countries;

4 Jun 2026 **Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)** *The Reporter*. The **Ad Hoc Committee** representing Ethiopia's bondholders indicates that it is preparing to sue the government over the ongoing dispute related to ongoing debt restructuring efforts;

4 Jun 2026 **Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)** *Borkena*. Reports claim that an ethnic **Agaw** rebel group calling itself the **Agaw Democratic Union (ADU)** has taken control of the **Waghumra** area in **Amhara Region**, suggesting a growing balkanisation of the region amid the ongoing conflict between the federal government and Amhara nationalist militia known as **Fano**;

29 May 2026 **Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)** *Amnesty International*. The global human rights organisation, **Amnesty International**, issues a statement raising concerns about political repression and threats to press freedom in Ethiopia ahead of the country's general election on 1 June;

28 May 2026 **Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)** *The Reporter*. Finance ministry commits to equal treatment of its creditors in its ongoing debt restructuring talks under the framework of the **Official Creditor Committee (OCC)**;

25 May 2026 **Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)** *Borkena*. Unidentified armed gunmen kill 12 people and abduct dozens of others in the town of **Gohatshion (Amhara Region)**.

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