

AFRICA RISK CONSULTING

Algeria Monthly Briefing June 2026

Algeria Summary 29 June 2026

Algeria will hold its legislative elections on 2 July to elect 407 members of the People's National Assembly (lower house of parliament) for a five-year term, with over 7,000 candidates contesting for seats. The government announces on 4 June that it has started building the \$13 billion 4,128km Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline, which will supply 30 billion cubic metres of gas per year from Nigeria to the European market. Despite Mali's close political and military relations with Russia, recent reports reveal that senior Algerian and Russian officials share similar concerns about Mali's approach to the conflict in its northern region.

Parliament elections in Algeria set for 2 July

Algeria will [hold](#) its legislative elections on 2 July to elect 407 members of the **People's National Assembly** (lower house of parliament) for a five-year term, with over 7,000 candidates contesting for seats. President **Abdelmadjid Tebboune** (2019-present) officially [signed Decree No. 26-145](#) on 4 April that confirmed 2 July as the date for the election as well as a revision of the electoral list which began on 12 April and concluded on 26 April.

Algerian officials have portrayed the elections as an important democratic exercise, and have encouraged citizens, including those living in other countries, to participate. Despite authorities encouragement, expectations for political change remain low as the upcoming elections are [unlikely](#) to alter the political balance in Algeria, with the ruling alliance of the **Front de Libération Nationale (FLN)**, the **Rassemblement National Démocratique (RND)**, and pro-establishment independents expected to benefit from an electoral system that has been pre-engineered to benefit them. Recent legislative and constitutional reforms have expanded presidential authority, increased state oversight of political parties, and given greater responsibility for managing elections to the foreign and interior ministries – roles previously resolved for the **Autorité Nationale Indépendante des Elections (ANIE)** (independent national authority for elections) (*see ARC Briefing Algeria Jan & Apr 2026*).


Parliament is also generally perceived as having limited influence over executive decision making, with Algerians [viewing](#) the legislative body as a 'rubber stamp' mechanism for decisions the executive branch makes. This has contributed to voter apathy and low public confidence in the electoral process. It remains a major challenge for authorities to increase voter turnout, particularly after the record-low participation rate of around 22% recorded during the 2021 parliamentary elections. Officials would [view](#) a higher turnout as evidence of political normalisation after the 2019 **Hirak** pro-democracy protests. However, low turnout would undermine the legitimacy of the election and solidify the notion that the elections have become more of a gesture than a meaningful democratic process.

Algeria to begin work on Trans-Saharan gas pipeline to Europe

The government [announced](#) on 4 June that it had started building the \$13 billion 4,128km **Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline**, a project that was first proposed in the 1970s to supply 30 billion cubic metres of gas per year from **Nigeria** and the region to the **European** market. The pipeline is planned to run through Nigeria, **Niger** and Algeria, before connecting to the **Mediterranean** through various pipelines.

Issam Gaba, the director of pipeline studies at state-owned company **Sonatrach**, said on 4 June that Sonatrach will build the pipeline's 1,210 km section in Algeria and it will be connected to an existing gas pipeline system in the **Aoulef Region** - located about 1,100 km from **Algiers** - that already

supplies Europe. An earlier version of the planned pipeline showed that it would connect **Warri** in Nigeria to the **Hassi R'Mel** gas hub in Algeria's **Laghouat Province**, passing through Niger.



Niger's petroleum minister, **Hamadou Tini**, also [told](#) reporters in Aoulef that construction work on a 720 km segment through Niger will start in early 2027 in collaboration with Sonatrach. However, ongoing [security issues](#) in Niger will have to be considered. For his part, Nigeria's petroleum resources minister **Ekperikpe Ekpo** also said that his country is committed to supply gas to the pipeline.

The three countries involved in the project [agreed](#), through the **Declaration of Niamey**, signed in February 2022, to revive the decades-long delayed project (See *ARC Briefing Algeria Aug 2022*). The project was proposed more than 40 years ago, and an agreement was signed between the countries in 2009, but progress stalled. Algeria and Nigeria signed an MoU for the pipeline in 2002 but progress was limited due to delays in the passage of Nigeria's oil sector reform law, the **Petroleum Industry Bill**, which was finally passed in July 2021 (see *ARC Briefing Nigeria July 2021*). However, amid the prevailing international energy crisis and European efforts to curb **Russian** gas imports, the stalled project is now seen as an opportunity to monetise Nigeria's gas resources and help meet European demand. Algeria, which is itself already a major gas supplier to **Italy**, **France** and **Spain**, is also aiming to increase its energy output to further meet growing demand in Europe.

While Algeria will boost its revenue generation if the Trans-Saharan gas project is realised, Nigeria will benefit the most from energy exports, given that the project is one of three export pipelines in which it is invested. Nigeria and **Morocco** are also working on the \$25 billion **Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline (NMGP)**, which has been in the works since 2016. Gas from the pipeline will supply 13 **Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)** countries involved in the project and benefit over 400 million people living in **West Africa** while improving energy infrastructure in the region.

Notably, several Moroccan and regional publications have [speculated](#) that Algeria's decision to revive the Trans-Saharan gas project is directly linked to its rivalry with Morocco. While it is just speculation, it could indicate how geopolitical competition between the two countries often spills over into strategic infrastructure projects, with each country seeking to strengthen its regional influence and economic leverage.

Russia privately signals support for Algeria's position on Mali

Despite Mali's close political and military relations with **Russia**, recent reports [reveal](#) that a meeting between senior Algerian and Russian officials in **Moscow** (Russia) in April 2025, show that the two countries share similar concerns about Mali's approach to the conflict in its northern region. During those discussions, Russian officials reportedly agreed that it was a mistake for the Malian government to abandon the 2015 **Algiers Accord**, which ended the war between the Malian government and a coalition of mainly **Tuareg** and **Arab** armed groups in northern Mali. The officials also reportedly argued that the political concerns of the **Azawad** group in northern Mali could not be ignored and emphasised that Tuareg separatists, the **Azawad Liberation Front (FLA)**, should not automatically be treated as a terrorist organisation.

The officials reportedly also emphasised that lasting peace in the region would require dialogue between the government and the northern communities rather than simply relying on military action. They further said that Russian forces in northern Mali were intended to fight extremist groups rather than directly confronting the FLA.

Nearly a year since that reported meeting in Moscow, **Al-Qaeda**-affiliated **Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)** and the FLA [carried](#) out a series of coordinated, large-scale attacks across Mali on 25 April. The offensive included strikes near the capital, **Bamako**, and resulted in the killing of defence minister **Sadio Camara**, who was second in-charge of Mali's junta. He is credited with brokering the country's Russian partnership and was called 'Mr Russia'. The killing of Camara was a major symbolic and strategic blow, particularly given his central role in shaping Mali's defence strategy and guiding its security relationships with Russia, as well as more recently with the **United States (US)**, which lifted sanctions on him in February. The attacks also dealt a major blow to Russia's security strategy in Mali, as the FLA and JNIM recaptured the strategic region of **Kidal** from Malian and Russian-backed forces. Kidal is significant as it was a symbol of Russia's promise to bring security to northern Mali where Western forces had failed.

While the attacks undermined Russia's credibility as a security partner in the region, the reported April 2025 meeting was also notable because it [shows](#) that Russia's public support for Mali's government differed from its private assessment of the conflict. Russia's reported private position is actually more closely aligned with Algeria, whose relations with Mali have deteriorated significantly in recent years. Russian officials are also said to have agreed that Algeria was justified in shooting down a Malian drone last year that had entered Algerian airspace, stating that Russia would have acted similarly to defend its own borders.

Despite Russia's strong partnership with Mali, it has privately recognised the importance of Algeria's security interests and viewed cooperation with Algeria as essential for achieving long-term stability in the **Sahel**.

Planner

2 Jul 2026 **(Algeria)** National assembly elections

Chronology

28 Jun 2026 **Algiers (Algeria)** *Morocco World News*. **Moroccan** police arrest six Algerian nationals for their alleged involvement in a criminal network active in document forgery, identity theft, illegal residence, and drug trafficking;

24 Jun 2026 **Algiers (Algeria)** *Algeria Press Service*. President **Abdelmadjid Tebboune** meets with a ministerial delegation from **Niger** in Algiers to discuss bilateral relations;

17 Jun 2026 **Algiers (Algeria)** *APS*. State-owned energy group **Sonatrach** signs a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the **German** energy company **VNG AG** to explore strategic cooperation opportunities;

16 Jun 2026 **Algiers (Algeria)** *APA News*. Ahead of legislative elections on 2 July, political parties are campaigning heavily on economic issues like purchasing power and social reform, with a concern remaining the risk of low voter turnout, which many observers fear reflects a broader public distrust in the country's representative institutions;

13 Jun 2026 **Algiers (Algeria)** *Morocco World News*. Moroccan police at the **Marrakech Menara Airport** arrest a 30-year-old **French**-Algerian woman on suspicion of publishing digital content that included defamation and insults against Moroccan citizens;

10 Jun 2026 **Algiers (Algeria)** *Algeria Press Service*. Pharmaceutical industry minister, **Ouacim Kouidri**, holds a meeting with a leading **Chinese** delegation as part of Algeria's ongoing efforts to enhance its domestic pharmaceutical production capabilities;

10 Jun 2026 **Algiers (Algeria)** *Yahoo*. **FIFA** issues World Cup accreditation to **French** sports journalist **Christophe Gleizes**, who has been detained in Algeria for a year;

9 Jun 2026 **Algiers (Algeria)** *European Sting*. The **European Commission** adds local airline **Air Express Algeria** to the latest **European Union (EU) Air Safety List**, banning the airline from operating within the EU due to serious safety concerns and identified shortcomings in its compliance with international aviation safety standards;

5 Jun 2026 **Algiers (Algeria)** *eNCA*. An Algerian appeals court rejects a prosecutor's bid for a tougher sentence for detained **French** journalist **Christophe Gleizes**, officially clearing the final legal hurdle for a potential presidential pardon;

2 Jun 2026 **Algiers (Algeria)** *Trend.az*. President **Abdelmadjid Tebboune** sends a congratulatory letter to President **Ilham Aliyev** of **Azerbaijan** on Azerbaijan's Independence Day;

1 Jun 2026 **Algiers (Algeria)** *Reuters*. **OPEC+** oil-producing countries will likely agree a further hike in their output target for July, though the **Iran** war has so far prevented several from delivering previous increases;

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