

## AFRICA RISK CONSULTING

### Guinea Monthly Briefing June 2026

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#### Guinea Summary 29 June 2026

*The **Génération pour la modernité et le développement (GMD)**, a political grouping whose name coincides with the initials of the head of state (General Mamadi Doumbouya), wins Guinea's legislative and local elections, which have been criticised for irregularities. Nigerian billionaire industrialist Aliko Dangote is likely to be an active partner in rolling out Simandou2040; repeated talks with Doumbouya have cemented a working relationship between Guinea's government and the Dangote Group of companies that may result in joint projects in oil, agriculture, industrialisation and financing. A Guinean, French and United States (US)-Ghanaian group concerned with human rights and government transparency has asked a French court for an *exequatur*, a legal procedure that may compel the state of Guinea to finally pay the compensation a West African court ordered it to pay for its role in the deaths of six people and the destruction of homes and property in the Forest town of Zogota in 2012. The court's decision, expected on 8 July, may have ramifications beyond this case and could affect current mining operations, particularly in Simandou.*

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#### Doumbouya's political movement overwhelmingly wins legislative elections...

The **Supreme Court** [confirmed](#) and [validated](#) on 20 June the results of the legislative elections held in Guinea on 31 May. The court [rejected](#) all legal challenges that some opposition parties, including **Abdoulaye Yéro Baldé** of the **Front démocratique de Guinée (FRONDEG)**, had mounted against the results, [citing](#) irregularities during the voting process. The opposition had described the entire election process as one that played out "under conditions of exclusion" and "in a climate of chaos, fraud and ballot stuffing". A [ministerial decree](#) dated 7 March had listed all traditional and/or prominent parties, including the **Rassemblement du peuple de Guinée (RPG)**, the **Union des forces démocratiques de Guinée (UFDG)**, and the **Union des forces républicaines (UFR)**, as among 40 political parties that the territorial administration and decentralisation ministry had declared dissolved (*see ARC Briefing Guinea May 2026*). The **Direction générale des Elections (DGE)** (general directorate of elections) excluded these parties from the elections because of their dissolution.

The **West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP)** [established](#) what it terms "operational defects" as well as "cases of corruption...and administrative meddling" in the electoral process. In addition, observers, civil society activists, journalists and opposition figures alike [call into question](#) the official voter turnout percentages of 52.87% for the legislative election. The DGE, which is run out of the territorial administration and decentralisation ministry, supplied this figure, as well as the 58.51% voter turnout percentage for the local elections that took place at the same time. **Ibrahim Diallo**, a leading figure in the civil society umbrella grouping **Forces vives**, [qualified](#) the figures as "having little credibility".

None of this matters to the winners, the presidential movement **GMD (Génération pour la modernité et le développement)**, with the same initials as the head of state, General **Mamadi Doumbouya** (2025-present)), and its close allies, including the **Union pour un mouvement populaire**, which will take 127 of the 147 available seats in the new **Assemblée nationale** (national assembly). They will also [dominate](#) virtually all local administrations, including those of the capital, **Conakry**. The [majority](#) of the 342 mayors and the local councils that compose the local administration will be either part of or closely aligned with the GMD.

The election marks a *de facto* return of the country to the one-party state it was between 1958 and 1984 – but this time without a formal political party; the GMD is a movement without a party political structure such as a political bureau and a directorate. The opposition has been reduced to a few remaining parties, such as FRONDEG and the **Bloc Libéral** of veteran politician **Faya Milimouno**; both will hold single seats. The new **Alliance pour une Guinée nouvelle (ANG)** of aspiring politician **Mory Kaba**, managed to get four seats but is unlikely to wield sufficient influence to make the government change course. Kaba was [opposed](#) to Doumbouya's presidential candidacy but appears to have decided to work within the institutional framework provided by the Doumbouya regime.

The new parliament will be predominantly tasked with working out the programmes, budgets and plans already decided in the **Conseil national de transition (CNT)**, the provisional parliament installed by General Doumbouya's junta immediately after the September 2021 coup and outlined in presidential decrees (see *ARC Briefing Guinea Jan, Mar, Apr and May 2026*). The framework for parliamentary decision-making will be **Simandou2040**, which runs from 2026 to 2040 (theoretically the end of Doumbouya's two constitutional mandates), as well as its first phase for the years 2026-2030, both of which the CNT approved in March. The structure for carrying out Simandou2040 consists of the **Delivery Unit**, created by presidential decree in January, which has sub-units in 11 line ministries (see *ARC Briefing Guinea Apr 2026*). Within these parameters, the newly elected parliament will be allowed to tinker with details, while the running of the country's future programmes remains principally in the hands of Doumbouya and his trusted lieutenant, **Djiba Diakité**, cabinet director for the president and head of the **Simandou Strategic Committee**.

### ... as Doumbouya holds more talks with Africa's richest industrialist, Aliko Dangote

Guinea is [seeking](#) to have more of the minerals it exports untreated (mostly bauxite but also gold and possibly even iron ore) treated and/or transformed locally. Bauxite currently leaves the country as red earth; refining it into alumina takes place predominantly in the **United Arab Emirates (UAE)**, **China** and **Russia**, hence the standing government policy to force mining operators to build refineries inside Guinea, a [policy](#) that has resulted in at least three alumina refineries currently being constructed. The government has since [banned](#) the export of unrefined gold, while **Nimba Gold**, a local company, is [developing](#) Guinea's first gold refinery.

These measures are aimed at adding value domestically, creating employment, increasing both export and government revenue, increasing local content and attracting new adjacent service industries, ranging from construction, maintenance and logistics to legal and administrative services. All this takes place within the government-mandated framework of Simandou2040, the comprehensive development plan that is now the law of the land.

Within this framework, contacts with a leading industrial and financing group like **Dangote Group** were only a matter of time. The relationship between the Guinean government and the Dangote Group is the result of personal meetings between President Mamadi Doumbouya and Dangote Group CEO **Aliko Dangote**. The [first](#) of these took place in January 2025 at the **Mohamed V Palace** in central **Conakry** (also known as **Palais des nations**), which Doumbouya uses for his meetings. Dangote [also met](#) the two other key figures in the Doumbouya entourage, cabinet director and **Simandou Strategic Committee** head Djiba Diakité and General **Amara Camara** (secretary-general to the presidency and the government's principal spokesman). It can be argued that these three men – particularly Doumbouya and Diakité – run Guinea. What emerged from these first contacts is that Doumbouya and Dangote get along very well, that the Dangote Group CEO is [on board](#) with the Simandou2040 agenda, and that enough ground has been broken to prepare a wide-ranging and comprehensive collaboration between the Dangote group and the Guinean government.

Initially, the areas of cooperation under discussion were oil and agriculture but subsequent follow up meetings, including one at the [Africa Forward](#) investment event in **Nairobi (Kenya)** in May and another at the same palace in Conakry on 12 June, have increased that range to other areas where the Dangote Group has activities, including energy, industrialisation and, crucially, financing. The

Simandou2040 agenda carries a [\\$200 billion price tag](#) for 15 years and the Dangote Group is an actor with pockets deep enough to fund at least some parts of it.

### **New hearing over Zogota massacre has possible implications for Simandou**

An alliance of relatives and survivors of what has become known as the “*Zogota Massacre*”, together with Guinean and **French** activist and human rights organisations, [is bringing](#) a case before the **Paris Judicial Court**. The **Paris** court [was asked](#) on 15 June to consider confirming a **West African** court verdict, which had ordered the Guinean State to financially compensate victims of human rights violations committed by Guinean security forces in the town of Zogota in August 2012. The move is a response to Guinea’s refusal to pay compensation to victims and survivors, which the **ECOWAS Court of Justice** in **Abuja (Nigeria)** had [ordered](#) it to do in November 2020.

In early August 2012, inhabitants of the remote **Guinea Forest** region town of Zogota briefly occupied the site of an iron ore mining project, at the time [in the hands of VBG](#), a joint venture of **Brazil**-based steelmaker **Vale** and Franco-**Israeli** diamond tycoon **Beny Steinmetz’s Beny Steinmetz Group Resources**. Their protest was connected to [several issues](#) that surround many mining projects. Specifically, the complaints concerned a perceived failure to provide local youths with jobs, local authorities embezzling funds earmarked for local development projects, and damage to the environment and sites the community considers sacred. The night following the occupation, Guinean security forces [entered](#) Zogota, killed six, wounded and tortured others, and destroyed or damaged homes and personal possessions.

Guinean human rights organisation **Les mêmes droits pour tous (MDT)** [filed](#) complaints against security forces personnel but no one has been held accountable, neither in the civil court where MDT had lodged the case, nor in a military court, where the case had been referred to. Failing this, MDT and a **Ghana-** and **United States (US)**-based non-profit group called **Advocates for Community Alternatives (ACA)** brought the Zogota case before the ECOWAS Court of Justice in Abuja. In November 2020, the ECOWAS Court of Justice ruled that the Guinean State was responsible for violations of the right to life, contravened prohibitions of arbitrary arrest and torture and should therefore [pay](#) the survivors compensation worth 4.56 billion Guinean francs (about half a million US dollars).

To obtain the compensation, MDT, ACA and the French pro-transparency group **Sherpa** in October 2023 [began procedures](#) at the Paris Judicial Court for recognition and enforcement of ‘*exequatur*’. This procedure aims at getting a French court to rule that verdicts delivered outside France – in this case by the ECOWAS Court of Justice – carry the same weight in France itself and can therefore be executed in France. The key question is whether the Guinean State is immune from the consequences of verdicts made outside its own jurisdiction. The plaintiffs argue that the seriousness of the events in Zogota warrant such a move, and that Guinea gave up its sovereignty immunity by recognising the ECOWAS Court of Justice, even when it [refuses to comply](#) with the decision the court has made.

The case was heard in 2024, referred in 2025 and had another hearing on 15 June, pending the decision the Paris Judicial Court will make regarding the *exequatur*, on 8 July. Should the Court decide that the State of Guinea can be made to comply with court orders made outside its territory, new options would emerge, including seizing Guinean assets – in this case in France – equivalent to the amount the ECOWAS Court of Justice ordered Guinea to pay.

The ramifications may go beyond the current case. A ruling in favour of the survivors of the Zogota Massacre would create a new situation, which Sherpa [qualifies](#) as “*an important precedent*”. The group [points out](#) that in cases of investment disputes, sovereign jurisdictions tend to comply with outcomes produced by tribunals like the **International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)** and that there is [no reason](#) to assume that survivors of human rights violations should not have a similar channel of legal redress.

Business entities may also face accountability issues. The VBG joint venture, which was subject to a later legal complaint lodged in Guinea, no longer exists and cannot be enjoined to pay for its alleged

role in the massacre, even though there is [evidence](#) to suggest that VBG agents were in contact with Guinean security forces at the time of the massacre. However, there may be situations emerging in which existing business entities can be made to pay compensation to victims of their operations if victims successfully bring their cases to court.

This could have consequences for projects such as the iron ore mine and infrastructure projects of **Simandou**, the operations of which ACA is following closely and where [similar violations](#) as those seen in Zogota have occurred. There are issues regarding workers' safety and workers' rights – including those of the 45,000 now laid off following the end of the infrastructure project – in addition to issues regarding the displacement of people from their homes and lands, environmental damage, threats to ancestral lands and damage to sacred sites. The mine operators [maintain](#) that they carry out their operations in ways that are socially and environmentally responsible and that they rehabilitate areas affected by their operations.

But there has also been repeated outcry over the [lack of transparency](#) surrounding the renewal of the Simandou mining conventions, which were negotiated between the then junta of transitional president Mamadi Doumbouya and the mine's principal (mainly Chinese) operators, [depriving](#) Guinean citizens of the right to be informed about the management of their country's resources. Opposition politician **Aliou Bah**, who denounced these practices in public in late November 2024, was arrested the next month and swiftly [jailed for two years](#), for what amounts to *lèse majesté*, in addition to facing accusations of having slandered the head of state, an indication that criticism of and revelations about the government's prestige project of Simandou will be met with severe repression.

## Planner

11 Nov 2026 **Kassa (Guinea)** Government sponsored **Simandou Summit**

2026 **(Guinea)** 4<sup>th</sup> Guinea Investment Forum

## Chronology

29 Jun 2026 **Conakry (Guinea)** *Africa Guinée*. President **Mamadi Doumbouya** appoints **Alya Camara**, the Guinean advertising office's director of human resources, as interim director general following the dismissal of director general **Aladji Cellou Camara** and his deputy, **Jean-Marie Soriba Coumbassa**, for alleged misconduct;

28 Jun 2026 **Conakry (Guinea)** *Vision Guinée*. Prime minister **Bah Oury** notes that Guinea could replicate **China's** economic transformation by implementing reforms based on greater discipline, efficiency and stronger governance, particularly in the energy sector, which he describes as critical to the success of the **Simandou 2040** programme;

28 Jun 2026 **Conakry (Guinea)** *Africa Guinée*. Prime minister **Amadou Oury Bah** warns that electricity theft and failure to pay electricity bills constitute crimes against Guinea, pledging zero tolerance for illegal connections as part of efforts to reform the energy sector;

26 Jun 2026 **Conakry (Guinea)** *Africa Guinée*. The **Agence Nationale d'Aménagement des Infrastructures Minières (ANAIM)** (national agency for mining infrastructure development) reaffirms its commitment to supporting communities affected by mining through the donation of housing and sanitation materials, dialogue with local authorities and communities and measures to improve road safety and access to basic services in the **Boké Region**;

24 Jun 2026 **Conakry (Guinea)** *Vision Guinée*. Guinea's newly elected municipal councillors will convene on 2 July to elect mayors and deputy mayors by secret ballot, with candidates requiring an absolute majority in the first round or a simple majority in a second round if necessary;

22 Jun 2026 **Conakry (Guinea)** *BBC*. President **Mamady Doumbouya** confirms an immediate ban on the export of unrefined gold to promote domestic processing, boost the local economy and create jobs;

20 Jun 2026 **Conakry (Guinea)** *BBC*. **Cour Suprême de Guinée** (supreme court) confirms the final results of the 31 May legislative elections after rejecting appeals from several political parties, officially validating the distribution of all 147 parliamentary seats;

5 Jun 2026 **Conakry (Guinea)** *Reuters*. The political coalition backing President **Mamady Doumbouya**, the **Génération pour la modernité et le développement (GMD)**, secures a strong legislative majority by winning at least 100 of the 147 available seats in the 31 May election;

1 Jun 2026 **Conakry (Guinea)** *AFP*. Counting is underway in Guinea following legislative and municipal elections that drew low turnout due to voter confusion and an opposition boycott;

31 May 2026 **Conakry (Guinea)** *Vision Guinée*. Legislative and municipal elections take place;

26 May 2026 **Conakry (Guinea)** *Bloomberg News*. Guinea, the world's largest bauxite producer, is finalising plans to restrict exports of the ore in an effort to curb a global supply surplus and raise prices back to reasonable levels;

26 May 2026 **Conakry (Guinea)** *BBC*. **Aboubacar Sidiki Diakité**, a prominent military figure serving a 10-year sentence for crimes against humanity, dies in custody following a medical emergency, with his death evoking mixed reactions in a country with long-standing political sensitivities surrounding accountability and military influence;

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