

AFRICA RISK CONSULTING

Angola Monthly Briefing June 2026

Angola Summary 30 June 2026

The ruling Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) is experiencing a rise in internal tensions ahead of its December party congress. President João Lourenço (2017-present) is running for re-election as party leader but is facing at least three challenges, the most notable of which is retired general and former Luanda Province governor, Higinio Carneiro. Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE) (national institute of statistics) reveals that the country's economy grew by 5.32% of real GDP in the first quarter (Q1) as inflation steadies. In resource developments, the Italian gas and oil giant, Eni, announces that it has taken the final investment decision (FID) to develop the offshore Greater PAJ project - a 50/50 joint venture between Eni and Britain's BP. The government also rules out plans to legalise artisanal mining.

Ruling party marred by factional battles ahead of national conference

Internal tensions are rising within the ruling **Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA)** ahead of its upcoming **9th Ordinary Congress**, scheduled for 9 and 10 December 2026. Central to the emerging factional divides within the party is the fact that at least four candidates [are expected](#) to contest the party presidency at the congress. This includes President **João Lourenço** (2017-present), who confirmed his intent to run for re-election as party leader on 11 May (*see ARC Briefing Angola May 2026*). Lourenço is the clear frontrunner, given his current power within the MPLA and the fact that the **Political Bureau** of the MPLA's **Central Committee** has [expressed support](#) for his candidacy.

Angola's current constitution places a two-term limit on presidents; accordingly, Lourenço is barred from being re-elected as the state president in the 2027 general election. However, Lourenço claims that he can still be elected as MPLA leader as the party revised its statutes in 2024 so that the party leader was not automatically the presidential candidate, and instead the Central Committee will select the party's presidential candidate. Lourenço clearly intends to remain the true power in the MPLA and **Angola** and rule by proxy via whoever the Central Committee nominates. This is a potentially risky strategy as it will result in the creation of two centres of power, that of the party leader and the national leader, which could worsen divisions within the MPLA.

Lourenço's need to shift to govern by proxy is a function of the outcome of the 2017 and 2022 general elections, which saw the MPLA lose its two-thirds parliamentary majority. The party's share of the vote fell to 61.08% in 2017 and 51.17% in 2022. As such, the MPLA has lost the ability to force through a constitutional amendment to enable Lourenço to remain in power.

Lourenço's desire to remain at the helm of the MPLA has motivated his political rivals to challenge him. Among [those expected](#) to challenge him at the MPLA congress are party stalwart **Antonio Cenancio**, academic and jurist **Jose Carlos de Almeida**, and **Luanda Province's** former governor, **Higinio Carneiro**; the latter of whom poses the most significant challenge to Lourenço.

[Carneiro](#) is a former military general who has been a senior and influential figure in the MPLA for decades. In addition to his military service, Carneiro has served in several high-profile positions, including as the governor of **Cuanza Sul Province** (1999-2002), public works minister (2002-2012), the governor of the former **Cuando Cubango Province** (2012-2016), and the governor of Luanda (2016-2017). Carneiro quickly emerged as Lourenço's main rival; on 25 June, he [officially submitted](#) his candidate application form to the party after garnering over 19,000 signatures supporting his candidacy, well exceeding the party's minimum requirement of 5,000.

However, Carneiro's insurgent challenge to Lourenço could be derailed by an ongoing corruption investigation into his actions while governor of Cuando Cubango. [According to](#) the attorney general's office, Carneiro is being investigated for embezzlement and money laundering. Carneiro is [alleged](#) to have misappropriated funds intended for social and economic development for his own benefit and the development of tourist facilities. On 23 June, the attorney general's office [informed](#) Carneiro that it was intending to indict him on these charges.

Carneiro has denied these allegations and [claimed](#) that they are politically motivated and intended to hamper his campaign to challenge Lourenço for the MPLA leadership. According to Carneiro, his supporters have faced pressure and intimidation from Lourenço's supporters. It is possible that Lourenço's allies in the MPLA will seek to disqualify Carneiro, citing these charges.

It is increasingly evident that the build-up to the party conference will be marked by a fierce battle over the legitimacy of the various candidates and is expected to break down into two clear camps – that of Lourenço and Carneiro. Carneiro himself has indicated his intent to challenge Lourenço's validity as a candidate. According to Carneiro, Lourenço's intent to run for a third term as party leader and his alleged misuse of his power as MPLA president violate the party's internal electoral processes.

Nevertheless, at present, Lourenço is expected to emerge triumphant and retain his control over the MPLA. However, the possibility that this battle and Lourenço's victory will cause a split in the party cannot be discounted.

Economy records strong growth

In contrast to the growing tension in Angola's political realm, the country's economic developments have been generally positive. Indicative of this, **Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE)** (national institute of statistics) [revealed](#) on 29 May that the country's economy grew by 5.32% of real GDP in the first quarter (Q1) (January-March), measured year-on-year. Quarter-on-quarter economic growth was 1.37% compared with Q4 2025.

The strong GDP growth was driven by the non-oil sector, which grew by 6.22%. Notably, the oil sector actually weighed down on this strong performance, recording a contraction of 0.21%. The bulk of the non-oil sector activity was [generated](#) by the agriculture, trade, vehicle repair, public administration, defence, and social security sectors.

It should be noted that despite the INE's strong GDP growth figures, major international institutions still maintain more conservative projections for Angola's 2026 economic performance. The **International Monetary Fund (IMF)** currently [expects](#) the country's economy to grow by 2.3% of real GDP this year, while the **African Development Bank (AfDB)** [forecasts](#) growth of 2.9%. However, it is unclear whether the IMF and AfDB have fully accounted for the impact that the recent surge in oil prices has had on the Angolan economy. Oil and petroleum are Angola's leading exports; as such, the recent spike in fuel prices caused by the war in the **Middle East** should translate into a financial windfall for the country. It is anticipated that INE's Q2 report will reflect this strong oil-sector performance.

Angola is also enjoying a period of sustained falling inflation. [INE](#) reported on 8 June that annual consumer price inflation declined to 10.88% in May compared with 11.58% in April. This was the [22nd consecutive month](#) in which inflation declined since the inflation peaked in July 2024 at 31.09%. The continued fall in consumer price inflation is largely the result of successful monetary policy interventions. If inflation continues to fall, the **Banco Nacional de Angola (BNA)** (central bank) will likely implement another cut in interest rates. Lower inflation and interest rates will have a net positive economic impact as they should help incentivise increased investment and consumer spending.

Investment decision made on offshore oil project

Highlighting the positive activity in Angola's oil sector, the **Italian** gas and oil giant, **Eni**, [announced](#) on 22 June that it had taken the final investment decision (FID) to develop the offshore **Greater PAJ**

project. This project is a 50/50 joint venture between Eni and **United Kingdom (UK)**-headquartered **BP** and is located around 200km off Angola's coast in the country's Blocks 31 and 31/21. The project will be managed by **Azule Energy**, which is co-owned by Eni and BP.

As per Eni, the project will consist of 17 wells connected to a new Floating Production, Storage and Offloading vessel (FPSO) that will have a capacity of 95,000 barrels of oil per day and a gas capacity of 70 million standard cubic feet of gas per day. The project is currently [estimated](#) to be worth \$5.1 billion and is projected to begin production for export by 2030.

This Greater PAJ project underscores the extent to which Angola's oil and gas sector remains highly active and attractive to investors. Importantly, the country's advanced hydrocarbons sector and comparatively stable operating environment will bring increased investor interest as efforts to better diversify fuel supply lines increase in the wake of the Middle East conflict.

Government rules out legalising artisanal gold mining

Mineral resources, oil and gas minister **Diamantino de Azevedo** [explicitly stated](#) on 25 June during a visit to **Bengo Province** that the government would not legalise artisanal gold mining in the near future, asserting this amid pressure to legalise artisanal mining to help combat illegal gold mining and the negative effects associated with this illicit activity.

Illegal mining is a persistent criminal challenge in Angola; illegal mining operations deprive the country of substantial amounts of tax and export revenue every year and present serious environmental and health threats. The lack of regulatory oversight at these mines results in the pollution of rivers, lakes, and groundwater, which threatens the health and livelihoods of agricultural and pastoralist communities in rural Angola. In addition, the absence of safety protocols at these mines makes them highly dangerous places for the miners themselves, many of whom are economically vulnerable individuals. Illustrative of this, a [landslide](#) on 22 June at an illegal gold mining site in Bengo killed at least 28 people.

Historically, illicit mining has centred on illegal diamond mining, but illegal gold mining has rapidly expanded in recent years. This shift has been driven by several factors, notably the fall in global diamond prices. According to de Azevedo, the government is cautious about legalising artisanal and semi-industrial gold mining as [similar efforts](#) in the diamond sector have been largely unsuccessful at both combating illegal mining and boosting domestic and localised small-scale mining operations.

Planner

9 Apr - 27 Jul 2026 **Cabinda (Angola)** International public tender for the 20-year management and development plans for the **Caio** deepwater maritime terminal;

Jul 2026 **Lunda Norte (Angola)** The 42.2MW **Cafunfo** photovoltaic power plant to begin the supply of energy;

1-2 Aug 2026 **Luanda (Angola)** Luanda to host an extraordinary session of the **African Union's Conference of Heads of State and Government** to analyse threats to peace, security and development;

9-10 Dec 2026 **Luanda (Angola)** The ruling **MPLA** party to hold its 9th Ordinary Congress;

2026-27 **(Angola)** World Bank entities, the **International Finance Corporation (IFC)**, the **International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)** and the **Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)**, will promote investment in key sectors in Angola;

2026 **(Angola)** **Angolan Cargo and Logistics Certification Regulatory Agency** will open logistics platforms in **Luvo (Zaire)**, **Caála (Huambo)** and **Namibe** this year;

2026 **Luanda (Angola)** Privatisation of telecommunications company **UNITEL** and sale of government stakes in **Standard Bank Ltd** expected to take place;

2026 **(Angola)** Government to introduce **World Health Organisation** approved malaria vaccination and anti-malaria education programme;

Dec 2026 **Luanda (Angola)** The **World Bank**-funded \$230m **Bitá Water Treatment** plant in Luanda is expected to start up, according to **France**-headquartered **Suez International África**, who are carrying out the work;

2026 **Cabinda (Angola)** End of phase 1 of construction of **Porto do Caio** is expected in the first half of the year;

2023-2026 **(Angola) Programa de Privatizações (PROPRIV)** (privatisation programme) extended to manage government divestment of 138 companies;

2027 **Cabinda (Angola)** **United Kingdom**-based **Gemcorp's Cabinda Refinery** begins phase 2 of refinery in 2027 and phase 3 to upgrade the units immediately thereafter;

2027 **Cuanza-Norte (Angola)**. The first turbine of the **Caculo Cabaça** dam, is expected to begin operating in 2027, according to the energy and water ministry;

Aug-Sep 2027 **(Angola)** National elections will be held; **João Lourenço's** final term as president ends;

Dec 2027 **Quipungo (Angola)** Effective start-up of **Quipungo Photovoltaic Power Plant (Huila Province)** postponed to December 2027;

Chronology

26 Jun 2026 **Luanda (Angola)** *AfDB*. President **João Lourenço** inaugurates the new **African Development Bank (AfDB)**-backed **Luanda Science and Technology Park**;

25 Jun 2026 **Luanda (Angola)** *Channel Africa*. The **National Assembly** passes the **Personal Income Tax Code** aimed at modernising Angola's tax and fiscal framework;

25 Jun 2026 **Washington D.C (United States)** *Novo Jornal*. **Adalberto Costa Junior**, the leader of the opposition **Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA)** political party, conducts a visit to the **United States (US)** and calls on the US to dispatch election observers to monitor Angola's 2027 general election;

24 Jun 2026 **Luanda (Angola)** *Africa News*. The state-owned national airline **TAAG** relaunches its weekly flight from Luanda to **Guangzhou (China)**;

22 Jun 2026 **Perth (Australia)** *Engineering news*. Australian mining firm, **Minbos Resources**, announces that it has signed a \$13.8m construction contract for Phase 2 of its **Cabinda Phosphate Fertiliser Plant**;

22 Jun 2026 **Qinghai (China)** *Club of Mozambique*. Organisers of the **18th China and Portuguese-speaking Countries Cultural Week** in Qinghai confirm that the Angolan contingent has withdrawn due to concerns about the **Ebola** outbreak in neighbouring **Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)**;

22 Jun 2026 **Luanda (Angola)** *World Oil*. The **United States (US)**-headquartered technology firm **Baker Hughes** is awarded a contract to provide subsea production systems for the Greater PAJ development off Angola's coast;

17 Jun 2026 **Luanda (Angola)** *Club of Mozambique*. President **João Lourenço** meets with **Mozambique's** President **Daniel Chapo** on the sidelines of the **Angola Investment Summit**;

17 Jun 2026 **Luanda (Angola)** *Global Tourism Forum*. The three-day **2026 Angola Investment Summit** takes place in Luanda;

17 Jun 2026 **Hanoi (Vietnam)** *Verangola*. Agriculture minister **Isaac dos Anjos** conducts a working visit to Vietnam, where he meets with his Vietnamese counterpart **Trinh Viet Hung** to strengthen bilateral cooperation in the agriculture, livestock, and forestry sectors;

15 Jun 2026 **Luanda (Angola)** *Ver Angola*. Officials confirm that copper exports from the **Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)** resumed along the **Lobito Atlantic Railway** after the Lobito-Huambo section of the railway was disrupted by flooding earlier this year;

9 Jun 2026 **Luanda (Angola)** *APA*. President **João Lourenço** begins a three-day working visit to **Serbia**;

1 Jun 2026 **Luanda (Angola)** *Africa Business Communities*. The **United Kingdom (UK)**-headquartered oil and gas firm **Afentra** secures a 34% stake in the KON 4 block in Angola's **Kwanza Basin**.

About Africa Risk Consulting:

Africa Risk Consulting (ARC) is a pan-African consulting company that provides timely, relevant information and advice that enables its clients to take informed investment decisions and to safeguard their reputations.

ARC's core consulting services include integrity due diligence and corporate investigations, political advisory and country assessments, opportunity monitoring and reputation risk management. Most relevant to private equity firms is ARC's integrity due diligence and corporate investigations capability. Specifically, ARC offers pre-deal integrity checks to highlight red flags before negotiations start; full detailed multi-jurisdictional reputation due diligence; and supplier and senior hire vetting and repeat due diligence for compliance programmes. ARC is unique in that it offers a 10-day delivery for a routine integrity due diligence. ARC also offers a suite of corporate investigations services from immediate investigation, evidence gathering, e-discovery, forensic accounting and whistleblower support on one end to crisis media management and regular monitoring on the other.

www.africariskconsulting.com

About ARC Briefing:

ARC Briefing is ARC's essential business information service.

Companies at any stage in their Africa expansion, whether building or communicating an Africa strategy, investing directly, expanding current operations, financing other investors, doing the legal leg-work or researching the Africa growth trend, need ARC Briefing.

ARC Briefing is an information service keeping you:

- Up to date with Country Chronologies of business-critical events
- In the know via Country Briefings on political, economic, business and operating trends. Written in-country, ARC experts analyse and comment
- Ahead with Country Planner which details future elections, budgets, regulatory changes etc.

www.africariskconsulting.com

Getting in touch

Please contact us by email info@africariskconsulting.com

Africa Risk Consulting (ARC) Pty Ltd expressly forbids the collection of information and content from ARC Briefing as data to train generative artificial intelligence models.

© Africa Risk Consulting (ARC)