

AFRICA RISK CONSULTING

Kenya Monthly Briefing August 2026

Kenya Summary 17 August 2026

President William Ruto (2022-present) launches Vision 2060, setting out an ambitious long-term economic transformation agenda for Kenya. However, its credibility depends on whether the consultation process can overcome feasibility and political ownership concerns ahead of the 2027 general election. Persistent power disruptions expose the gap between Kenya's renewable-energy ambitions and the national grid infrastructure needed to deliver reliable electricity and support energy-intensive investment. This increases pressure for investment in battery storage and backup capacity and raises questions over the grid's ability to accommodate new renewable projects. An increase in targeted al-Shabaab attacks along Kenya's north-eastern border demonstrate the Somalia-based militant group's continued ability to infiltrate and disrupt security patrols, transport routes, and critical infrastructure.

Ruto launches Kenya's post-2030 development blueprint

President **William Ruto** (2022–present) [launched](#) nationwide consultations on a successor to **Kenya's Vision 2030** on 12 August, bringing together over 5,000 delegates from all 47 counties. The launch followed a 30 July [national address](#) in which Ruto called for a nationwide citizen-led conversation to develop a successor to Vision 2030, arguing that the new framework should be anchored in the 2010 Constitution and designed to transcend electoral cycles. The proposed 2030–2060 framework is commonly referred to as **Vision 2060** but [officially](#) framed as the 'National Conversation on Kenya's Future Beyond Vision 2030'.

On 21 July Ruto [received](#) a document titled 'Reflections and Proposals on Strategic Guidelines for Kenya's Long-Term National Transformation Beyond Vision 2030', prepared by an expert group comprising of **Kisumu** governor **Peter Anyang' Nyong'o**, **Japanese** economist **Hiroyuki Hino**, and academics **Michael Chege**, **Karuti Kanyinga**, and **Peter Wanyande**. Hino previously [advised](#) former prime minister **Raila Odinga** on economic affairs and later served as senior adviser for strategic initiatives and the economy to then-deputy president Ruto; his [career](#) also includes senior **International Monetary Fund (IMF)** roles and research on inequality, employment, and social cohesion.

The initial economic ambition is substantially more demanding than Vision 2030 and [proposes](#) lifting annual gross national income per capita from about KSh 258,500 (\$2,000) to KSh 10.3m (\$80,000), broadly matching present-day **Singapore**. Hino [said](#) this would require 10% annual per-capita income growth, sustained every year for the next 35 years. The proposals also target universal access to basic services such as water and healthcare, elimination of child malnutrition, and a 27% improvement in learning quality. The proposals identify agriculture productivity, export-oriented manufacturing, technology and innovation as principal growth engines alongside fiscal discipline, lower public debt, stronger infrastructure, and a more business-friendly regulatory environment. Hino [identified](#) corruption, human-capital weaknesses, debt management and insufficient growth as central constraints, noting:

"Corruption damages the economy and weakens the social fabric. Curbing corruption would be truly transformative for Kenya."

The proposal has received mixed feedback across the political stage. **Orange Democratic Movement (ODM)** party leader **Oburu Odinga** [hailed](#) Vision 2060 as "an idea of our late Raila Amolo Odinga" and that Raila had formed the team which developed it, adding that ODM was "100% supporting it". **Homa**

Bay senator **Moses Kajwang'** and ODM chairperson **Gladys Wanga** also used the same meeting to [defend](#) closer ODM cooperation with Ruto's **United Democratic Alliance (UDA)**, giving the initiative political relevance to ongoing negotiations over the parties' alliance ahead of 2027.

However, **Nairobi** senator and former ODM secretary general **Edwin Sifuna**, who opposes the party leadership's closer alignment with Ruto, [argued](#) that a younger generation should be given greater responsibility for shaping Kenya's future, linking Kenya's existing economic difficulties as stemming from corruption and mismanagement under experienced political elites. Opposition figures including **Kalonzo Musyoka**, former deputy president **Rigathi Gachagua**, and **Martha Karua** [portrayed](#) the initiative as a distraction from immediate concerns including living costs, unemployment, healthcare and taxation.

Kenyan economist **Odhiambo Ramogi** argued that consultations should be [delayed](#) until after the August 2027 general election, warning that proximity to the polls risks turning the consultation process into a contest over political advantage. Ramogi instead advocated preparatory work by the **Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA)**, **Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS)** and universities to establish economic models and evidence against which the proposals could be assessed before wider political negotiations begin.

Launching consultations barely a year before the 2027 general election, while Ruto seeks a second term, increases the risk that electoral polarisation will prevent Vision 2060 from acquiring the broad institutional ownership needed to survive beyond his presidency.

Persistent outages expose Kenya's renewable power constraints

A widespread electricity [outage](#) disrupted Nairobi, the **Coast**, **Mount Kenya**, and the **Central Rift** regions between 29 and 30 July, adding to persistent power disruptions that increasingly contrast with Kenya's international image as a renewable-energy leader. The disruption was followed on 7 August by a [fire](#) at the **Musaga** substation in **Kakamega County** which cut power across Kakamega, **Bungoma**, **Busia**, **Siaya**, and **Vihiga** counties. These incidents followed major nationwide blackouts in 2023 and 2024 and [recurring](#) periods of scheduled power cuts as rising demand has reduced the spare capacity available to the grid.

The reliability problems complicate Ruto's efforts to [market](#) Kenya internationally as a clean-energy investment destination. Renewable sources [account](#) for roughly 79% of electricity generation, including 40.1% from geothermal, 22.4% from hydropower and 13% from wind. However, high renewable generation has not automatically translated into reliable electricity for households and businesses. **Kenya Power** CEO **Joseph Siror** [said](#) on 11 August that variable renewable energy, mainly wind and solar, now exceeds 20% of the grid's dependable capacity, compared with a 15% benchmark cited by the utility.

The complication with renewable energy is that wind and solar generation can fluctuate quickly depending on weather conditions, requiring the national grid to have sufficient storage, backup generation and transmission capacity to keep supply stable. Kenya Power [said](#) sudden increases or falls leave the grid vulnerable and require other generators to be brought online at additional cost. Under existing 'take or pay' contracts, the utility may still have to pay renewable producers while also paying other generators to stabilise the system which can increase the overall cost of power. Despite the environmental and economic potential in developing Kenya's abundance of renewable energy, the problem facing the government is that transmission, storage, and dependable backup generation have not expanded at the same rate.

Battery storage is likely to become increasingly important for new renewable projects. Energy principal secretary (PS) **Alex Wachira** [said](#) on 11 August that Kenya could require around 1,000MW of battery storage, allowing excess electricity to be stored when demand is lower and released during peak periods. He said Kenya's energy transition is not just about adding more renewables, but also requires "*modernising the electricity grid and transforming the way we plan, operate and manage the power system*".

Kenya Power has [indicated](#) that new wind and solar projects should be paired with battery storage. Although building storage into new developments would make variable renewable output easier to manage and improve grid stability, the added cost could affect project economics and become a point of negotiation over tariffs and power-purchase terms.

Technology companies are already positioning themselves around this need. During the **Kenya Energy Transition Forum** on 11 August, **Huawei Kenya's** deputy CEO for public affairs **James Sun Quan** [said](#) that Huawei is prepared to support the energy transition through grid-management and storage technology, highlighting a growing investment opportunity.

The government is also seeking additional dependable supply. Kenya [expects](#) a further 200MW of imports from **Ethiopia**, adding to growing reliance on the Ethiopia-Kenya electricity interconnector; imports [accounted](#) for around 11% of national electricity consumption in 2025. Kenya is also [reportedly](#) in talks with **Turkey-based Karpowership** over a floating power plant that could be anchored off the Kenyan coast and connected to the grid as a relatively rapid source of additional generation.

Kenya's unreliable power constraints has significant implications for investment in artificial intelligence (AI) and data-centre investment. In May 2024, **United States (US)** tech-giant **Microsoft** and **United Arab Emirates (UAE)**-based **G42** [proposed](#) a roughly KSh 130 billion (\$1 billion) geothermal-powered facility capable of eventually requiring 1 gigawatt (GW) of electricity. In May 2026, Ruto subsequently [acknowledged](#) the scale of the problem, saying:

"To switch on that one data centre, we would need to shut off power for half the country."

Although commercial negotiations also [contributed](#) to the delays, the project illustrates the infrastructure constraints facing large, energy-intensive investments. The constraints also have implications for **Konza Technopolis**, the government's flagship Vision 2030 smart-city and technology project. Konza is [intended](#) to attract technology companies and support cloud computing, AI, and other digital services through infrastructure including the **Konza National Data Centre**. Although persistent national grid constraints would not necessarily prevent Konza from operating, they stand to increase the cost of guaranteeing uninterrupted power and complicate accommodating large, energy-intensive tenants.

Kenya's renewable resources are significant investment advantages, but the more critical opportunity is increasingly in the renewable energy, but rather whether electricity becomes more reliable and affordable. Recurring outages are likely to remain a constraint on both public confidence and Kenya's ambitions to attract power-intensive AI, manufacturing and digital infrastructure investment until grid investment catches up.

Increased al-Shabaab attacks prompt government to reassess border security

Al-Qaeda-linked al-Shabaab ambushed Kenyan security personnel near **Wantey Dam (Mandera County)**, near the **Somalia** border, on 28 July, [killing](#) five personnel before an improvised explosive device (IED) [hit](#) a reinforcement team dispatched to the scene, destroying an armoured vehicle but causing no further casualties. This ambush was among the most serious in a surge of cross-border attacks along Kenya's north-eastern border in recent months.

Kenyan forces reportedly [killed](#) 11 suspected militants at a border camp on 13 July while disrupting an alleged plan by around 30 fighters to attack a village; on 24 July, gunmen [attacked](#) **Fino** and **Arabia** in Mandera within an hour of each other, and two days later, suspected militants [attacked](#) a **Safaricom** telecommunications mast at **Abakaile (Garissa County)**.

By 7 August, security data [cited](#) counted nine incidents in Mandera, four in Garissa and two in **Wajir County**; that reporting followed a 6 August roadside explosion near **El Wak** (Mandera) that injured six people and has added urgency to Kenyan security officials' reported reassessment of how to contain persistent small-scale, cross-border attacks.

Al-Shabaab controls large areas of south-central Somalia and has been fighting the Somali central government for close to two decades. While al-Shabaab is not making large attempts to hold territory in Kenya, the pattern indicates the group's continued ability to infiltrate, attack road movements and infrastructure, and withdraw. Kenyan security reporting indicates that recruitment remains an additional concern as al-Shabaab continues to target [vulnerable](#) young people through local [networks](#) and online platforms, including social media and encrypted messaging. This pattern is consistent with a 10 August **United Nations (UN)** [assessment](#) that al-Shabaab has shifted from broadly elevated attack levels towards "*more targeted and strategic operations*." Despite tactical losses in Somalia, the UN assesses that al-Shabaab retains resilient finances and sufficient capacity for dispersed attacks against patrols, roads and infrastructure.

Despite Ruto's February [announcement](#) that border crossings between Kenya and Somalia would reopen after almost 15 years of restrictions, the border has remained closed. In May, Ruto [said](#) renewed fighting between Somalia's federal forces and **Jubaland** forces, alongside political uncertainty in Somalia, had made the frontier more difficult to manage, necessitating the ongoing closure. Although the closure restricts formal movement, limited exemptions continue and informal cross-border activity has not disappeared completely. The challenge is to restore regulated trade without increasing infiltration risks.

The Kenyan government has responded by strengthening specialist capabilities; 122 **Special Operations Group** officers [graduated](#) on 6 August after six-and-a-half months of training. A month earlier, the **Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI)** and US government [began](#) a seven-week bomb-technician programme focused on detecting and neutralising explosive threats. Ruto separately [reaffirmed](#) Kenya's strategic security partnership and counter-terrorism cooperation with **United States Africa Command Commander (AFRICOM)** General **Dagvin Anderson** on 29 July. The partnership also has growing maritime importance as US-Kenyan cooperation is expanding to surveillance and coastal-security capabilities amidst growing instability around the **Red Sea** and **Gulf of Aden**, including **Houthi** attacks on commercial shipping. Kenya has [raised](#) concern about Houthi threats to shipping through the **Bab el-Mandeb Strait**, warning that attacks on commercial vessels and threats to blockade the strait created wider risks for Western **Indian Ocean** trade and Kenya's maritime economy.

Although incidents have increased, the threat is likely to remain concentrated on security forces, transport routes, telecommunications and field operations in Mandera, Garissa and Wajir. While greater specialist capacity can improve responses, intelligence, route protection, and increased cooperation with border communities remain central challenges for the Kenyan government.

Planner

9-10 Sep 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** AmCham Business Summit 2026;
 17-18 Sep 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** East Africa CEO & Investment Forum;
 14-16 Oct 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** Fintech Festival Kenya;
 20 Oct 2026 **(Kenya)** Mashujaa Day (national holiday)
 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission to Nairobi;
 19 Jun – 17 Jul 2027 **(Kenya)** Kenya to co-host Africa Cup of Nations (AFCON) alongside Tanzania and Uganda;
 10 Aug 2027 **(Kenya)** General election;

Chronology

16 Aug 2026 **Homa Bay (Kenya)** Amnesty International. Amnesty International Kenya condemns the reported attacks on journalists, disruption of media broadcasts, destruction of property, unlawful road blockades, and acts of violence and intimidation by hired mobs

against planned political activities in Homa Bay by **Nairobi** senator **Edwin Sifuna** and **Linda Mwananchi** leaders;

16 Aug 2026 **Homa Bay (Kenya)** *The Standard*. Police arrest 14 people following clashes at **Linda Mwananchi** political rallies in **Nyandiwa**, **Magunga** and **Oyugis** in **Homa Bay** county. Police fired tear gas to disperse demonstrators during another rally in Homa Bay Town that left at least two people injured;

16 Aug 2026 **Kakamega (Kenya)** *Kenyans*. Prime cabinet secretary (CS) **Musalia Mudavadi** launches the **Magharibi Movement**, a new movement to mobilise **Western Kenya** voters from **Kakamega**, **Bungoma**, **Busia**, **Vihiga**, and **Trans Nzoia** counties to support President **William Ruto**'s re-election in 2027.

16 Aug 2026 **Homa Bay (Kenya)** *Kenyans*. Roads in parts of Homa Bay are blocked ahead of a planned **Linda Mwananchi** rally involving **Nairobi** senator **Edwin Sifuna**, **Siaya** governor **James Orendo** and **Trans Nzoia** governor **George Nitembeya**.

16 Aug 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *Capital FM*. **Chinese** global consumer technology company **Anker Innovations** enters the Kenyan market, targeting growing demand for chargers, power banks and audio devices as smartphone ownership and mobile data use increase;

15 Aug 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *Business Daily*. **National Assembly** speaker **Moses Wetang'ula** directs the **Finance and National Planning Committee** to investigate **United States**-headquartered **QVSE**, an online platform that reportedly allows Kenyans to use cryptocurrency to invest in US equities;

14 Aug 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *The Star*. The **Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority (EPRA)** reduces the maximum retail price of diesel by KSh 5 (\$0.038) per litre to KSh 217.86 (\$1.66) while leaving the prices of super petrol and kerosene unchanged at KSh 214.03 (\$1.63) and KSh 191.38 (\$1.46) for the period between 15 August and 14 September;

14 Aug 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *Reuters*. **Treasury**'s 2026/2027 borrowing strategy shows Kenya is considering its first panda bond, targeting about \$300m from **China**'s domestic bond market, alongside an \$815m **Eurobond**, over \$500m of **Japanese**-market borrowing and a planned \$1 billion debt-for-food-security swap backed by the **United States (US)** **International Development Finance Corporation**;

14 Aug 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *Business Daily*. **South Africa**'s **Vodacom** appoints two additional executives – **Mariam Cassim** and **Matimba Mbungela** – to **Safaricom**'s board following Vodacom's acquisition of 15% of the Kenyan government's stake and **Vodafone**'s 4.9% holding for KSh204 billion (\$1.56 billion), lifting Vodacom's total holding to 55% and increasing influence over key appointments;

14 Aug 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *Reuters*. Government welcomes the **United States (US)** **Senate**'s approval of legislation extending the **African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)** through December 2028, reducing near-term uncertainty for Export Processing Zone (EPZ) manufacturers and agricultural exporters dependent on preferential access to the US market;

13 Aug 2026 **Mombasa (Kenya)** *The Star*. The **United Kingdom (UK)** and Kenya deepen maritime-security cooperation including training and capability cooperation during a visit by **HMS Dragon** and **RFA Lyme Bay** to Mombasa, highlighting Kenya's **Indian Ocean** coast as a support point for Western naval operations linked to wider **Middle East** instability around the **Strait of Hormuz**;

13 Aug 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *ITWeb*. **DataReportal**'s **Mid-Year Global Update Report**, lists Kenya as the world's most active nation for artificial intelligence (AI) adoption recorded among the 54 countries tracked, with 97.5% of online adults using the technology monthly, ranking Kenya ahead of the **United Arab Emirates (UAE)**, **Indonesia**, the **United States (US)** and the **United Kingdom (UK)**;

12 Aug 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *Reuters*. **Central Bank of Kenya** governor **Kamau Thugge** states an **International Monetary Fund (IMF)** team is expected in Nairobi shortly for regular consultations that will also cover Kenya's request for a new **fund**-supported programme with a lending component;

12 Aug 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *Business Daily*. Local cryptocurrency firms warn that newly finalised **Virtual Asset Service Provider** regulations could push startups to relocate to **Mauritius** or **South Africa** as the framework requires minimum paid-up capital of KSh100m (\$767,465) for virtual-asset exchanges, KSh300m (\$2.3m) for stablecoin issuers and KSh150m (\$1.15m) for wallet providers;

11 Aug 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *Reuters*. **Central Bank of Kenya's Monetary Policy Committee** maintains the **Central Bank Rate** at 8.75% for a third consecutive meeting;

11 Aug 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *The National Treasury*. Kenya's **National Treasury** publish the **Draft 2026 Budget Review and Outlook Paper (BRDP)** for public comment, advancing preparations for the FY2027/28 budget ahead of the August 2027 general election;

11 Aug 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *People Daily*. A nationwide strike by the **Kenya National Union of Nurses and Midwives (KNUNM)**, which began on 29 July and expanded to **Nairobi's Kenyatta National Hospital (KNH)** on 4 August, continues into its third week as KNUNM presses for conclusion of the 2025–2029 collective bargaining agreement, permanent terms for universal health coverage (UHC) nurses, and implementation of career progression agreements;

10 Aug 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *Bloomberg*. Kenya announces plans to import one million 90kg bags of maize (about 90,000 tonnes) as part of "*urgent policy actions*" to replenish strategic reserves after drought and disrupted rains damage the 2026 crop, with a wider shortfall of 5.4 million bags projected by end-September and further contingency imports potentially required;

10 Aug 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *BBC*. Kenya vies to become the first African country to host the **2029 World Athletics Championships**, facing rival bids from **United Kingdom, Italy, and Germany**, with a decision by **World Athletics** expected next month;

9 Aug 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *Business Daily*. A new **Afrobarometer** survey shows that Kenyans view **China's** economic and political influence more favourably than that of the **European Union (EU)**, with 64% rating China's influence positively, compared with 60% for the **United States (US)** and 47% for the EU;

7 Aug 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *Business Daily*. The **Kenya Sugar Board** begins an audit of informal cross-border sugar trade, citing illegal inflows, weak traceability, and substantial revenue leakage;

6 Aug 2026 **Naivasha (Kenya)** *Daily Nation*. During a three-day Naivasha retreat President **William Ruto** and **Orange Democratic Movement (ODM)** leader **Oburu Oginga** agree that **Kenya Kwanza** and ODM will form a formal coalition for the 2027 election, develop a joint manifesto, and establish negotiating teams to determine the coalition's structure and power-sharing arrangements, with ODM pushing for 50-50 sharing of senior government positions and the 2027 deputy-presidential/running-mate slot, a position currently held by **Kithure Kindiki**;

6 Aug 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *KBC*. Prime cabinet secretary (CS) **Musalia Mudavadi** hosts **Chinese** ambassador **Zhou Pingjian** and representatives of the Chinese business community in Kenya in Nairobi, with Pingjian stating that Chinese overseas organisations have been a major pillar to the friendly relations between China and Kenya and welcoming Mudavadi's commitment to improve conditions for local investments;

5 Aug 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *Bloomberg*. Kenya is finalising details on \$450m in emergency financing from the **World Bank** through a **Contingent Emergency Response Project** to cushion the economy against the **Iran** conflict and forecast weather shocks;

5 Aug 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *Reuters*. **Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE)** CEO **Frank Mwiti** says that the exchange plans to launch **East Africa's** first AI stocks-focused exchange-traded fund (ETF) denominated in the Kenyan shilling before the end of 2026;

4 Aug 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *The Standard*. President **William Ruto** announces that village elders will receive a KSh3,000 (\$23) monthly stipend and instructs the interior ministry to formally institutionalise the elders' role in grassroots administration;

4 Aug 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *Daily Nation*. The **International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL)** **African Cyberthreat Assessment Report 2026** ranks Kenya as the second-most vulnerable country in Africa to cyberattacks, highlighting the country's growing cybersecurity risks;

3 Aug 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *Daily Nation*. Opposition party **Orange Democratic Movement (ODM)** coalesces around cooperatives cabinet secretary **Wycliffe Oparanya** as its preferred candidate for deputy president alongside President **William Ruto** in the 2027 general elections;

3 Aug 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *Business Daily*. **National Treasury** data shows that Kenya borrowed KSh 416.2 billion (\$31.9m) between 1 January and 30 April 2026, including seven new foreign loans;

3 Aug 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *Daily Nation*. The opposition **Azimio la Umoja One Kenya** coalition, chaired by former president **Uhuru Kenyatta**, approves a restructuring and rebranding ahead of 2027, admitting **Fred Matiang'i**, **Peter Munya** and **Lenny Kivuti** to its **National Council**, and committing engagement with several parties to build a broader opposition coalition;

2 Aug 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *The Star*. During his exit interview, outgoing **Belgian** ambassador **Peter Maddens** calls on Kenya's political leaders, institutions and citizens to ensure that the 2027 general election is peaceful, credible and inclusive;

2 Aug 2026 **Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)** *The East African*. During the **African Union (AU)** 49th ordinary session, **African Union Executive Council** elevates Kenya from **tier two to tier one** under the bloc's 2027–2029 financing framework, joining Ethiopia, **Algeria**, **Angola**, **Egypt**, **Morocco**, **Nigeria**, and **South Africa** as the member states responsible for the largest share of AU assessed contributions;

31 Jul 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *The Standard*. Former interior cabinet secretary (CS) **Fred Matiang'i** holds talks with outgoing **French** ambassador **Arnaud Suquet** to discuss Kenya's economic outlook and opportunities to strengthen bilateral trade and investment;

31 Jul 2026 **Lamu (Kenya)** *Semafor*. **Greenpeace Africa** considers legal action to block approvals for **Nigeria**-headquartered **Dangote's** proposed \$17 billion, 700,000-barrel-per-day refinery in Lamu, arguing the government made political and financial commitments before completing adequate environmental assessment and public consultation;

29 Jul 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *The Star*. President **William Ruto** hosts a farewell meeting with **Cyprus'** outgoing high commissioner to Kenya, **Savvas Vladimirov**, following discussions between prime cabinet secretary (CS) **Musalia Mudavadi** and Vladimirov on expanding areas of cooperation, including to the blue economy, pharmaceuticals and trade, and emphasised promoting investment and economic opportunities;

28 Jul 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *The Standard*. **Uganda's** permanent secretaries for finance and energy join the **Kenya Pipeline Company (KPC)** board, securing Uganda with veto power

over the hiring and firing of the KPC's CEO, tariff changes, dividend policy, and share capital decisions, following Uganda's purchase of a 20.15% stake in KPC through the **Uganda National Oil Company (UNOC)** in February 2026;

28 Jul 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *The Standard*. President **William Ruto** reassigns implementation of the **Intergovernmental Relations Act** from deputy president **Kithure Kindiki** to prime cabinet secretary (CS) **Musalia Mudavadi**, shifting a key national-county coordination role away from Kindiki and fuelling speculation over Kindiki's standing within the **Kenya Kwanza** coalition ahead of the 2027 general election;

28 Jul 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *NTV*. Outgoing **European Union (EU)** ambassador to Kenya **Henriette Geiger** uses a farewell interview on **NTV Kenya** to reflect on the transformation of EU-Kenya relations as she concludes her five-year mandate, describing the relationship between Kenya and the EU as “*a comprehensive political and economic partnership*” and highlighting Kenya's growing importance as a partner for the EU on the international stage on shared global challenges;

28 Jul 2026 **Nairobi (Kenya)** *Citizen Digital*. The **National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC)** launches an independent investigation into ten prominent Kenyans including former deputy president **Rigathi Gachagua** and cabinet secretaries **Aden Duale** and **Geoffrey Ruku**, over remarks the commission says could amount to hate speech or ethnic incitement ahead of the 2027 general election.

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