

AFRICA RISK CONSULTING

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Mozambique Summary 18 August 2026

Gaza Province governor Margarida Mapanzene Chongo resigns following reported pressure from the ruling party, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo). President Daniel Chapo (2025-present) conducts an official visit to Portugal during which he meets with his Portuguese counterpart, Antonio Seguro (2026-present), prime minister Luis Montenegro, and attends an Africa-focused event the Portuguese diaspora organised. Portugal's Galp Energia files for arbitration with the World Bank's International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) over its tax dispute with the Mozambican government. Alhu Sunnah wa Jama'ah (ASWJ) carries out a number of kidnappings in Cabo Delgado Province as the group increasingly uses the tactic as a lucrative revenue source and even a potential point of leverage over the government.

Gaza Province governor resigns

Gaza Province governor **Margarida Mapanzene Chongo** (Mapanzene) announced her [resignation](#) from office on 24 July, making her the first provincial governor to resign from office after the central government stopped appointing governors and provincial assemblies began to elect them in 2019. Mapanzene, who had held the position since January 2020, did not provide reasons for her resignation. However, it appears that the ruling **Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo)** party pushed her to resign amid an ongoing scandal in the province related to the alleged diversion of humanitarian aid intended for victims of the severe flooding that impacted southern Mozambique (including Gaza) earlier this year.

The perception that a senior political figure such as a provincial governor would be forced out of office due to an ongoing corruption scandal, especially one in which they have not been directly implicated yet, is a highly unusual development in Mozambique politics. It suggests that President **Daniel Chapo** (2025-present) may be serious in his stated intent to tackle corruption in the country. It also indicates that Frelimo remains shaken by the nationwide unrest that followed the country's disputed October 2024 general election. Public anger over corruption was a major driver in those protests and the subsequent demonstrations in the first half of 2025 that centred on the cost of living and anger over poor governance.

The alleged embezzlement of humanitarian aid from flood victims could easily be a trigger to instigate renewed anti-government protests, especially given that the opposition **Aliança Nacional para um Moçambique Livre e Autónomo (Anamola)** is looking for opportunities to amplify anti-government sentiment.

Chapo and Frelimo secretary general **Chakil Aboobacar** also likely took advantage of the corruption scandal as an opportunity to replace Mapanzene with their preferred candidate. Mapanzene was elected governor in 2020 when Frelimo was still firmly under the control of former president **Filipe Nyusi** (2014-2024). At that time, Chapo was not even a national political figure. Chapo and Aboobacar are actively trying to cement their control over the ruling party and marginalise Nyusi's influence. Central to achieving this will be to sideline and replace politicians who rose to prominence under Nyusi and who are not in Chapo and Aboobacar's faction within Frelimo. As such, Mapanzene's ousting will be a warning to other senior Frelimo figures, especially those who are not in Chapo's inner circle, to eschew corrupt practices and improve their governing performance in order to not provide an opening for Chapo and Aboobacar to remove them from office.

On 7 August, **Alfeu Constantino Cuna** was [inaugurated](#) as Gaza's new governor. Cuna is an established Frelimo loyalist but has not previously served in a major political office. Prior to his elevation as governor, he was a [legal advisor](#) in Gaza's provincial secretary of state's office. His career has largely been in the civil service. Interestingly, his career trajectory somewhat mirrors Chapo's, who also spent most of his professional life outside of formal politics prior to his appointment as **Inhambane Province** governor in 2016. Chapo has tasked Cuna with improving governance in the province, with a particular focus on ensuring that the province's ongoing reconstruction and recovery operations succeed.

President conducts official visit to Portugal amid arbitration with Galp Energia

Chapo [conducted](#) an official visit to **Portugal** from 14 to 17 July, accompanied by foreign minister **Maria Manuela dos Santos Lucas** and transport minister **Joao Jorge Matlombe**, as Chapo seeks to further strengthen Mozambique's bilateral ties with Portugal. During this visit, Chapo met with his Portuguese counterpart, President **Antonio Seguro** (2026-present), prime minister **Luis Montenegro**, and the head of the Portuguese **Assembleia da República** (assembly of the republic), **José Pedro Aguiar-Branco**. Chapo also participated in the ninth **EurAfrican Forum**, an event the **Portuguese Diaspora Council** organised.

Deepening the relationship with Portugal is one of Chapo's foreign policy priorities. Notably, this visit follows similar official visits in December last year, when he attended the **Sixth Portugal-Mozambique Bilateral Summit** in **Porto** and in July 2025, when he met with Montenegro and then-president **Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa** (2016-2026).

Chapo used this visit to petition Portugal for its support to convince the **European Union (EU)** to renew the **EU Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM)** Mozambique for another two years when the current mandate expires in September. The EUMAM provides advice and training to Mozambique's security forces, which are combating insurgents in Cabo Delgado province.

Although it was not expressly stated, among the secondary goals for Chapo's visit was to ensure that the countries' diplomatic and trade relationship was not impacted by Mozambique's ongoing [tax dispute](#) with the major Portuguese energy firm **Galp Energia**, in which the Portuguese government has a minority stake. This dispute is centred on Mozambique's claim that Galp has failed to pay the full tax owed from the March 2025 [sale](#) of its stakes in LNG projects located in **Area 4** of the **Rovuma Basin** off the coast of **Cabo Delgado Province** to **XRG**, a subsidiary of **Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC)**. Mozambique's revenue service, the **Autoridade Tributária de Moçambique (AT)**, claims that it is owed EUR 162m (\$188m) from this sale, while Galp argues its tax liability is only EUR 26m (\$30m).

This dispute escalated on 10 July when Galp confirmed that it had [filed](#) an arbitration case against the Mozambican government with the **World Bank's International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)**.

International arbitration proceedings often take years to resolve, and Galp's decision to approach the ICSID indicates that the company does not believe that there is any hope of a negotiated resolution with the Mozambican state. The arbitration itself will likely be decided based on the technical specifics of the initial agreement that underpinned Galp's investment in the Mozambican LNG sector, and the legitimacy of how the company calculated the expenses of this investment, which it offset against the proceeds of the sale to reach the lower tax calculation.

Galp's decision to file for international arbitration has placed pressure on the government, as the matter will now draw increased international scrutiny as a test of Mozambique's investment environment and the government's willingness to settle disputes with investors. As such, if the ICSID eventually finds evidence against the state, Mozambique will need to adhere to the body's decision or risk severely damaging its standing as an investment destination, especially for energy and mining projects. These projects require substantial commitment and, as such, investors are particularly sensitive to potential difficulties in settling disputes with local governments and regulators.

Insurgents carry out kidnappings in Cabo Delgado

Mozambique can ill-afford to undermine investment appetite in the mining and energy sectors, especially given the operational challenges in the resource-rich Cabo Delgado. Most of these difficulties are related to the ongoing **Alhu Sunnah wa Jama'ah (ASWJ)** Islamist insurgency that is centred in that province. Indicative of the threat posed by ASWJ to economic operators in Cabo Delgado, in the first week of August, a group of insurgents [attacked](#) a logging project in **Quissanga** district and abducted several workers. Officials or local reports have not confirmed the exact date of the incident. The militants demanded a ransom for the release of the workers and destroyed equipment at the site when the operator refused to pay. Ultimately, the workers were freed but only after the insurgents destroyed property at the site, forcing the project to cease operations.

A week earlier, on 26 July, ASWJ militants [abducted](#) local teachers travelling to attend a training session between the **Mueda** and **Montepuez** districts. According to officials, the hostages were released after a ransom of around \$2,800 was paid to the militant group.

However, the most significant incident occurred on 6 August when ASWJ fighters [abducted](#) as many as 150 fishermen from the villages of **Pequeue** and **Milamba** in **Macomia** district. This mass kidnapping indicates an increase in the group's resources and capacity to hold a large number of hostages but the incident is also significant in that ASWJ reportedly wants to exchange these hostages for its imprisoned members rather than a cash ransom. This suggests an evolution in the group's approach to kidnapping incidents, which could lead to more valuable targets being abducted to pressure the government to accede to such an exchange. The need for more politically valuable hostages does increase the threat to foreign nationals, as such victims are more likely to bring increased international scrutiny and pressure.

ASWJ has completed its shift away from using kidnapping primarily to secure new forced recruits, slaves, and to compel local communities to cooperate with the group and now considers kidnapping to be a lucrative revenue source and even a potential point of leverage over the government. As such, ASWJ is expected to continue to orchestrate kidnappings in the province, particularly along roadways, including the main **EN-380** highway.

Planner

31 Aug 2026 – 6 Sep 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique). Feira Internacional de Maputo (FACIM) 2026** (Maputo International Fair)
 30 Sep 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique) Banco de Moçambique** (central bank) **Monetary Policy Committee (MPC)** meeting
 2028 **(Mozambique)** Municipal elections
 2029 **(Mozambique)** Presidential elections

Chronology

12 Aug 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique) Club of Mozambique. United States (US)** energy giant **ExxonMobil** indicates that it expects to make the final investment decision on its liquefied natural gas (LNG) project in **Cabo Delgado Provinces** before the end of the year;
 11 Aug 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique) AIM.** Government spokesperson and state administration minister, **Inocêncio Impissa**, reveals that the state collected over MZN 183 billion (\$2.86 billion) in revenue during the first half of 2026, meeting 45% of the government's tax collection target for the year;
 11 Aug 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique) AIM.** The **Council of Ministers** announces that it is considering selling a portion of the government's majority stake in the **Tmcel** telecommunications firm;

11 Aug 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique)** *Club of Mozambique*. Authorities reveal that the **Fundo Soberano de Moçambique (FSM)** (sovereign wealth fund) master investment plan mandates for the FSM to manage 70% of its investment based on **United States (US)** indices and 30% on **European** indices;

11 Aug 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique)** *Club of Mozambique*. The **Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE)** (national statistics institute) reveals that Mozambique's annual inflation rate slowed slightly to 7.48% in July from 7.51% in June;

11 Aug 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique)** *Club of Mozambique*. The **Council of Ministers** approve the creation of the **Agência de Desenvolvimento Integrado do Sul (ADISUL)** (southern integrated development agency), which will be headquartered in **Xai-Xai (Gaza Province)** and oversee the coordination of development and territorial planning in the southern provinces;

6 Aug 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique)** *AIM*. The **Serviço Nacional de Migração (SENAMI)** (national migration service) reveals that nearly 47,000 Malawian nationals travelled through Mozambique in recent months while returning home from **South Africa**, fleeing the threat of xenophobic violence in that country;

3 Aug 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique)** *Club of Mozambique*. The **Council of Ministers** approve the creation of a new emergency mechanism to mobilise up to \$50m through the state-owned oil company, **PETROMAC**, to ensure stable fuel imports;

30 Jul 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique)** *AIM*. The government awards a 25-year concession to two **Chinese** companies - **Union Portlink Capital** and **Zhongmei Engineering Group** - to build and operate a one-stop border post at the **Machipanda** border crossing with **Zimbabwe**;

29 Jul 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique)** *AIM*. The central bank, **Banco de Moçambique (BdM)**, maintains its main monetary policy rate at 9.25%;

29 Jul 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique)** *AIM*. Illegal miners seize control of a gold mine in **Cabo Delgado Province's Montepuez** district;

20 Jul 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique)** *AIM*. Suspected Islamist insurgent attacked the village of **Intutupue** in **Cabo Delgado Province's Ancuabe** district, razing four houses;

20 Jul 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique)** *AIM*. President **Daniel Chapo** meets with former **British** prime minister **Tony Blair** in Maputo to discuss the **Tony Blair Institute for Global Change's** work in Mozambique;

20 Jul 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique)** *AIM*. Opposition party **Aliança Nacional para um Moçambique Livre e Autónomo's (Anamola)** leader **Venâncio Mondlane** swears 35 new party officials into office amid the party's continued efforts to build internal structures;

18 Jul 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique)** *AIM*. President **Daniel Chapo** meets with **Belarusian** foreign minister **Maxim Ryzhenkov** at his office in Maputo, during which the two men pledge to strengthen Belarus-Mozambican relations;

18 Jul 2026 **London (United Kingdom)** *AIM*. A **United Kingdom (UK)** government document reveals that planned development assistance to Mozambique will fall by 90% by 2029;

17 Jul 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique)** *AIM*. Prime minister **Benvinda Levi** swears in new leaders of state agencies including the **Instituto Nacional de Segurança Social (INSS)** (national social security institute), the **Comissão Consultiva do Trabalho (CCT)** (labour advisory commission), and the **Gabinete de Informação de Moçambique (GABINFO)** (Mozambique information office);

16 Jul 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique) AIM.** Officials announce the creation of a new commission to help combat illegal mining in the country;

14 Jul 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique) AIM.** The Council of Ministers approves the creation of **Companhia Nacional de Aquisição de Produtos Petrolíferos (ENAPP)**, which will be tasked with procuring and managing the country's fuel supplies;

13 Jul 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique) AIM. United Nations (UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)** reports that insurgents killed at least ten people and displaced over 12,000 people in **Cabo Delgado Province** in June.

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