

AFRICA RISK CONSULTING

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Venâncio Mondlane, the leader of the opposition Aliança Nacional para um Moçambique Livre e Autónimo (Anamola), reveals that he will be tried for allegedly inciting violence and terrorism in the 2024/25 post-election unrest. President Daniel Chapo (2025-present) appoints Felisberto Dinis Navalha as Banco de Moçambique (BdM) governor, a move that is not expected to result in a change in monetary policy strategy. Alhu Sunnah wa Jama'ah (ASWJ) attacks a hunting camp in the Niassa Special Reserve (Niassa Province), taking at least one foreign national hostage.

Opposition leader to face criminal trial

Venâncio Mondlane, the leader of the opposition **Aliança Nacional para um Moçambique Livre e Autónimo (Anamola)**, [revealed](#) on 25 August that he had received a supreme court summons to face criminal trial. The court is charging Mondlane with several serious crimes, including incitement to collective disobedience, public instigation to commit a criminal act, and incitement to commit terrorism. All these charges relate to his actions during the unrest that followed the October 2024 general election (*see ARC Briefing Mozambique Nov 2024*). The **Conselho de Estado** (council of state) June [decision](#) to suspend Mondlane's immunity from prosecution as a member of the council enabled this summons. The court has not announced a date for the start of the trial, but it is expected to begin before the end of the year.

Mondlane was a presidential candidate in the October 2024 general election; he ran as an independent and placed second behind President **Daniel Chapo** (2025-present), officially receiving 24.19% of the votes cast. Mondlane disputed these results, accusing the **Comissão Nacional de Eleições (CNE)** (national electoral commission) and the ruling party, the **Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo)**, of rigging the election. Mondlane called on his supporters to refuse to accept the result and stage protests to denounce the alleged electoral fraud. These protests built on the existing demonstrations that had been called on 21 October following the murder of Mondlane's close ally and personal lawyer **Elvino Dias** in a suspected assassination (*see ARC Post-Election Brief Mozambique Oct 2024*).

The subsequent post-election unrest lasted well into 2025, during which as many as 400 people were [killed](#), hundreds more were injured, thousands were arrested, and at least \$500m in economic and structural damage was incurred. Civil society and international humanitarian organisations largely [blamed](#) security forces' heavy-handed response for the large number of casualties incurred during the protests. Yet, despite this, little action has been taken against security forces who used live ammunition against protesters or the senior officials who gave this order. Instead, Mozambique's attorney-general, the **Procuradoria-Geral da República (PGR)**, has focused on prosecuting senior opposition leaders who helped drive the unrest, particularly Mondlane.

Mondlane's role in driving the post-election protests is indisputable. The former presidential candidate made numerous public and online statements calling on Mozambicans to refuse to accept the election results and to stage public demonstrations. However, the PGR's real challenge will be to prove that Mondlane's calls for demonstrations equated to incitement to criminal action and that he intended his supporters to damage property. It will be particularly difficult for the PGR to legitimately equate these actions to terrorism.

The upcoming trial presents an opportunity and risk for Mondlane. The charismatic opposition leader will use his trial as a platform from which to boost his standing as the country's leading opposition

figure. Mondlane's desire to use the trial as a stage was confirmed by his legal team's [request](#) that the proceedings be televised live. He will also use his prosecution as evidence that he is being targeted by the government because he presents a real political threat to Frelimo, especially ahead of the October 2028 municipal elections. Such a platform will effectively turn Mondlane into a martyr in the eyes of his supporters and potentially mobilise other opposition voters to rally around him. As such, Mondlane could emerge from this process as more politically powerful, positioning him for a stronger campaign to be **Maputo** mayor in 2028 (he is widely expected to contest this election).

However, this trial does also present a serious threat to Mondlane's political career and personal freedom. Although it is unlikely that the PGR can put together a clear case that Mondlane actively incited his supporters to commit crimes and acts of terrorism, the possibility that he will be convicted and sentenced cannot be discounted. This is especially the case given that Frelimo and the government exert influence over the courts, despite the judiciary's ostensible independence. Furthermore, if Mondlane is found guilty on even some of the more minor charges he faces, this could be sufficient to bar him from contesting future elections on the grounds that he will not be a candidate in good standing.

There will also be an increased threat of unrest during the impending trial. Mondlane will use his court appearances as default rally events, and Anamola members are expected to stage frequent demonstrations to support their party leader. If Mondlane is found guilty, there is a high chance of protests, especially in Maputo, that could rapidly devolve into violent unrest.

President appoints new central bank governor

Chapo announced on 1 September that he had [appointed](#) the economist **Felisberto Dinis Navalha** as **Banco de Moçambique (BdM)** governor and **Benedita Maria Guimino** as his deputy. Navalha replaced the outgoing governor, **Rogério Zandamela**, whose second and final term concluded on 31 August. Zandamela oversaw a largely successful tenure as BdM governor that was defined by his aggressive monetary policy approach. Under Zandamela's leadership, Mozambique's [inflation rate](#) fell from 25.91% in September 2016 to a low of 2.01% in September 2019. Inflation is currently 6.45% (August 2026). During his second term, Zandamela oversaw the stabilisation of Mozambique's monetary policy, managed to bring inflation rates under control and successfully weathered the shock of the **Covid-19** pandemic.

Navalha is an experienced central banker, having [worked](#) at the BdM for 26 years between 1996 and 2022, holding various technical and managerial positions. These included a stint as the director of economic studies (2011-2017) and a five-year stint as an administrator and member of the BdM board of directors. Since 2022, he has worked as an academic, teaching economics at **Universidade Eduardo Mondlane (UEM)**. Guimino is a similarly experienced central banker who has worked at the BdM since 1999. She is a member of the board of directors and is considered an expert in several areas, including currency issuance, circulation, and payment systems. Given that both Navalha and Guimino both worked closely with Rogerio over the past ten years, their appointment is not expected to lead to a meaningful change in the bank's approach to monetary policy. As such, the BdM is expected to maintain a hawkish position to combat inflation.

The announcement of the new central bank governor was not without controversy. Navalha was not Chapo's first choice; the president initially [appointed](#) former BdM administrator **Waldemar Fernando de Sousa** as governor, with Navalha as his deputy on 31 August. However, Chapo was forced to reverse this appointment within 24 hours following backlash to de Sousa's appointment. Specifically, de Sousa is [alleged](#) to have helped facilitate and contract the illegal debt that was at the centre of Mozambique's 2016 debt scandal while he was a BdM administrator. This scandal was among the largest political controversies in Mozambican history and even resulted in the conviction of former finance minister **Manuel Chang** in the **United States (US)** (see *ARC Briefing Mozambique Sep 2024*). In fact, among the reasons Frelimo selected Chapo as its presidential candidate in 2024 was that he was a relative political outsider and was thus untainted by the debt scandal. As such, the

initial appointment of de Sousa was a serious political faux pas by Chapo, leading to the embarrassing public reversal of the announcement within 24 hours.

Regardless of Chapo's initial blunder, Navalha and Guimino face serious difficulties at the helm of the BdM. Mozambique's economy faces several monetary policy challenges, including sustained inflationary pressure, in large part caused by the ongoing conflict in the **Middle East** and the country's persistent foreign exchange (forex) shortages. Navalha has [indicated](#) that he considers the forex shortages a priority issue that he will engage with the private sector on formulating solutions. Mozambique's persistent forex shortages undermine the country's ability to fund its imports, leading to trade disruptions, rising costs of imported goods, and sustained downward pressure on the local currency, the Metical, which in turn aggravates inflation further. If inflation rises any further, the BdM is expected to increase interest rates further; however, this will have limited impact given that inflation is largely being driven by external forces.

Islamist insurgents attack hunting camp in Niassa Province

In an alarming development for Mozambican security officials, the **Alhu Sunnah wa Jama'ah (ASWJ)** (also known as **Islamic State -Mozambique**) [attacked](#) a hunting camp in the **Niassa Special Reserve, Niassa Province**, on 3 September.

The incident occurred in the reserve's **Marangira** hunting concession area; an unconfirmed number of militants stormed the camp, looting supplies and setting fire to accommodation facilities. The insurgents killed one person and [captured](#) 11 hostages, one of whom is believed to be a **South African** national employed at the site. Notably, the three **United States (US)** tourists at the camp were unharmed and have since been evacuated out of Niassa.

ASWJ's primary operating area is in **Cabo Delgado Province** but the group is known to carry out attacks in northern **Nampula Province** and eastern Niassa province. Notably, this is not the group's first attack in the Niassa Special Reserve, which borders Cabo Delgado's **Mueda** and **Montepuez** districts. In April 2025, ASWJ militants attacked a luxury camp in the reserve, killing two people (*see ARC Briefing Mozambique May 2025*). As a consequence of such past attacks, several governments already recommended against travel to the reserve; this latest incident will lead to an [affirmation](#) of these recommendations.

The taking of the South African hostage is a particularly concerning development as this could mark an escalation in the group's kidnapping activities to target foreign nationals. If so, this would increase the operating threat to foreign nationals throughout northern Mozambique. Finally, ASWJ's ability to attack tourist facilities in Niassa underscores the failure of Mozambican and allied counterinsurgency forces to contain the group to its strongholds in north and eastern Cabo Delgado.

Planner

21 – 22 October **(Mozambique)** Opposition **Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Renamo)** national council meeting;

2026 **Maputo (Mozambique)** The start of opposition leader **Venâncio Mondlane's** criminal trial;

October 2028 **(Mozambique)** Municipal elections;

20-25 Jul 2027 **(Mozambique)** Ruling **Frente de Libertação de Moçambique's (Frelimo)** 13th congress;

October 2029 **(Mozambique)** National general election;

Chronology

10 Sep 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique)** 360Mozambique. The **Agenzia Italiana per la Cooperazione Allo Sviluppo (AICS)** (Italian agency for development cooperation) reveals

plans to commit EUR 2m (\$1.16 million) in climate resilience projects in **Pemba, Beira, and Ibo Island**;

10 Sep 2026 **Paris (France)** *Club of Mozambique*. National defence minister **Cristóvão Artur Chume** meets with his French counterpart, **Catherine Vautrin**, to discuss potential defence and counter terrorism cooperation;

10 Sep 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique)** *AIM*. Officials reveal that the required reinforcing of the **Moamba Major** and **Mapai** dams against extreme weather events will cost around \$1.5 billion;

9 Sep 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique)** *Club of Mozambique*. **The Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE)** (national statistics institute) reveals that the number of registered companies, organisations and other entities increased by 8.5% to 114,524 in 2025;

9 Sep 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique)** *Club of Mozambique*. An **International Monetary Fund (IMF)** delegation arrives to hold technical discussions as part of the wider negotiations over a possible new **Extended Credit Facility (ECF)** arrangement;

8 Sep 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique)** *AIM*. The central bank, **Banco de Moçambique (BdM)**, reveals that the volume of **Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)** fell by 21% year-on-year in the first quarter of 2026;

7 Sep 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique)** *Channel Africa*. Mozambique observes its annual **Victory Day** commemorating the signing of the **1974 Lusaka Accord** that ended the country's **War of Independence**;

4 Sep 2026 **Kigali (Rwanda)** *Club of Mozambique*. Justice minister **Mateus Saize** attends the **Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG)** Council of Ministers meeting in Kigali and affirms Mozambique's commitment to combatting money laundering and terrorist financing;

3 Sep 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique)** *ICLG*. Irish mining company **Kenmare Resources** indicates that it may file for international arbitration over a dispute with Mozambican tax authorities regarding its titanium mine in **Nampula Province**;

3 Sep 2026 **São Tomé (São Tomé and Príncipe)** *Club of Mozambique*. Prime minister **Benvinda Levi** attends the inauguration of the recently re-elected São Tomé and Príncipe President **Carlos Vila Nova**;

1 Sep 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique)** *Club of Mozambique*. Officials reveal plans to increase cotton production from 20,000 tonnes to 60,000 tonnes a year;

1 Sep 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique)** *Defence Web*. The **European Union (EU) Military Assistance Mission in Mozambique (EUMAM Moz)** marks the second anniversary of its current incarnation, providing training to Mozambican security forces;

31 Aug 2026 **Belgrade (Serbia)** *Club of Mozambique*. Prime minister **Benvinda Levi** meets Serbian President **Aleksandar Vučić** in Belgrade to discuss the potential for increased bilateral cooperation;

31 Aug 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique)** *Club of Mozambique*. The annual **Feira Internacional de Maputo (FACIM)** (Maputo international fair) begins with over 3,000 exhibitors;

28 Aug 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique)** *Club of Mozambique*. The opposition **Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Renamo)** announces that it will hold a national council meeting on 21 and 22 October to discuss Mozambique's geopolitical issues and Renamo's own internal difficulties;

26 Aug 2026 **Chimoio (Mozambique)** *Club of Mozambique*. Ruling **Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo)** central committee meets in Chimoio (**Manica Province**);

24 Aug 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique)** *WHO*. The **World Health Organisation (WHO)** awards Mozambique's pharmaceutical regulator, the **Autoridade Nacional Reguladora de Medicamentos de Moçambique (ANARME)**, a Maturity Level 3 classification indicating an improved regulatory environment in the country;

21 Aug 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique)** *Carta de Moçambique*. The **United States (US) State Department** reiterates its recommendation against all travel to northern Mozambique due to the threat of terrorism, specifically, **Cabo Delgado Province**; the **Niassa Special Reserve (Niassa Province)**, and the northern districts of **Nampula Province**;

20 Aug 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique)** *AIM*. The **United Nations (UN) Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team on the Islamic State (IS)** releases a report indicating that **Ahlu Sunnah wa Jama'ah (ASWJ)** (also known as the **IS-Mozambique**) has increased its recruitment efforts, growing to between 400 and 500 fighters;

19 Aug 2026 **Maputo (Mozambique)** *Club of Mozambique*. **Venâncio Mondlane**, the leader of the **Aliança Nacional para um Moçambique Livre e Autónimo (Anamola)**, accuses the ruling party, **Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo)**, of misusing the country's security forces to intimidate opposition parties.

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