

Blowout Risk Assessment Services

Sensitivity analysis of a Blowout Spill with K-BOS

13/08/2024



Introduction

Objective and Methodology of the sensitivity analysis

The Objective of the presentation is to quantify the ALARP effect of the K-BOS
 on the risk of a spill in the case of a well blowout and the impact on the
 probability of the event to pass from a minor spill to a major spill event

(duration more than 1 day = estimated maximum time to activate K-BOS through ROV in the case where it was not activated by the crew or in case of a rig loss/explosion)

• The used methodology is to calculate **the probability of a well blowout** and combine it with **the probability of failure of the K-BOS** in E-SID configuration solely used as an emergency source control device

 Principle applied on a selected well to calculate the reduced risk of a major blowout spill.

Probability of a well blowout

Ways of determining the probability of a well blowout

• IOGP Risk Assessment Data Directory 2019 (Appendix 1):

Depending on the type of well and the standards applied, one can determine the probability of a blowout based on historical frequencies of similar wells; or

Fault Tree Analysis approach (Appendix 2)

For the estimation of the Blowout probability of the well, a Fault Tree Analysis approach considering the different barriers in the well and their individual failure probability.

The singular probabilities are grouped into Intermediate events using AND/OR logic and subsequently added up to calculate the blowout probability of the entire well.

Probability of failure of K-BOS

In an E-SID mode (Emergency Shut-in Device), with independent controls and used as a source control device.

Fault Tree Analysis approach (Appendix 3)

A thorough analysis of K-BOS equipment has been carried out to identify all the components involved in the closure of the ram during a blowout emergency event and to quantify the reliability of the overall K-BOS system regarding its activation function and its capability to cut the tubular elements inside the wellbore and to seal the well from potential uncontrolled flows.

K-BOS Probability of Failure on Demand = 1.2×10^{-4}

Calculation of the probability of a major blowout spill

Selected well: Exploration well in the Otway basin in Australia

Likelihood of occurrence


LOC MDO: Highly Unlikely (2) based upon AMSA Annual Report 2017-18 (serious incident reports)

LOWC condensate: Remote (1) (1.6 x 10⁻⁴ for drilling of a normal deep exploration wells and a probability of 1.5 x 10⁻⁴ for drilling of appraisal wells based upon gas wells operated to North Sea Standard) ref IOGP Risk Assessment Data Directory Blowout Frequencies September 2019: https://www.iogp.org/bookstore/product/risk-assessment-data-directory-blowout-frequencies/

Average spill duration

Base Case = Per Environmental Plan

K-BOS E-SID Case = K-BOS installed on top of wellhead as a pre-positioned capping stack / Emergency Shut-in Device




^{*} A capping stack cannot prevent a major spill (major spill = spill that lasts more than one day)

Calculation of the probability of a major blowout spill

Base Case = Per Environmental Plan

K-BOS E-SID Case = K-BOS installed on top of wellhead as a pre-positioned capping stack / Emergency Shut-in Device





Appendices



Appendix 1 - IOGP Risk Assessment Data Directory 2019



REPORT SEPTEMBER 2019

RISK ASSESSMENT DATA DIRECTORY

Blowout Frequencies

Appendix 1 - IOGP Risk Assessment Data Directory 2019


Table 2-1: Blowout and Well Release Frequencies for Offshore Operations of North Sea Standard

| Operation | Category | Frequency, Average Well | Frequency, Gas Well | Frequency, Oil Well | Unit | Fraction Subsea ¹ |
|---|------------------|----------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------|---------------------------------|
| Exploration Drilling, Shallow Gas ² | Appraisal Well | | | | | |
| | Topside Blowout | 2.1 × 10 ⁻³ | - | - | per drilled well | 0 |
| | Blowout (Subsea) | 1.3 × 10 ⁻³ | - | - | per drilled well | 1 |
| | Wildcat Well | | | | | |
| | Topside Blowout | 2.1 × 10 ⁻³ | - | - | per drilled well | 0 |
| | Blowout (Subsea) | 1.2 × 10 ⁻³ | - | - | per drilled well | 1 |
| Development Drilling, Shallow Gas ² | Topside Blowout | 1.7 × 10 ⁻³ | - | - | per drilled well | 0 |
| | Blowout (Subsea) | 1.0 × 10 ⁻³ | - | - | per drilled well | 1 |
| Exploration Drilling, Deep, Normal Wells ³ | Appraisal Well | | | | | |
| | Blowout | 1.4 × 10 ⁻⁴ | 1.5 × 10 ⁻⁴ | 1.2 × 10 ⁻⁴ | per drilled well | 0.47 |
| | Well Release | 1.3 × 10 ⁻³ | 1.4 × 10 ⁻³ | 1.2 × 10 ⁻³ | per drilled well | 0 |
| | Wildcat Well | | | | | |
| | Blowout | 1.5× 10 ⁻⁴ | 1.6× 10 ⁻⁴ | 1.3 × 10 ⁻⁴ | per drilled well | 0.47 |
| | Well Release | 1.4 × 10 ⁻³ | 1.5 × 10 ⁻³ | 1.2 × 10 ⁻³ | per drilled well | 0 |
| | Blowout | | | | · | |

Appendix 2 – Fault Tree Analysis of a well blowout


• For the estimation of the Blowout probability of the well, a Fault Tree Analysis approach considering the different barriers in the well and their individual failure probability.

• The singular probabilities are grouped into Intermediate events using AND/OR logic as illustrated below




Appendix 2 – Example well blowout probability calculations

 Based on example well below, total probability for that well is calculated for each flowpath and operation and presented as below



Appendix 3 – K-BOS Fault Tree Analysis

Calculation of Probability of Failure on Demand



Thank you

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