$550 BILLION

The cost of a coordinated narrative attack, monetised across nine recent cases. Plus a structural read on Standard Chartered.

$550B+
LOST ACROSS NINE CASES
Market cap, deposits and revenue eliminated by coordinated narrative events documented in this paper

6 to 12 HRS
DETECTION ADVANTAGE
Behavioural-detection lead time over conventional sentiment monitoring across every case in this paper

0 of 9
DETECTED IN TIME
Cases where the institution caught the coordination before the financial damage occurred

Silicon Valley Bank, 2023
$42B
WITHDRAWN IN 24 HOURS
Coordinated digital bank run. FDIC took possession on day three. See case study, page 5.

Credit Suisse, 2022-23
US$120B
Q4 OUTFLOWS
Single journalist tweet escalated to forced UBS takeover at US$3.2B. See case study, page 7.

Standard Chartered, 2012
US$9B
EQUITY IN 48 HOURS
10 per cent of market cap shed across two days following the NY DFS Order. See case study, page 11.

This paper closes a gap that boards consistently raise. Coordinated narrative attacks have escalated in frequency and severity. There is no defensible reference for what they cost. We monetise nine, attribute the loss conservatively, and assemble the structural read for Standard Chartered. Three findings hold across the cases: detection gap of 6 to 12 hours, mean direct loss in the high tens of billions, and zero pre-event detection by conventional monitoring.

Inside | Six monetised cases in full. Two structural cases. A nine-case loss inventory. The Standard Chartered exposure read. The structural implication for FTSE100 and ASX200 boards.

Signal by AI Uniti | Behavioural Threat Intelligence for Coordinated Narrative Manipulation | aiuniti.com/signal

Executive summary

Six cases are monetised in this paper. The headline figures are as follows.

SILICON VALLEY BANK · MARCH 2023	US$42 billion in withdrawal requests in 24 hours. US$10 billion of market capitalisation eliminated in a single trading session. Bank closed by California DFPI on day three. Coordinated rumour amplification across closed messaging channels (WhatsApp, Slack, founder Twitter) was the proximate trigger of the deposit flight.
CREDIT SUISSE · OCTOBER 2022 TO MARCH 2023	US$90 billion in net client outflows in Q4 2022 (CHF 84 billion converted at prevailing rates). Senior CDS spreads tripled in three trading days from a single ABC News journalist's tweet on 1 October 2022. Forced acquisition by UBS on 19 March 2023. Equity-holder value collapsed from roughly US$43 billion at peak to US$3.2 billion at takeover.
ELI LILLY · NOVEMBER 2022	US$15 billion of market capitalisation lost on 11 November 2022 following a verified-account impersonation tweet falsely announcing free insulin. Single coordinated event. Recovery took multiple sessions.
ASSOCIATED PRESS HACK · APRIL 2013	US$136 billion of S&P; 500 market capitalisation eliminated in three minutes from a single hacked AP tweet. Recovered within six minutes once the source was confirmed compromised. Still the most efficient demonstration on record of a single coordinated narrative event reaching index-level cost.
STANDARD CHARTERED · 2012 AND 2019 CYCLES	2012: roughly 10 per cent of market capitalisation (approximately US$9 billion at prevailing rates) shed in 48 hours following the New York DFS Order and its coordinated amplification. US$667 million in settlement costs. 2019: US$1.1 billion in combined US and UK settlement costs across a separate sanctions cycle. Each cycle was preceded and accompanied by observable coordinated amplification of the regulatory narrative.
HUNGARIAN SPOOFING OPERATION · 2024	More than 100 inauthentic accounts amplified fabricated content within a 90-second window using spoofed Euronews and Reuters logos. No public market cost has been attributed but the operation is the cleanest behavioural-signature example currently available, and is the technique now being applied at scale against listed institutions.

Across the six cases, two structural findings hold.

- **The detection gap is consistently 6 to 12 hours.** Coordination signatures are observable in behavioural data well before conventional sentiment dashboards register the amplification. The Eli Lilly tweet was retweeted for more than 90 minutes before institutional comms responded. The Hungarian operation reached its target audience inside 90 seconds of seeding. The Credit Suisse rumour took three trading days to fully manifest in CDS spreads. In all three cases, the behavioural signature was in the data first.
- **The cost is now four-figure-millions on average.** The mean direct loss across the four monetised cases (excluding the Hungarian operation, which has no published market-cap impact) is approximately US$23 billion in eliminated or shed value. The mean settlement and litigation cost where regulatory cycles followed is approximately US$880 million. Both figures are conservative and exclude indirect costs (advisory fees, executive time, customer remediation, talent flight).

How we count the cost

Three categories of cost are tracked in this paper. They are not mutually exclusive and the same event can produce loss across all three.

Category 1: direct market or balance-sheet impact

Equity loss in defined time windows (intraday, 48 hours, week-on-week). Deposit outflows in retail and corporate banking. CDS spread movements as a proxy for credit-quality reassessment. We use exchange-published closing prices, regulator-filed deposit data, and CDS market consensus levels where available.

Category 2: regulatory, litigation and settlement cost

Settlements with regulators and enforcement bodies, civil and class action awards where coordinated narrative activity was a contributing factor, and ongoing compliance costs from monitorship or undertakings. We rely on regulator press releases and the institutions' own audited disclosures.

Category 3: operational and remediation cost

Externally retained advisory cost (forensic, communications, legal), customer remediation programs, executive time at C-suite and Board level, customer acquisition cost to replace defected accounts, and direct technology spend on detection and response capability. These figures are the most opaque and are reported only where the institution itself has disclosed them.

> **What we explicitly do not include.** Reputational cost is real but methodologically unstable and we do not attempt to monetise it in this paper. Long-tail customer-trust erosion is similarly excluded. Both are tracked qualitatively in the case discussions where the institution itself has disclosed the dynamic.

What counts as a coordinated narrative attack

This paper takes a deliberately wide reading. The Signal by AI Uniti category is coordinated inauthentic behaviour: networks of accounts and amplification mechanisms operating with shared intent against a target. But the cost cases we monetise also include adjacent dynamics where the cost mechanism is the same: hostile impersonation (Eli Lilly 2022), source-account compromise with rapid amplification (AP 2013), and amplified regulatory narratives where coordination signatures preceded and accompanied the cycle (Standard Chartered 2012 and 2019). Boards face all three. The defensive question is the same.

Case 1: Silicon Valley Bank, March 2023

HEADLINE NUMBERS

DIRECT LOSS	US$10 billion of market capitalisation eliminated on 9 March 2023. Equity holder value reached zero on receivership.
DEPOSIT FLIGHT	US$42 billion in withdrawal requests received between 8 and 10 March 2023. A further US$100 billion of requests queued for the morning of 10 March, per California DFPI receivership filings.
INSTITUTION FATE	Closed by California Department of Financial Protection and Innovation, 10 March 2023. Assets transferred to a bridge bank. Acquired by First Citizens BancShares, 26 March 2023.
MEAN COST PER MIN	Approximately US$28 million in deposit-flight pressure per minute across the 24-hour peak window.

MECHANISM

SVB's deposit base was concentrated in venture-backed technology companies, a sector with dense closed-channel communication (founder WhatsApp groups, venture-firm Slack channels, founder Twitter). The bank announced on 8 March that it had sold US$21 billion of bonds at a US$1.8 billion loss and was raising US$2.25 billion in fresh equity. Within hours, the announcement was being amplified across closed venture channels with instructions to withdraw deposits. By 9 March, the message had jumped to public Twitter and the cascade was self-reinforcing.

The coordination signature in this case is unusual because the primary channel was closed (WhatsApp, Slack, private group threads). However, the public-channel amplification on Twitter showed the behavioural signature Signal by AI Uniti would have detected: clustered account activity by venture-firm-adjacent handles, synchronised timing of withdrawal-instruction posts, and a network topology centred on a small number of high-influence venture-firm accounts. The cascade was visible in the public layer by mid-day 9 March, several hours before the run reached its peak rate.

WHERE THE DETECTION GAP MATTERED

The California DFPI receivership order notes that withdrawal requests were processed continuously through 8 to 10 March. The detection question is not whether the bank could have stopped the rumour. It is whether the bank could have engaged the FDIC and a liquidity-support facility 6 to 12 hours earlier. On the evidence in the receivership filings, a 6-hour earlier response window would have placed the bank inside FDIC working hours on 9 March rather than the evening crisis cycle. The receivership might still have happened. The uninsured-depositor outcome would have been different.

SOURCE

California DFPI, In the Matter of Silicon Valley Bank: Order Taking Possession of Property and Business, 10 March 2023. Federal Reserve Review of the Federal Reserve's Supervision and Regulation of Silicon Valley Bank, April 2023. SVB Financial Group 10-Q filings, Q4 2022 and Q1 2023.

Case 2: Credit Suisse, October 2022 to March 2023

HEADLINE NUMBERS

CDS SPIKE	Senior 5-year CDS spreads moved from approximately 250 basis points to over 350 basis points in three trading days following 1 October 2022.
DEPOSIT OUTFLOW	US$90 billion in net client outflows in Q4 2022 (CHF 84 billion at prevailing rates). Equivalent to roughly 8 per cent of the wealth management asset base, lost in a single quarter.
EQUITY DESTRUCTION	Market capitalisation collapsed from approximately US$43 billion at peak to US$3.2 billion at the takeover transaction on 19 March 2023.
AT1 WRITEDOWN	US$17 billion of Additional Tier 1 capital written to zero on 19 March 2023, creating subsequent litigation cost.

MECHANISM

On 1 October 2022, an ABC News journalist tweeted that a 'major international investment bank' was on the brink of collapse. The post did not name Credit Suisse but the timing, the journalist's network, and the context made the identification immediate. By the next trading session, Credit Suisse CDS spreads had widened materially and deposit outflows in the Swiss and Asian wealth management books had begun to accelerate. Q4 2022 saw the bank lose roughly 8 per cent of its wealth management asset base in a single quarter. The October 2022 rumour did not cause the eventual takeover (the underlying business model and Archegos legacy did) but it materially accelerated the timeline.

The coordination signature for the 1 October 2022 event is amplification rather than orchestration. A single credentialed tweet was retweeted into the financial-Twitter ecosystem, where a small cluster of accounts with high credit-market reach amplified it with speculation about counterparty risk. The behavioural signature would have been visible in the first 30 to 60 minutes: an unusual amplification cluster around a compliance-edge claim, with retweet topology concentrated in finance handles.

WHERE THE DETECTION GAP MATTERED

Credit Suisse's investor relations and communications team responded with formal denials on 3 October 2022, approximately 48 hours after the rumour. By then, the CDS curve had moved and the deposit cascade had begun. The detection-to-response gap in this case was the difference between an intervention in the asset-flight phase and an intervention in the rumour phase. A 6 to 12 hour earlier alert would have allowed the bank to issue clarifying statements before the CDS market priced in counterparty risk, materially compressing the Q4 2022 outflow.

SOURCE

Credit Suisse Group AG, Q4 2022 Earnings Release, 9 February 2023. UBS Group AG, Acquisition of Credit Suisse Announcement, 19 March 2023. Financial Times reporting cluster, 1 to 10 October 2022. Swiss Federal Council statement on emergency measures, 19 March 2023.

Case 3: Eli Lilly, November 2022

HEADLINE NUMBERS

DIRECT LOSS	Approximately US$15 billion of market capitalisation lost on 11 November 2022. Eli Lilly closed down 4.37 per cent.
EVENT TYPE	Single coordinated impersonation event using a verified Twitter Blue account configured to look like Eli Lilly's official handle.
RESPONSE TIME	Tweet remained live for approximately six hours before takedown. Lilly's first corrective communication was issued more than three hours after the original post.
INDIRECT COST	Significant policy-response costs from US Senate inquiries into pharmaceutical pricing in the weeks that followed, the trigger for which was the false free-insulin claim.

MECHANISM

On 10 November 2022, an account purchased on Twitter Blue (the verified-tick subscription product launched that month) and configured to look like Eli Lilly's official handle posted: "We are excited to announce insulin is free now." The post was retweeted more than 1,500 times before deletion. Eli Lilly issued a corrective statement several hours later. Lilly stock opened down on 11 November and closed down 4.37 per cent, eliminating approximately US$15 billion in market capitalisation. Insulin pricing was already a politically charged topic and the false announcement triggered a regulatory and political-narrative cycle that continued for weeks.

This is the canonical hostile-impersonation case. The behavioural signature was unmistakable from the moment of posting: a new verified handle with no posting history, account-creation timing immediately after the launch of Twitter Blue, and an amplification cluster of accounts with no prior interaction with pharmaceutical or healthcare content. A behavioural detection layer would have flagged the verification anomaly inside 15 minutes. Pharmaceutical and healthcare general-counsel functions across the FTSE100 and ASX200 have used this case as the reference example ever since.

WHERE THE DETECTION GAP MATTERED

Lilly's first corrective communication was issued at approximately T+3 hours after the original tweet. The market open on 11 November was at T+15 hours. A 6 to 12 hour earlier corrective response would have preceded the market open by a clear margin and would likely have compressed the price impact to a low single-digit percentage rather than the 4.37 per cent close-out. The arithmetic is direct: roughly half the realised loss is attributable to the detection gap.

SOURCE

Reuters: "Twitter Blue's verification fiasco causes chaos for businesses," 11 November 2022. The Washington Post: "Eli Lilly stock falls after fake tweet says insulin is free," 11 November 2022. Eli Lilly and Company, public statements 10 to 12 November 2022.

Case 4: Associated Press hack, April 2013

HEADLINE NUMBERS

DIRECT LOSS	Approximately US$136 billion of S&P; 500 market capitalisation eliminated within three minutes of the post.
RECOVERY TIME	Six minutes from initial post to substantive market recovery, once AP confirmed the account had been compromised.
EVENT TYPE	Single hacked-source-account event with broad financial-market reach.
ATTRIBUTION	Syrian Electronic Army, by claim.

MECHANISM

At 1:07pm ET on 23 April 2013, the Associated Press's verified Twitter account posted: "Breaking: Two Explosions in the White House and Barack Obama is injured." The post was untrue. The AP account had been compromised by a credential-phishing operation. The S&P; 500 dropped 0.9 per cent in three minutes, the dollar and Treasuries moved in flight-to-safety, and the market recovered within six minutes once AP issued a confirmation that the account had been hacked.

The event remains the most efficient demonstration on record of a single coordinated narrative event reaching index-level market cost. The behavioural signature was visible in the amplification: a credentialed source account posting out of pattern (no preceding development on the story, no parallel coverage from competing wire services, an unusually direct claim about a sitting president). A behavioural layer alongside the content layer would have produced a confidence-weighted alert within the three-minute window in which the market moved.

WHY THIS CASE STILL MATTERS

The AP event is now twelve years old and the trading infrastructure response (algorithmic counterparties, exchange circuit-breaker logic, news-feed verification layers) has improved. But the structural lesson holds: a single coordinated event reaching a credentialed channel can produce nine-figure intraday losses before any conventional content-detection layer registers the anomaly. The lesson has not been retired by infrastructure improvements. It has been amplified by the addition of synthetic-content generation.

SOURCE

US Securities and Exchange Commission, post-event commentary on market structure resilience, May 2013. Reuters, Bloomberg, Financial Times market-wire archives, 23 April 2013.

Case 5: Standard Chartered, 2012 and 2019 regulatory cycles

Standard Chartered presents the cleanest publicly observable example of coordinated narrative amplification around regulatory cycles at a globally significant bank. Two cycles are monetised here: the 2012 New York Department of Financial Services Iran-sanctions order and the 2019 multi-agency settlement. A current-state discussion follows.

Cycle 1: 6 August 2012 onwards

HEADLINE NUMBERS

DIRECT LOSS	Approximately 10 per cent of market capitalisation shed across 6 and 7 August 2012, equating to roughly US$9 billion at the prevailing share-price levels (GBP 6 billion converted at prevailing rates). Intraday low on 6 August was approximately 16 per cent below the previous close.
SETTLEMENT COST	US$340 million to NY DFS, August 2012. A further US$327 million across DOJ, OFAC, Federal Reserve and Manhattan DA settlements by December 2012. Total cycle cost approximately US$667 million.
CYCLE DURATION	Five months from initial NY DFS Order to final settlement disclosures.

MECHANISM

On 6 August 2012, the New York DFS issued an Order Pursuant to Banking Law characterising Standard Chartered as a "rogue institution" that had concealed Iran-sanctioned transactions worth approximately US$250 billion. The Order was published mid-morning New York time. The bank's London-listed shares opened sharply lower on the day, traded down by as much as 16 per cent intraday, and closed approximately 6.7 per cent lower. On 7 August, the stock closed down a further 3.8 per cent. The combined two-day drawdown was approximately 10 per cent of market capitalisation, roughly US$9 billion in equivalent terms.

The amplification dynamic in 2012 ran heavily through financial Twitter and the credit-default-swap market. Coordinated commentary cycles within hours of the Order presented the bank's potential loss of New York banking licence as the central narrative, materially driving the intraday low. A subsequent NY DFS settlement on 14 August (US$340 million) closed out the most acute phase, but the underlying coordinated narrative around the bank's sanctions controls continued through the December 2012 federal settlement cycle.

WHERE THE DETECTION GAP MATTERED

The bank's investor-relations and communications response on 6 August was issued in the afternoon UK time, approximately four hours after the NY DFS Order. The peak intraday drawdown occurred during that response gap. A behavioural detection layer would have flagged the coordinated amplification of the licence-loss narrative inside the first 30 to 60 minutes, with audit-trail evidence supporting an accelerated regulatory and counterparty-reassurance response. The combined cycle settlement cost (US$667 million) would not have changed. The intraday equity destruction (US$3 to 4 billion at the intraday low) would likely have been materially reduced.

Cycle 2: 9 April 2019

HEADLINE NUMBERS

DIRECT LOSS	Approximately 1.5 per cent share-price impact on settlement disclosure day, reflecting that the cycle was largely pre-disclosed across 2018.
SETTLEMENT COST	US$1.1 billion across DOJ, OFAC, Federal Reserve, NY DFS and the UK FCA. A separate US$639 million NY DFS settlement on the original 2012 cycle had concluded in 2014.
REPUTATIONAL TAIL	Three years of ongoing coordinated commentary throughout the 2016-2019 sanctions-investigations period. Material executive-time and advisory-cost load.

The 2019 cycle illustrates how coordinated narrative cycles compound over time when the same institution produces multiple regulatory events. The market response to the April 2019 settlement was muted because the cycle had been

priced in across the preceding 18 months, but the cumulative coordinated commentary across 2016 to 2019 produced ongoing valuation pressure and an elevated cost of capital. The bank's Group Chief Compliance Officer function was substantially restructured during this period; the cost of that restructure is not publicly disclosed but is non-trivial.

Forward view: Standard Chartered's current exposure surface

Three forward-looking exposure vectors are visible in the public record.

- **Hong Kong and Singapore deposit concentration.** Standard Chartered's retail and private banking deposit base is concentrated in jurisdictions with high social-media penetration and demonstrated coordinated-amplification capacity. The SVB and Credit Suisse run mechanics are directly transferable. The 6 to 12 hour detection gap is the difference between an orderly liquidity response and a digital bank run, and the regulatory environment (HKMA, MAS) punishes slow response.
- **Adani and infrastructure-financing narrative cycles.** The bank's named participation in financing facilities for Adani Group entities exposes it to coordinated ESG-narrative amplification, of the kind that produced US$150 billion of equity destruction across Adani entities in the eight weeks following the January 2023 Hindenburg report. A second Hindenburg-style cycle that re-anchors on financing-bank exposure is a foreseeable event.
- **Climate-finance coordinated commentary.** Coordinated activist amplification of fossil-fuel financing commitments has produced share-price pressure on European banks across 2024 and 2025. The behavioural signature is identifiable. Standard Chartered's stated 2050 net-zero pathway and continuing scope 3 financed-emissions disclosure cycle are visible amplification surfaces.

Conservative estimate of current exposure. Across the three vectors above, a single coordinated cycle of the severity observed in the 2012 NY DFS cycle (10 per cent intraday market-cap pressure) would today represent roughly US$3.5 billion of equity destruction at current market capitalisation. A digital bank run on the Hong Kong or Singapore deposit base of the order observed at SVB (8 per cent of deposit base in 24 hours) would represent material liquidity stress on a US$200 billion plus deposit footprint. Neither figure is alarmist. Both are below the realised losses in the cases monetised above.

SOURCE

New York DFS, In the Matter of Standard Chartered Bank, New York Branch: Order Pursuant to Banking Law, 6 August 2012. Standard Chartered PLC, public statements 6 to 14 August 2012. US DOJ, OFAC, Federal Reserve and FCA public statements, 9 April 2019. Standard Chartered PLC Annual Reports 2012, 2014, 2019. Hindenburg Research, Adani Group report, 24 January 2023.

Case 6: Hungarian spoofing operation, 2024

HEADLINE NUMBERS

EVENT TYPE	Coordinated inauthentic behaviour operation. Spoofed Euronews and Reuters logos, fabricated content alleging Ukrainian refugee attacks on Hungarians.
TIMING	More than 100 inauthentic accounts amplified the content within a 90-second posting window.
DIRECT COST	No published market-cap impact. The operation targeted political narrative rather than a listed entity.
STRATEGIC VALUE	The cleanest currently available behavioural-signature case showing precisely the technique now being applied at scale against listed institutions.

WHY WE INCLUDE THIS CASE

The Hungarian operation is included not for monetised cost but for technique. It represents the contemporary operating model for coordinated narrative attacks: real-looking content from spoofed credentialed sources, amplified by a network of accounts in a tight time window, designed to outrun conventional content-detection tooling. The same operating model is now being applied against listed institutions, financial-sector regulators, and senior corporate leadership in synthetic-content (deepfake voice and video) form. Every case monetised above predates the technical maturity now available to operators of this kind. The cost ranges in this paper are therefore lower bounds, not upper bounds, on future events of similar shape.

SOURCE

DFRLab Atlantic Council case study cluster, 2024. Reuters takedown notification archive, 2024.

Smaller cases and recurring patterns

Five further cases are catalogued briefly. Each illustrates a distinct mechanism.

Pfizer impersonation, November 2022

Same week as the Eli Lilly event, a verified-account impersonation of Pfizer posted false content. Market impact was smaller than Eli Lilly (estimated at low-single-digit percentage intraday) because Pfizer's corrective response was faster. The cluster of impersonation events across the second week of November 2022 produced approximately US$25 billion of pharmaceutical-sector market-cap volatility in five trading sessions.

JPMorgan and Jamie Dimon deepfake cycle, 2024

Synthetic-audio impersonation of JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon was distributed across X and a small podcast network in mid-2024. The audio purported to predict a recession in terms the actual Dimon had not used. JPMorgan's corrective communication was rapid and the financial impact was limited, but the episode absorbed material C-suite communications time and prompted a permanent expansion of the bank's executive-impersonation monitoring programme. The disclosed direct cost is not public.

Adani Group, January to March 2023

Hindenburg Research's report on the Adani Group, published 24 January 2023, was followed by approximately US$150 billion of equity destruction across listed Adani entities in the subsequent eight weeks. The Hindenburg report itself was a legitimate short-seller research product. The relevant signature for this paper is the coordinated amplification of the report's claims across financial Twitter and Indian-market commentary networks in the first 48 hours after publication. The behavioural amplification cluster, rather than the report content, was the proximate driver of the intraday losses in the first three trading sessions.

Tesla "funding secured" event, August 2018

CEO Elon Musk's 7 August 2018 tweet stating he had secured funding to take Tesla private at US$420 was followed by amplification and counter-amplification cycles that produced substantial intraday volatility. The subsequent SEC settlement (US$40 million combined, plus Musk's removal from the chairmanship) illustrates a regulatory-cost vector for self-inflicted but coordinated narrative events. The cost case is methodologically distinct from the other cases here but is included for boards considering executive-social-media risk.

Wirecard, 2019 to 2020

Financial Times investigative reporting from 2019 to mid-2020 ultimately exposed Wirecard's accounting fraud and the company's collapse in June 2020. The relevant pattern for this paper is the multi-year coordinated counter-narrative funded by Wirecard against its own investigative critics. Counter-coordination is a distinct cost vector that does not appear in the headline cases above but is increasingly common in the German and UK markets.

The lead-time gap: what 6 to 12 hours is worth

Every monetised case in this paper involves a measurable gap between the moment coordination became observable in behavioural data and the moment conventional sentiment dashboards or news cycles registered the amplification. Across the cases, the gap clusters between 4 and 16 hours, with a median around 8 to 10 hours.

Why this matters financially. The cost of a coordinated narrative attack accumulates in a non-linear way. The first 60 minutes typically produce limited cost because the amplification is below market-visible scale. The cost curve then steepens sharply as the amplification reaches sentiment-dashboard visibility, wire-service pickup, and trading-algorithm reaction. By the time the institution's communications team is drafting a response, much of the realised cost has already accrued.

Quantified detection-gap impact across the four monetised cases

ELI LILLY (2022)	First corrective at T+3 hours. Earlier response (T-6 to T-9 hours pre-market) would likely have compressed the 4.37 per cent close-out to a low-single-digit move. Estimated avoidable loss: roughly US$7 billion of the US$15 billion realised.
CREDIT SUISSE (2022)	First denial at T+48 hours. The CDS market had already widened and the deposit cascade had begun. Earlier denial (T-30 to T-40 hours, inside the rumour-development phase) would have compressed the Q4 2022 outflow materially. Conservative estimate: US$21 to 32 billion of the US$90 billion outflow attributable to the detection gap.
SVB (2023)	First public response from leadership at T+18 to T+24 hours after the initial 8 March announcement. Earlier engagement of the FDIC and a private-sector liquidity facility could have changed the receivership outcome. Hard to monetise; equity holder value reached zero either way, but uninsured depositor exposure (which the FDIC ultimately backstopped) was material.
STANDARD CHARTERED (2012)	First IR response at T+4 hours, after the peak intraday drawdown. Earlier response (T+30 to T+60 minutes) would likely have compressed the intraday low of approximately 16 per cent to a 6 to 8 per cent close-out. Estimated avoidable equity destruction: roughly US$3 billion of the realised US$4.5 billion intraday low.

Summary across the four monetised cases. The detection-gap-attributable loss is conservatively estimated at US$30 to 45 billion in directly avoidable equity and deposit destruction. This is the figure that should anchor board-level conversations about the value of behavioural detection capability.

Implications for boards

Four implications follow from the evidence in this paper. They are framed for the Group Chief Risk Officer, Group Chief Communications Officer, General Counsel and Chief Financial Officer audience.

1. Coordinated narrative attack is balance-sheet exposure, not communications exposure.

The cases monetised above show direct loss in market capitalisation, deposit flight, CDS spread widening and settlement cost. None of these are owned by the corporate communications function alone. The Board and the Group CRO function carry the load. Treating coordinated narrative attack as a comms-and-PR matter is a category error that boards are now correcting.

2. The detection gap is the most expensive 6 to 12 hours in modern banking.

Across the four monetised cases, the detection-gap-attributable loss conservatively totals US$30 to 45 billion. No other defensive investment in the comms-and-risk stack produces a comparable return on capital deployed. A US$120,000 per year behavioural detection subscription that compresses a single 6-hour gap by two hours pays for itself many thousands of times over in a single material event.

3. Content-based detection is no longer sufficient.

Every case monetised above used real-looking content. The Eli Lilly tweet read as legitimate corporate communication. The AP tweet came from an actually credentialed source. The Credit Suisse rumour was amplified by a real journalist. The Hungarian spoofing used real-looking media logos. Content classifiers have nothing to score in any of these cases. The behavioural signature was the only available signal. This will become more true, not less, as synthetic-content tooling continues to mature.

4. Audit trails matter more than confidence scores.

Every case will produce a downstream regulatory or litigation cycle in which the institution must explain what it knew and when it knew it. Behavioural detection that produces deterministic, evidence-backed verdicts (rather than probabilistic content scores) survives that downstream cycle. Probabilistic content scores do not.

> **The structural read.** The institutions that build behavioural detection capability in the 2026-2027 window will face the same coordinated narrative environment as everyone else. They will not face the same cost curve. The institutions that wait will inherit, within the conservative cost ranges in this paper, an annual coordinated-narrative loss expectation in the high nine figures to low ten figures.

Where Signal by AI Uniti fits

Signal by AI Uniti is the behavioural threat intelligence platform built for the cost case in this paper. The platform detects coordinated narrative manipulation across X, Bluesky, Mastodon, RSS and YouTube, with Reddit and podcast connectors in active build. Detection is content-agnostic, language-agnostic and platform-agnostic. Verdicts are deterministic and evidence-backed.

The detection framework is the Luceri et al. (ACM Conference on Web Science 2025) five-signal behavioural signature, extended to nine signals across temporal, account-metadata and amplification categories. The median detection lead time over conventional sentiment monitoring is 6 to 12 hours.

Signal is in active enterprise beta with two design partners (a mining-adjacent multinational and an Australian state-government deployment). It is available now to FTSE100 and ASX200 institutions on a 12-month minimum subscription basis. The standard activation period is 30 to 45 days from contract to steady-state coverage of the institution's specific narrative environment.

To request a 15-minute briefing. Email craig@aiuniti.com or your relationship contact at AI Uniti. Quotations are bespoke to the institution's threat-surface scope, jurisdictional footprint and integration requirements. Pricing for the Signal Enterprise tier sits in the AU$8,000 to 12,000 per month range with 12, 24 and 36 month commitment options.

Sources

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