The Neglected Context of Congressional Campaigns

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Despite the seemingly ubiquitous concerns of modern political science, little attention has yet been paid to campaigning for legislative office. This rather unexpected lacuna has attracted the interest of Professor Paletz. He hopes, herein, to use a case study—Georgia's Fourth Congressional District in 1966—as a device through which to look at campaigning in a more systematic fashion than has heretofore been common, especially for the lower house. It is an interesting story, told well, leaving (of course) the usual question of whether one can generalize from a case study.

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Introduction[1]

Members of the House of Representatives are sometimes defined as "the shortest distance between two years."[2] And most congressmen are obsessed with re-election. They know that, irrespective of their skill and reputation within Congress, their power rests on the whims and proclivities of their constituents. Yet election campaigns have been described as "the great Eleusinian mystery of the democratic state,"[3] and V. O. Key's observation that "Congressional elections have been subjected to very little analysis,"[4] retains considerable validity. Indeed, until recent years, when political scientists studied congressional elections they were primarily concerned with election results, presidential coattails, and campaign financing as it related to candidate rectitude and representational integrity.[5]

Lately, the literature on congressional elections has increased. It falls into essentially two categories. There are the different and untested prescriptive works of Lewis A. Froman, Jr.,[6] and Stanley Kelley, Jr.;[7] and there are a few descriptive studies of campaign organization, strategy and techniques.[8] These latter studies, however, are generally

[1] I am indebted to my friends Leonard Rubin, Randall Ripley, and Norman Hartweg for their observations on an earlier version of this paper. Sadly, they are unwilling to accept responsibility for its defects. Thanks are also due to the anonymous readers whose comments on previous drafts sent me wearily back to the typewriter.

[2] Charles L. Clapp, *The Congressman* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1964), p. 373.

[3] R. B. McCallum, "The Study of Psephology," *Parliamentary Affairs,* 8 (1955), 509.

[4] V. O. Key, *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1964), p. 574.

[5] See for example Louis Bean, *The Mid-term Battle* (Washington: Cantillon Books, 1950); Malcolm Moos *Politics, Presidents and Coattails* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1952); and Milton C. Cummings, *Congressmen and the Electorate* (New York: Free Press, 1965). The definitive work on campaign financing is Alexander Heard, *The Costs of Democracy* (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1960). In *Public Opinion and Congressional Elections* (New York: The Free Press, 1962), William N. McPhee and William A. Glaser engage in a theoretical analysis of election results but pay little attention to campaigns and none at all to tactics and strategy.

[6] "A Realistic Approach to Campaign Strategies and Tactics," in L. Harmon Zeigler and M. Kent Jennings, eds., *The Electoral Process* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 1–20.

[7] *Political Campaigning; Problems in Creating an Informed Electorate* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1960).

[8] See David A. Leuthold, *Electioneering in a Democracy* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968); John W. Kingdom, *Candidates for Office* (New York:

lacking in some of the following respects. First, they are not related to the prescriptive literature. Second, the authors are often unable to obtain complete access to the candidates; and as a result fail to detail campaign intricacies adequately or to comprehend events from the candidates' perspectives. In addition, several aspects of the total context within and against which campaigns take place are slighted. Finally, campaigns are rarely approached in any systematic fashion.[9]

This study attempts to close some of the gaps in congressional campaign scholarship. Looking in detail at one congressional election to which I enjoyed access, I try systematically to depict the contextual factors and discuss the extent to which they were amenable to candidate control. Next I describe the degree to which each candidate's campaign successfully manipulated and modified these contextual factors. I then relate my approach to the campaign prescriptions of Froman and Kelley.

Campaign Context

Constituency:[10] Georgia's fourth congressional district consists of all of DeKalb and Rockdale counties and part of Fulton county.[11] Rapidly growing DeKalb is essentially a highly educated, affluent, suburban community. According to the 1960 census its population was 256,782, an increase of 88.3 per cent from 1950. Of this population, 37.5 per cent was under 18 years old and only 8.7 per cent was Negro; 62.2 per cent of DeKalb workers were employed in white-collar occupations; 62.7 per cent were working outside the countt; and the median income

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Random House, 1966); John Bibby and Roger Davidson, *On Capitol Hill: Studies in the Legislative Process* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), pp. 30–71; L. Harmon Zeigler and M. Kent Jennings, *The Electoral Process*, op. cit., esp. pp. 21–41 and 122–138; William J. Gore and Robert L. Peabody, "The Functions of the Political Campaign: A Case Study," *Western Political Quarterly*, 11 (1958), 55–70; John C. Donovan, *Congressional Campaign: Maine Elects a Democrat* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1958); and Charles L. Clapp, *The Congressman*, op. cit., chap. 8.

[9] In the *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 26 (Spring 1962), 126–32, Charles O. Jones offers "A Suggested Scheme for Classifying Congressional Campaigns." Although a worthwhile start, the approach is rudimentary and general.

[10] These figures are taken from *Supplement to Congressional District Data Book, No. 5* (Bureau of Census, January, 1965). The Georgia voting age is 18.

[11] The proportionate importance of each county to the constituency can be partially measured by the number of precincts: DeKalb has 61, Fulton 26, and Rockdale 5.

of all workers was $6,873. Rockdale, on the other hand, is a rural county with a population of 10,572.

Fulton county,[12] which is essentially metropolitan Atlanta, had a population of 556,326, reflecting an increase of 17.5 per cent over 1950. Of these, 34.8 per cent were Negro and 34.4 per cent were under 18. Only 6.4 per cent worked outside the county. The median annual income was $5,207 but 25.5 per cent received less than $3,000. That part of Fulton county actually in the fourth district contained a Jewish area and a substantial proportion of Negro voters.

By 1966 it was estimated the district contained almost half a million people of whom roughly 182,000 were registered to vote. In any election some two-thirds of those registered could be expected to go to the polls; probably ten per cent of these would be Negro.

The candidates' views of constituency voting patterns reflected demographic characteristics. Rockdale was seen to consist primarily of lower-class whites who would generally vote Democratic but were vulnerable to Republican anti-Negro appeals. The part of Fulton county in the constituency was regarded as safely Democratic because of its substantial Negro population. Full of suburban commuters, DeKalb was considered by both camps to be vulnerable to Republican inroads and would account for roughly two-thirds of the votes cast.

To corroborate these candidates' views we need only examine the voting figures for 1964[13] in Table I.

TABLE I
Voting Figures, 1964

	CONGRESS		PRESIDENCY	
	(Mackay) (D)	(Pickett) (R)	(Johnson) (D)	(Goldwater) (R)
DeKalb	42,876	37,070	37,113	49,368
Fulton	21,862	12,008	21,192	13,742
Rockdale	1,750	1,248	1,972	1,503
Total	66,488	50,326	60,277	64,613

These figures suggest that the constituency had a possible Republican majority. Specifically, some of the affluent white citizens of DeKalb county might be ideologically inclined to a conservative Republican. If

[12] Census figures are unavailable for only a part of Fulton county.

[13] These figures are taken from the *Official State of Georgia Tabulation by Counties for Presidential Electors, U.S. Representatives, State Officers, and Constitutional Amendments, General Election Nov. 3, 1964,* prepared by Ben W. Fortson, Secretary of State, Atlanta, Georgia.

so, they had remained Democratic due to a combination of traditional party loyalty, an ability to distinguish national from local and state Democratic candidates, and respect and affection for the Democratic congressional candidate. Alternatively, the Goldwater victory might have been mainly an anti-Johnson vote untranslatable into future Republican success. In any event, although the composition of the constituency for the 1966 election was beyond candidate control, partisan affiliations seemed fluid enough to invest the 1966 campaigns with considerable potential for determining the fourth district's congressman.

Candidates: Democratic incumbent James A. Mackay is in his late forties, has a round face, receded hair, and a slightly corpulent girth. His wit and lack of pomposity are rare among American politicians. From 1950–52 and, after losing in 1952, from 1954 to 1964, Mackay had been a Georgia state representative from DeKalb county. During his sojourn in the legislature, Mackay battled to keep the Georgia schools open following the Supreme Court's 1954 desegregation decision. He vigorously opposed the county unit system.[14] When judicial invalidation of that system in 1962[15] was followed by Georgia congressional district reapportionment in 1964,[16] Mackay was elected to Congress from the new fourth district seat.

In 1964, Mackay had defeated Roscoe Pickett. Pickett is reputed to have outraged many of the more educated, upstanding, affluent, and conservative voters with his bucolic manner and lack of issue comprehension. It is generally believed, for example, that because of his appearance and demeanor, Pickett made maladroit use of television. As one highly influential Republican put it:

[14] The county unit system functioned as follows: the fifth congressional district in Georgia consisted of Fulton county (population 536,000); DeKalb county (257,000) and Rockdale county (less than 11,000). Fulton and DeKalb each had six county unit votes, while rural Rockdale had two votes. Since the candidate winning the most votes in a county received that county's unit vote, it was possible to combine DeKalb and Rockdale to gain electoral victory. This happened in 1946 and 1952. The county unit system served to vitiate the electoral power of Fulton county's substantial Negro population.

[15] The decision was sustained and broadened by the Supreme Court in *Gray* v. *Sanders* on March 18, 1963.

[16] The redistricting bill was passed by the Georgia House of Representatives on February 21, 1964, exactly four days after the Supreme Court decision in *Wesberry* v. *Sanders* declaring Georgia's congressional districts unconstitutional. Its major impact was to split the fifth congressional district. The new fourth district encompassed all of DeKalb and Rockdale counties and part of Fulton county. The new fifth district contained the remaining vast majority of Fulton county; previously the fifth had contained all three counties.

> Roscoe was convinced that all he needed was more television exposure to win the election. But every time he went on TV he lost another thousand votes. Even today, though, he still says he would be in Congress if he had spent more money on television. [17]

But Mackay's Republican opponent in 1966 was Benjamin Blackburn, a thirty-nine-year-old Republican of the new breed. As conservative as Pickett in his opposition to an active national government, Blackburn was handsome, vigorous, crisp and direct in speech, and conveyed an aura of moderation.

Political candidates are generally unable to influence the nomination of their opponents and therefore rarely try. This election was no exception. Mackay was automatically renominated as the incumbent who had won with relative ease in 1964. For his part, Mackay would have enjoyed running again against Pickett but had no say in the Republican choice of the more formidable Blackburn. It is not unknown for candidates to complicate the lives of their opponents by encouraging (sometimes with funds) opposition in a primary. A conservative Democratic opponent might have cost Mackay time, energy and money; demonstrated constituency discontent with the liberal incumbent; and served to air some of the "big spending" themes subsequently employed by Blackburn. Nonetheless, for numerous reasons, neither candidate encountered primary opposition.

Other Elections: The American ballot at an election generally offers a plethora of contests. This is so well known that we frequently ignore its implications and effects. In this instance three other contests were to have a bearing on the Mackay–Blackburn election.

Heading the Democratic ticket for governor was Lester Maddox. In rhetoric and action an old style populist, Maddox rose to an unsavory fame when he refused to integrate his Atlanta fried chicken restaurant despite numerous court orders. Any black intrepid enough to visit his establishment encountered a pistol-packing Maddox handing out ax-handles to his white customers. Eventually he sold his restaurant and entered the furniture business. Lester Maddox was a perennial political candidate. He ran for Mayor of Atlanta in 1957, losing to the incumbent by a two-to-one margin. He gained the runoff election for Lieutenant Governor in 1961 but was again defeated.

Aiming higher after every defeat, Maddox ran for governor of

[17] Personal interview. No respondents will be identified in this essay. It is an occupational hazard which political scientists and their readers must often endure that, to obtain candor from practicing politicians, we must promise anonymity; and then keep our promise.

Georgia in 1966. The first Democratic primary contained seven candidates. Ellis Arnall, a moderate on the race question and former governor, won without a majority. Maddox running, so it was claimed, on a shoestring, was second. Maddox won the runoff.[18]

Winning the Democratic primary in Georgia is generally tantamount to election to office. This year, however, there was a strong Republican candidate for governor. As Georgia's first Republican congressman in many years, Howard (Bo) Callaway had established an impeccably conservative voting record during his two years in Washington. He was in his late thirties, good looking and, as a millionaire, sure to run a well-financed campaign. Callaway was almost as unacceptable as Maddox to Negroes and liberals. It was said by some cynics that both candidates for governor had solutions to the race problem: Maddox believed in separation of the races; Callaway believed that the races could live together if the Negro kept his place wearing a red jacket and serving drinks.

To further complicate the issue, supporters of defeated Ellis Arnall started a write-in for their man. Their objective was to prevent either Callaway or Maddox from winning over fifty per cent of the votes for governor. By Georgia law this would throw the decision into the hands of the state legislature. Arnall's supporters then intended to appeal their case to the courts after the election on the grounds that the malapportioned Georgia legislature could not and should not select the new governor.

Two other contests deserve mention. Fifth congressional district incumbent Charles L. Weltner, having successfully overcome primary opposition, subsequently withdrew his candidacy. First elected to Congress in 1962, Weltner was the only deep-South congressman to vote for the 1964 Civil Rights bill on final passage. With Maddox winning the Democratic nomination for governor, Weltner withdrew because he said he could not keep the oath required of Democratic candidates to support their party's gubernatorial nominee. In the other important race, long-term incumbent Democratic Senator Richard B. Russell was unopposed for re-election.

These other elections on the ballot established a contextual factor over which neither Mackay nor Blackburn exercised any control. Their only alternative was to decide not to run. But Mackay wanted to be re-elected and was determined to persist irrespective of the nomination of Lester Maddox. Although Blackburn's decision to run had been reinforced by the knowledge that he would be on the ballot with Callaway and would also benefit from the latter's substantial financial

[18] The figures were: Maddox 443,055, Arnall 373,004.

resources, he would probably have sought election anyway because of a belief in Mackay's vulnerability.

Nonetheless, the other contests influenced the Mackay–Blackburn election. Because Mackay and Maddox were ideologically incompatible and personally distant, they ran unrelated campaigns. In contrast, Callaway and Blackburn worked much more closely, even sharing some campaign workers. Moreover, Callaway provided funds to help his congressional candidate. Maddox had no funds to dispense, and even had his campaign been bountifully endowed he would have given nothing to Mackay.

Mackay was more politically compatible with Arnall. Unfortunately, the write-in was an *ad hoc* operation without Arnall's full public endorsement. Furthermore, it was directed in opposition to the official Democratic gubernatorial candidate. These factors precluded an organized cooperative campaign. Indeed, the Arnall effort tended to divert funds and workers from Mackay's campaign.

Weltner's action probably hindered Mackay's campaign in three ways. First, Mackay never really overcame in his own mind, or before some of his demanding constituents, the moral challenge posed by Weltner's withdrawal. Perhaps more important, Weltner's departure permitted conservative forces to focus their energy and finances on the fourth district. And Negroes (in both the fourth and fifth districts) lost a powerful incentive to go to the polls.

Russell's lack of Republican opposition also hurt Mackay. Had Russell been opposed, this vastly popular Georgia Democrat would probably have evoked a substantial straight party vote to the benefit of Mackay, Maddox, and all the other Democratic candidates.[19] This brings us to the nature of the ballot.

The Ballot: Not only was the Mackay–Blackburn contest overshadowed in the media by the race for governor, it was buried in the ballot. The contest was number 88 on page three of the seven-page DeKalb ballot. In addition, the voter had several choices: he could vote individually for the candidates for each office, he could write-in a name in a rather complicated procedure, he could pull the straight party lever, he could even vote straight party and then select a candidate of the opposing party for one or more office. Such a ballot raised a host of specters. Let us look at Mackay's problems. Liberals might simply write-in Ellis Arnall for governor (which involved asking for an additional ballot) and not bother to vote for Mackay. Even if they also

[19] Indicating Russell's popularity and Republican prudence, the Senator did not experience Republican opposition in his seven elections to the Senate.

voted for Mackay, there was a strong chance that their write-in ballots would be improperly completed and therefore disallowed. Even if the write-in ballots were accurate, there was a possibility that the election officials, out of fatigue, by mistake, or for more reprehensible reasons, might not count them. Whereas the liberals were likely to go to the polls, Negro voters faced with a choice of Maddox or Callaway would probably stay away. DeKalb's suburban voters posed the worst problems. Lester Maddox was anathema to many of these. Mackay's fear, and Blackburn's hope, was that they would go to the polls and simply pull the Republican lever which combined Callaway, Blackburn, and all other Republican candidates. As for the lower-class whites of Rockdale, they would vote for Maddox; and Mackay could only hope that in so doing they would pull the Democratic lever which uneasily united the congressman with Lester Maddox.

Party: Mackay was the Democratic candidate and Blackburn the Republican. Normally, party affiliation is displayed by a candidate to attract voters of a similar persuasion and to identify him with the beneficent acts of a local, state, or national administration. Accordingly, the candidate whose party members compose a constituency majority is likely to flaunt his affiliation. The minority candidate publicizes his party membership only before the party faithful and generally downgrades it elsewhere (by omitting it from his campaign advertising for example). Thus, although a nominee's party membership is an immutable election fact, it is also one which he can publicize or conceal through his campaign. The party is, of course, also a source of funds either directly from party organizations or from similarly affiliated members.

In the Mackay–Blackburn election, the former might be expected to emphasize his party. Blackburn would probably de-emphasize his Republican affiliation while collecting campaign funds from the Republican coffers. The apparent changeability of party affiliations in the fourth district complicated such calculations. Both Republican presidential candidate Barry M. Goldwater and Mackay had carried the constituency in 1964. Moreover, with Lyndon B. Johnson in the White House and Lester Maddox running for governor, there were at least two disparate meanings of the word Democratic; Mackay would probably seek to avoid them both. Mackay was, however, the incumbent.

Incumbency: During his congressional term Mackay tried to cement his constituency support. He opened a district office and performed the service functions considered essential for re-election. He obtained a seat on the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee where he was exceptionally active in contributing to passage of the traffic safety

legislation which Congress adopted, under the spur of Ralph Nader, to diminish the family automobile's dangerous aspects. He established thirty-one special citizens' panels to advise him on subjects ranging from fine arts to agriculture legislation. Gimmicky perhaps, but at their peak they involved almost one thousand people, and they brought citizens to congressman and vice versa.

It is commonly asserted that incumbency is significant in explaining a congressman's re-election.[20] Certainly Mackay was initially better known than his opponent and he benefitted as his constituency and Washington offices performed their service functions. In addition, as a member of the President's party, he could bring federal benefits to his constituency.

On the other hand, incumbency provides a candidate with a voting record. Mackay had voted against repeal of Section 14b of the Taft-Hartley act, for Medicare, and for the 1965 Voting Rights bill. Indeed, although his support had sometimes been equivocal and unenthusiastic, Mackay had often voted for Great Society legislation. This made it difficult for him to dissociate himself from President Johnson, who was conspicuously unpopular with many Georgians. Furthermore, Mackay's very presence in Congress tarred him with some responsibility for the state of the nation including inflation, the inconclusive war in Vietnam, and the controversial antipoverty program. Incumbency is clearly a double-edged sword and Mr. Dooley's advice not without merit: "If I was runnin' f'r office, I'd change me name, an' have printed on me cards: 'Give him a chanst; he can't be worse.' "[21]

Group Support and Opposition: Established interest groups sometimes court a candidate, especially an incumbent, by providing campaign funds and other forms of assistance. In this election the focus of such support (although not necessarily the extent) was determined well before the campaign began; for Mackay's voting record, pronouncements, and other activities had alienated some constituency groups and attracted others. Thus, Mackay did receive some help from the Atlanta Labor Council, but he was denied a formal endorsement because of his vote against repeal of section 14b of the Taft-Hartley act. Moreover, as a result of his votes for Medicare and Voting Rights, as well as his role in Traffic Safety, Mackay had incurred the wrath of the American Medical Association and the automobile industry. The former

[20] See Leuthold, *Electioneering in a Democracy,* op. cit., pp. 122–28.

[21] Finlay Peter Dunne, *Mr. Dooley on Ivrything and Ivrybody,* ed. by Robert Hutchinson (New York: Dover Publication, 1963), p. 191.

in particular contributed substantially to the Blackburn campaign. Since the other groups taking an interest in the election were generally ideologically conservative (the John Birch Society), they tended to support Blackburn. For Mackay, therefore, incumbency seemed to encourage organized group opposition in the constituency rather than support.

Issues: As suggested by my discussion of incumbency, candidates are somewhat confined in their choice of issues by their past deeds and pronouncements and by the electorate's concerns. On the other hand, the range of issues raised, the ways they are deployed to blame an opponent, and their relevance for the electorate's voting decisions, all offer considerable scope for the shrewd campaigner, as I shall subsequently document.

Campaigns

Mackay and Blackburn each hoped through his campaign to persuade the electorate to go to the polls and vote for him. To achieve this purpose, campaign organizations were established, finances raised, issues propounded, party affiliations exploited, and various techniques of campaigning utilized. Yet each campaign was waged within the context I have analyzed. A brief discussion will suggest why Blackburn's campaign, although far from perfect, was better designed than Mackay's to exploit favorable contextual factors and avoid unfavorable ones.[22]

Campaign Organization: Each candidate established the conventional campaign organization, but whereas Mackay ran his own campaign, Blackburn obtained the services of the Reverend Roy Pfautch. Pfautch and the other staff of his Civic Service, Inc., of St. Louis virtually ran "the whole damn show", as one extremely knowledgeable participant put it.[23] Mackay did not believe in employing professional campaign

[22] Contextual factors such as constituency composition and the nature of the ballot are immutable for each election but after an election they can be changed and often are. The politics of districting and redistricting are notorious. Less well known but almost as common are attempts to structure a ballot. This is done, for example, when the party in control of state electoral machinery puts its most potent vote-getter as the first candidate under the straight party lever. The 1968 North Carolina ballot exemplifies this technique.

[23] Pfautch's participation in the management of the Blackburn campaign was probably the best-kept secret of the election. It is unclear whether Pfautch was sent to Georgia by the Republican National Committee or came as a result of an accidental meeting with the candidate. In contrast to some campaign consultants,

consultants, but even had he wished to employ the Reverend he lacked the requisite finances.

Finances: Ample finances, or at least an adequate minimum which does not leave a candidate hopelessly deprived in comparison to his opponent, are essential for victory in a congressional election in a competitive consitutency. Finances are dependent upon contextual factors in the sense that candidates enter a contest quite differently endowed with funds and with the potential to acquire more. The campaign is important in that a candidate can stimulate additional funds by the issues he raises, policies he espouses, and promises (open and covert) he makes.

Mackay spent approximately $6,000, received mostly in small amounts from some eleven hundred contributors. His party affiliation and legislative support of the Johnson administration produced $1,000 from the Democratic National Committee and $1,500 from the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee.

In campaign finance the amount a candidate receives is not the only consideration. So that media space can be reserved, it is important to have the money, or the promise of the money, well in advance. Much of Mackay's financing came in dribs and drabs. Consequently, not only was he inhibited in obtaining media space, he was compelled to spend valuable time late in the campaign seeking additional funds at breakfasts with influentials. Blackburn, on the other hand, received ample funds early and was able to plan ahead; his finance committee never found it necessary to disturb him. In comparison to Mackay, Blackburn spent over $100,000 and perhaps close to $120,000. [24]

Party: Because of his ideological incompatibility with and personal distaste for Maddox, Mackay ran independently of the state and local Democratic party; although he did obtain endorsements from some

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this ordained and practicing minister of the United Presbyterian Church is reluctant to speak to scholars or the press, and indeed threatened to sue the author for publishing any untoward statements. He has been described as "The most active professional campaign manager in the Midwestern states." He "has worked only for Republicans . . . but would welcome the chance to have a Democratic client." *Congressional Quarterly* 26:14 (April 5, 1968), 712.

[24] The Republican Congressional Boosters Club of Washington, D.C., provided $5,000 to the Blackburn Campaign for Congress Committee on Aug. 3 and a further $2,500 to Citizens for Blackburn Committee on Sept. 23. In contrast, Mackay received his funds from the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee on Oct. 5 and the Democratic National Committee on Nov. 4. In reporting their expenditures, Mackay showed receipts of $5,875 and expenditures of $7,775 compared to Blackburn's $3,363 and $3,810 respectively; see *Congressional Quarterly,* 25:32 (Aug. 11, 1967), 1449.

regular state party notables which were released to the public the night before election day for last-minute effect.

Given the unpopularity of the Johnson administration with many white voters in the district, the major contribution of the national Democratic party to Mackay's campaign was financial. Mackay's main attempt to exploit his connection with Washington was not entirely successful. A few days before election day Mackay announced that post office delivery to over 65,000 families in a new residential area of DeKalb would henceforth be door-to-door. Unfortunately, the press release also contained the estimated annual cost to the government of $525,000. Several constituents complained of the expense and others made disparaging comments about more benefits to the affluent.

Blackburn received financial aid from the national Republican party and also cooperated with Callaway. In his public campaign he de-emphasized his Republican affiliation, but his advertisements linked his name with Callaway's (who was expected to run strongly in DeKalb) and, without mentioning the word Republican, urged a straight-party vote.

Issues: Each candidate sought to raise those issues he considered important and on which he believed his opponent to be both different and vulnerable. Mackay emphasized his experience, constitutency service, his ability to procure federal largesse, and the inexperience and lack of service of his opponent.

In contrast to Mackay, Blackburn's campaign manager engaged in attitude testing to determine constituency sentiment. It was discovered that, although Mackay had a personal following, many of the white voters in the constituency thoroughly disapproved of President Johnson and were concerned with inflation (which they associated with excessive government domestic spending and foreign aid), crime in the streets, and the situation in Vietnam. Accordingly, the Republican attacked Mackay as a rubber stamp for LBJ, as a full-fledged big-spending supporter of the Great Society, and as a party hack. Despite its saliency, Blackburn was reluctant to raise the Vietnam issue because he feared that President Johnson might rectify the situation just prior to the election in somewhat the same way President Kennedy handled the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. He raised it indirectly by accusing Mackay of voting for foreign aid to countries that helped America's enemies in Vietnam. After initial use, the issue of crime in the streets was discarded because voters refused to impute responsibility for it to Mackay and indeed became offended at the suggested association.

This attitude sampling also disclosed that many of the voters,

especially in DeKalb county, were favorably inclined to a candidate who was youthful, vigorous, attractive, with a young family—rather like themselves. Blackburn fitted this image better than Mackay and his main concern became that of bringing this information to as many voters as possible.

To counter Mackay's accusation that Blackburn was against everything, the Republican, towards the end of the campaign, started emphasizing the specific proposals he supported. He also attempted to pre-empt Mackay's strengths of experience, personal attention to constituents, and accomplishments for the district. Hence, in his literature and advertising Blackburn promised town meetings, a newsletter, a year-round district office, and he proposed to seek federal government funds for air and water pollution, highways, rapid transit, and mental health. The inaccurate impression conveyed was that these were areas of Mackay neglect.

Each candidate, then, was constrained in the issues he adopted and the views he expressed by his previous positions and personal commitment and the context in which the campaign took place. Within these constraints, however, Blackburn's use of issues was flexible and consciously designed to retain his existing support and to gain additional adherents in DeKalb county.

Methods of Campaigning: Both candidates used television, billboards, newspapers, radio and brochures, to the best of their financial ability. Blackburn used television for brief commercials. Mackay relied primarily on the traditional candidate address to the viewer, although he did adopt the five-minute statement rather than half-hour presentations. In addition, there were three joint television debates. Mackay had successfully debated Pickett and had no compunction about challenging Blackburn. He hoped to reveal his opponent's flaws and also to illuminate the issues of the campaign. In addition, the debates provided additional television time he could not otherwise afford. Blackburn accepted a debate to put himself on the same platform with the older and physically less prepossessing Mackay and because it was difficult to avoid the gauntlet. He thought he did well in the first debate, so several others were held.

Abetted by greater funds, Blackburn's managers were able to send brochures to every eligible fourth district voter. This, at a cost of $13,000, Mackay was unable to do. A highlight of the Blackburn brochure was a section entitled "Government Services to You," in which the Republican was identified somewhat misleadingly with federal largesse, undercut Mackay's claim of being the only provider of loaves and fishes, presented a means for constituents to bypass the

congressman's office, and suggested that Blackburn's election would result in the personal representation Mackay was supposedly not providing.

Blackburn's superior utilization of television commercials and mailed brochures was partially offset by the editorial support Mackay received from both Atlanta newspapers. And although the actual reporting was generally factual, at least one article, appearing the day before the election, was stimulated by the Mackay camp. It began as follows: "Benjamin H. Blackburn, an ultra-conservative Republican vigorously supported by a physicians' political group and a strong John Birch Society element, is making a serious bid to unseat Democratic Rep. James A. Mackay in Tuesday's election."[25] On the other hand, Mackay's staff were discomfitted when the national government dispatched federal voting officials into some Georgia counties on election day to inhibit voting intimidation and irregularities. They feared that such action would rouse antagonism among white voters in the fourth district and were upset when it received substantial publicity in the local press.

Neither candidate was content with the efficacy of the media and both undertook personal appearances. In addition to their joint debates, they appeared separately before civic and religious groups. These appearances were designed to encourage supporters to go to the polls. Thus Mackay sought Negro support by speaking at Negro church services and making donations. The effectiveness of the Negro church as the traditional way of wooing and organizing the Negro community is increasingly in doubt. Mackay was conscious of this but had devised no alternative method. Like other liberal Democratic candidates, he paid the pastors and prayed. Blackburn did not expect the Negro vote and made no effort to obtain it for fear of alienating his actual and potential white support.

"Coffees" were another method of personal campaigning in which Blackburn utilized superior techniques. Mackay's "coffee" appearances were arranged almost *ad hoc* whenever a supporter showed interest. One that I attended, held in an attractive area of DeKalb, was peopled with a dozen ladies, shy, well-fed, earnest and uninformed. The congressman's message was warm, diffused, intelligent, anecdotal, and verbose. He stayed for almost an hour and a half. Blackburn used coffees extensively. He often went to three during the day and another three at night (so husbands could be present). These were arranged by his supporters, but stimulated by his campaign staff. His purposes were

[25] *Atlanta Journal* (Nov. 7, 1966), article by Jack Nelson.

to become known; to show that he was attractive, personable, and informed; to fire up his supporters who were present; and to induce the doubting to his side. He would give a twenty minute hard-hitting statement and then leave. Two of his adherents in the group would gauge the effectiveness of his appearance and recruit volunteer and financial support. It was through the reports of these ladies who remained at the coffee after his departure that Blackburn learned not to attempt to use the "crime in the streets" issue against Mackay.

Finally, Blackburn had a highly organized telephone campaign in which his staff and volunteers contacted likely supporters requesting a vote and, if the person solicited seemed amenable, a financial contribution and aid in the election. The approach was designed to appear spontaneous.

The Results: An Analysis

Blackburn ended up 368 votes ahead of Mackay. There were 1,350 disputed ballots, mostly in DeKalb county, in which individuals voted both straight party and for a congressional candidate. After several months of maneuvering in the Georgia courts and in Congress, Blackburn was seated. He had transformed a Democratic majority of over 16,000 into a narrow disputed victory. Meanwhile, Democratic candidate Lester Maddox became Governor of Georgia.[26]

It is apparent that, guided by Pfautch, the Blackburn campaign was more sophisticated than Mackay's. Abetted by professional organization and ample funds, it was somewhat directed as exploiting aspects of the context conducive to Blackburn's advantage (such as Mackay's incumbency and association with the Great Society, President Johnson's unpopularity with many white voters, disdain for Maddox in DeKalb, and so on). Concomitantly, Blackburn's campaign minimized or evaded several disadvantageous background factors (Blackburn's inability to dispense federal favors and his Republican affiliation). Clearly some voters, especially in DeKalb, were persuaded that Mackay was no longer deserving of their vote.

Conversely, Mackay's campaign was intuitive and improvised. He never engaged in attitude testing and his decisions about issues were based on impressionistic information regarding the electorate's

[26] Callaway received 453,665 (47.4%), Maddox 450,626 (47.1%), and Arnall 52,831 (5.5%) votes. On Jan. 10, 1967, in joint session of Senate and House of Representatives, the Georgia General Assembly selected Lester Maddox governor by 182 to 66. Thirty-six Democratic members voted for Callaway.

preferences and responses. Nor did Mackay consciously design many effective campaign tactics specifically directed at the exploitation or evasion of contextual factors.

Blackburn's campaign may have been superior to Mackay's in modifying contextual factors, but, as the figures in Table II attest, the relative effects of each campaign on the election outcome are difficult to unravel.

TABLE II
Election Figures Georgia Fourth District [27]

	DEKALB	FULTON	ROCKDALE	TOTAL
Mackay '64	42,876	21,862	1,750	66,488
Mackay '66	38,712	13,993	2,184	54,889
Pickett '64	37,070	12,008	1,248	50,326
Blackburn '66	45,168	8,927	1,154	55,249
Maddox '66	24,880	7,814	2,190	34,884
Callaway '66	56,143	11,841	954	68,938

In DeKalb county Mackay received 4,164 less than in 1964, and Blackburn's vote was 8,098 higher than Pickett's. Yet Mackay ran 13,832 ahead of Maddox, and Blackburn 10,975 behind Callaway. Many DeKalb voters endorsed the straight Republican ticket. But many others must have voted for Callaway and then Mackay; or written in Arnall (he received 5,679 votes counted in DeKalb) and then voted for Mackay; or ignored the gubernatorial contest and just voted for Mackay. In these instances the superior Blackburn campaign proved unable to persuade these DeKalb voters to pull the straight-party Republican lever; their antipathy for Maddox did not extend to Mackay.

On the other hand, Mackay's campaign seems to have failed to bring out the Negro vote in Fulton county. In 1964 Mackay received approximately 65 per cent of Fulton's fourth district votes; in 1966 his share declined to 61 per cent. This 1966 percentage applied not to almost 34,000 votes as cast in 1964, but to less than 23,000. Whereas the total vote for Congress increased by just under 4,000 votes in DeKalb between 1964 and 1966, it declined by almost 11,000 in Fulton county. In absolute numbers in Fulton county, Mackay received almost 8,000 votes less in 1966 than in 1964, while Blackburn received

[27] See *Official State of Georgia Tabulation by Counties for U.S. Senator et. al.*, prepared by Ben W. Fortson, Secretary of State, Atlanta, Georgia. The Fulton figures for Maddox and Callaway are calculated from the actual precinct returns.

just over 3,000 votes less than Pickett. An analysis reveals that these were primarily Negro precincts. For example, one precinct counted on to provide a Mackay bulwark had the following results: 2,488 registered, Mackay 496, Blackburn 215, Maddox 134, Callaway 511. In the primary this same precinct gave Arnall 1,019 and Maddox 144, while in 1964 Mackay received 1,091 to Pickett's 454. Given a choice of Maddox or Callaway for governor, many Negroes simply stayed away from the polls. Some of these who did vote merely wrote in Arnall, then left without considering any other office.

It may be that if Mackay's campaign had enjoyed a superior organization, greater financing, and better tactics, more Negroes could have been lured to the Fulton county polling booths. As one Mackay worker observed: "If Jim had had $30,000 more he would still be in Congress." Nonetheless, the impact of contextual factors cannot be denied. Had Arnall been the democratic candidate for governor instead of Maddox; had Callaway not run; had there been no gubernatorial contest whatsoever; had the Georgia ballot not facilitated straight-party voting; Mackay might still be in Congress.

Yet, what this brief analysis ultimately suggests is that although electoral victory or defeat is a candidate's defining criterion of the success or failure of his campaign, scholars might find it more profitable to judge a campaign according to the extent to which it maximizes the candidate's impact within contextual constraints. This would necessitate analyzing past election results in the constituency; isolating the various elements of the context and assessing their favorable potential for both candidates; and then comparing the efficacy of each campaign on the final vote. This approach probably requires some sample survey polling to determine constituency sentiment before, during, and perhaps immediately following the campaign, in order to test the effectiveness of each candidate's campaign with respect to contextual factors. Ideally, such polls would measure degree of voter attitude change rather than gross decisions to vote for one candidate instead of another.[28]

The Efficacy of Campaign Prescriptions

I have suggested that a congressional candidate's campaign can be usefully conceptualized as a not necessarily conscious attempt to exploit or surmount aspects of the context within which the election

[28] Unfortunately, for reasons of time, cost, and candidate reluctance we did not poll the electorate.

takes place. Lewis A. Froman and Stanley Kelley, with considerably different purposes in mind, have both prescribed campaign conduct. It may be worthwhile, therefore, to examine the efficacy of their prescriptions against my data and approach.

In "A Realistic Approach to Campaign Strategies and Tactics,"[29] Froman provides what is in effect a primer on how to win elections. He advises the candidate to develop group support, because this provides him with other people to share in the campaign effort. Furthermore, groups are mechanisms of communication which provide their members with criteria for evaluation and interpretation of information which are likely to be internalized. Groups have the means to enforce conformity of opinions and views. This may well be true; the problem for a candidate is that active groups of this kind—cohesive, organized, and militant—tend to be ideologically or few-issue oriented. It is difficult, if not impossible, for the candidate to maneuver for their support. They know that he is essentially either with or against them. Much as Mackay might have needed support from the AMA, his vote for Medicare precluded such aid. Moreover, ideological interest groups often tend to alienate the candidate's other potential or actual supporters. For this reason the Birch Society support for Blackburn was covert. Most groups, however, are simply not as well organized, as unified, or as interested in politics as Froman suggests. Mackay was far more the wooer than the wooed. And even when he garnered support from some union he was never sure that its members were industrious on his behalf.

Second, Froman stresses the obvious need for individual support. The key to this, he observes, is party identification. A candidate needs to get his supporters out to vote, activate latent supporters, and change the opposition. Froman contends that candidates should

> concentrate on style issues when dealing with their own supporters and on position issues when dealing with the opposition. . . . [W]ith opponents, broad generalizations about one's party being the party of peace, prosperity, and clean government are likely to backfire, because they already perceive their own party in those terms. With opponents, it is necessary to stress position issues which might give them grounds for thinking that perhaps the candidate is an exception to the usually perceived party differences and hence a feeling of safety in supporting him.[30]

[29] Jennings and Zeigler, op. cit., pp. 1–20.
[30] Ibid., pp. 8–9.

According to Froman, latents should have position rather than style issues pressed before them because they are likely to misperceive position issues.[31] But Mackay never clearly knew who his supporters and opponents were in crucial DeKalb county. Moreover, his supporters there, even if identifiable, favored him for a variety of reasons, not simply on the basis of party. Many of them opposed his party and some of his specific views but respected him personally (a category not particularly considered by Froman); for this group neither style nor position issues would have been effective. Other supporters liked his party but disliked him as an individual and his views (what they knew of them). Or they liked neither Mackay nor his party but endorsed his views (or rather some of his views). Besides, there was more than one Democratic party in the election. Some people supported him because he was a member of the Democratic party of Lester Maddox; others, because his was the Democratic party of President Lyndon B. Johnson. This does not exhaust the possible permutations, and we are only considering supporters in DeKalb county.

For Mackay the situation was actually even more complex. Even if his supporters had been identifiable in terms of party, specific issues, or candidate personality, how was he to devise appropriate style or position campaign messages to reinforce their support, and simultaneously concoct position issues to convince the doubting? Alternatively, how could he win the doubting with issues and retain supporters through style? Some appeals are mutually exclusive. This involves the nature and effect of the campaign messages. Moreover, the mass media, especially television and radio, which most candidates agree are indispensable, have a blunderbuss rather than a rifle effect; they are relatively indiscriminate. Despite the intervening variables of selective exposure and selective perception, it is difficult to direct a message through the media to Negro supporters without, at the same time, communicating it to anti-Negro lower-class white adherents.

In many ways Blackburn tried to follow Froman's prescriptions. He and his staff identified those precincts that had gone heavily for Goldwater and assumed that these voters were potential supporters. Attitude tests were conducted to determine which issues exercised the electorate. An attempt was made to direct the campaign around these salient issues at potential and actual adherents. Nevertheless, Blackburn too found it difficult to gear media messages coherently to supporters.

Because of the inadequacies of the media, both candidates sought out the people directly through personal appearances. But even here

[31] Ibid., p. 9.

they encountered the effects of their opponent's campaign. Thus Blackburn may not have wanted to, but towards the conclusion of his campaign he had to stress certain issues in order to respond to Mackay's attacks. And Mackay could not evade constituency concerns, particularly inflation and government spending, when they were emphasized by Blackburn.

I am suggesting that a candidate might do well to heed Froman's advice but that contextual factors may make it somewhat difficult to follow. More important, however, Froman's main interest in his article is in the winning of office. Consequently, he observes "that the behavior of the candidates during the campaign is one of the least influential factors in determining electoral outcomes." [32] It may well be that this emphasis on electoral outcome compounded by the prevalence of safe seats in Congress [33] partially explains the relative lack of study of congressional campaigns. Perhaps the approach suggested here of relating context to campaigns to voter attitudes, and de-emphasizing gross electoral outcome, may stimulate additional research.

Froman's prescriptions are designed to make campaigns more effective in garnering votes. Stanley Kelley, less concerned with election results, seeks to make campaigns bearers of rationality. To do so, it is necessary

> to encourage the distribution of all information relevant to the voters' decision, to ensure some equality in access to the electorate for rival candidates; to encourage those forms of campaigning that establish a relationship between audience and candidates similar to that presupposed by debate. [34]

If a campaign is a candidate's attempt to maneuver within contextual constraints and opportunities, what is the likelihood of Kelley's prescriptions being adopted?

A candidate's paramount concern is to exploit or overcome the campaign context and to thrust his name before the voters in ways which incline them to go to the polls and vote for him. This message is sent forth amidst a cacophony of distractions to an electorate, many of whose members have little desire to hear it. To earn attention it must be succinct, clear, and salient. It need neither educate nor conduce to issue discussion. It need not be rational nor lead to voter rationality. Furthermore, the candidates do not have great control over the issues.

[32] Ibid., p. 4.

[33] See Raymond E. Wolfinger and Joan Heifetz, "Safe Seats, Seniority, and Power in Congress," *American Political Science Review*, 59 (June, 1965), 337–49.

[34] Political Campaigning, op. cit., p. 155.

As in the Mackay–Blackburn election, many issues were thrust upon the candidates by dint of their previous involvements and the concerns of the voters. All Mackay and Blackburn could do was emphasize some subjects and try to ignore others. Accordingly, Mackay accentuated his experience and ability to get things done. Blackburn stressed his personal and political congruence with what he hoped was a majority of the electorate. The result was less the dialogue sought by Kelley and more like two barkers in a fairground promoting their respective and quite different shows (a combination of personality, party, and issue preference). And in plugging their attractions the candidates were not confined to megaphones but employed the entire panoply of the mass media.

As a solution to this kind of situation, Kelley urges debates. Most incumbent congressmen are chary of debating. Mackay was a rare exception. He decided to debate Blackburn because it was his natural inclination to try to educate his constituents on the issues, because it seemed appropriate to the high educational level of the constituency (especially DeKalb county), and because he thought it had worked in the past against Pickett. He also hoped to expose Blackburn's superficialities. Ironically, the debates may have had a deleterious effect for Mackay. They not only enabled interested voters to compare the candidates' personality, verbal facility, and apparent mastery of the issues of the day, they may have convinced some DeKalb voters that Blackburn was ideologically more compatible with their views than Mackay.

The trouble with Kelley's prescriptions, from a candidate's point of view, is that they are based less on the reality of political campaigning and the objectives of candidates than on the needs of the electorate as Kelley conceives them. It seems to me that the thrust of his argument for rationality is that elections should provide choices. Choice requires concern, but campaigns fail to impress on many voters the relevance and importance of problems and policies. Choice requires knowledge of alternatives, but campaigns state issues rhetorically, not analytically. Choice requires consciousness of a position or positions according to which alternatives may be accepted or rejected, but campaigns present slogans rather than principles. In sum, Kelley seems to be espousing delegation as proper to the interests of the electorate in a democracy.

The average incumbent has little reason to contribute to such a form of campaign rationality. His campaign is used to preserve his majority by exploiting favorable contextual factors. Debating gives an opponent equal time, unnecessary exposure, legitimacy, may diminish the impact of superior financing and, as in Mackay's case, raise issues which suggest

the incumbent is not representing the views of some of his constituents. Consequently, although they might not admit it, many incumbent congressmen seek by their campaigns to be trustees rather than delegates.[35] They are therefore unlikely to adopt Kelley's prescriptions voluntarily. And given the importance and complexity of the context in congressional campaigns in determining the electoral outcome, perhaps trustees are all we can expect.

[35] For the distinction see John C. Wahlke, et al., *The Legislative System* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1962), pp. 267–86.