

# ShinyHunters

## Seven Years of Data-Theft Capitalism

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From the database bazaar to a federated extortion brand: **3B+ records**, **300+ named victims**, and one alliance reshaping global cybercrime.

# ShinyHunters at a glance

The longest-running, most adaptive financially-motivated data-theft group of the past decade.

## 3B+

RECORDS STOLEN · LIFETIME

Across 7 years and 5 operational eras

## 3.65 TB

STOLEN FROM CANVAS

~330 institutions defaced May 7;  
Instructure paid the ransom May 11

## 5

DISTINCT OPERATIONAL ERAS

Each defined by a new attack surface —  
not an upgrade of the last

**Business model: exfiltrate, extort, leak.** Each era refines the same model and applies it one layer higher in the enterprise stack — consumer DBs → cloud warehouses → Salesforce CRM → SaaS supply chain → identity-platform fronts. As of July 2026 ShinyHunters runs multiple concurrent enterprise campaigns — not as a single group, but as a **federated brand**.

# Three developments the C-suite must internalize

**CRITICAL**

## The Salesforce Vishing Campaign

Industrial-scale voice-phishing — Google, Cisco, Adidas, Qantas, LVMH, Allianz, Workday, Pandora, Chanel, TransUnion. ShinyHunters claims **1.5B records** from **760 Salesforce tenants** via stolen Drift OAuth tokens.

**CRITICAL**

## The SLH Alliance Federation

August 2025: ShinyHunters + Scattered Spider + LAPSUS\$ publicly merge as **Scattered LAPSUS\$ Hunters**. Pooled initial access, exfiltration and extortion capability. Brand identity is now plural — and partially impersonated.

**HIGH**

## Education Is a Strategic Target

**3.65 TB / 275M** Canvas records via a Free-for-Teacher ticket flaw. ~330 portals defaced May 7; ransom paid May 11. Penn, Princeton, Harvard, McGraw Hill, Follett — sector-wide, not isolated.

# Five eras, one business model

Each era industrialises the previous era's tradecraft against a higher-leverage attack surface — same model, escalating blast radius.

**1** 2019–2021

## The Database Bazaar

### WHAT HAPPENED

Rose on the breach-forum economy. Databases auctioned on RaidForums; harvested creds reused.

### WHY IT MATTERS

Built the brand into a tradeable trademark that survived every later takedown.

**2** 2022–2023

## Law-Enforcement Reckoning

### WHAT HAPPENED

Raoult arrested 2022, sentenced 2024 (36 mo + \$5M). Co-conspirators indicted — ops continued.

### WHY IT MATTERS

Decapitation needs a leader. SH never had one — alliance ties were already live.

**3** 2024

## Snowflake Inferno

### WHAT HAPPENED

UNC5537 bought infostealer logs, walked into ~165 Snowflake tenants. AT&T paid ~\$370K BTC.

### WHY IT MATTERS

Broke the one-victim model — one platform under 165 enterprises, parallel extortion.

**4** Jun–Aug 2025

## Salesforce Vishing

### WHAT HAPPENED

Vishing → modified Data Loader → mass exfil. Aug 28: Drift OAuth theft — 760 tenants, 1.5B records.

### WHY IT MATTERS

"We have MFA" bypassed by social engineering. Defence shifts to identity and OAuth.

**5** Aug 2025–now

## SLH Alliance

### WHAT HAPPENED

SH + Scattered Spider + LAPSUS\$ federate. "Retirement" was performative — Aura, Canvas followed.

### WHY IT MATTERS

Brand is plural but unequal — treat attribution as brand, not forensic.

# Who is "ShinyHunters" today?

Per HivePro [TA2026107](#) (April 2026): the name is used by at least three operationally distinct entities. Treat every attribution claim as a marketing assertion to be validated.

## ENTITY 1

### The Original Cluster

Inside the SLH Alliance

High-end campaigns: Salesforce vishing (Cisco, Adidas, Qantas), Drift/Gainsight OAuth, Salesforce Aura, Canvas/Instructure. Operates the [shinyhunte.rs](#) DLS and the canonical Tox / BTC negotiation channels.

## ENTITY 2

### Impersonators

Extortion using the brand

Telegram and dark-web operators using the ShinyHunters name without affiliation. Observed in the May 2025 PowerSchool school-district re-extortion. ShinyHunters publicly denied operating retail sales channels.

## ENTITY 3

### Data Resellers

No intrusions, just resale

Operators like "DB+ Collector" who do not breach — they aggregate and resell infostealer-log credentials under the umbrella name. Their threat is credential exposure, not direct system compromise.

**IMPLICATION:** Paying one "ShinyHunters" extortion does not prevent another. The brand is plural — extortion liability is **per-claim, not per-actor**.

# Salesforce breach — five-step tradecraft loop

Each step has discrete defensive controls — and a different team accountable for them.

**1**

## Identity Acquisition

Vishing to help desk; IT-impersonation calls; victim-branded credential portals; real-time MFA relay; infostealer log markets.

&gt;

**2**

## Persistence

Register attacker MFA device; delete "method enrolled" emails (ToogleBox Recall); authorize malicious Connected Apps.

&gt;

**3**

## Lateral Movement

SSO session pivots  
Salesforce → M365 → SharePoint → Slack.  
Search for **confidential**, **internal**, **proposal**, **vpn**.

&gt;

**4**

## Exfiltration

Modified Salesforce Data Loader; PowerShell-driven SharePoint bulk downloads; OAuth token-stuffed API extraction.

&gt;

**5**

## Extortion

72-hour BTC timer via Tox; DLS publication; SMS harassment; DDoS amplification; private dataset sale up to \$1M.

**KEY:** No malware executes on an endpoint in steps 1–4. **EDR has zero defensive value** against this chain — the high-leverage controls are identity-side and SaaS-audit-side, not endpoint-side.

# CVEs in scope — direct & alliance-partner


ShinyHunters is identity-first; CVEs are minor. Most of the attack surface is SaaS integrations and OAuth abuse — not patchable bugs.

## DIRECTLY EXPLOITED BY SHINYHUNTERS & SLH PARTNERS

CVE	PRODUCT	CVSS	USE
CVE-2025-31324	SAP NetWeaver — unrestricted file upload	10.0	SLH publicly claimed exploit
CVE-2025-61882	Oracle E-Business Suite (BI Publisher)	9.8	SLH leaked PoC Oct 2025; CI0p mass exploit
CVE-2021-35587	Oracle Access Manager	9.8	"Yukari" persona — Oracle 12c data theft
CVE-2026-35273	Oracle PeopleSoft Enterprise PeopleTools	9.8	Unauthenticated RCE for initial access
no CVE	Salesforce Aura / Experience Cloud misconfig	—	Mar 2026 — ~400 companies
no CVE	Salesloft-Drift OAuth token theft	—	TruffleHog → 760 SF tenants → 1.5B records
no CVE	Gainsight Salesforce integration OAuth abuse	—	Nov 2025 — 285 SF instances

# Where ShinyHunters has hit hardest

Relative concentration of named victims across SLH-era operations, by sector.



## WHAT THIS TELLS US

### Financial services leads

Salesforce CRM penetration is highest — UNC6040 hits where the data is.

### Tech & SaaS clusters

Around the Drift/Gainsight cascade — vendors breached through their customers' integrations.

### Education is the newest escalation

Most concentrated — Penn → Harvard → Princeton → Canvas in 8 months.

# IOC landscape

High-level inventory. The complete IOC corpus — with full payment & negotiation indicators — is in the HiveForce Labs advisories on Oracle EBS, PeopleSoft, and ShinyHunters brand-hijack.

## 26

### IPV4 ADDRESSES

Across UNC6661 / UNC6671 / SLH clusters

## 22

### PHISHING DOMAINS

<company>sso, <company>okta

## 95+

### SHA256 HASHES

LummaC2, StealC, Vidar, RedLine, Meduza, Rhadamanthys

## 6

### NEGOTIATION CHANNELS

Tox, Tutanota, OnionMail, BTC, XMR, .onion DLS

### PRIORITY DETECTION TARGETS

- **Phishing domain pattern:** <company>sso.com, <company>okta.com, <company>internal.com — via NICENIC or Tucows.
- **Exchange / SharePoint:** deletes of "new MFA" / "method enrolled" emails; PowerShell UA downloading >50 files in 5 min.
- **OAuth grant anomaly:** ToogleBox Recall auth in Google Workspace; new Salesforce Connected App approvals outside change windows.
- **Network:** auth from Mullvad, Oxylabs, NetNut, 9Proxy, Infatica, nsocks — **hunt, do not blindly block.**

# MITRE ATT&CK — operational hotspots

Heat shows where SLH operators spend the most time.

## Initial Access

HIGH

- T1566.004 Spearphishing Voice
- T1078 Valid Accounts
- T1195 Supply Chain Compromise

## Credential Access

HIGH

- T1111 MFA Interception
- T1528 Steal App Access Token
- T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie

## Persistence

HIGH

- T1098.005 Device Registration
- T1136.003 Cloud Account

## Defense Evasion

MEDIUM

- T1550.001 App Access Token Reuse
- T1578.005 Modify Cloud Compute

## Collection

HIGH

- T1213 Data from Info Repos
- T1119 Automated Collection

## Exfiltration

HIGH

- T1567.002 Exfil to Cloud Storage
- T1041 Exfil over C2
- T1020 Automated Exfiltration

## Command & Control

MEDIUM

- T1071.001 Web Protocols
- T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy

## Impact

HIGH

- T1657 Financial Theft
- T1498 Network DoS

# The next 90 days

Where the SLH alliance is most likely to escalate — based on tradecraft maturity, attack-surface migration, and recently-claimed access.

## HIGH LIKELIHOOD

### Education-sector escalation continues

A confirmed payday on a 3.65 TB exfil invites pressure on Blackboard, D2L and Schoology customers, direct K-12 district extortion, donor/alumni lifts at more Ivies, and follow-on phishing against 9,000 Canvas institutions.

## HIGH LIKELIHOOD

### More Salesforce-AppExchange supply-chain hits

Drift and Gainsight set the playbook. Any AppExchange integration with broad OAuth scopes — analytics, AI assistants, marketing-attribution — is a viable vector. Expect another large OAuth cascade by Q3.

## MEDIUM LIKELIHOOD

### ShinySp1d3r RaaS launches operationally

The teased VMware ESXi ransomware would move SLH from pure data-theft into encryption-enabled double extortion. Initial victims likely in manufacturing or healthcare.

## MEDIUM LIKELIHOOD

### Government / NGO extortion expansion

EU Commission and CIC Vietnam show willingness to hit state-affiliated targets. Expect additional EU agencies, mid-tier national governments, and large NGOs — testing the political response calculus.

# Four pillars — ordered by leverage, not familiarity

Derived from HivePro TA2026107, the Mandiant Jan 2026 hardening guide, and SLH post-incident response patterns.

**1**

## Phishing-Resistant MFA

FIDO2 keys or passkeys for all workforce — mandatory for SSO admins. Push, SMS and TOTP are trivially captured by phishing. Hardware-bound credentials cannot be relayed.

**2**

## SaaS Integration Governance

Daily OAuth-token audit. Allowlist Connected Apps. Remove mass-export from non-admins. Define trusted IP ranges. Rotate API keys in GitHub, GitLab, Jira, Azure DevOps.

**3**

## Post-Compromise Detection

Alert on ToogleBox Recall auth, deletion of "MFA enrolled" emails, PowerShell SharePoint bulk downloads, Data Loader exports from untrusted IPs, Okta admin roles from anonymized IPs.

**4**

## 24-Hour Patch SLA on Internet-Facing Apps

Prioritize [CVE-2025-31324](#) (SAP NetWeaver), [CVE-2025-61882](#) (Oracle EBS), [CVE-2021-35587](#) (Oracle Access Manager).

# Leveraging the Hive Pro platform

Every row is actionable within an hour of read. Subscribe once, ingest continuously.

WORKFLOW	ACTION
<b>Threat Actor Search</b>	Subscribe to ShinyHunters, Scattered Spider, LAPSUS\$ — auto-alert on new IOCs / TTPs.
<b>Vulnerability Module</b>	Track & prioritize <a href="#">CVE-2025-31324</a> , <a href="#">2025-61882</a> , <a href="#">2021-35587</a> , <a href="#">2026-35273</a> .
<b>Malware Library</b>	Monitor LummaC2, StealC, Vidar, RedLine, Meduza, Rhadamanthys — the infostealer pipeline feeding SLH access.
<b>IOC Ingestion</b>	Auto-import IOCs from advisories <a href="#">TA2025307</a> , <a href="#">TA2026107</a> , <a href="#">TA2026165</a> into SIEM, EDR, firewall, SaaS-audit telemetry.
<b>Attack Surface Module</b>	Discover external exposure and map each exposed asset to known, operationally-exploited CVEs.
<b>Campaign Tracking</b>	Subscribe to active campaigns: Aura misconfig, SSO-vishing, Drift/Gainsight OAuth abuse, third-party SaaS supply-chain.

# Are you exposed to ShinyHunters?

Identify ShinyHunters / SLH-alliance exposure across your SaaS estate, identity stack, and external attack surface — in hours, not weeks.

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