

HiveForce Labs

THREAT ADVISORY



ATTACK REPORT

INC Ransomware: Rust-Based RaaS Exploiting Public-Facing Edge Devices

Date of Publication

July 17, 2026

Admiralty Code

A1

TA Number

TA2026203

Summary

First Seen: July 2023

Targeted Regions: Global (Except CIS countries)


Targeted Platforms: Windows, Linux, VMware ESXi

Targeted Industries: Manufacturing, Legal, Healthcare, Business Services & Consulting, Financial Services, Retail, Charitable Organizations, Government, Transportation, Technology, Education, Real Estate, Agriculture, Pharmaceutical, Energy, Telecommunications, Associations, Media, Aerospace, Defense, Insurance, Religion, Hospitality, Aviation, Food Service

Malware: INC ransomware (aka GOLD IONIC, G1032)

Attack: INC is a Rust-based ransomware-as-a-service operation (aka GOLD IONIC) that has claimed 800+ victims since 2023 and ranks among 2026's most active groups, hitting legal, manufacturing, healthcare, technology, and construction targets predominantly in the US. Operators gain entry via unpatched edge appliances (notably CVE-2023-3519 and CVE-2023-48788) or broker-supplied credentials, then use living-off-the-land binaries and a modified Veeam credential dumper to move laterally across Windows, Linux, and ESXi. Data is exfiltrated to attacker cloud storage before double-extortion encryption, with aggressive defense impairment via driver-dropping process killers and shadow-copy deletion. Pressure is applied through a Tor negotiation portal, a public leak site, wallpaper defacement, and ransom notes printed to networked printers.

🔪 Attack Regions



CVE	NAME	AFFECTED PRODUCT	ZERO-DAY	CISA KEV	PATCH
CVE-2023-3519	Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway Code Injection Vulnerability	Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway			
CVE-2023-48788	Fortinet FortiClient EMS SQL Injection Vulnerability	Fortinet FortiClient EMS			
CVE-2024-5772	SimpleHelp Path Traversal Vulnerability	SimpleHelp Remote Support Software			
CVE-2025-5777	CitrixBleed 2 (Citrix NetScaler Gateway Out-of-Bounds Read Vulnerability)	Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway			

Attack Details

#1

INC Ransom is a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation that emerged in July 2023, also tracked under the alias GOLD IONIC. It established itself as a semi-private, affiliate-based operation rather than a rebrand, and by 2026 matured into a top-tier operator, with more than 800 victims claimed since 2023. Its rise was opportunistic, the disruption of LockBit and shutdown of BlackCat pushed affiliates and tooling toward INC.

#2

The group's ecosystem influence is distinctive. In May 2024 the source code was listed on underground forums for \$300,000; shortly after, the Lynx operation emerged with substantial code overlap, and Sinobi later appeared, the original brand continues to operate while its codebase propagates into adjacent families. Victimology is US-centric: the United States accounts for 60% of victims, with a long tail led by Australia, Canada, and Germany, and a complete absence of CIS-region victims, suggesting CIS-based operators. The 2026 top five sectors are legal services, manufacturing, technology, healthcare, and construction, a shift away from the earlier education focus.

#3

The attack chain favors known techniques. Initial access comes via spear-phishing, IAB credentials, and public-facing exploits, CVE-2023-3519 (Citrix NetScaler), CVE-2023-48788 (Fortinet EMS), CVE-2024-57727 (SimpleHelp), and CVE-2025-5777 (Citrix Bleed 2). A modified Veeam credential dumper upgraded for salted-DPAPI, RDP/PsExec lateral movement, a BYOVD process terminator that drops vulnerable drivers, remote-access tooling for C2, and 7-Zip plus rclone exfiltration round out the toolkit.

#4

Both payloads are now Rust-based. The Windows encryptor deletes shadow copies, uses a hybrid Salsa20/AES scheme with Curve25519 ECC, and appends a .INC extension. The Linux/ESXi variant supports --esxi (VM shutdown via vim-cmd), --motd, --daemon, and fast/medium/slow modes, deriving per-file AES-128-CTR keys via X25519 ECDH. Extortion is double-sided, a credentialed negotiation site plus a public leak site, combined with wallpaper hijacking, INC-README notes, and automated network printing of ransom notes.

Recommendations



Patch Exploited Edge Appliances: Prioritize remediation of the internet-facing vulnerabilities tied to INC intrusions, CVE-2023-3519 (Citrix NetScaler ADC/Gateway), CVE-2023-48788 (Fortinet FortiClient EMS), CVE-2024-57727 (SimpleHelp RMM), and CVE-2025-5777 (Citrix Bleed 2), and maintain a vulnerability management program that fast-tracks fixes for flaws known to be exploited by ransomware operators.



Harden and Monitor Remote Access: Restrict RDP and SSH exposure from the internet, harden and monitor external remote services, and enforce multifactor authentication on all remote and privileged access points to blunt the value of broker-supplied and stolen credentials.



Protect Veeam and Backup Infrastructure: Isolate backup servers, apply least-privilege service accounts, and monitor for base64-encoded PowerShell execution and unauthorized SQL queries against Veeam credential stores that indicate use of the modified Veeam-Get-Creds credential dumper.



Enforce Strong Identity Controls: Require complex, regularly rotated alphanumeric passwords, watch for the creation of new privileged accounts, and alert on off-hours authentication and anomalous administrative activity.



Maintain Offline, Immutable Backups: Follow the 3-2-1 backup rule with at least one offline or immutable copy stored off-site under separate credentials, and routinely test restoration to ensure recovery without paying a ransom.



Deploy Anti-Tamper EDR: Run endpoint detection and response with behavioral detection and anti-tamper protections enabled, and monitor for driver-based process termination (including the vulnerable drivers filwfp.sys, filnk.sys, and fildds.sys), Volume Shadow Copy deletion, and safe-mode boot manipulation.



Monitor Living-off-the-Land and RMM Tooling: Alert on suspicious use of PsExec, WMIC, net, and network scanners such as Advanced IP Scanner and nmap, and inventory or restrict unsanctioned remote management tools including AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, and TeamViewer.



Detect Staging and Exfiltration: Watch for 7-Zip archiving of large data sets and outbound transfers via rclone or MegaSync to cloud storage such as Mega.nz, and block or closely monitor access to unsanctioned file-sharing services.



Potential MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

Tactic	Technique	Sub-technique
Initial Access	<u>T1190</u> : Exploit Public-Facing Application	
	<u>T1566</u> : Phishing	<u>T1566.001</u> : Spearphishing Attachment
	<u>T1078</u> : Valid Accounts	
Execution	<u>T1059</u> : Command and Scripting Interpreter	<u>T1059.001</u> : PowerShell
		<u>T1059.003</u> : Windows Command Shell
Persistence	<u>T1543</u> : Create or Modify System Process	<u>T1543.003</u> : Windows Service
	<u>T1136</u> : Create Account	
Privilege Escalation	<u>T1078</u> : Valid Accounts	
Defense Evasion	<u>T1562</u> : Impair Defenses	<u>T1562.001</u> : Disable or Modify Tools
		<u>T1562.009</u> : Safe Boot Mode
	<u>T1070</u> : Indicator Removal	
Credential Access	<u>T1003</u> : OS Credential Dumping	



Tactic	Technique	Sub-technique
Discovery	<u>T1046</u> : Network Service Scanning	
	<u>T1057</u> : Process Discovery	
	<u>T1087</u> : Account Discovery	
Lateral Movement	<u>T1021</u> : Remote Services	<u>T1021.001</u> : Remote Desktop Protocol
		<u>T1021.002</u> : SMB/Windows Admin Shares
Command and Control	<u>T1219</u> : Remote Access Software	
Collection	<u>T1560</u> : Archive Collected Data	<u>T1560.001</u> : Archive via Utility
Exfiltration	<u>T1567</u> : Exfiltration Over Web Service	<u>T1567.002</u> : Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
Impact	<u>T1486</u> : Data Encrypted for Impact	
	<u>T1490</u> : Inhibit System Recovery	
	<u>T1491</u> : Defacement	<u>T1491.001</u> : Internal Defacement
	<u>T1529</u> : System Shutdown/Reboot	

✂ Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

TYPE	VALUE
SHA256	31800380c359143ae82c4f9011eee653dd22443d03d6a499148203bbfc275502, ea721240c14e3d14f8d88e0020880448c6c602f1180a1e5dbe40871cf eedcc22, 8d1a22c430252f29611766b8e4a82af0fba60d609246463466b384d6d 4793df4, bf8c45e5aa9551a17eefbd1d179422c32b4309c47ee9a3f315bb80ed6 d4f7efc, 6bf155b269d452f3c3b62832b27bbebe4da436e228dbf521155b1d59 89e3743f, 1898d056463284d849801cbdea6a3dec6c9f568f01569912c3868a5ee a9a5449, 24f6c0ca39b2a5593086ff56d818ddfbde121f8e44d54faa762e510397 dc9db7, dc9938f51150d13a69fc25f3f19052eacb1bf0a086fd5cf39762501fb3d dd7da, acce811c4fc2a6e3fddd4231e386f1648ca44f039d2d275316bc0a0fc96 e0af4, 90e46e89fec2108a1cb4850bb33e3563e92a14d04e1e613ac8c9311f1 52d294c, ff5da8f0330a4c581c37284c74aae2683c007dc6e406e1e2e6803e7bb 398b77b, 97aebda5482899fef84a24e456bff055acaa47e5ab4029f768d9e0c62a 660ce2, 1d10d8f5a420d0e4683b4cb40bcf0c984d1e7ea1f3b4442a00a525584 632ac11, f6a01d0246ce31faf6938ea488086d4358505405a4ef5c5faa482e79e9 2cb347, d65120291dee76c694f8bea54841f7f68329b499b28f4aee5ea5c9369 a7432cb, 765508aa2ec6a1b73a76a23f4fa559d32355622748c91a46ed7b315ea e2ee60a, d26bfb0147f60dc6500a9298d521ee67b49daaf4b8f8be54e7cc8fd86a 597570

TYPE	VALUE
SHA256	589d9480fbfec2d8e61638eb0b537183d0f9977411fd1d2c0f8eb611fe ebe880, 7f37351979c249417cb180b4ede0ed17e5fe2a1f08add4d72606b589f 8fdb245, 5cc212f84d2bf3fbab165aaf09b16e00fcf2f1ccd880d24b14404c53dcd bf241, 60aeb9f7bccf377ff02ed64783e66a62c0f976878d9729b067bc7e5b0b 9da9d6, 6cd349eda0fa6c8b274a0920852c68f8b727afea1fdbbc69ad183cef05d 9cf141
Domains	incblog[.]su, Incbackend[.]top, Incapt[.]blog
TOR Addresses	incblog6qu4y4mm4zvw5nrmue6qbwgtgjsxpwb7ixzssu36tsajldoad[.]o nion, incpaykabjqc2mtdxq6c23nqh4x6m5dkps5fr6vgdkgzp5njssx6qkid[.]oni on, incblog7vmuq7rktic73r4ha4j757m3ptym37tyvifzp2roedyzzxid[.]onio n, incbackrlasjesgpfu5brktfjknbqoahe2hhmqfhasc5fb56mtukn4yd[.]onio n, incbacg6bfwtrlzwdbqc55gsfl763s3twdtwhp27dzuik6s6rwdcityd[.]oni on
Filenames	INC-README.txt, INC-README.html, ipscan.exe, Advanced_IP_Scanner_2.5.3850.exe, netscan.exe, pskill.exe, ProcessTerminator.exe, filwfp.sys, filnk.sys, fildds.sys, Veeam-Get-Creds.ps1
File Paths	C:\Program Files\Angry IP Scanner\ipscan.exe, C:\ProgramData\VMware\libsm2\netscan.exe

Patch Links

CVE-2023-3519:

<https://support.citrix.com/supporthome/kbsearch/article?articleNumber=CTX561482>

CVE-2023-48788: <https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/psirt/FG-IR-24-007>

CVE-2024-57727: <https://guides.simple-help.com/kb---security-vulnerabilities-01-2025#security-vulnerabilities>

CVE-2025-5777: <https://support.citrix.com/support-home/kbsearch/article?articleNumber=CTX693420>

Recent Breaches

<https://www.kyokuto.com/en/>

<https://www.statebankofnauvoo.com/>

<https://asa-international.com>

<https://oakparkmi.gov>

<https://samberger24.de>

<https://tecnocurva.com.br>

<https://carvalima.com.br>

<https://tricountyhs.org>

<https://ezortea.com.br>

<https://tambasa.com>

<https://hamilton-eye.com>

<https://acworth-ga.gov>

<https://www.roundshield.com/>

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<https://www.acronis.com/en/tru/posts/from-emerging-threat-to-top-tier-ransomware-as-a-service-the-evolution-of-inc-ransomware/>

<https://www.checkpoint.com/cyber-hub/threat-prevention/ransomware/inc-ransom-group-detection-and-prevention/>

<https://www.bitsight.com/underground/threat-actors/inc-ransom>

<https://www.rescana.com/post/inc-ransomware-incident-analysis-exploiting-citrix-netscaler-and-fortinet-vulnerabilities-through-double-extortion-attac>

<https://www.fortiguard.com/threat-actor/6333/inc-ransomware>

What Next?

At Hive Pro, it is our mission to detect the most likely threats to your organization and to help you prevent them from happening.

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