

**“IT IS CLEAR WHAT IS HAPPENING,
AND ACTION NEEDS TO FOLLOW”**

Insiders Speak: NGO Antisemitism, Failed Accountability, and
Their Impact on Social Cohesion

EiGHT

SCRUTINY. ACCOUNTABILITY. RENEWAL.

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“Jewish employees raised concerns openly at first.

Then less often.

Then not at all.

In time, **they were all gone.**”

— NGO staffer from international NGO

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This report acknowledges the brave and principled staff of human rights, humanitarian, development, and environmental NGOs whose experiences and insights inform its findings—and all those committed to universality, impartiality, independence, and humanity: the founding values of a sector that betrays its mission when politics, ideology, or institutional interests override principle.

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

“... at this point there is no need to establish direction or facts further, it is clear what is happening, and action needs to follow.”

— Working Group on Antisemitism, international humanitarian organization, August 2025

Human rights and humanitarian organizations are among the most influential forces in modern society. They shape policymakers, media, courts, educational institutions, and public opinion, and serve as primary architects of the moral and legal vocabulary through which we understand conflict, rights, and justice.

Yet the sector largely operates according to non-binding guidelines, voluntary commitments, and self-regulatory frameworks—exercising significant public influence without meaningful external scrutiny or consistently demonstrated methodological rigor.

What external examination exists relies largely on organizational self-reporting rather than independent investigation of how organizations function in practice.

This 63-page submission represents the first independent and extensive account of how the human rights and humanitarian NGO sector has failed to uphold the values it exists to promote, drawn primarily from the first-hand experiences of professionals from within it.

EiGHT submits that this combination of substantial influence and limited accountability has produced inadequate institutional responses to antisemitism, and to practices that actively undermine social cohesion.

The evidence for this submission is drawn from inside the sector itself. Since October 7, 2023, EiGHT has engaged with more than 70 professionals—Jewish and non-Jewish—from global human rights, humanitarian, environmental, and development organizations. These include Amnesty International, Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières/MSF), Greenpeace, Human Rights Watch, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Mercy Corps, Plan International, Save the Children, and UNICEF.

Most of the organizations featured directly or indirectly in this submission have a presence in Australia through national sections, affiliate offices, or operational programs. They also engage with Australian policy, media, and public discourse, making the conduct documented in this submission directly relevant to the Commission’s mandate.

Contributors span senior leadership, program and policy roles, communications, fundraising, research, editorial, and human resources functions, and are drawn from offices across Europe, North America, the Middle East, Asia-Pacific, and Australia.

The accounts documented in this submission do not reflect the views of a single department, region, or level of seniority; they reflect a pattern embedded across organizational structures, geographies, and functions.

Across accounts, several themes emerge:

Inaction, minimization, and retaliation

Documented complaints about hostile behavior related to Jews, Israel, or Israelis, and professional standards failures connected to Israel work have consistently failed to produce meaningful consequences. Staff past and present describe managerial indifference, ostracism, and in some cases apparent retaliation. The absence of independent reporting mechanisms and trusted complaints processes leaves most without meaningful redress.

Silencing, self-censorship, and the suppression of open discourse

Contributors describe workplace cultures in which dissent is dismissed or disparaged. They also report environments where challenging official dogma or raising concerns about Israel-related work—regardless of experience or the substance of the position—risks being mischaracterized as politically motivated; met without evidentiary rebuttal or substantive engagement; and/or attributed to personal grievance rather than professional conscience. Fear of professional and social consequences produces widespread self-censorship extending beyond Jewish staff to colleagues who raised similar concerns.

Hostile internal cultures

Formal commitments to neutrality coexist within internal cultures that contributors described as ideologically activist on Israel and hostile to Jewish identity. Internal communications platforms host content that violates organizational standards. Social media operates as a parallel, largely unaddressed sphere in which staff propagate and amplify rhetoric—including staff openly defending the perpetrators of the October 7 attacks in Israel—that runs counter to policies and theoretically would not survive formal editorial review.

Leadership modeling of hostility

When the most senior figures in the sector publicly model dehumanizing attitudes toward Israel and Jews, they set institutional tone and establish the boundaries of acceptable discourse for those below them. Contributors repeatedly describe managers who minimized or dismissed concerns, with formal complaints frequently met with expressions of sympathy and no further action.

Methodological failures and narrative shaping

Contributors describe recurring failures including omitting material context, failing to correct known inaccuracies for political reasons, asymmetric sourcing standards, and lack of rigor in editing and fact-checking. Beyond inadvertent error, internal documents show that narrative influence has been treated as articulated institutional priority—with coverage, framing, and legal conclusions at times shaped by advocacy objectives and donor incentives, not evidentiary standards.

NDA's and silencing

In some cases, non-disclosure agreements appear to have been deployed not as standard confidentiality protections but as instruments of intimidation—including requiring employees who have made formal complaints to affirm no wrongdoing had occurred. The cases of Plan International and Greenpeace, both with Australian operations, illustrate how these mechanisms can function to protect institutions rather than employees.

Impact on individuals and social cohesion

Jewish staff reported exclusion, psychological harm, and professional vulnerability within workplaces ostensibly committed to equality. Survey evidence indicates the problem is sector-wide: 55% of Jewish professionals in secular humanitarian organizations reported experiencing or witnessing anti-Jewish bias; 73% said organizational responses were ineffective; and only 12% said their workplace provided tools and resources for dealing with antisemitic statements or behavior.

The accountability gap and its public consequences

The failures documented in this submission do not remain contained within the sector. These organizations are not merely commentators on public life—they are among its architects. The concepts, frameworks, and moral vocabulary through which societies understand conflict, rights, and justice are substantially shaped by NGO outputs. When those outputs are flawed, partial, or shaped by advocacy objectives rather than evidence, the consequences move through academic institutions, media, courts, and governments—gathering authority at each stage until they are received by most people as settled truth. The Antoinette Lattouf case against the ABC—at the center of which lay an unexamined Human Rights Watch assertion—illustrates the mechanism directly.

The findings in this submission span workplace culture, governance, methodological integrity, and public outputs. They are grounded in the first-hand experiences of people who have dedicated their professional—and in many cases personal—lives to human rights or supporting humanitarian efforts. They come from inside the sector, not outside it, and cannot credibly be characterized as uninformed or hostile to the broader rights agenda.

II. KEY FINDINGS

THE FOLLOWING FINDINGS RECUR ACROSS ORGANIZATIONS, INDIVIDUALS, AND EVIDENCE TYPES—AND COLLECTIVELY POINT TO SYSTEMIC FAILURE RATHER THAN ISOLATED MISCONDUCT.

Lack of accountability

No meaningful consequences following documented complaints, policy violations, or leadership misconduct.

Selective application of core principles and standards

Universalism, neutrality, evidentiary rigor, and duty of care applied inconsistently, with different standards routinely applied to work involving Israel and to complaints involving Jewish staff.

Lack of transparency

Editorial corrections withheld, material context omitted, and institutional priorities concealed. Internal documents indicate that narrative influence has driven outputs publicly presented as independent findings.

Failure to act on antisemitism

Complaints trigger definitional debates rather than investigations. Antisemitism is treated as uniquely disputable and politically inconvenient.

Exclusion of Jewish staff from relevant processes

Jewish perspectives treated as politically compromised. Jewish staff have been excluded from discussions about antisemitism, Israel-related work, and organizational responses directly affecting them.

Absence of safe and independent avenues of redress

Lack of trusted third-party reporting mechanisms. Internal complaints processes are embedded within structures prioritizing institutional protection over staff welfare.

Retaliation against staff raising concerns

Jewish and non-Jewish staff who raised concerns face marginalization, role elimination, and enforced silence through NDAs extending far beyond standard confidentiality norms.

Hostile work environments tolerated

Internal platforms, workplace cultures, and social media operate without meaningful oversight, hosting content that violates internal standards and would not be tolerated were it directed at any other minority group.

Leaders modeling hostility

Senior figures publicly express dehumanizing views toward Israel and Jews, chilling reporting of abuses and establishing an institutional tone for others to follow.

Methodological failures in institutional outputs

Material is omitted, context is selective, coverage is shaped by political rather than evidentiary considerations, and conclusions appear in some cases to have preceded evidence selection.

Systematic disregard for Israeli and Jewish victims

Israeli and Jewish civilians, including hostages, receive systematically less institutional attention, empathy, and advocacy than victims in comparable contexts, including via deliberate language choices minimizing their status.

Sector-wide self-censorship and chilling effects

Fear of professional and social consequences produce widespread underreporting and suppression of identity, extending beyond Jewish staff to colleagues who raised similar concerns.

Institutional outputs contributing to broader social harm

Flawed findings, uncorrected errors, and deliberate narrative-shaping by organizations with significant public authority are transmitted through media, academia, policy, and law—amplifying prejudice and impacting social cohesion under the guise of independent findings.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

EIGHT SUBMITS THAT THE EVIDENCE BASE PRESENTED IN THIS SUBMISSION IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT CONCRETE ACTION, AND RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDS THAT THE COMMISSION:

Establish independent access and voice for affected staff

Require NGOs operating in Australia—particularly those receiving public funding and tax concessions—to provide staff with access to genuinely independent, third-party reporting pathways for discrimination complaints, including antisemitism. Internal complaints processes embedded within organizational hierarchies have demonstrably failed to provide meaningful redress and should not be treated as sufficient. The Commission should additionally establish a confidential mechanism through which current and former NGO staff, workplace discrimination specialists, governance professionals, and independent experts can provide evidence directly. Many contributors to this submission expressed willingness to testify if appropriate protections are in place.

Establish a standing independent oversight mechanism

This body should have authority to receive complaints, initiate investigations, publish findings, make binding recommendations to organizations receiving public funding and tax concessions. The mechanism should be constituted with fixed, non-renewable terms; appointed through a process requiring sign-off from a panel comprising legal, governance, academic, and community representatives—with the NGO sector excluded from decisive influence. It should be subject to mandatory cooling-off periods prohibiting appointment of former NGO staff and maintain publicly accessible conflicts of interest registers. Funding should be statutory and independent of both government discretionary allocation and NGO contribution. After five years, an independently appointed reviewer should conduct a parliamentary review of effectiveness. The Australian Financial Complaints Authority provides a domestic precedent for a statutory, sector-independent body with binding authority and own-motion investigation powers.

Require public reporting of findings and outcomes

Require that the independent oversight mechanism publish its findings, determinations, and recommendations in full, subject only to necessary redactions to protect complainant identity. Organizations subject to investigation should be required to publish their responses to findings and detail remedial steps taken, with timelines for compliance. Suppression of findings—whether through confidentiality agreements, institutional pressure, or procedural delay—should be treated as an aggravating factor in any subsequent assessment of organizational conduct.

Condition public funding on enforceable accountability standards

Recommend that Australian government funding and tax exemption frameworks for NGOs incorporate enforceable minimum standards relating to non-discrimination, effective complaints-handling, whistleblower protection, and workplace dignity—with compliance assessed independently rather than self-reported. Require that NGOs demonstrate their institutional responses to antisemitism are consistent with responses to other forms of racism and discrimination.

Investigate the weaponization of NDAs

Examine the use of non-disclosure agreements, non-disparagement clauses, and confidentiality provisions in NGO employment disputes—with particular attention to whether such mechanisms are being deployed

to silence staff, suppress complaints, or require employees to affirm that no wrongdoing occurred as a condition of financial settlement.

Commission an independent survey of Jewish staff experiences

Direct an independent body to conduct a confidential, sector-wide survey of current and former Jewish professionals within human rights and humanitarian NGOs operating in Australia, in order to establish the scale, nature, and institutional handling of reported concerns. An Australia-specific survey would establish the domestic picture with the precision required for targeted policy response.

Develop and enforce sector-wide standards with independent benchmarking

Recommend the development of independent, publicly available standards covering governance, methodological rigor, neutrality, transparency, and workplace discrimination—with minimum benchmarks against which organizational performance can be assessed, published, and acted upon. Support development of an external accountability index through which NGO adherence to those standards can be scored and made publicly available to donors, governments, media, and the public.

Examine the public consequences of methodological failure

Investigate the role of human rights and humanitarian organizations in shaping public discourse—specifically where institutional outputs produced under the conditions documented in this submission have contributed to antisemitism, dehumanization, or social fragmentation.

“Over time, a workplace dedicated to truth-telling developed an atmosphere of fear and conformity.”

— NGO staffer from international NGO

IV. ABOUT EIGHT

EiGHT was founded by human rights, humanitarian, and other professionals from global NGOs. It is the first insider-led initiative focused on systemic problems within the sector, particularly gaps in oversight and accountability that organizations have too often treated as isolated incidents.

EiGHT takes a proactive, solutions-oriented approach. Its current focus areas include:

- Establishing measurable, transparent norms in the rights and humanitarian space;
- Developing independent indices to assess methodology, rigor, and governance;
- Advancing third-party oversight and independent reporting mechanisms for staff;
- Supporting professionals silenced by non-disclosure agreements;
- Increasing transparency and informed public scrutiny; and
- Building partnerships to promote an ecosystem grounded in neutrality, universalism, and open debate.

V. METHODOLOGY

This submission draws on first-hand accounts from more than 70 professionals within the human rights, humanitarian, development, and environmental NGO sector, as well as review of internal documents, communications, and secondary sources, including media reporting and academic literature.

All the professionals whose experiences are reflected here are either still working in their NGOs, remain in the sector, or left within the last four years. A significant proportion have left since October 7, 2023.

EiGHT models its evidentiary approach on investigative standards the sector itself claims to uphold: documenting first-hand accounts, corroborating where possible, and protecting the dignity and security of witnesses. Contributors who have requested anonymity have done so citing fear of retaliation.

Like these organizations, EiGHT considers this approach to serve both evidentiary and representational purposes—establishing facts while ensuring affected individuals are properly heard. EiGHT fully subscribes to the position of human rights organizations that interviewing victims and witnesses gives them “an opportunity to have their voices and stories reach a wider audience”—and helps “develop the recommendations we address to authorities for cessation and redress” of failures.¹

Consistent with established human rights investigative practice, EiGHT considers recurring accounts from individuals unconnected to one another—particularly where corroborated by documents, communications, or consistent institutional responses—to indicate systemic patterns rather than isolated incidents.

The limitations inherent in this document—including self-selection of most contributors—are ones the sector acknowledges in its own published and cited investigative work. They do not invalidate the patterns documented, but they do reinforce why independent investigation, rather than organizational self-assessment, is required. All interviews cited were conducted between April 2024 and May 2026.

¹ “Our Research Methodology,” Human Rights Watch, <https://www.hrw.org/our-research-methodology> (accessed May 2026).

VI. ANTISEMITISM IN CIVIL SOCIETY

A persistent challenge in addressing antisemitism is lack of consensus around definitions. Definitional debates can become circular, and at times function to delay or avoid addressing conduct that is clearly unacceptable.

This submission therefore does not confine itself to contested definitional thresholds. Instead—recognizing that criticism of Israeli government policy, Zionism, or nationalism is not inherently antisemitic—it focuses on, and refers to, observable culture and behavior that targets or negatively affects Jewish and Israeli staff, colleagues perceived as sympathetic to their concerns, or individuals raising concerns about work related to Israel-Palestine.

This includes differential standards, exclusionary workplace dynamics, dehumanizing rhetoric, and other patterns of conduct inconsistent with the principles and standards that human rights and humanitarian organizations claim to uphold, and that have not been tolerated in relation to other minority groups.

A key feature of antisemitism in the human rights and humanitarian sphere is that it is barely acknowledged and often coded. One employee of a global environmental NGO said:

“In my circles, the issue is not individual cases of antisemitism or open Jew-hatred. The issue is a kind of systemic pollution of international NGO spaces and transnational federations with the constant demonization of Israel, the total acquittal of Palestinian leadership, and the adoption of anti-Israel language, like genocide, intifada, settler-colonialism, etc.”²

Rather than overt exclusion or explicit discriminatory policy, contributors described environments in which antisemitism was frequently reframed as political disagreement and deflected into debates about Israel and Zionism—rather than recognized and addressed as a distinct form of discrimination.

As a non-Jewish staffer in Amnesty International Australia said:

“I noticed a tendency within the organisation [after the Bondi beach attacks in December 2025] to frame efforts to address antisemitism as attempts to restrict criticism of Israel.”³

The evidentiary threshold for raising concerns about antisemitism or work relating to Israel appears significantly higher than in other contexts, and often effectively impossible to meet.

EiGHT reviewed multi-page dossiers compiled by staff and submitted to managers in at least three different global rights, humanitarian, and environmental NGOs that contained first-hand accounts and documented violations of basic norms of dignity, respect, and neutrality. None appear to have resulted in further meaningful questions or action.

For example, a document submitted to managers in 2025 by a Working Group on Antisemitism in an

2 Interview with Zsuzsanna Ujj, biodiversity policy expert and environmental advocate with extensive experience across government administration and international civil society sectors.

3 Testimony of Amnesty International Australia staffer. On December 14, 2025, two gunmen killed 15 people and injured 40 in an attack at Bondi Beach during a Hanukkah celebration attended by around 1,000 people. The Islamic State later claimed responsibility.

international organization with several state and territory offices in Australia, stated:

“Since May 2024, while initial reactions were positive, several proposals, such as a dedicated taskforce on antisemitism and inclusion of antisemitism in staff integration programs, have not seen follow-through.... Many of these incidents, such as slurs, Holocaust trivialization, and conspiracy theories about Jews, were either tolerated or resulted in inadequate follow-up. Last year there was a suggestion to appoint a task force but at this point there is no need to establish direction or facts further, it is clear what is happening, and action needs to follow.”⁴

Many people interviewed stated they did not know of any instance in which complaints relating to antisemitism had led to substantial organizational reflection, independent investigation, structural reform, or sustained institutional initiatives comparable to those implemented in response to movements such as #MeToo or Black Lives Matter.

In those other contexts, many organizations moved swiftly, initiating mandatory trainings, listening sessions, external audits, leadership statements, structural reviews, affinity groups, and organization-wide policy reform.⁵

Contributors describe a starkly different response when Jewish staff raised concerns—skepticism and dismissal from the same organizations that publicly committed to “lived experience” and “tackling discrimination and racism.”⁶

Lack of broad inclusion of Jewish staff in discussions about antisemitism has also been notable.

One non-Jewish staff member at Amnesty International Australia noted a “disturbing rise in anti-Zionist ideology within the organisation,” with the term “Zionist” frequently used in a “disparaging or pejorative manner.” Despite this, the staffer said:

“I am not aware of any organisational effort to define Zionism in consultation with the many Jewish community groups and individuals for whom it forms part of their identity.”⁷

Many said they felt treated as politically compromised participants whose perspectives were viewed with suspicion or qualification. Contributors described situations in which Jewish concerns were filtered through debates over Israel, Zionism, “power,” or alleged political motivations.

4 Working Group on Antisemitism 2025, internal document submitted to management, international humanitarian organization with Australian operations, 2025, document on file with EIGHT.

5 In 2020, for example, when current and former staffers accused Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) of institutional racism and colonial structures, MSF issued an apology and promised reforms. “Médecins Sans Frontières is ‘institutionally racist,’ say 1,000 insiders,” Guardian, July 10, 2020, <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/jul/10/medecins-sans-frontieres-institutionally-racist-medical-charity-colonialism-white-supremacy-msf> (accessed May 2026); In July 2020, the international leadership of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) made a “public commitment to tackle discrimination and racism within our organisation.” The Core Executive Committee (Core ExCom) pledged to “lead the way for the radical action sought after and demanded by our associations,” see: “Tackling Institutional Discrimination and Racism within MSF,” Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), July 2020, <https://www.msf.org/tackling-institutional-discrimination-and-racism-within-msf> (accessed May 2026).

6 For example, Amnesty International Canada states on its hiring page: “We believe our work is stronger when it benefits from the experience, knowledge and wisdom of people who have faced systemic barriers, and encourage applications from qualified candidates who have lived experience as a member of historically underrepresented communities.” See: “Work with Us,” Amnesty International Canada, <https://www.amnesty.ca/work-with-us/> (accessed May 2026).

7 Testimony of Amnesty International Australia staff member.

One contributor summarized the dynamic as follows:

“The conversation never becomes: ‘What happened, and why did this employee experience it as antisemitic?’ Instead, it immediately becomes: ‘But what is antisemitism really? What about Zionism? What about Gaza?’ You end up circling the drain of definitions while nothing is actually investigated.”⁸

Contributors repeatedly described complaints processes as focused less on examining underlying conduct than on determining whether conduct met increasingly narrow or contested thresholds for recognition as antisemitism. In practice, employees past and present said this often resulted in institutional paralysis in which no meaningful inquiry, accountability, or remediation followed.

In one instance in 2025, someone who had worked at a human rights organization and was seeking a professional reference from a former colleague was met first with silence, then a question:

“I note that the [organization] uses the IHRA definition of antisemitism—does that mean that ‘from the river to the sea,’ for example, would be defined as antisemitic?⁹... Countering antisemitism is a hugely important priority but so is ensuring that countering antisemitism doesn’t lead to the silencing of pro-Palestinian speech.”

The former employee replied:

“I don’t need the reference, so let’s take that off the table.... I am fascinated by the idea that your values would be a factor in vouching for my professionalism.”¹⁰

ANTISEMITISM: CONTESTED DEFINITIONS, ABSENT ACCOUNTABILITY

Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch do not subscribe to the IHRA working definition of antisemitism—the definition that Australia adopted in 2021.¹¹ Human Rights Watch has formally opposed its adoption, arguing the definition has been used to suppress legitimate criticism of Israel and pro-Palestinian advocacy and conflates political speech with racial hatred.¹² Amnesty International was among more than 100 signatories of Human Rights Watch’s open letter urging the United Nations not to adopt it.¹³

Both organizations have pointed to two alternative definitions: the Jerusalem Declaration on

8 Interview with NGO staffer “A” from international human rights NGO.

9 The IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism—which the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance adopted in 2016 and Australia endorsed in 2021—is the most widely adopted international framework for identifying antisemitism, used by governments, courts, universities, and civil society organizations across more than 40 countries as a non-legally binding reference standard. See: International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, Working Definition of Antisemitism (adopted May 26, 2016), <https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-antisemitism>

10 Interview with NGO Staffer B, International Human Rights NGO (not the Australian Government source).

11 Australian Government, Prime Minister Scott Morrison, address to the Malmö International Forum on Holocaust Remembrance and Combating Antisemitism, October 2021.

12 Letter to Co-Sponsors of Proposed ABA Resolution 514 on Antisemitism, Human Rights Watch, January 26, 2023, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/01/26/human-rights-watch-letter-co-sponsors-proposed-aba-resolution-514-antisemitism> (accessed May 2026).

13 “UN: More Groups Address Antisemitism Issue,” Human Rights Watch, April 20, 2023, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/04/20/un-more-groups-address-antisemitism-issue> (accessed May 2026).

Antisemitism¹⁴ and the Nexus Document.¹⁵ Both alternatives are generally considered to set a narrower threshold than IHRA, with the Nexus Document explicitly protecting support for BDS and opposition to Zionism from being classified as antisemitic.

Contributors to this submission described organizations that were notably more energetic in specifying what antisemitism is not—and in protecting speech about Israel from the label—than in actively fighting for rigorous identification and application of antisemitism standards internally.

Several contributors reported that concerns about antisemitism were reframed as interpersonal conflict, political disagreement, or communications issues rather than discrimination requiring institutional response. A former employee from a global human rights NGO said:

“It was incredibly frustrating to have professional issues be treated like a personality clash. Eventually, I was so traumatized by unaddressed toxic behavior that I told my boss I needed to take a couple of sick days. He knew the background to the situation; he just didn’t want to handle it. He said, ‘Sure. Enjoy your time off.’”¹⁶

Others described what appeared to be leadership reluctance to publicly acknowledge anti-Jewish hostility or problematic Israel-Palestine work for fear of appearing “pro-Israel,” even where concerns appeared well-substantiated and the same individuals had privately expressed agreement. One frustrated employee of a global human rights NGO wrote to a senior manager:

“Three of us raised issues, including yourself, and in a call to me you said various elements that remain are not acceptable. And yet you totally back down.”¹⁷

A senior manager at Human Rights Watch described his calculus for whether to push back on ideological content:

“I do wince sometimes at [redacted]’s stuff on colonialism... I’m torn between just saying I’m too old, I’m not going to be here, there’s no point... and actually taking a stand... it depends on how much energy I have on any particular day.”¹⁸

Contributors stated that managers have resisted treating antisemitism as a distinct issue, instead automatically coupling it with Islamophobia in ways contributors said deflected from rather than advanced accountability for antisemitism specifically. On October 20, 2023, the UK director of Human Rights Watch wrote to colleagues:

“Can I just check that we are addressing Islamophobia in our product on antisemitism.... I think it’s important in any product on antisemitism that we address both.”¹⁹

14 Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism, March 2021, <https://jerusalemdeclaration.org/> (accessed May 2026).

15 Nexus Document, Task Force on Israel and Antisemitism, Bard College and University of Southern California, 2021, <https://nexusproject.us/the-nexus-document/> (accessed May 2026).

16 Interview with NGO staffer “C” from international NGO.

17 Document from 2022 on file with EIGHT.

18 Senior manager, Human Rights Watch, 2023, on file with EIGHT.

19 Internal email communication, Yasmine Ahmed, UK director, Human Rights Watch, October 20, 2023, document on file with EIGHT.

The pattern contributors described is consistent with sector-wide survey data. A 2025 survey released by Blue Compass, an organization focused on combating antisemitism in the nonprofit sector, found that despite a rise in incidents, only 12% of respondents reported that their organizations offer tools or support to address antisemitism.²⁰

VII. EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS

7.1 INACTION, MINIMIZATION, EXCLUSION, RETALIATION

Accounts consistently described patterns of managerial inaction, minimization, and indifference in relation to concerns about antisemitism or professional standards. Some people also described what appeared to be retaliation for speaking out, including roles being “eliminated”—only to reappear not long after. One staffer from a global rights NGO with an Australian office stated:

“I’d always had great annual reviews. I had never been busier and was in the middle of a large, complex project. I raise concerns about the quality of Israel work and the behavior of one manager in particular and suddenly this same manager decides to eliminate my role. No warning or context or even explanation. In fact, so abruptly that my immediate manager actually apologized to me in writing for how it all happened. And then, lo and behold, the job resurfaces some months later.”²¹

In January 2025, Amnesty International suspended its Israeli chapter—established in 1964—for two years after its members questioned the legal reasoning underlying Amnesty’s determination of “genocide.”²²

Interim chair Tiumalu Lauvale Peter Fa’afiu framed the suspension in terms of “AI Israel’s misalignment with and hostility to Amnesty positions.” He also accused the chapter of “endemic anti-Palestinian racism.” No meaningful due process, right of reply, or transparency accompanied the decision, which was sent with no prior warning to Amnesty Israel’s director and chair just one hour before all Amnesty sections globally were notified.²³

Amnesty Israel denied the racism allegations, citing its record of balanced criticism of both Israeli and Palestinian conduct. Its members responded by accusing the global organization of overlooking antisemitism within its own ranks.²⁴

20 Blue Compass, *Jewish Professionals in Secular Nonprofits*, December 2025, <https://bluecompassnetwork.org> (accessed May 2026).

21 Interview with NGO staffer “B” from international NGO.

22 In a statement, Jewish staffers from Amnesty said that while many of them agreed that Israeli atrocities in Gaza “may have crossed the threshold of crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing,” they found that Amnesty’s “genocide” report “does not substantiate its claim of intent by Israel to destroy the Palestinians, which is a mandatory component for establishing the crime of genocide according to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Article II).”

23 Letter from Tiumalu Lauvale Peter Fa’afiu, Interim Chair, Amnesty International Board, to AI members, January 6, 2025, on file with EIGHT. The letter stated that the International Board would “establish a Review Committee mandated to determine whether or not there is a future, beyond the two-year suspension period, for AI Israel within the Amnesty Movement.”

24 Interview with NGO staffer “C” from Amnesty.

Individual experiences mirror this institutional pattern. Other Jewish staff, or staff who have simply raised their voices about bias or rigor in Israel work, described being sidelined from work and discussions directly related to their expertise.

“At first, I was still heard internally. But the internal dynamics became what I can only describe as ‘cotton wool-ish’: no direct confrontation, just silence, soft ostracism, ghosting, quiet exclusion. Issues were evaded with phrases like, ‘Yes, we know, but it’s difficult,’ or ‘We agree, but we lack capacity.’”²⁵

Some described organizational cultures so hostile and inconsistent with stated duty-of-care commitments that remaining was professionally and psychologically untenable.

In one case, an employee at a global environmental NGO with an Australian presence described a post-October 7 environment increasingly characterized by hostility toward Israel and Jews, including Holocaust comparisons, minimizing or justifying Hamas violence, and promoting BDS-related activity.²⁶

Despite clinical documentation of work-related PTSD, and recommendations from the organization’s employee assistance service supporting relocation, management declined to investigate the concerns and denied the transfer request.²⁷

The employee subsequently left.

7.2 DECLINE OF OPEN DISCOURSE, SILENCING, SELF-CENSORSHIP

Contributors across multiple organizations described long-standing workplace cultures in which dissent was dismissed, marginalized, or openly disparaged—and where critique of Israel work in particular was subject to being misrepresented or minimized as politically motivated, rather than seen as professionally conscientious.

One Human Rights Watch staff member recalled internal reactions to a 2009 New York Times op-ed by the organization’s founder, Robert Bernstein, in which he criticized what he said was Human Rights Watch’s disproportionate focus on Israel:²⁸

“A senior staff member was standing in the conference room, in front of the Nobel Peace Prize on the wall. And in front of the whole room, she was openly bashing him. It certainly sent a message about the kind of treatment dissenters can expect.”²⁹

Dismissal extends beyond internal spaces. Human Rights Watch conducted a multi-pronged damage-control campaign in response to Bernstein’s article, including press releases, op-eds, letters to the editor, and media interviews—much of it using language that Bernstein said mischaracterized his argument.

25 Interview with NGO staffer “D” from international NGO.

26 Interview with NGO staffer “E” from international NGO.

27 Documentation on file with EIGHT, clinical health assessment and employee assistance service recommendations.

28 Robert L. Bernstein, “Rights Watchdog, Lost in the Mideast,” New York Times, October 20, 2009, <https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/20/opinion/20bernstein.html> (accessed May 2026).

29 Interview with NGO staffer “B” from international NGO.

“This is not what I believe or what I wrote in my op-ed piece,” he stated.³⁰

Contributors noted that organizations with multi-million-dollar budgets and established media relationships can absorb criticism, reframe it, and flood the zone in ways individual critics—however credentialed—cannot match. Those who try risk being characterized as “pro-Israel” or disaffected, without evidentiary rebuttal or substantive engagement.

A staffer in Amnesty International Australia said they had:

“...noticed a tendency within the organisation [after the Bondi beach attacks] to frame efforts to address antisemitism as attempts to restrict criticism of Israel.”³¹

When Senior Editor Danielle Haas left Human Rights Watch in 2023 after 14 years, she raised concerns in an internal exit email—later published externally—regarding her observations of bias in Israel-related work and behavior that violated protocols.³² Human Rights Watch’s response did not address the substance of her concerns, stating only vaguely and without proof that the organization applies “the same standards of rigor and dedication to our work on Israel-Palestine as we do to other conflict areas.”³³

A senior manager referred to Haas on Israeli radio as an “embittered ex-employee.”³⁴

Institutional reframing of professional concerns as personal grievance recurs across organizations and individuals. Molly Malekar, former executive director of Amnesty International Israel, said:

“Every single person on my staff—all professionals and well-known activists for Palestinian human rights—were treated as a priori biased. Professional concerns about methodology and facts were disqualified. Any nuanced approach was perceived as ‘serving the Israeli government narrative... Ironically, the same conduct that human rights groups rightly identify as a threat to human rights in others—the populist ‘us versus them’ demagoguery of authoritarian regimes—is deployed by these same groups against those they perceive as internal heretics.”³⁵

A long-time employee of a global human rights NGO with operations in Australia described the culture that

30 Robert Bernstein’s rebuttal statement to HRW, NGO Monitor, October 24, 2009, https://ngo-monitor.org/robert_bernstein_s_rebuttal_to_hrws_response/ (accessed May 2026).

31 Testimony of Amnesty International Australia staffer.

32 “HRW outgoing senior editor blasts ‘infected’ work on Israel,” Times of Israel, November 16, 2023, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/outgoing-human-rights-watch-senior-editor-blasts-groups-infected-work-on-israel/> (accessed May 2026).

33 Ibid.

34 Ex-Human Rights Watch Program Director Sari Bashi, interview on Reshet B radio, July 17, 2024.

35 Interview with Molly Malekar, former executive director Amnesty International Israel.

evolved over more than a decade, and which produces that dynamic:

“Academic frameworks and far-left activist models were treated as moral authority. Staff repeated slogans as if they were insights. Post-colonial theory swept through institutions: the ‘Global South’ was romanticized, ‘decolonizing’ rhetoric became compulsory, and priorities were shaped less by field realities than by internal status games, fundraising incentives, and political fashion. Much of this felt hollow, slogans without substance. But these slogans gained power because disagreement became socially risky. Leadership—often more cautious, more conventional in private life than junior staff—frequently avoided confronting the culture. People would tell me privately that I was right, but publicly they stayed quiet. They’d say, ‘These are different times.’ Over time, a workplace dedicated to truth-telling developed an atmosphere of fear and conformity.”³⁶

People consistently identified open hostility, casual racism, aggression, and violations of institutional standards and principles in discussions referencing Jews, Israelis, and Israel-related concerns—particularly after 2021, when Human Rights Watch became the first major international human rights organization to formally label Israel an “apartheid” state, followed by Amnesty International in 2022.³⁷

In one global NGO, documented behavior submitted to managers in 2025 included staff publicly referring to a “Jewish establishment” and stating the organization “should just let Israelis die.” In another, a colleague heading back to work left co-workers with a casual declaration of “Arbeit macht frei” (Work makes free)—the Nazi inscription above the gates of Auschwitz.³⁸

Third-party research corroborates these findings. A 2025 survey by OLAM, the global Jewish humanitarian network, found that among Jewish professionals in secular humanitarian and human rights organizations: 55% had experienced or witnessed anti-Jewish bias or hate; 57% reported anti-Israel incidents such as colleagues questioning Israel’s legitimacy or dismissing Jewish expertise as “biased”; 73% believed organizational responses were ineffective or reported that no action was taken; and most felt pressure to suppress aspects of their Jewish identity due to assumptions regarding Israel.³⁹

Contributors described conditions that have not improved since the survey was conducted and, in many cases, have worsened. As a staff member at an international rights group said:

“Jewish employees raised concerns openly at first. Then less often. Then not at all. In time, they were all gone.”⁴⁰

36 Interview with NGO staffer “C” from international NGO.

37 “A Threshold Crossed: Israeli Authorities and the Crimes of Apartheid and Persecution,” Human Rights Watch, April 27, 2021, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/04/27/threshold-crossed/israeli-authorities-and-crimes-apartheid-and-persecution> (accessed May 2026); “Israel’s Apartheid Against Palestinians: A Cruel System of Domination and a Crime Against Humanity,” Amnesty International, February 1, 2022, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/02/israels-apartheid-against-palestinians-a-cruel-system-of-domination-and-a-crime-against-humanity/> (accessed May 2026).

38 Written complaint documentation, 2025, international NGO, on file with EIGHT.

39 OLAM and Burson, “Isolation, Antisemitism and a Thirst for Community: The Experiences of Jewish Practitioners in Secular International Development and Humanitarian Aid,” September 11, 2025, <https://www.olamtogether.org/resources/jewish-practitioners-research-2025> (accessed May 2026).

40 Interview with NGO staffer “F” from international NGO.

7.3 HOSTILE INTERNAL CULTURES

Across the sector, formal commitments to neutrality have coexisted with internal cultures that contributors described as ideologically activist on Israel-related issues, and hostile to Israelis, Jewish identity, and views departing from prevailing orthodoxies.

One non-Jewish staffer from Amnesty International Australia described minimization of Jewish and Israeli suffering; compromised accuracy and neutrality “when they conflicted with preferred narratives”; and “rhetoric and conduct that would be recognised as prejudicial in any other context being excused or amplified.” Their conclusion was unambiguous:

“My experience at AIA has left me deeply concerned that anti-Jewish bias and prejudice have become embedded in parts of the organisation’s culture and decision-making.... What I observed was not a series of isolated incidents, but a consistent pattern.... I am deeply concerned that these patterns have contributed to a culture that tolerates and even justifies violence and intimidation towards Jews.”⁴¹

Jewish staff described being drawn—often unwillingly—into political debates and assumptions about their identity or allegiance that had no bearing on their professional roles. Internal communication channels emerged as the primary arena for such dynamics, routinely hosting content that violated organizational policies on abuse, collegiality, duty of care, bullying, and racism—and that would not have been tolerated in relation to any other group.

An employee at a global NGO said:

“When Jewish staff raised concerns, the response wasn’t dialogue or care; it was social punishment.... Jewish staff must remain silent or accept moral condemnation. This isn’t inclusion; this is mob dynamics inside a values-driven institution: a righteous majority enforcing ideological conformity by targeting a minority identity.”⁴²

Doctors Without Borders (MSF) formally commits to “impartiality,” “neutrality,” and “bearing witness.” Its internal “Souk” communication platform is essentially the organization speaking to itself, a window into internal culture and attitudes that is accessible to MSF’s more than 67,000 staff and association members worldwide across its global network of sections and associations.⁴³ Guidelines state that posts be signed, and “abusive, slanderous or libelous comments or personal attacks are forbidden and will be deleted.”⁴⁴

In practice, contributors described the platform as a forum for incendiary and discriminatory rhetoric, at times posted anonymously, with moderators repeatedly failing to intervene in exchanges that Jewish and non-Jewish staff alike experienced as hostile, exclusionary, and discriminatory.

Posts on MSF’s internal communication channel since October 7, 2023, include:⁴⁵

- “The fight for freedom ... is about liberating the world from the grip of Zionism...”⁴⁶

41 Testimony of Amnesty International Australia staff member.

42 Interview with NGO staffer “G” from international NGO.

43 “Who We Are,” Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), <https://www.msf.org/who-we-are> (accessed May 2026)

44 “General Conditions of Use and Legal Information,” MSF, Document on file with EiGHT, www.eightrights.org.

45 Internal posts, MSF “Souk” platform. Document on file with EiGHT.

46 Interview with Mercy Corps staffer.

- Israel is a “76-year-old crime scene.”
- “As for the accusation of rape against Palestinian resistance fighters, I believe these are propaganda.”; Israel is “the colonizer” that “wants to be the victim too.”
- “Stop playing the Jewish card.”
- “Zionism is...” pictogram, with images related to “scholasticide,” “battle-testing murder tech” and “300 Palestinian children in cages/year.”




- “I leave you your hatred, your racism and your victimization (we’re used to it!). I also leave you your shame and dishonor for your support of a racist, Nazi and genocidal state. Zionism will not pass!... When the extreme right becomes the best ally of a genocidal Zionist state, what should we conclude? It’s all the same: fascism=Nazism=Zionism. Boia chi molla!!!!!!” [Italian fascist and far-right slogan meaning roughly “Death to those who give up” or “Down with those who surrender”].

Souk MSF Information and debates MSF hands-on The organisation Membership

I leave you your hatred, your racism and your victimization (we’re used to it!).
 I also leave you your shame and dishonor for your support of a racist, Nazi and genocidal state.
 Zionism will not pass!
 MSF is doing its duty by bearing witness to the crimes and horrors of a genocide supported by the majority of Western states, where the extreme right dictates policies.
 When the extreme right becomes the best ally of a genocidal Zionist state, what should we conclude? It’s all the same: fascism=Nazism=Zionism.
 Boia chi molla!!!!!!
 Fold back ▶

In other international NGOs with Australian operations, internal posts have included:⁴⁷

- “ Hamas is, first and foremost, a political entity. To generalize in this way is to perpetuate harmful biases against the Arab world and those of Islamic faith.”
- A cartoon “for those who are confused by European colonization,” depicting an Israeli soldier with a boot on the back of a Palestinian, beside a cowboy with a boot on the back of a Native American
- Criticism of Hamas described as rooted in “racial biases.”
- A video ending with militants entering the Gaza envelope accompanied by heroic music and the Quranic verse: “Enter...you will be victorious.”



In one case, a map captioned “The Final Phase of the Gaza Genocide”—in which the hole in the “O” of “genocide” was shaped like the State of Israel—was posted in an internal channel. When a Jewish employee asked what the image was meant to imply, the response was:

“Hi @[REDACTED]. I’m not sure why the map triggered you. If anything, it reflects the immense power you hold within this reality.... This map doesn’t attack you; it exposes a system of apartheid that benefits you.”⁴⁸

In Amnesty International Australia, a staffer described tropes about Jewish power and control circulating “without institutional sanction or consequence.” They include an article shared by a key staffer working on the Israel-Palestinian conflict warning of “billionaire Zionist” influence in Australian public schools. The same staff member shared an article calling for a Royal Commission into “Zionist influence” in Australia.⁴⁹

47 Internal posts, international NGOs. Document on file with EIGHT.

48 Ibid.

49 Testimony of Amnesty International Australia staff member.

Beyond hostile speech, organizational cultures have at times normalized staff radicalization, according to interviewees. One MSF employee described a human resources staffer’s permissive attitude in 2024 toward employing militants in Gaza and rejecting background checks for incoming Gazan staff. The employee said they were told:

“Well, you know, obviously people are becoming militants because of the war, and we have to expect it, and it’s understandable that they would become radicalized because of what Israel is doing to them. But we’ve decided we’re not going to do background checks. That’s not what we’re going to do.”

The employee told EIGHT:

“What struck me was not simply the statement itself, but how casually it was treated, as though radicalization was both inevitable and acceptable, and therefore something the organization should accommodate rather than scrutinize. The message, in effect, was ideological radicalization is understandable, and vetting concerns are secondary. The implication was chilling: it’s fine—we could end up hiring Hamas affiliates to work in our hospitals.”⁵⁰

7.4 ROLE OF SENIOR LEADERS

When senior figures in the human rights and humanitarian sector publicly and privately model the attitudes documented in this submission, they do more than express personal views. They set institutional tone, confer legitimacy on those below them, and signal to staff, funders, media, and the public what the sector values, who it protects, and how it is permissible to speak about Jews.


In 2025, Javid Abdelmoneim—who later that year became international president of the 67,000-strong Doctors Without Borders (MSF)—reposted a blanket characterization of Israel, a country of 10 million people, as “child killers.” He also reposted a claim that Israel had “transformed Jewish symbols into symbols of genocide” and represented “the greatest threat to Judaism and the Jewish people on planet earth.”⁵¹



50 Interview with NGO staffer “H” from international NGO.

51 Javid Abdelmoneim, repost of @Mohanad, “The issue has never been that Israelis are white or that they’re Jewish. The issue is that they are a colony of settlers that continue to ethnically cleanse the native Palestinian population. Israel could be 100% black and we’d oppose these child killers just the same,” X (formerly Twitter), January 6, 2025, screenshot on file with EIGHT.

In 2024, Christopher Lockyear, secretary general of MSF, publicly gave “my vote” for UNRWA to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. His endorsement did not address the first-hand testimony from Israeli hostages of being held captive by UNRWA staff in Gaza; findings by the United Nations’ own internal watchdog that evidence “could indicate” UNRWA involvement in the October 7 attacks, after which it terminated nine contracts⁵²; and an Israeli intelligence dossier naming 12 UNRWA employees alleged to have been involved in the October 7 attacks, leading more than a dozen countries to suspend funding.⁵³



In January 2025, Alexis Deswaef, president of the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), shared a cartoon depicting an Israeli soldier instructing ICE agents to “shoot first,” “block the ambulances,” and “call the victim a terrorist.” The FIDH is one of the world’s largest human rights umbrella organizations, with more than 200 member groups.⁵⁴



52 UNRWA Commissioner-General Philippe Lazzarini, Official Statement, “Investigation completed: Allegations on UNRWA staff participation in the 7 October attacks,” August 5, 2024, <https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/official-statements/investigation-completed-allegations-unrwa-staff-participation-7-october> (accessed May 2026).

53 “Israel releases names and details of alleged involvement of UNRWA employees in October 7 attacks,” CNN, February 16, 2024, <https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/16/middleeast/israel-allegations-unrwa-october-7-intl/index.html> (accessed May 2026).

54 Alexis Deswaef, Facebook share of cartoon by @carloslatuff, January 20, 2025, screenshot on file with EIGHT.

Since 2023, Agnès Callamard, secretary-general of Amnesty International, has described Israel and the United States as “voracious predators,”⁵⁵ vigorously defended UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese after she publicly referred to a “Jewish lobby” subjugating Europe and the United States,⁵⁶ and described Israel’s inclusion in the 2026 Eurovision Song Contest as “an attempt to normalize its ongoing genocide.”⁵⁷

In December 2025, Kenneth Roth, ex-executive director of Human Rights Watch, responded to the murder of 15 Jewish people at Bondi Beach not by condemning the attack or expressing solidarity with its victims, but by attacking Australia’s antisemitism envoy Jillian Segal for “cheapening the concept” of antisemitism on the grounds that she had linked protests against Israel to the massacre.⁵⁸



55 Amnesty International, *The State of the World’s Human Rights*, April 2026, Index POL 10/0320/2026, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/0320/2026/en/> (accessed May 2026). In the preface, Callamard says that throughout 2025 “voracious predators stalked through our global commons, hulking hunters plundering unjust trophies. Political leaders like Trump, Putin and Netanyahu, among many others, carried out their conquests for economic and political domination through destruction, suppression and violence on a massive scale.”

56 “US sanctions UN expert Francesca Albanese, critic of Israel’s Gaza offensive,” BBC, July 10, 2025, <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c70rlxr0kyo> (accessed May 2026).


57 “Europe: Failure to suspend Israel from Eurovision betrays humanity and exposes blatant double standards,” Amnesty International, May 11, 2026, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2026/05/europe-failure-to-suspend-israel-from-eurovision-betrays-humanity-and-exposes-blatant-double-standards/> (accessed May 2026).

58 Kenneth Roth (@KenRoth), “Australia’s special envoy to combat antisemitism, Jillian Segal, ends up promoting antisemitism by cheapening the concept because she links protests against Israel’s genocide and apartheid to the antisemitism of the Bondi Beach massacre,” X (formerly Twitter), December 2025, screenshot on file with EIGHT.

In 2018, Unni Karunakara, former international president of MSF and subsequently affiliated with Yale and Columbia, responded to the Tree of Life Synagogue massacre in Pittsburgh in October—in which 11 Jewish worshippers were killed—with: “Blame for the shooting must be shared by Zionists like Netanyahu for enabling white nationalists like Trump, stoking fear and hatred all around.”⁵⁹



In May 2025, Natalie Roberts, executive director of MSF UK, responded to news that MSF was receiving a donation from Irish rap group Kneecap with a heart and raised fist emoji. At the time, a band member stood charged under the UK Terrorism Act for displaying a Hezbollah flag at a concert while shouting “Up Hamas, Up Hezbollah”—both designated terrorist organizations—and the band had projected “F* Israel” at Coachella.⁶⁰



The tone set at the top is reflected below it. Jewish and non-Jewish contributors alike describe senior managers minimizing, dismissing, or taking no action when presented with concerns they say violate institutional standards and humanitarian principles.

When a Jewish staff member at Human Rights Watch reported personal attacks by a colleague in 2022—supported by written evidence—management responded:

“I’m sorry this experience has been demoralizing for you.”⁶¹

No further action followed.

59 Unni Karunakara (@UnniKarunakara), “Blame for the shooting must be shared by Zionists like Netanyahu for enabling white nationalists like Trump, stoking fear and hatred all around,” X (formerly Twitter), October 31, 2018, screenshot on file with EIGHT.

60 Natalie Roberts, executive director, MSF UK, LinkedIn post, May 2025, screenshot on file with EIGHT

61 Written documentation, 2022, on file with EIGHT.

At Amnesty International USA, another staff member raising similar concerns was told:

“That must have been hard for you to write.” Again, no action was taken.⁶²

In 2025, Paul O’Brien, executive director of Amnesty International USA, advised staff not to share an Atlantic magazine article detailing NGO double standards regarding Israel and the experiences of Jews in the sector:

“I ask that you please refrain from engaging on social media around this, and I suggest that you do not share the article further, to reduce amplification.”⁶³

Contributors noted that he encouraged sensitivity toward those “who may feel impacted” by the article and who were “on the receiving end of this kind of story”—but not toward the staff whose experiences the article documented.⁶⁴

Amnesty managers also dismissed concerns that several staff members raised in 2023 regarding posts by Rasha Abdel Latif, who shortly before joining the board of Amnesty USA had shared content glorifying a terror attack on civilians in Tel Aviv, stating, “There is NOTHING called ‘Israel,’ it is ‘Palestine territory,’” and shared an image depicting an Israel-shaped hand flicking away the Jewish Star of David with text in Arabic: “This land does not fit two identities. It’s either us—or us.”⁶⁵



62 Interview with Amnesty staffer.

63 “The Double Standard in the Human-Rights World,” Atlantic Magazine, March 2025, <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2025/03/human-rights-organizations-israel-double-standard/> (accessed May 2026).

64 Paul O’Brien, executive director, Amnesty International USA, internal staff communication, 2025, document on file with EiGHT. See also, “The Double Standard in the Human-Rights World,” Atlantic Magazine, March 2025, <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2025/03/human-rights-organizations-israel-double-standard/> (accessed May 2026).

65 Rasha Abdel Latif, retweet of @AhmadLubbad6, February 16 [2022], screenshot on file with EiGHT.

Declining to act, a senior manager reportedly told staff the cartoon represented the author’s “pain.” Abdel Latif remained on the board.⁶⁶

Another recurring theme was the absence of clear institutional standards regarding antisemitism and the tendency for internal debates—often conducted without meaningful participation by Jewish staff—resulting in inaction.

At Amnesty International, interviewees said managers had rejected requests for mandatory antisemitism training. A voluntary session held in 2024 focused on identifying “false antisemitism” and Israeli illegitimacy. Questions regarding whether attacks on Zionists—including threats of violence—could constitute antisemitism in some circumstances went unanswered, according to people present.⁶⁷

7.5 SOCIAL MEDIA: AN UNADDRESSED SPHERE

Contributors described social media as a dimension of organizational culture the sector has largely failed to properly address.

Staff have used personal accounts—outside formal review processes or organizational oversight—to disseminate or amplify rhetoric and viewpoints unlikely to appear in official institutional communications. Reposts and retweets circulate inflammatory content while maintaining nominal distance from official positions.

Organizations frequently respond to such content by stating that the views expressed are personal and do not represent official institutional positions. In an internal memo, Amnesty’s response to Board member Rasha Abdel Latif tweeting and retweeting support for terror attacks on civilians in Tel Aviv, and an image in February 2022 of Israel being flicked off the map, was:

“These tweets and retweets were done in a personal capacity and do not represent the positions of Amnesty International.”

It went on to reframe concerns raised about her tweets as politically motivated:

“We are also deeply concerned that these attacks against a Palestinian board member come after Amnesty International has publicly challenged the Israeli government’s human rights record. All too often organizations, human rights defenders and journalists are targeted in an attempt to undermine their credibility and their human rights work.”⁶⁸

Contributors argue the private/personal distinction is inadequate on at least two grounds.

First, staff accounts frequently identify individuals via their professional affiliations, making the content institutionally adjacent in practice. Second, labeling rhetoric as “private” does not address an underlying concern: whether individuals expressing racist or dehumanizing views online can meaningfully separate those attitudes from their professional conduct and work.


66 Interview with Amnesty staffer.

67 Interview with staffers “H” and “I,” Amnesty.

68 “Lines of response to tweets and retweets made by AIUSA Board member Rasha Abdel Latif,” Amnesty International. Document on file with EIGHT.

In 2024, Isra Chaker, senior campaign manager at Amnesty International USA, commented on Instagram under @israspeaks about Noa Argamani, an Israeli abducted by Hamas from the Nova music festival and held in Gaza. Omitting any reference to Hamas, “hostage,” or Argamani’s 245 days in captivity, Chaker described Argamani as a “freed Israeli captive”—without mentioning she had been rescued in an Israeli military operation rather than released by Hamas. She also included a quote that appeared to minimize Argamani’s ordeal: “I confirm that I was not beaten and did not have my hair cut, I was injured from the collapse of a building bombed in an Israeli airstrike.”

Unlike the campaign it mounted for the Chibok schoolgirls abducted by Boko Haram in 2014, Amnesty did not participate in a campaign for the release of Israeli hostages.⁶⁹



Veronica Koman, a researcher and campaigner for Amnesty International Australia, posted on X in Indonesian on October 18, 2024: “My respect to Yahya Sinwar...Legend!!”—a reference to the architect of Hamas’ October 7 massacres.⁷⁰



69 Isra Chaker (@israspeaks), senior campaign manager Amnesty International USA, Instagram Story, circa June 2024, screenshot on file with EIGHT.

70 Veronica Koman (@VeronicaKoman), researcher/campaigner Amnesty International Australia, post in Indonesian, X (formerly Twitter), October 18, 2024, screenshot on file with EIGHT.

“What I observed was not a series of isolated incidents, but a consistent pattern....

I am deeply concerned that these patterns have contributed to a culture that tolerates and even justifies **violence** and **intimidation towards Jews.**”

— AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AUSTRALIA STAFFER

Alia Al Ghussain, a researcher and advisor within Amnesty Tech—later head of the Big Tech Accountability and Deputy Programme Director at Amnesty Tech—posted “Embarrassing” in response to Downing Street in the UK projecting the Israeli flag in solidarity following the October 7 attacks.⁷¹



Content on social media is typically subject to significantly less editorial, methodological, and legal scrutiny than formal organizational publications—making it an easier vehicle for disseminating rhetoric or framing that theoretically would not survive a formal review process.

It also functions as a space—in conjunction with other media and platforms—where unverified claims and maximalist framings can be seeded and normalized by NGOs or adjacent figures—long before, or in place of, them surfacing in official positions.

7.6 METHODOLOGICAL FAILURES

Contributors described recurring methodological failures in relation to Israel, Israelis, and Jewish issues, including inconsistencies in evidentiary standards, correction practices, contextual analysis, transparency, sourcing protocols, and legal interpretation. The failures operated through omission as much as commission and, at times, appear to reflect institutional decisions rather than inadvertent error.

FAILURE TO CORRECT KNOWN INACCURACIES

Following the October 17, 2023 explosion at Gaza’s Al-Ahli hospital, several major NGOs, including MSF, published material either directly asserting or heavily implying Israeli responsibility. Although subsequent evidence indicated that the explosion was likely caused by a Palestinian rocket, corrections were often absent or buried.

One MSF staff member reported that a senior manager openly rejected issuing a correction on grounds that doing so could upset Hamas and jeopardize colleagues operating under its restrictions in Gaza, as well as MSF staff then being held hostage by the Houthis in Yemen. The manager said that a correction

“Could be seen to be pro-Israel.”⁷²

While the security incident in Yemen was ultimately resolved, the tweet remained on the MSF International

71 Alia Al Ghussain (@little_a91), researcher and advisor on technology and human rights, Amnesty Tech, reply to @10DowningStreet, “Embarrassing,” X (formerly Twitter), October 8, 2023, screenshot on file with EIGHT.

72 Interview with NGO staffer “J,” MSF.

X account at time of writing.⁷³



The same pattern of inadequate correction and clarification surfaced two years later. In February 2026, MSF buried news that it had scaled back operations at Gaza’s Nasser Hospital—citing “armed men, some masked” at the facility—in a collapsed FAQ entry at the end of a 17-item list on an ambiguously titled page on its website.⁷⁴

The disclosure gained traction only after NGO professionals noted it, and it was posted on X.⁷⁵

According to a former program-level staff member at a global human rights NGO, with direct involvement in Israel-Palestine work:

“That is how credibility dies: institutional certainty, slogan repetition, and refusal to self-correct. The reality is that many of these organizations now function less like watchdogs and more like unelected political parties—powerful actors inside left-leaning public opinion but increasingly detached from rigorous standards and from the basic human rights principles they claim to defend.”⁷⁶

EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT INFORMATION

Contributors described bias as operating frequently through omission rather than overt assertion, shaping a narrative in which Israel appears to lack legitimate military objectives and targets civilians as a matter of policy. Examples include:

- A June 2024 MSF press release regarding the Nuseirat refugee camp operation that made no mention that the operation had been conducted to rescue four Israeli hostages held by Hamas.⁷⁷
- A September 2024 Human Rights Watch press release on exploding pagers and walkie-talkies in Lebanon that described devices having “exploded across Lebanon, killing at least 37 people,” without naming Hezbollah or noting that its operatives were the primary targets.⁷⁸

⁷³ Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), post on X (formerly Twitter), October 17, 2023, <https://x.com/MSF/status/1714363236315779572> (accessed May 2026).

⁷⁴ “Addressing frequently asked questions and allegations about MSF’s work in Gaza,” Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), <https://www.msf.org/addressing-frequently-asked-questions-and-allegations-about-msf-work-gaza-palestine> (accessed May 2026).

⁷⁵ Danielle Haas, “Ideological rot had hollowed out human rights NGOs from within,” Jewish Chronicle, March 30, 2026, <https://www.thejc.com/opinion/no-one-is-scrutinising-human-rights-ngos-trmv6c1bz> (accessed May 2026).

⁷⁶ Interview with NGO staffer, “K,” global human rights organization

⁷⁷ “In Gaza, ‘we did not have time to bury them,’” Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), June 10, 2024, <https://www.msf.org/gaza-we-did-not-have-time-bury-them>.

⁷⁸ “Lebanon: Israeli strikes kill hundreds and hostilities escalate,” Human Rights Watch, September 25, 2024, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/09/25/lebanon-israeli-strikes-kill-hundreds-hostilities-escalate> (accessed May 2026).

- A 2024 workshop titled “Apartheid in Israel” at Amnesty International’s General Meeting that characterized Israel’s foundation as illegitimate and Jews as having seized Palestinian land, driven out its inhabitants, and oppressed them ever since. Among the historical information not referenced: continuous Jewish presence in the region, attacks on Jewish communities before 1948, legal Jewish land purchases, and failed peace proposals.⁷⁹

The pattern extends to internal communications. An hour-long organization-wide “Israel-Palestine” meeting at Human Rights Watch on October 23, 2023—led by Israel-Palestine Director Omar Shakir and attended by 300 staff—did not mention any Israelis, including the more than 1,000 victims of October 7 or the approximately 251 hostages held in Gaza. Asked at the end of the meeting why they were not referenced at all, a senior staffer responded:

“On October 7 we were holding two truths in one hand.”⁸⁰

An internal MSF email in 2024 ahead of the October 7 anniversary of Hamas’ attacks described the significance of the date as being the “beginning of this round of the conflict in Gaza.” It encouraged staff to join the planned October 5 “National Ceasefire” March in London. Nowhere did the email mention Hamas’ massacres, its Israeli victims, or the 251 hostages seized that day.⁸¹

Similarly, Amnesty International Australia’s official public statement on the first anniversary of October 7 opened not with the attacks, but with:

“76 years since the forced displacement of Palestinians by the state of Israel began...”⁸²

FAILURE TO HUMANIZE ISRAELI AND JEWISH VICTIMS

Contributors described their organizations’ failure to adequately cover or amplify significant aspects of the Israeli experience resulting from the October 7 massacres.

The response to October 7 itself was repeatedly cited as emblematic. Oxfam described the Hamas attacks as “military offensives.”⁸³ Save the Children referred to them as “an escalation in violence.”⁸⁴ Amnesty described them as “an unprecedented operation by its fighters into southern Israel.”⁸⁵ Mercy Corps referred to “escalating violence.”⁸⁶

79 Interviews with NGO staffers “L” and “M,” Amnesty.

80 Interview with Human Rights Watch staffers.

81 Internal MSF email, October 2024, on file with EIGHT

82 “76 Years On, Palestinians Continue Their Fight for Human Rights, Peace and Justice,” Amnesty International Australia, October 8, 2024, <https://www.amnesty.org.au/76-years-on-palestinians-continue-ight-for-human-rights-peace-and-justice/> (accessed May 2026).

83 “Oxfam reaction to today’s military offensives in Israel and the Gaza Strip,” Oxfam, October 7, 2023, <https://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/oxfam-reaction-todays-military-offensives-israel-and-gaza-strip> (accessed May 2026).

84 “Save the Children statement following escalation in Israel and Gaza,” Save the Children, October 7, 2023, <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/save-the-children-statement-following-escalation-in-israel-and-gaza/> (accessed May 2026).

85 “Israel/OPT: Civilians on both sides paying the price of unprecedented escalation,” Amnesty, October 7, 2023, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/10/israel-opt-civilians-on-both-sides-paying-the-price-of-unprecedented-escalation-in-hostilities-between-israel-and-gaza-as-death-toll-mounts/> (accessed May 2026).

86 Mercy Corps Statement on Escalating Violence in Gaza and Israel,” Mercy Corps, October 8, 2023, <https://www.mercycorps.org/press-room/releases/statement-escalating-violence-gaza-palestine-israel> (accessed May 2026).

At Mercy Corps, an internal communication on October 8, 2023, characterized the previous day's events as having “started ... between Palestinian armed groups and Israeli forces”—omitting any acknowledgment of Israeli civilian victims or colleagues. A later internal post shared “thoughts and support” for people, including colleagues, in Gaza and Syria affected by recent events, without sharing similar sentiments for people in Israel.⁸⁷

A staff member added their hope for “our colleagues and partners across the region, from Gaza to Syria to Israel ... and all civilians throughout the Middle East,” while noting that Mercy Corps also had Israeli partners who were fearing for their lives, and that the start of the violence was initiated by Palestinian militants targeting innocent civilians in Israel, not “Israeli forces.” The staffer said:

“In response, both of my posts were removed. I was told not to make any more posts on workspace and told that I violated Mercy Corps’ Code of Conduct. When I asked what aspect of my posts violated the Code of Conduct, I received no response. The Chief Ethics Officer later admitted to me verbally that he had not looked into these posts and also that Mercy Corps regularly violates its code of conduct by making political statements about the Middle East.”⁸⁸

As conflict escalated between Iran, Israel, and the United States in June 2025, a senior Amnesty International Australia manager reportedly said: “We need to speak on Israeli civilian casualties because in this heightened environment, not doing so could lead to accusations of bias.”⁸⁹

Contributors additionally described rhetoric that eroded the category of Israeli civilian-hood itself. A senior staff member in Amnesty stated internally that there may be “no such thing as an Israeli civilian” because military service is compulsory in Israel.⁹⁰

At a prominent NGO in Australia, a facilitator contracted to do an anti-racism training in 2025 likened October 7 to “when slave-owners were having their slaves rebel against them,” according to a staff member present. The facilitator said she struggled to empathise with fear felt by Israelis—the “oppressor.”⁹¹

Just over one month after Hamas’ October 7 massacres, its victims appeared in only 2 of 24 agenda items on Human Rights Watch’s internal to-do list. Priorities instead included items like “talking to Disney,” “UK arms transfers [to Israel],” and “[Israeli] demolitions.” Even the two references to Israeli victims minimized the crimes: the hostage crisis was framed as an abstract “dignity” issue rather than a grave violation of international law, while the massacre itself was simply termed “killings in southern Israel.”⁹²

Contributors contrasted this muted approach with powerful organizational responses to other atrocities. In the weeks before October 7, the same organizations had described Salvadoran state abuses as “heinous,” Singaporean hangings as “abhorrent,” and the UK’s pushback of migrants as “morally reprehensible.” Following September 11, 2001, Amnesty International had been “appalled at [the] devastating attacks

87 Document on file with EiGHT.

88 Ibid.

89 Interview with NGO staffer “M” from Amnesty.

90 Interview with NGO staffer “N” from Amnesty.

91 Testimony of staffer “J” from prominent NGO in Australia.

92 Document on file with EiGHT.

against civilians.”⁹³

Amnesty Secretary General Agnès Callamard mentioned Israeli hostages only twice on X during the entire month of October 2023, and neither post called for their release. The discovery of six murdered Israeli hostages on September 1, 2024, went unmentioned on the social media accounts of Human Rights Watch’s Israel-Palestine Director Omar Shakir.⁹⁴

When the January 2025 ceasefire was announced—bringing the release of hostages held in Gaza for more than 460 days—Amnesty International USA’s official account described the deal as bringing “some glimmer of relief to Palestinian victims of Israel’s genocide.” It did not reference the hostages, their families, or the Israeli dimension of the ceasefire.⁹⁵



It took Amnesty International just over one year to release a report on Israeli “genocide”—but more than two years to release a report on the October 7 attacks, which it eventually published in mid-December 2025—a period widely recognized in media and advocacy circles as the lowest-visibility window of the year.⁹⁶ Internal documents indicate staff had resisted earlier publication of the document to avoid generating support for Israel.⁹⁷

Staff described editorial pressure to minimize Hamas.

A staffer in a prominent NGO in Australia recalled being “instructed multiple times” to hide social media comments mentioning Hamas or calling for the release of hostages on grounds they were “politically problematic or adjacent to anti-Muslim sentiment.” In one instance, a colleague directed removing reference to Hamas and hostages from a communication because they “worried it places too much on

93 “United States of America: Amnesty International Appalled at Devastating Attacks Against Civilians,” Amnesty International Press Release, AMR51/134/2001, September 11, 2001, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr51/134/2001/en/> (accessed May 2026).

94 Danielle Haas, “The Human Rights Establishment,” Sapir Magazine, Volume 12, Winter 2024, <https://sapijournal.org/authors/danielle-haas/> (accessed May 2026).

95 Amnesty International USA (@amnestyusa), post on X (formerly Twitter), January 18, 2025, <https://x.com/amnestyusa/status/1880708267577430096> (screenshot on file with EIGHT).

96 “‘You Feel Like You Are Subhuman’: Israel’s Genocide Against Palestinians in Gaza,” Amnesty International, December 5, 2024, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde15/8668/2024/en/> (accessed May 2026); “Targeting Civilians: Murder, Hostage-Taking and Other Violations by Palestinian Armed Groups in Israel and Gaza,” Amnesty International, December 11, 2025, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde15/0282/2025/en/> (accessed May 2026).

97 Charles Lane, “The Fight Inside Amnesty International Over Its Hamas Report,” Free Press, September 21, 2025, <https://www.thefp.com/p/the-fight-inside-amnesty-international> (accessed May 2026).

Palestine as the bad guy.”⁹⁸

In another example of pressure to erase Israeli victims and shield Hamas from institutional accountability, MSF staff in Lebanon circulated an internal petition within days of Hamas’s murder, demanding the organization withdraw a press release that had described “brutal mass massacre of civilians perpetrated by Hamas.” It called on directors to “instantly stop the Israeli media narrative adopted by the west framing Israelis as victims.”⁹⁹

FAILURE OF BALANCE, FOCUS, AND CONSISTENCY

Contributors described recurring contextual asymmetries: Palestinian militant violence framed through “root causes” such as “Israeli apartheid,” “structural violence,” or “Israeli colonialism,” while omitting factors including the religious ideology and explicit calls for Holy War in the charters of Hamas and Hezbollah, and legitimate security contexts for Israeli military operations, such as stopping rocket attacks on civilians and rescuing hostages in Gaza.

The framing was evident from the first hours after October 7. In her initial email to staff that day, then-Human Rights Watch Program Director Sari Bashi opened not with the massacre, but with a broader narrative of Israeli aggression:

“Following a long period of escalation, primarily in the West Bank, with significant violence by Israeli soldiers and settlers and sporadic attacks by Palestinian gunmen, this morning armed groups in Gaza launched an attack on Israel...”¹⁰⁰

A lack of transparency about what is covered—and why—obscures accountability. Danielle Haas, a former senior editor at Human Rights Watch who oversaw production of its annual flagship World Report, sought clarity on behalf of readers regarding the consistently disproportionate length of the Israel-Palestine chapter. She received none.

“Is it because HRW invests more resources here? Thinks the abuses are more egregious than elsewhere? Has better access than to countries like North Korea and Iran? Whatever the reason, we should be transparent with readers. But there never was a clear explanation.”¹⁰¹

One unarticulated factor shaping both coverage and resource allocation, say insiders, is donor revenue. Staffers at both MSF and Amnesty described how images of Palestinian suffering “played well” with

98 Testimony of staffer “J” from prominent NGO in Australia.

99 Internal petition, MSF Lebanon staff, October 2023, document on file with EiGHT; “Indiscriminate Violence and the Collective Punishment of Gaza Must Cease,” Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), October 12, 2023, <https://www.msf.org/indiscriminate-violence-and-collective-punishment-gaza-must-cease> (accessed May 2026).

100 Sari Bashi, Human Rights Watch program director, internal staff email, October 7, 2023, document on file with EiGHT.

101 Danielle Haas, “The Human-Rights Establishment,” Sapir Magazine, Volume 12, Winter 2024, <https://sapijournal.org/friends-and-foes/2024/the-human-rights-establishment/> (accessed May 2026).

donors—and were promoted accordingly.¹⁰²

“It is no secret within the organization that Gaza-related crisis communications have become a major driver of fundraising performance. During ceasefire periods, results declined, creating pressure to sustain a heightened sense of urgency. This incentivized the continued use of urgent and emotionally charged language and outdated communications, at the expense of accuracy and honest representation of developments on the ground.”¹⁰³

At Amnesty International Australia, one staff member described Gaza as a “particularly effective fundraising engine,” stating that 7 of 10 fundraising appeals from October 2023 until time of writing focused wholly or partly on the Israel-Palestine conflict.

“Even appeals framed around broader themes—press freedom or refugee rights—frequently returned to this single context.”¹⁰⁴

Concern about audience receptivity was evident even on October 7, 2023. Responding to criticism that the organization had not unequivocally condemned Hamas’ attacks, a senior Human Rights Watch manager defended Director Sari Bashi framing the atrocities as reactions to “apartheid” and “oppression” on grounds of wider resonance:

“I think her approach here is justifiable; she is condemning the attacks on Israeli civilians in a way that tries to appeal to a wider audience including Palestinians.”¹⁰⁵

Institutional focus that is shaped by ideology, as opposed to principles of universalism or consistency, can result in enormously different approaches to issues—for example, “settler-colonialism” applied to Israel but not to Australia, Canada, or the United States; the “right of return” for refugees applied to Palestinians but not to up to 1 million Jews forced to flee Muslim countries after Israel’s birth in 1948.¹⁰⁶

This in turn can have considerable practical impact, diverting finite attention and resources from populations in acute crisis elsewhere—among them the famine in Sudan, where more than 21 million people faced acute food insecurity by 2026 and more than 11.5 million were displaced in the world’s largest displacement crisis.¹⁰⁷ In Darfur, a UN panel of experts found that between 10,000 and 15,000 Masalit people were murdered in El Geneina alone in 2023—a determination the US State Department formalized

102 Interview with Amnesty and MSF staffers.

103 Interview with NGO staffer “N” from international NGO.

104 Testimony of Amnesty Australia staffer.

105 Communication with manager, October 7, 2023, on file with EIGHT. In her post on October 7, 2024, Bashi wrote: “The reports and unverified videos of Israeli families taken hostage in their homes, kidnapped into Gaza- are terrifying. There’s no honor in unlawful attacks on civilians. No matter how just your resistance to apartheid and oppression is,” Sari Bashi (@saribashi), post on X (formerly Twitter), October 7, 2023, <https://x.com/saribashi/status/1710619432093896716> (screenshot on file with EIGHT).

106 For example, Israel-Palestine director Omar Shakir did not mention Jewish refugees still unable to return to their homes in Muslim countries when he stated that “international human rights law guarantees refugees and exiles the right to enter the territory they are from, even where sovereignty is contested or has changed hands, and reside in areas where they or their families once lived and have maintained links to.” See: “75 Years Later, Israel Blocking Palestinian Refugees/Return,” Human Rights Watch, May 15, 2023, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/05/15/75-years-later-israel-blocking-palestinian-refugees-return> (accessed May 2026).

107 Public Health Situation Analysis: Sudan Conflict and Complex Emergency, February 2026, World Health Organization, <https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/public-health-situation-analysis---sudan-conflict-and-complex-emergency> (accessed May 2026).

as genocide in January 2025.¹⁰⁸

As one staffer from a major global human rights NGO explained:

“Coalitions formed around maximalist framing of Israel as an apartheid state and escalating accusations in increasingly absolute terms. Over time, this shift changed how abuses were prioritized. Some victims mattered more than others. Human rights concerns around ISIS detention camps run by Kurdish forces were immense. Yet abuses against Kurds by Turkey often received limited attention. The serious, sustained reporting didn’t come. Instead: a few tweets, minimalist statements, selective outrage. That is not impartiality—it is politics.”¹⁰⁹

A specific incident illustrates the pattern. In July 2024, a rocket killed 12 children in the Druze Israeli town of Majdal Shams; weapons analysts determined the projectile was an Iranian-made Falaq-1 rocket launched by Hezbollah from south Lebanon. Several NGOs did not publicly respond to the deadly incident, even though they had extensively covered the pager attack in September 2024 targeting Hezbollah militants that reportedly killed two children—raising questions about the criteria governing institutional attention.

According to Diane Richard, former press officer at Plan International France, the strike was a clear sign of her organization’s “double standards.”

“The NGO wrote in a tweet that it was a ‘tragic’ event, without naming the source of the strike. Yet two days earlier, a strike on a school in Gaza had sparked outrage of a completely different magnitude.”¹¹⁰

Inconsistency also characterizes NGOs’ application of the “genocide” designation.

From 2023 to 2024, MSF did not use the word “genocide” to describe humanitarian crises in Sudan, Syria, Yemen, Ukraine, or Myanmar—making Gaza the singular context in which the term entered MSF’s communications vocabulary. The organization has consistently refused to apply the term to Sudan and Darfur, despite an independent UN fact-finding mission concluding the conflict bore the “hallmarks of genocide,” including declarations of intent. In the early 2000s, MSF explicitly declined to use the genocide label regarding Darfur, citing an absence of legal authority to make such a determination and to protect its independence.¹¹¹

Information that does not fit dominant narratives, insiders say, is often underplayed or ignored. Noting in October 2025 that global rights groups were not denouncing Hamas atrocities—including a wave of public executions and extrajudicial killings¹¹²—against Gazans, Yariv Mohar, former Amnesty International Israel

108 UN Panel of Experts on Sudan, Final Report, S/2024/85, January 23, 2024, United Nations Security Council, <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/012/07/pdf/n2401207.pdf> (accessed May 2026).

109 Interview with NGO staffer “K” from international NGO.

110 Diane Richard, Instagram post, April 9, 2025, <https://www.instagram.com/p/DW6xR7BjIuc/> (accessed May 2026).

111 ‘Sudan: “Hallmarks of genocide” found in El Fasher, UN investigators detail mass killings and ethnic targeting,’ UN News, February 19, 2026, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/02/1166997> (accessed May 2026); Speaking Out: Case Studies from MSF’s Experience of Humanitarian Dilemmas —Darfur 2004, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), June 2024 reissue, <https://www.msf.org/sites/default/files/2024-06/msf-speaking-out-darfur-en.pdf> (accessed May 2026).

112 “Hamas carries out public executions hours after peace deal,” BBC News, October 14, 2025, <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjr034p5prlo> (accessed May 2026).

deputy director, wrote:

“They rightly condemn Israel vehemently for the atrocities it committed in Gaza, yet, at the same time, they downplay, excuse, or even praise Hamas’ horrors. That narrative paints one party in the conflict as the villain and the other as the saint or victim—without appreciating the complex internal dynamics of each society. This is a moral distortion, and there is a real danger that a young generation of potential human rights supporters will be swept uncritically into a narrative that legitimizes atrocities by actors seen as supporting the weaker side (even though Hamas also slaughter Palestinians). This would erode the universality of human rights.”¹¹³

FAILURE OF NEUTRALITY AND NARRATIVE-FRAMING

Contributors described institutional behavior that undermines stated commitments to neutrality.

One Amnesty staffer described institutional encouragement to participate as identifiable organizational representatives in demonstrations dominated by chants such as “From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free” and “Intifada Revolution.” When asked whether participation might be interpreted as organizational endorsement of those slogans, the staff member said a senior leader responded:

“It’s clear that we’re only supporting what we’re holding [ceasefire] signs for.”

When asked whether the organization might also demonstrate support for freeing Israeli hostages, the same leader replied:

“No, because we’re against the Israeli government.”¹¹⁴

The same tolerance for contested phrases, and disregard for Jewish experience of them, is evident in Amnesty’s Australian operations. In its submission to the New South Wales parliamentary inquiry into hate slogans, AIA directed the committee to seek definition of the meaning “globalise the intifada” from Palestinian and Arabic-speaking communities; Jewish experience of the phrase went unexamined. In AIA’s framing, the authoritative voice on meaning belongs to those who use it.¹¹⁵

Evidence gathered by EiGHT indicates this is not incidental. Global rights NGOs operate not only as investigators and advocates, but as strategic actors seeking to shape public narratives.

One Human Rights Watch employee described meetings in the years before the release of the organization’s 2021 “Apartheid” report in which there was open discussion about strategy and intent to “change the narrative” about Israel in the public sphere by framing it an “apartheid” state.

The same focus on messaging was evident after October 7. An internal Human Rights Watch document from just three days after Hamas’ massacres shows that at the top of the “main objectives” of talking points the

113 Yariv Mohar, “Why aren’t the world’s human rights groups denouncing Hamas atrocities against Gazans?” Haaretz, October 27, 2025, <https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2025-10-27/ty-article-opinion/.premium-why-arent-the-worlds-human-rights-groups-denouncing-hamas-atrocities-against-gazans/0000019a-25e4-df67-a3fa-bdf6aed40000> (accessed May 2026).

114 Interview with staffer “M” from Amnesty.

115 Testimony of Amnesty International Australia staffer.

Middle East team was planning was:

“Influence the narrative—highlight the context of this latest round of hostilities (i.e. Apartheid etc.).”¹¹⁶

That orientation translated directly into action. In a November 12, 2023 organization-wide discussion, Human Rights Watch staff described briefing “top-tier celebrities,” reaching out to Palestinian-American influencers Gigi and Bella Hadid, and advising major Hollywood representation firms including Creative Artists Agency (CAA) and Endeavor on how to communicate about the Israel-Hamas crisis.¹¹⁷ Both companies represented numerous high-profile entertainment figures who publicly supported pro-Palestinian activism after October 7.

Earlier in 2023, Human Rights Watch announced it was partnering with Hollywood to increase awareness of humanitarian issues in popular culture, aiming to integrate human rights messaging into film and TV storytelling.¹¹⁸

An MSF planning document ahead of the first anniversary of October 7 reflects the same preoccupation with managing public perception, stating

“It will be important to challenge the dominant narrative that ‘the war started on 7th of October.’”¹¹⁹

FAILURE OF METHODOLOGICAL RIGOR

Contributors described an inversion of investigative practice, in which conclusions increasingly appeared to shape evidence selection and framing rather than the other way around.

Staff at both Amnesty and Human Rights Watch—both of which concluded in 2024 that Israel was committing genocide in Gaza—described processes in which a predetermined conclusion had been reached and articulated openly internally, with information selected to match.

Contributors also described what they perceived as a deliberate shift from cautious investigative practice toward coordinated narrative-shaping, through repeated use of genocide-related language in hashtags, reposts, and institutional messaging prior to any formal legal determination. In December 2024, Amnesty

116 Internal Human Rights Watch document, October 10, 2023, document on file with EiGHT.

117 Human Rights Watch staff discussion, November 12, 2023, document on file with EiGHT.

118 Julian Borger, “Human Rights Watch teams with Hollywood to sharpen humanitarian focus,” *Guardian*, May 4, 2023, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/may/04/human-rights-watch-hollywood-film-tv> (accessed May 2026).

119 MSF internal planning document on file with EiGHT.

staffers wrote:

“From its inception, the [Amnesty] report was represented in internal correspondence as ‘the genocide report’—even while the research was still in its preliminary phase. This is a strong indication of bias and also a factor that can cause further bias (imagine how hard it is for a researcher to work for months on a report titled ‘the genocide report’ and conclude that it was ‘only’ about crimes against humanity—the name sets the expectations). This way of naming a report in advance is not typical of other investigations conducted by Amnesty International. For example, the planned report on the October 7 massacre, which is in its final stages of work, is simply titled ‘the October 7 report’ in internal correspondence, without hinting which crimes are (yet to be) found....

These sorts of predetermined conclusions and outputs risk politicizing AI’s human rights work at large. We are concerned that the inclination to support a predetermined conclusion is based on internal and personal politics rather than support for universal human rights.”¹²⁰

Internal discussions relating to international humanitarian law reportedly focused on developing creative interpretations specific to Israel. It later publicly presented these novel interpretations, developed specifically for Israel, as settled legal conclusions.

Employees past and present also spoke of sourcing standards applied asymmetrically: excessive caution toward Israeli sources alongside uncritical reliance on compromised Palestinian ones. In a discussion of Gaza casualty figures five days after the October 7 attacks, Human Rights Watch Israel-Palestine Director Omar Shakir stated in an organizational meeting:

“[Our] only source is the Gaza Health Ministry. All of us always cite them and it’s reliable.”¹²¹

He repeated that endorsement publicly in the UK Guardian on October 27—lending Human Rights Watch’s institutional credibility to figures produced by a party to the conflict under conditions that independent analysts and governments had identified as grounds for significant caution.¹²²

At the same time, abundant caution is often applied to Israeli-related contexts.

Despite Hamas filming and livestreaming its own attacks, and videos of survivor testimony circulating widely on social media, Human Rights Watch on October 9 still referred to the “apparent” deliberate targeting of civilians. Only on October 18—11 days after more than 1,200 people were murdered—did it state categorically that Hamas had intended to kill anyone: it announced it had “verified four videos” from October 7 “showing three incidents of deliberate killings.”¹²³

Danielle Haas’ 14-year tenure as senior editor at Human Rights Watch gave her an unusually detailed view of the gap between the organization’s public claims of methodological rigor and the reality of how work was actually produced. Among the structural problems she identified and raised internally: researcher notes were not reviewed before publication; “spot-checks” were substituted for rigorous fact-checking;

120 “Jewish Staffers of Amnesty International Criticize the Movement’s Genocide Report,” Haaretz, December 5, 2024. Document on file with EiGHT.

121 Document on file with EiGHT.

122 Chris McGreal, “Can we trust casualty figures from the Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry?” Guardian, October 27, 2023, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/26/can-we-trust-casualty-figures-from-the-hamas-run-gaza-health-ministry> (accessed May 2026).

123 “Israel/Palestine: Videos of Hamas-Led Attacks Verified,” Human Rights Watch, October 18, 2023, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/10/18/israel/palestine-videos-hamas-led-attacks-verified> (accessed May 2026).

and managers were too stretched to give final edits the attention they required. When she raised a series of errors and problems in the Israel-Palestine chapter of the World Report in 2022, the response was not to acknowledge the concerns, including related to factual errors, or engage with proposed solutions—it was to excuse them. A senior staffer told her:

“For context, [name redacted] has indeed been extremely busy with work that has a lot of value to the organization. He simply can’t do everything.”¹²⁴

FAILURE OF LANGUAGE

Language is among the most precise instruments available to human rights organizations—and among the most revealing when examined closely.

A Human Rights Watch piece in February 2025 on the funeral of Shiri, Ariel, and Kfir Bibas—an Israeli mother seized by Hamas on October 7, 2023, with her toddler and infant sons—framed their deaths not as brutal or inhumane but as “illegal,” stating simply that the funeral was a reminder of “why hostage taking is prohibited under international law.” A civilian mother and two child hostages who had been held captive by a designated terrorist organization in Gaza for more than 500 days were described as having died “while in custody.”¹²⁵

Minimization of Israeli suffering was visible at a prominent NGO in Australia in late 2025, when Hamas still held the bodies of hostages. When the organisation’s head office circulated communications referring to “all living Israeli hostages” being freed,¹²⁶ key content approvers at the Australian office removed the word “living,” stating it “gets rid of emotive language that privileges Israel.” The edit did not neutralize the statement; it made it factually inaccurate by implying all hostages had been released—obscuring ongoing rights abuses and erasing victims. A staffer who voiced concerns was told the altered copy was “fine as is.”¹²⁷

A press release headline should signal what is being announced. When Amnesty International finally released its report on Hamas’ October 7 atrocities—more than two years after the attacks—the accompanying press release title gave no indication of the subject and did not mention October 7 or Hamas by name: “Sustainable Peace Requires International Justice for All Victims of All Crimes in Israel and the OPT.”¹²⁸ A link to the report appeared only after three links related to Israeli “genocide” and “apartheid.” The October 7 killings, the 1,200 dead, 251 hostages, and the sexual violence committed by Hamas—the subject of the report the press release purported to announce—appeared 15 paragraphs in.

The October 7 report was afforded significantly less institutional promotion than other work, including the Israel “genocide” report of December 2024 (and an upcoming West Bank ethnic cleansing report, under

124 Document on file with EIGHT.

125 Tom Porteous, “Bibas Family Funeral in Israel Highlights Illegality of Hostage Taking,” Human Rights Watch, February 26, 2025, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/02/26/bibas-family-funeral-israel-highlights-illegality-hostage-taking> (accessed May 2026).

126 “Israel’s genocide against Palestinians in Gaza continues unabated despite ceasefire,” Amnesty International, November 27, 2025, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/11/israels-genocide-against-palestinians-in-gaza-continues-unabated-despite-ceasefire/> (accessed May 2026).

127 Testimony of staffer “J” from prominent NGO in Australia

128 “Sustainable Peace Requires International Justice for All Victims of All Crimes in Israel and the OPT,” Amnesty International, December 11, 2025, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/12/sustainable-peace-requires-international-justice-for-all-victims-of-all-crimes-in-israel-and-the-opt/> (accessed May 2026).

embargo until June at time of writing), which came with fundraising toolkits, petitions, social media tiles, videos and advocacy toolkits.

A staff member at a global environmental NGO described the broader shift in institutional language and priorities after October 7:

“The language changed. Before, it was ‘evidence-based,’ ‘fact-finding,’ ‘climate science,’ ‘fossil free,’ ‘biodiversity,’ ‘circular economy,’ ‘indigenous peoples,’ ‘justice,’ and ‘common good.’ After October 7, it was all about ‘ecocide,’ ‘water-apartheid,’ ‘genocide,’ ‘colonial greenwashing,’ and ‘Nakba.’ Always ceasefire, never hostages. Always Zionists, never Islamists. Always Netanyahu, never Sinwar. Always 1967, never 1922. I assumed it was a mistake, ignorance. But gradually I realized it was intentional; the double standards were conscious and deliberate. At a high-level meeting, it was officially stated: ‘Israel doesn’t deserve the same treatment as Palestinians.’”¹²⁹

7.7 IMPACT ON JEWISH PROFESSIONALS AND SOCIAL COHESION

The institutional dynamics described in this submission have caused documented harm to individuals and carry broader implications for social cohesion in Australia and internationally.

Jewish staff reported exclusion, isolation, anxiety, and professional vulnerability within organizations whose stated values they had chosen as the basis for their careers. Some took temporary leave in response to hostile work environments; several have left entirely.

At least one full-time employee of a global NGO with presence in Australia took doctor-recognized medical leave following conduct that management declined to address. The clinical documentation from a licensed psychologist diagnosed the employee with work-related post-traumatic stress disorder directly attributable to the workplace environment.¹³⁰

Nearly all contributors felt unable to openly express aspects of their Jewish identity at work—including religious observance, family connections to Israel, or concerns about antisemitism—despite the existence of anti-bullying, anti-harassment, DEI, safeguarding, and dignity-at-work policies.

Many reported fears that raising concerns had adversely affected their prospects for promotion, collaboration, or continued employment. A consistent theme among the dozens of people with whom EiGHT has spoken was fear of professional blacklisting within a highly interconnected sector.

Non-Jewish staff who shared similar concerns likewise described reluctance to speak openly, fearing social or professional consequences.

129 Interview with staffer “L,” global environmental NGO.

130 Clinical health assessment and employee assistance service recommendations reviewed by EiGHT.

7.8 CASE STUDY — PLAN INTERNATIONAL: THE COST OF SPEAKING OUT

In February 2023, Diane Richard was hired as a press officer by Plan International France—which has an Australian branch in Melbourne—explicitly for her activist background. Problems began, she said, when she publicly questioned how certain feminist organizations had responded to the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023, and called for acknowledgment of the sexual violence committed that day. An internal directive from Plan International’s global headquarters headlined “Allegations of sexual violence on Oct 7” instructed staff not to respond to external criticism about Hamas’ sexual violence. Months after the attacks, that violence remained classified internally as allegations.

According to Richard, her public stance triggered a wave of hostile behavior from one colleague in particular, both at work and on social media. “She stopped speaking to me, would leave a room when I entered it, obstructed my work, stated that she did not want to appear publicly alongside me, posted insulting stories about me, and sent me threatening messages.”

When Richard finally reported the alleged harassment, Plan International required her to sign a social media contract restricting her personal speech. Her alleged harasser received a mutual termination agreement with full benefits. “I couldn’t understand why I was the only one required to sign this document... Nor why the response to my harassment complaint was to treat me as though I were the one responsible for what was happening to me.”

Richard was dismissed for serious misconduct, with no notice period and no severance pay. In the stated grounds for dismissal, Richard was reprimanded for discussing October 7 sexual violence on her personal social media; for criticizing feminist organizations’ response to the attacks; and for urging those organizations to support a twelve-year-old girl who had been the victim of an antisemitic rape—even though, she noted, “Plan International’s very purpose is to defend children and girls.”

At time of writing, Richard was pursuing her case before the French labor tribunal. The question of whether Plan International Australia’s global governance structures are consistent with the values it publicly espouses—and whether Australian government funding is subject to adequate scrutiny of those structures—is a matter this submission respectfully places before the Commission.¹³¹

The cumulative effect has been significant emotional distress, erosion of institutional trust, and attrition of experienced professionals from organizations that depend on principled, rigorous staff.

The 2025 survey released by Blue Compass, an organization focused on combating antisemitism in the nonprofit sector, reveals that 35% of Jewish professionals working in secular non-profits had considered leaving their jobs due to witnessing antisemitism or encountering harmful stereotypes.¹³²

The implications extend well beyond individual workplaces. Human rights and humanitarian organizations shape media narratives, public discourse, educational materials, policy discussions, and legal advocacy both domestically and internationally.

131 Diane Richard, interview with EiGHT; Diane Richard (@dianerichardoff), Instagram post, April 9, 2025, <https://www.instagram.com/p/DW6xR7Bjluc/> (accessed May 2026).

132 Blue Compass, Jewish Professionals in Secular Nonprofits, December 2025, <https://bluecompassnetwork.org> (accessed May 2026).

Where institutional outputs lack neutrality, consistency, or methodological rigor, the effects extend into public life—reinforcing polarization, amplifying hostility, and normalizing exclusionary rhetoric.

The marginalization of Jewish perspectives within influential civil society organizations contributes to broader perceptions that antisemitism is treated as less serious than other forms of discrimination, weakening confidence in anti-discrimination frameworks and undermining social cohesion.

VIII. INSTITUTIONAL ASSOCIATION WITH PROSCRIBED ORGANIZATIONS, MILITANTS

The IHRA definition of antisemitism, which Australia adopted in 2021, includes among its illustrative examples: “Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor.”¹³³

When Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, MSF, and sectoral leaders normalize association with organizations or related individuals that call for the destruction of the Jewish state, and who participate in the murder of Jewish and Israeli civilians, they provide institutional legitimacy to antisemitism—laundering it through the language of human rights and humanitarianism.

At minimum, they demonstrate a double standard in pushing for boycotts, suspensions, and isolation of Israeli institutions on claimed grounds of disregard for human life. At worst, NGOs’ connections with Palestinian militants suggests something closer to active embrace.

The foundational ideology of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) calls for eliminating the Jewish state as an economic, political and military entity. Its military wing claimed direct participation in the October 7 massacres in official Telegram statements, publishing photographs of operatives attacking Israeli communities. Its history includes aircraft hijackings and suicide bombings targeting civilians.¹³⁴

On June 5, 2025, Amnesty International Germany’s Middle East expert Katja Müller-Fahlbusch spoke alongside a PFLP-linked activist at a protest outside the German Foreign Ministry, timed to the Israeli foreign minister’s visit to Berlin. Protesters displayed red-painted hands—a direct reference to the 2000 Ramallah lynching, in which two Israeli reservists were murdered by a Palestinian mob and their bodies publicly desecrated.¹³⁵

133 International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, Working Definition of Antisemitism, adopted May 26, 2016, Bucharest Plenary, <https://holocaustremembrance.com/resources/working-definition-antisemitism> (accessed May 2026). Australia adopted the IHRA definition in 2021, with bipartisan support, and reaffirmed it in April 2026.

134 The Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades “participated in the 7 October 2023 attacks against Israel alongside Hamas and several other Palestinian armed groups,” European Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades – PFLP,’ https://ecfr.eu/special/mapping_palestinian_politics/abu_ali_mustafa_brigades_pflp/ (accessed May 2026).

135 ‘Protestaktion “Rote Linie Völkerrecht” anlässlich des Besuchs des israelischen Außenministers in Berlin’ (Action “Red Line International Law” on the occasion of the visit of the Israeli Foreign Minister to Berlin), Amnesty International Deutschland, Press Release, June 4, 2025, <https://www.amnesty.de/pressmitteilung/deutschland-israel-protestaktion-rote-linie-besuch-israelischer-aussenminister-berlin> (accessed May 2026); ‘PFLP-Aktivist spricht bei Amnesty-Kundgebung in Berlin’ (PFLP Activist Speaks at Amnesty Rally in Berlin), democ.e.V., June 11, 2025. <https://democ.de/artikel/pflp-amnesty-kundgebung/> (accessed May 2026).



Amnesty International Germany issued no acknowledgment, retraction, or statement of concern, and did not launch an internal investigation—echoing what staff describe as a wider NGO practice of indifference and outright denial when it comes to links with Palestinian militants, including dismissing possible evidence, rejecting claims of militant association as politically motivated, and seeking no independent investigation.¹³⁶ Staff described working presumptions that Israeli government statements, military findings, judicial decisions, and intelligence assessments are inherently without merit.

The Berlin protest reflects a long-standing sectoral comfort with the PFLP.

In 2011, Human Rights Watch appointed Shawan Jabarin—convicted in 1985 for recruiting PFLP members and found by the Israeli Supreme Court to have maintained PFLP activity in 2007, 2008, and 2009—to its Middle East Advisory Board.¹³⁷ Executive Director Kenneth Roth initially said it was “not true” that Jabarin had been a member of PFLP, then added: “And if he had been, it’s ancient history.”¹³⁸

In September 2025, the US Treasury sanctioned Al-Haq, Al Mezan, and PCHR—organizations whose leadership include Jabarin and PCHR director Raji Sourani, who publicly declared pride in PFLP membership at a 2014 PFLP ceremony.¹³⁹ Human Rights Watch described the groups as “widely respected” and called the sanctions “cruel and vindictive.” Amnesty International called them “a deeply troubling and

136 Ibid.

137 Jabarin’s role on the board is verified on the organization’s dedicated directory page, the Middle East and North Africa Division Advisory Committee Roster. “Middle East and North Africa Division Advisory Committee Members,” December 18, 2013, Human Rights Watch, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/12/18/middle-east-and-north-africa-division-advisory-committee-members> (accessed May 2026). Human Rights Watch’s own dedicated page for Jabarin was no longer publicly accessible at time of writing. Human Rights Watch, “Shawan Jabarin” [page no longer accessible], formerly available at: <https://www.admin.hrw.org/tag/shawan-jabarin> (accessed May 2026). As recently as May 2026, Jabarin was publicly identified as “a member of Human Rights Watch Middle East Advisory Board” in coverage of his receipt of the University of Galway’s 2024 Alumni Award for Law, Public Policy and Society. “Palestinian human rights defender Shawan Jabarin welcomed to Galway law school,” Irish Legal News, May 2026, <https://www.irishlegal.com/articles/palestinian-human-rights-defender-shawan-jabarin-welcomed-to-university-of-galway> (accessed May 2026).


138 Kenneth Roth, quoted in: Harold Evans, “Shawan Jabarin’s Controversial Appointment to Human Rights Watch Board,” Daily Beast, February 15, 2011, <https://www.thedailybeast.com/shawan-jabarins-controversial-appointment-to-human-rights-watch-board/> (accessed May 2026).

139 Al Haq director Shawan Jabarin was convicted and imprisoned in 1985 for recruiting PFLP members and organizing PFLP training outside Israel. The Israeli Supreme Court found him to have maintained PFLP activity in 2007, 2008, and 2009. Raji Sourani, director of PCHR, served three years in prison for PFLP membership. At a 2014 PFLP anniversary ceremony he reported to have publicly stated: “I was in the ranks of the Popular Front... we don’t apologize and don’t regret our past, we are proud that once we were members of this organization and we fought in its ranks.” The PFLP Honors Fighter Professor Raji Sourani in Recognition of His Role in Conveying the Message of Our People], Donya Al-Watan, February 14, 2014. (Archived).

shameful assault on human rights.” Neither organization addressed the convictions, the court findings, or the directors’ own declarations.

Defending sanctioned organizations is one expression of a broader institutional reflex that extends to actively reframing convicted militants as human rights victims.

In 2024, Amnesty described the death in custody of Walid Daqqa—a senior PFLP operative convicted of involvement in the torture and murder of an Israeli soldier and imprisoned for 38 years—as “a cruel reminder of Israel’s disregard for Palestinians’ right to life,” presenting him as a “writer” whose death was “heart-wrenching.” His conviction, sentence, and PFLP role were not prominently identified.¹⁴⁰



Beyond how human rights, humanitarian, and other NGOs publicly frame militants—and how that characterization carries over public opinion and social cohesion—the broader question remains as to what these organizations know, and choose not to act on, within their own operations.

In June 2024, MSF identified Fadi al-Wadiya as one of its staffers, describing his killing in an Israeli drone strike as “cynical,” “abhorrent” and “beyond shocking.”¹⁴¹ The IDF published photographs of al-Wadiya in Islamic Jihad uniform, stating he had worked in PIJ’s rocket manufacturing unit for more than 15 years. In February 2026, Palestinian Islamic Jihad itself confirmed he had been a senior operative.¹⁴² MSF’s public

140 Israel/OPT: Death in custody of Walid Daqqa is cruel reminder of Israel's disregard for Palestinians' right to life," Amnesty, April 8, 2024, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/04/israel-opt-death-in-custody-of-walid-daqqah-is-cruel-reminder-of-israels-disregard-for-palestinians-right-to-life/> (accessed May 2026).

141 "MSF colleague killed in Gaza City," Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), June 25, 2024, <https://www.msf.org/msf-colleague-killed-gaza-city> (accessed May 2026).

142 "MSF physiotherapist killed in Gaza while on his way to work," Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), June 25, 2024 (editor's note added February 24, 2026), <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/msf-physiotherapist-killed-gaza-while-his-way-work> (accessed May 2026). Notably, despite the February 2026 editor's note acknowledging that Palestinian Islamic Jihad had confirmed al-Wadiya as a member of the group, the original article title—presenting him as a healthcare worker killed on his way to work—remained updated as of May 2026.

denial of prior knowledge about his terror ties followed what one MSF staffer with direct involvement in Gaza operations described in 2024 as broader internal institutional indifference to militant presence in its own operations. The employee said:

“We know very well that in Nasser Hospital, key players—the Hamas Ministry of Health people—had moved back into office and were not welcome on that floor. There had always been doors you were expected to avoid.... They were in the hospitals. The outrage over it...MSF is, ‘Oh my God, these sacred spaces!’ The people who have breached these sacred spaces, we know it’s Hamas. We know that. So, the outrage is clearly misplaced.”¹⁴³

The same employee described a culture of institutional silence when confronted with evidence of militant activity, including a staff briefing in which an outgoing colleague described working alongside militants in Gaza hospitals:

“There were probably 10 of us in the room when this person described this. And everybody just looked so, ‘Oh my God, they said it. They shouldn’t have said it.’”

On hiring, the same employee was unambiguous:

“We don’t do any background checks on anyone we hire in Gaza.”

When two suspected Hamas militants, flagged as such by MSF Palestinian sources, appeared on a hiring list, the response was to go ahead regardless:

“They decided to just proceed. It looks so shady. We won’t hire them, but we have to go ahead with the test....We’re putting everyone at risk, and this is what the staff is saying. And we were just going ahead even when we knew.”¹⁴⁴

Most recently, in February 2026, questions regarding the sector’s tolerance for association with designated terrorist organizations were raised when UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese appeared at the Al Jazeera Forum in Doha on a panel alongside Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi—just weeks after Iranian security forces had massacred as many as 30,000 people in two days.¹⁴⁵ When European governments called for Albanese’s resignation, Amnesty International Secretary-General Agnès Callamard condemned the criticism and demanded public apologies from the foreign ministers of France, Czechia, Austria, Germany, and Italy.¹⁴⁶

IX. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, STRUCTURAL

143 “Interview with MSF staffer.”

144 Ibid.

145 “17th Al Jazeera Forum: The Palestinian Cause and the Regional Balance of Power in the Context of an Emerging Multipolar World,” Al Jazeera Forum, February 7-9, 2026, Doha, Qatar, <https://forum.aljazeera.net/> (accessed May 2026).

146 “Global: European states must retract outrageous attacks on UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese,” Amnesty International, February 13, 2026, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2026/02/european-states-must-retract-attacks-francesca-albanese/> (accessed May 2026).

BIAS

A question this submission implicitly raises is why none of the failures documented in preceding sections are corrected. This section provides a partial answer: incentive structures point the other way.

None of the organizations documented in this submission are fully transparent about their donor lists. Where entanglements have been discovered or unearthed, what has emerged suggests relationships that could compromise independence.

In an internal communication in April 2025, Mercy Corps CEO Tjada D’Oyen McKenna told staff she was travelling to Qatar and the United Arab Emirates,

“...a region with significant potential for new partnerships and funding...I’ll be meeting with current and prospective government and private donors to introduce and position Mercy Corps as a strong partner in humanitarian and development work.”¹⁴⁷

The communication did not acknowledge the poor human rights records of the governments being courted and included no conflict-of-interest framework or recognition that organizations whose stated values include human dignity and accountability face particular obligations when seeking funds from governments that systematically violate both.

Also in 2025, Omar Shakir—Human Rights Watch’s Israel-Palestine director—was publicly listed as an adjunct instructor at Georgetown University in Qatar. He appears to have been responsible for the organization’s Qatar-based operations, which has hosted senior Hamas officials and facilitated their financing.¹⁴⁹



In November 2023, a leaked alleged Qatari government document detailed a €3 million donation made to Human Rights Watch in January 2018, described in the document as “confidential and urgent” and coordinated through the Qatari Embassy in London. Human Rights Watch denied having solicited or

147 Tjada D’Oyen McKenna, internal staff communication, Mercy Corps, April 2025. Document on file with EiGHT.

148 On file with EiGHT

149 “Treasury Targets Hamas Terrorist Group Members, Operatives, and Financial Facilitators in Gaza and Elsewhere Including Sudan, Türkiye, Algeria, and Qatar,” US Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, October 18, 2023, <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1816> (accessed May 2026).

accepted any money from the Qatari government or any other government.¹⁵⁰

In 2020, Human Rights Watch admitted, following media reports, that it had accepted a \$470,000 donation from Saudi magnate Mohamed Bin Issa Al Jaber—negotiated by then-Executive Director Kenneth Roth under a memorandum of understanding stipulating the funds could not be used for LGBT rights work in the Middle East and North Africa.

The donation in 2012 came one year after Human Rights Watch had published a report documenting Al Jaber’s own company’s coercive labor practices. Human Rights Watch described the decision as “deeply regrettable” and returned the money but offered no accounting of the lapse in governance or the donation’s possible impact on Human Rights Watch work. Roth remained in his post.¹⁵¹

Human Rights Watch’s opacity regarding donor relationships is not a recent concern. In May 2009, Middle East Director Sarah Leah Whitson attended private fundraising receptions in Riyadh and Jeddah. According to a report in Arab News, a Saudi English-language wire service, Whitson highlighted the organization’s battles with “pro-Israel pressure groups in the U.S., the European Union and the United Nations” as part of the pitch to Saudi donors. Executive Director Roth said the meeting had been “falsely construed” as soliciting funds to counter the Israel lobby. No transcripts or contemporaneous notes of Whitson’s remarks were made public.¹⁵²

When organizations that shape narratives about Israel and antisemitism are financially entangled with entities that have direct interests in those narratives, what reaches Australian communities—and with what authority—has direct consequences for social cohesion.

X. THE REGULATORY LANDSCAPE

Human rights and humanitarian organizations can exercise substantial influence over public opinion, media narratives, and policymaking, yet their reports and advocacy materials are generally not subject to the same formal accountability mechanisms that apply to government institutions. While these organizations remain subject to applicable laws, donor requirements, and public scrutiny, there is typically no independent public authority responsible for routinely auditing, verifying, or certifying the accuracy, completeness, or impartiality of their published content.

Over the past 25 years, this gap has been addressed through a proliferation of voluntary initiatives. None possesses authority to compel compliance, investigate misconduct independently, or impose meaningful sanctions for non-compliance. The resulting system is a mark-your-own-homework model, where NGOs

150 “The Raven Project leaks: Alleged Qatari support of 3 million euros for Human Rights Watch (Special Dispatch No. 10973),” MEMRI, November 21, 2023, <https://www.memri.org/reports/raven-project-leaks-alleged-qatari-support-3-million-euros-human-rights-watch>. The document has not been independently verified, and its provenance cannot be confirmed.

151 “Statement on Return of Donation,” Human Rights Watch, February 27, 2020, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/02/27/statement-return-donation> (accessed May 2026).

152 Ori Nir, “Human Rights Watch and Its Saudi Donors,” *The Forward*, July 2009, <https://forward.com/news/110381/human-rights-watch-and-its-saudi-donors> (reporting on the original Arab News account and HRW’s response); Jeffrey Goldberg, “Fundraising Corruption at Human Rights Watch,” *The Atlantic*, July 15, 2009 (containing Roth’s email responses in full); David Bernstein, “Human Rights Watch Goes to Saudi Arabia,” *Wall Street Journal*, June 16, 2009 (original English-language reporting on the visit) (accessed May 2026).

effectively grade themselves.¹⁵³

The sector divides broadly into advocacy and operational organizations.

For many advocacy organizations, the principal reference point is the INGO Accountability Charter (now operating as Accountable Now), which describes its framework as voluntary, designed to “complement and supplement existing laws” by drawing on “a range of existing codes, norms, standards and guidelines.”¹⁵⁴ Adopted in 2006, by 11 founding signatories including Amnesty International, Greenpeace International, and Oxfam International, it required annual self-reporting against 12 accountability commitments covering transparency, governance, and effectiveness. Notably, Accountable Now has since made its traditional reporting framework optional.¹⁵⁵ It also does not encompass some of the sector’s most influential actors, including Human Rights Watch and MSF.

For operational humanitarian organizations, the principal framework is the Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards, establishing technical benchmarks across health, water, sanitation, food security, and shelter. Alongside it sits the Core Humanitarian Standard (CHS), administered by the CHS Alliance, formed in 2015 from the merger of HAP International—the sector’s first international self-regulatory body, founded in 2003—and People In Aid.¹⁵⁶ Voluntary third-party certification against the CHS is available but optional.¹⁵⁷

The Charter for Change, launched in 2015, cuts across both categories. Its 52 signatory INGOs—including ActionAid and CARE—committed to eight measures intended to ensure southern-based actors serve as genuine partners in humanitarian response, including directing at least 25% of humanitarian funding to local and national organizations by 2020. That target was missed: signatories reached approximately 23% by the deadline, with no mechanism to compel compliance or impose consequences. The Charter has been endorsed by over 1,300 local and national organizations from 57 countries.¹⁵⁸

On financial accountability, organizations are subject to charity and tax law in their jurisdictions of registration: the UK Charity Commission, the US IRS 501(c)(3) framework, and their equivalents. These obligations safeguard against financial impropriety but do not regulate research methodology, editorial standards, or the handling of internal complaints.

Donor conditionality from the EU, USAID, and the FCDO represents one of the more significant external levers in practice but applies to grant-funded activities rather than overall organizational conduct or published outputs. It also raises its own questions where funding relationships shape advocacy priorities in ways that are neither transparent nor independently scrutinized.

153 Even rare exceptions—such as Amnesty’s KonTerra review into staff wellbeing in 2019—reflects accountability at an organization’s discretion, not accountability by design: Amnesty commissioned it, controlled its terms, chose what it examined, and decided when circumstances warranted one.

154 INGO Accountability Charter (2006), “The Charter’s Purpose,” <https://www.oxfamintermon.org/hubfs/Oxfam-Website/OxfamWeb-Documents/INGO-Accountability-Charter.pdf> (accessed May 2026).

155 Ibid.

156 CHS Alliance, About Us. <https://www.chsalliance.org/about/> (accessed May 2026).

157 Médecins Sans Frontières participated in developing the Sphere Handbook but subsequently withdrew from the project, citing concerns that rigid minimum standards can conflict with medical ethics and operational independence—illustrating a broader reality: even where detailed standards exist, major organizations may decline to participate without consequence.

158 Charter for Change, Signatories, <https://charter4change.org/signatories/>; Charter for Change, Commitments. <https://charter4change.org/commitments>

These frameworks exist alongside a wider range of accountability tools: financial disclosures, performance evaluations, social audits, and stakeholder participation processes. Each represents a legitimate practice in isolation. Collectively, however, they share the same structural weakness—internally commissioned, selectively published, and unenforceable. No external body can compel their production, verify their accuracy, or act on their findings.

In addition, individual organizations have commitments on diversity, equity, inclusion, workplace dignity, and anti-discrimination. The central contention of this submission is not that such commitments are absent, but that the conduct documented herein demonstrates a significant divergence between stated principles and organizational practice.

Across these frameworks, verification is predominantly self-reported, complaints are typically handled internally, and there is generally no independent regulator with a mandate to routinely investigate the accuracy, methodology, editorial standards, or handling of complaints relating to NGOs' published outputs.

In Australia, registered charities are subject to oversight by the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission (ACNC), which monitors financial compliance and governance obligations but does not extend to research methodology, editorial standards, the handling of internal complaints, or the accuracy of published outputs. Organizations whose outputs shape public discourse, legal proceedings, and government policy in Australia can, under the current framework, be registered charities in good standing while engaging in precisely the conduct this submission documents.

XI. BARRIERS TO REPORTING

Multiple factors deter staff from reporting concerns relating to antisemitism, bias, workplace hostility, and failures in professional standards.

Prior negative experience—either personally endured or witnessed in colleagues—has been a major deterrent. Contributors described organizational cultures in which concerns are consistently minimized or reframed as personal grievances, and complaint mechanisms are embedded within structures that function primarily to preserve the status quo.

Complaints appeared to be handled inconsistently depending on who was implicated, while Israel-related concerns were frequently treated as politically sensitive matters rather than assessed through ordinary workplace conduct frameworks.

Many staff concluded there was little point raising concerns because previous complaints had not resulted in investigations, accountability measures, or meaningful organizational change.

Leadership behavior was also cited as a deterrent, especially when they modeled hostility toward Israel and Jews. Overt political displays within offices compounded self-censorship, especially when requests to

address them went unanswered. A working group on antisemitism in one organization said:

“It would be helpful if [the organization] would clarify explicitly that delegates or staff members should refrain from wearing signs of identification with a party to a conflict (e.g. keffiyeh) in view of the principle of neutrality. This should also apply to taking parts in public demonstrations of support to one party to the conflict or the other which includes social media.”¹⁵⁹

Mischaracterization of those who criticize Israel work—even staff who have been active and outspoken about Israeli policies—was also cited as a deterrent, with common themes being they are politically driven, aim to defend the Israeli government and its policies, “excuse” Israeli military actions, and want to “tell the world ‘Israel is right....’”

Fear of retaliation was repeatedly cited. Contributors described concerns about adverse career consequences, social ostracism, reputational harm, and exclusion from future opportunities within a relatively interconnected professional sector. Several contributors stated they had been removed from forums or discussions directly related to their expertise, while others described situations severe enough that staff ultimately chose to leave rather than continue to raise concerns.

At Amnesty USA, a human rights lawyer specializing in national security and human rights law said she was removed from all relevant discussions and was ostracized by staff after she objected to the organization immediately blaming Israel for creating the “root cause” of the October 7 attacks.

“I went from a valued member of the staff to being persona non grata because I had suggested that we should have some respect for the victims of a horrendous human rights attack, instead of blaming them for it,” she said.¹⁶⁰

In some cases, institutional channels intended to protect employees failed entirely.

One employee reported attempting to submit a formal complaint via an officially designated reporting address in accordance with the organization’s Prevention and Intervention Against Harassment Policy, only to receive an automatic bounce notification stating it was not operational.¹⁶¹ The failure constituted not only a breach of the organization’s own internal protocols, but a violation of a national equal treatment and non-discrimination law requiring employers to maintain effective and accessible mechanisms for reporting, investigating, and remediating workplace harassment.

Staff also expressed uncertainty about whether complaints were independently reviewed, appropriately escalated, or resolved according to consistent criteria. In multiple organizations, contributors alleged that reputational considerations appeared to outweigh accountability concerns.

EiGHT also received accounts of confidentiality agreements being used to intimidate and silence employees, and of restrictions extending beyond reasonable workplace confidentiality protections. The following Greenpeace España case illustrates the dynamic in documented detail.¹⁶²

159 Working Group on Antisemitism 2025, internal document submitted to management, international humanitarian organization with Australian operations, 2025, document on file with EiGHT.

160 Amnesty USA staff member.

161 Interview with staffer, international NGO.

162 The following account is based on the employee’s claims and legal filings, not established findings.

11.1 CASE STUDY — GREENPEACE: SILENCE AS SETTLEMENT

In 2026, a Jewish employee of Greenpeace España brought a legal claim against Greenpeace Spain and Greenpeace International, alleging that from late 2023 both organizations had created and tolerated a hostile work environment. This included alleged repeated antisemitic posts on official Slack channels (including by senior staff such as Greenpeace International’s Global Equity, Diversity and Inclusion Coordinator); Holocaust-referencing imagery; and public responses in a March 2025 survey on the Israel-Gaza conflict that expressed hostility towards Jewish colleagues, and questioned the fitness of Jewish and Israeli staff for employment.¹⁶³

She also claimed procedural failures, including that the organization had over nearly nine months failed to lodge her issues as formal complaints. In February 2026, she said the NGO—without investigation, interview or hearing—proposed removing her from internal channels. Arguing the response amounts to revictimization, she claimed that both entities be held jointly liable as a single employer group given their integrated operations, shared funding of her role, and mutual deflection of responsibility.

She sought termination of her contract with severance and approximately AUD \$410,000 in additional damages for discrimination and violations of her fundamental rights to equality, dignity and freedom of expression.

In subsequent negotiations, the organization insisted that in exchange for financial compensation, the employee affirm that “no breach of fundamental rights had occurred” during her employment, waive all claims against the organization and every affiliated entity in its global network, and accept confidentiality provisions of unlimited duration, extending even to discussions with her own family members and partner.

The organization refused requests for standard carve-outs, including the ability to discuss her experience with close family. The confidentiality agreement, it said, extended to “third parties without exceptions.” Introducing exceptions in the “personal or private sphere would render the assumed obligation devoid of substance and compromise its effectiveness.” It further refused to permit her to speak in public fora on matters of general interest, asserting that even general statements could create “a risk of improper association or attribution of positions” to the organization, given her prior employment.

She rejected the settlement. At time of writing, she was considering pursuing legal action in the Spanish labor courts for violation of fundamental rights, including discrimination, harm to moral integrity, and infringement of freedom of expression.¹⁶⁴

163 The March 2025 survey on “Greenpeace’s response to Palestine-Israel” was described as “an independent project of a small group from the Greenpeace Future Leadership Programme” and sent to all Greenpeace International staff as an organizational learning exercise intended to gather diverse perspectives. The survey referenced “16+ months of genocide in Gaza” without any reference to Hamas’s October 7 attacks. It did not appear to include safeguards to identify, assess, or mitigate discriminatory or harmful content in free-text responses to the survey. Documentation on file with EiGHT.

164 Documentation reviewed by EiGHT.

XII. THE ACCOUNTABILITY GAP AND ITS PUBLIC CONSEQUENCES

The accountability gaps identified in preceding sections do not stay contained within the sector. Through a cycle involving academic and cultural institutions, media organizations, policymakers, and legal bodies, they are transmitted—and legitimized—at every level of public life.

The cycle operates across at least five mutually reinforcing nodes.

NGOs produce findings and legal characterizations under conditions documented in this submission: conclusions that may have preceded evidence, omitted material information, partially framed the available record, or suppressed corrections.

Academic institutions theorize and elaborate upon those findings within established intellectual frameworks—particularly post-colonial and international legal theory—in ways that confer scholarly legitimacy and insulate claims from empirical challenge. NGO staff frequently teach within those same institutions, including as adjunct professors, normalizing their analytical frameworks as disciplinary standards, while NGO reports are assigned as course reading and treated as credible primary sources.¹⁶⁵

Media organizations report both as established fact.

Policymakers cite and incorporate them into official positions and funding decisions.¹⁶⁶

Legal institutions receive the resulting consensus as evidence of widespread expert agreement, and in some cases codify it in determinations with binding or persuasive authority.¹⁶⁷

The cycle begins before any academic, media, or policy institution has received the output—with what

165 For example: in one New York institution alone—Roosevelt House, the Public Policy Institute of Hunter College in New York—no less than eight current or former staff from Human Rights Watch were listed in 2026 as faculty in the Human Rights Program, <https://www.roosevelthouse.hunter.cuny.edu/hrp/hrp-instructors/> (accessed May 2026). In Australia, the output of organizations such as Amnesty and Human Rights Watch is frequently included as assigned or recommended materials. For example, the Western Australia senior humanities curriculum sample teaching programs explicitly assigns Human Rights Watch—World Report 2023 and Amnesty International refugee materials as teaching resources for human-rights coursework.

166 In the Australian Senate on August 9, 2023, for example, Senator Lidia Thorpe referenced Amnesty International in calling for the Australian government to “say Israel is an apartheid state” (“Amnesty International has said it.”) Australian Senate Hansard — 9 August 2023. While discussing Israeli policies and apartheid allegations in a Senate debate on June 21, 2023, Senator Jordon Steele-John also quoted Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International: “Human Rights Watch recognises it, Amnesty International recognises it...” Australian Senate Hansard — 21 June 2023. In the aftermath of Hamas’ October 7, 2023 attacks, Australian media outlets including the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC News and Media Watch), Special Broadcasting Service (SBS News), The Guardian Australia, and The Sydney Morning Herald regularly referenced statements, investigations, and assessments from both organizations as part of their reporting and analysis of the conflict.

167 In its third provisional measures order in *South Africa v. Israel*, the International Court of Justice relied on international reports—including from the WHO and the IPC—that had not been provided to or considered by either party, some published after Israel had already submitted its written observations, thereby incorporating external institutional outputs into a binding legal determination without adversarial scrutiny. *South Africa v. Israel*, ICJ, Order on Third Request for Provisional Measures, March 28, 2024; Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Barak; see Tal Mimran, “Third Provisional Measures in *South Africa v. Israel*,” *Verfassungsblog*, April 11, 2024, <https://verfassungsblog.de/third-provisional-measures/> (discussing the procedural fairness concerns arising from the Court’s reliance on external reports not before the parties).

organizations choose to publish, when they choose to publish it, and what internal deliberations shape those choices. By citing each other's findings, players within the NGO ecosystem construct echo chambers of consensus, generating the appearance of independent convergence. The result is conformity without obvious explicit coordination: anchor organizations establish a norm, smaller ones align, and those who resist are isolated within a sector whose interconnectedness functions as both its strength and its enforcement mechanism.

Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch both published major reports reaching comparable conclusions of Israeli “genocide” within 14 days of each other in December 2024. On apartheid, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty reached near-identical legal conclusions on one of the most contested characterizations in international law, within 10 months of each other—in April 2021 and February 2022 respectively. In both cases, the simultaneity generated media and policy impact that neither could have achieved alone—each organization citing the other as corroboration, the pair together creating the impression of independent convergence.

Anchor organizations set not only analytical norms but behavioral ones.

When Amnesty International suspended its Israeli chapter in January 2025—after it challenged its genocide determination—it established a template: organizational survival based on ideological conformity. Within months, similar calls were emerging across the sector. At Greenpeace, internal communications demanded that Greenpeace Israel be closed if it failed to adopt identical political characterizations, as illustrated by the following three separate comments:¹⁶⁸

- “If GP Israel don’t call for an end to the occupation in Gaza, West Bank, or Call out the Israeli Government for genocide, war crimes, apartheid then GP Israel should be closed.”
- “Also, there should be an investigation into the MED (Israel Office) role in promoting Zionism and Israel/Jewish supremacy ideology, as well as their partnerships they have formed over the years with organisations that might have ties with such ideologically problematic entities. There has been public comments on its tie with such organisations and we should clear it up. In case such things are found, we should even consider closing the office.”
- “get rid of GP Israel, stop normalising Israel as anything less than a genocidal colonial settler entity”

This submission has documented the conditions under which those norms are produced: predetermined conclusions shaping evidence selection; press releases omitting material context; correction practices governed by political rather than evidentiary considerations; and internal priorities explicitly framed as narrative influence. When outputs produced under these conditions acquire the authority of legal determination or settled policy, the consequences extend far beyond the sector.

For Jewish Australians, the practical effect has been an environment in which prejudice can be expressed as political conscience, grounded in the apparent findings of independent investigators, endorsed by academic consensus, reported as fact, and reflected in the positions of governments and international bodies. The cycle does not merely spread misinformation. It provides misinformation with the full institutional authority of modern liberal societies.

The mechanism operates domestically as well as globally. In January 2026, Amnesty International Australia made a submission to the Parliament of New South Wales describing the slogan “globalise the intifada”

168 Staff comments related to a March 2025 survey, “Greenpeace’s response to Palestine-Israel.” Documentation on file with EiGHT.

as “deeply embedded in peaceful anti-genocide, anti-apartheid, and anti-occupation movements.”¹⁶⁹ The slogan—which calls for the internationalization of armed uprising—has been widely understood as a call to violence and has been cited in connection with antisemitic incidents in Australia and internationally.

The normalization surfaces beyond formal submissions.

In 2024, Friends of the Earth Melbourne hosted Environmental Nakba: A First Nations Forum on the Effects of Colonisation on Indigenous Lands at Black Spark Cultural Centre in Northcote, Victoria.¹⁷⁰ The event brought together representatives from Friends of the Earth Malaysia and Palestine, a Palestinian academic framing conflict as “ecocide,” a Mapuche land rights activist, and a Wurundjeri First Nations speaker under the banner of environmental and Indigenous solidarity. Multiple participants explicitly endorsed militancy, direct action, and escalation as legitimate responses to perceived oppression, while denying equivalent legitimacy to those on the other side—including Jewish indigeneity. Statements included: “We need to escalate,” “I’m starting a fucking revolution,” and “Find a target that you like... and fucking hit that target.”

Neither Friends of the Earth Melbourne, which organized the event, nor Friends of the Earth International issued a distancing statement.

169 Amnesty International Australia, Submission No. 85 to the NSW Parliament Standing Committee on Law and Safety, Inquiry into Measures to Prohibit Slogans that Incite Hatred, January 2026, parliament.nsw.gov.au (accessed May 2026).

170 Environmental Nakba—a First Nations forum on the effects of colonisation on Indigenous Lands [Video], YouTube, Friends of the Earth Australia, May 24, 2024, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CVe5KYfUzv0> (accessed May 2026). Speakers: Marisol Salinas Caicheo, Jasper Cohen-Hunter, Prof. Mazin Qumsiyeh (Friends of the Earth Palestine), Meenakshi Raman (President, Friends of the Earth Malaysia; former Chair, Friends of the Earth International), Abeer M. Butmeh (Coordinator, PENGON/Friends of the Earth Palestine). Facilitated by Nathalie Farah.

12.1 CASE STUDY — LATTOUF AND THE PROBLEM OF INSTITUTIONAL

PRE-VALIDATION

The December 2023 termination of ABC presenter Antoinette Lattouf makes the mechanism visible with unusual clarity.

Lattouf reposted a Human Rights Watch claim that Israel was deliberately deploying starvation as a weapon of war in Gaza—captioning it “HRW reporting starvation as a tool of war.” She did not present it as an allegation or contested finding. The ABC’s own Content Director of Radio Sydney had advised Lattouf it was acceptable to post material that was “fact-based, from a verified source, or from a reputable organisation.”¹⁷¹ The Federal Court accepted she had been told that posting “fact-based material from a verified source would be fine.”¹⁷² Human Rights Watch was the verified source. Its imprimatur was the fact-check.

As documented in this submission, the methodological conditions under which Human Rights Watch and other organizations produce claims are fallible and require external scrutiny. Institutional pre-validation means that by the time information reaches a journalist, further scrutiny appears unnecessary.

When Lattouf was terminated, the accuracy of the underlying claim was never examined. The termination was received not as a consequence of disseminating unverified material but as retaliation for disseminating the truth—a framing that further insulated the original claim from scrutiny and positioned those who questioned it as complicit in suppression.

The social cohesion consequences are direct.

Claims circulated at broadcast scale under institutional authority contribute to an environment in which hostility toward Jewish Australians can present itself not as prejudice but as conscience—grounded in findings that have passed through every institution society uses to confer legitimacy.

The harm is not only to the individuals affected, but also to the shared foundations on which social cohesion depends: common agreement about evidence, institutional integrity, and the basic facts from which disagreement might productively proceed.

171 Elizabeth Green, content director, ABC Radio Sydney, evidence given in *Lattouf v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (No 2)* [2025] FCA 669 (Rangiah J), Federal Court of Australia, June 25, 2025, at [491], <https://www.judgments.fedcourt.gov.au/judgments/Judgments/fca/single/2025/2025fca0669> (accessed May 2026).

172 *Lattouf v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (No 2)* [2025] FCA 669 (Rangiah J), Federal Court of Australia, June 25, 2025, <https://www.judgments.fedcourt.gov.au/judgments/Judgments/fca/single/2025/2025fca0669> (accessed May 2026). The precise passage as characterized in legal commentary: the Court determined Lattouf was “merely provided with advice that it would be best not to post anything controversial about the war... qualified by an indication that posting fact-based material from a verified source would be fine.”

XIII. ANALYSIS: SYSTEMIC DRIVERS

The failures documented in this submission are not isolated incidents or the product of individual misconduct alone. They reflect structural conditions within the NGO sector that make these dynamics predictable and, without external intervention, self-reinforcing.

Three interlocking structural drivers are at work.

- **Weak external accountability.** Human rights and humanitarian organizations exercise influence comparable to regulatory bodies—shaping law, policy, media, and public discourse—while operating under voluntary governance standards, self-reported compliance, and internal complaints processes embedded within the hierarchies they are meant to scrutinize.
- **Perverse incentive.** Donor funding responds to bold narrative framing. Reputational authority accrues to organizations that are decisive, not cautious. Corrections that complicate prevailing narratives attract neither resources nor recognition. Staff advancement reflects alignment with institutional orthodoxy more reliably than methodological rigor.
- **Ideological closure.** Across the accounts gathered for this submission, a consistent pattern emerges: workplaces in which a particular analytical framework has hardened into institutional consensus, and in which challenge to that consensus is treated not as legitimate dissent but as political threat or organizational disloyalty. This structural resistance to self-correction means the mechanisms that might otherwise produce accountability—whistleblowing, complaints, internal criticism—are routinely reframed and dismissed rather than acted upon.

Contributors described the rise of a generation of staff who had come to treat their own ideological frameworks as institutional baseline—and felt entitled to demand organizational alignment with them. MSF staff in Lebanon, describing themselves as “shocked and outraged” by a press release on October 12, 2023, demanded that directors withdraw it and accused the organization of “once more” choosing to “stand behind the ‘White’ face of the organization.” They would, they said,

“...be amenable to accept a much more balanced press release if not a public apology.”¹⁷³

These drivers compound one another. Weak accountability removes external corrective pressure. Perverse incentives reward positioning over integrity. Ideological closure disables internal dissent. The antisemitism documented in this submission, and the organizational non-responses that followed, are among the most visible consequences.

EiGHT acknowledges that many within the sector remain deeply committed to universalism, neutrality, and principled advocacy. What this analysis suggests is that good intentions are insufficient without structural conditions that make accountability possible. Those conditions do not currently exist. Creating them is the purpose of the recommendations in this submission.

173 Internal petition, MSF Lebanon staff, October 2023, document on file with EiGHT; “Indiscriminate Violence and the Collective Punishment of Gaza Must Cease,” Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), October 12, 2023, <https://www.msf.org/indiscriminate-violence-and-collective-punishment-gaza-must-cease> (accessed May 2026).

XIV. CONCLUSION

Human rights and humanitarian organizations occupy positions of significant moral and institutional authority. They name abuses, shape narratives, influence courts, and tell the world who deserves protection. That authority is not self-legitimizing. It depends on the consistent application of the principles these organizations claim to uphold—universalism, neutrality, evidentiary rigor, and equal regard for all those whose rights are at stake.

This submission documents what happens when that consistency fails—and when the sector’s own accountability mechanisms are insufficient to detect or correct the failure. The result is not merely an internal workplace problem. It is a public one. Flawed findings travel. Uncorrected errors compound. Narratives shaped by institutional priorities rather than evidence are received as independent truth—shaping how communities are perceived, how prejudice is legitimized, and how social cohesion is either sustained or eroded.

The individuals whose experiences ground this submission are not critics of human rights. They are among its most committed practitioners. They came forward at professional and personal risk because they believe the sector can and must do better—and because they understand, better than most, what is lost when it does not.

This is precisely the systemic, public-interest failure the Commission exists to address. The evidence is sufficient; the patterns are clear. The consequences—for Jewish Australians, for institutional credibility, and for the shared foundations of a cohesive society—are serious enough to demand a response.

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