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THE LEDGER BEHIND THE DEAL

A Framework for Assessing JobsOhio's Return to Ohio Taxpayers

Prepared by the Ohio Common Ground Research Center

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Table of Contents

At a Glance

What this report does

- Lays out a methodology for testing whether JobsOhio's economic development activity produces a net benefit or net cost for Ohio taxpayers.
- Distinguishes between economic activity **announced** by companies JobsOhio assists and economic activity **caused** by JobsOhio's involvement.
- Summarizes what independent reviewers — the Ohio Auditor of State, journalists, and JobsOhio's own commissioned studies — have found in the public record as of mid-2026.
- Identifies the specific project-level data that is not currently public, and would be required to move from a framework to a conclusive answer.

What this report does not do

- It does not calculate a single taxpayer ROI figure for JobsOhio, because the project-level data required to do so reliably is not uniformly public.
- It does not conclude that JobsOhio "helps" or "hurts" Ohio taxpayers.
- It does not take a position on JobsOhio's funding structure, its liquor-franchise agreement, or pending transparency legislation.

1. Why This Report

JobsOhio is Ohio's primary economic-development organization. Since 2011, it has negotiated incentive packages, marketed the state to companies considering where to locate or expand, and reported hundreds of "project wins" each year. It is also, by design, a private nonprofit corporation rather than a state agency, and it is funded not by ordinary tax revenue but by the profits of the state's liquor franchise, which JobsOhio's affiliate leases from Ohio through 2053. [1][3]

Two people can look at the same set of facts about JobsOhio and reach opposite conclusions. One will point to JobsOhio's reported jobs, payroll, and capital-investment totals, and to a JobsOhio-commissioned study estimating that every dollar it invests generates roughly seventeen dollars in state tax revenue over time. [11][12] The other will point to a state audit finding that most companies receiving job-creation tax credits in the most recent reporting period did not meet the job commitments tied to those credits, and to years of reporting that JobsOhio operates outside the state's public-records and open-meetings laws. [6][7][33]

Both sets of facts are accurate. The disagreement is not really about the facts — it is about **methodology**: what should count as a JobsOhio-caused benefit, what should count as a cost, and how confident anyone can be that a given project would not have happened in Ohio anyway. This report sets out that methodology, applies it to what is publicly known as of mid-2026, and identifies specifically what additional information would be needed to reach a fully supportable conclusion.

Throughout this report, "taxpayer return" refers to whether the measurable public benefits generated by JobsOhio-assisted activity exceed the total public costs required to produce those benefits. Not every public benefit accrues to taxpayers in a narrow sense — some flow to local governments, public schools, or infrastructure — so this report occasionally uses "net public return" interchangeably to reflect that broader scope.

Without an agreed methodology, reasonable observers can examine the same public facts and reach very different conclusions. That is the situation today: JobsOhio's supporters and its critics are often citing accurate, non-contradictory facts while talking past each other about what those facts add up to. A shared framework does not resolve that disagreement by itself, but it clarifies exactly where the disagreement lies.

A note on scope

This report addresses JobsOhio as an institution and the general question of taxpayer return. It uses several individual projects and incidents — including the Intel semiconductor project in New Albany and JobsOhio's Job Creation Tax Credit partners — as illustrations of the methodological issues involved. It is not a comprehensive audit of any individual company or deal, and it does not attempt to compute a statewide dollar figure.

2. What Is JobsOhio?

JobsOhio was created by the Ohio General Assembly in 2011 to replace the state's Department of Development as Ohio's lead economic-development entity. It is organized as a private 501(c)(4) nonprofit corporation whose board is appointed by the governor. [9]

Funding: the liquor franchise

In 2013, JobsOhio's affiliate, the JobsOhio Beverage System (JOBS), paid the state $1.4 billion for a 25-year exclusive franchise to sell spirituous liquor in Ohio, financed through private revenue bonds. JOBS uses the profits from liquor sales — not liquor taxes — to fund the day-to-day operation of the state's liquor enterprise and to make annual grants to JobsOhio for economic-development activity. In February 2025, the Ohio Controlling Board extended that franchise from its original 2039 expiration to 2053, without requiring an additional up-front payment. [1][3][9][11]

JobsOhio describes this arrangement as meaning it uses "absolutely no tax dollars or other public dollars." [1] Critics, including sitting and former state officials, describe the same arrangement differently: the liquor franchise itself was a public asset, its profits previously flowed to the state's general fund, and diverting those profits to JobsOhio has an opportunity cost for the state treasury regardless of whether the word "tax" applies to them. [3][4][8] Both descriptions rest on the same underlying transaction; they differ on how to characterize forgone public revenue. Under the current agreement, JOBS makes "deferred payments" back to the state's general fund in years when liquor profits exceed a baseline growth rate — a cumulative $380.3 million between fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2021, according to the Ohio Legislative Service Commission. [22]

Legal status and public-records exemption

Because JobsOhio is organized as a private corporation, it is exempt from most of Ohio's public-records and open-meetings laws, a status written into the 2011 authorizing legislation and reinforced by subsequent law. [18][32] JobsOhio is still subject to certain oversight: state law requires an independent financial audit each year, plus a periodic compliance-and-control review conducted by a private accounting firm in consultation with the Auditor of State. The firm conducting the fiscal year 2025 review, Deloitte & Touche, reported no material findings but noted several minor procedural exceptions. [10][19]

Scale

JobsOhio's reported 2024 operating revenue was $1.8 billion. [34] Its 2023 Annual Report described 327 project wins that year, involving 16,457 projected jobs, $1.1 billion in projected new payroll, and $14.4 billion in capital-investment commitments, alongside 27,836 retained jobs. [2][13][29]

Looking at the program cumulatively rather than year by year, JobsOhio reported in March 2026 that 4,275 projects had been executed statewide between 2011 and 2024, with combined company commitments of 305,625 direct jobs, nearly $20 billion in associated new payroll, and $137 billion in capital investment attracted. [38] These cumulative figures describe the full 14-year program; they are a different scope than the single-year 2023 figures above and should not be added to them.

3. Announced Outcomes vs. Verified Outcomes

The figures JobsOhio publishes each year — project wins, projected jobs, projected payroll, capital-investment commitments — describe what companies and JobsOhio have **announced or committed to**. They are a reasonable starting point for measuring activity, but they are not, by themselves, evidence of a realized net benefit to taxpayers. Three distinctions matter for interpreting them.

Committed versus delivered

A project win is a commitment, not a completed transaction. Commitments can be delayed, scaled back, or not fully realized. Section 8 of this report walks through one high-profile example — Intel's New Albany semiconductor campus — where the gap between the original announced timeline and the current one is now several years, illustrating why year-of-announcement figures require later verification against actual outcomes.

Gross activity versus JobsOhio-caused activity

JobsOhio's reported totals describe the full scope of a project a company undertakes with JobsOhio's assistance, not the portion of that project attributable to JobsOhio's involvement. A company that would have located a facility in Ohio regardless of any incentive, but received one anyway, would still appear in JobsOhio's project totals at its full scope. This distinction — addressed at length in Section 4 — is the central methodological challenge in any taxpayer-return analysis.

Modeled tax revenue versus collected tax revenue

JobsOhio's most-cited return figure comes from a pair of studies it commissioned from IMPLAN, an economic-modeling firm: an 11-year study (2011–2021, updated to 2025 dollars) and a 3-year study (2022–2024), together covering 4,275 JobsOhio-assisted projects. As of a March 2026 JobsOhio publication summarizing the combined results, the studies estimate approximately $28 billion in cumulative state tax revenue (2011–2024, including modeled indirect and induced effects) attributable to those projects. JobsOhio adds to that figure $2.21 billion in real, non-modeled cash flows — the $1.4 billion it originally paid the state for the liquor franchise in 2013 plus $756 million in profit-sharing payments made through fiscal year 2025 — for a combined $30.1 billion, against $1.98 billion in JobsOhio's own cumulative incentive spending through 2025. JobsOhio frames the result as an approximately 15-to-1 "consolidated return on investment." [11][12][27][38] JobsOhio states that the $28 billion tax figure already accounts for tax credits, exemptions, and abatements granted to companies — a claim that, if accurate, would partly address the gross-versus-net concern raised below, though it has not been independently verified and does not appear to net out the opportunity cost of the liquor-franchise revenue itself, nor does it apply a but-for adjustment to any of the 4,275 projects. [38]

Regardless of the exact ratio, the figure remains a **model output**, not a tally of tax dollars the state treasury has independently collected and reconciled against JobsOhio's costs, and it was not produced by a party independent of JobsOhio. That the model's own vendor has publicly endorsed the client's framing illustrates the point: IMPLAN Group's chief executive, Justin Helmig, is quoted in JobsOhio's own release stating that "this report represents the likely minimum level of impacts." [38] Input-output models like IMPLAN are a standard, widely used tool in economic-impact analysis generally, but they share known limitations documented in the academic and industry literature on their use: results depend heavily on the geographic scope and regional multipliers chosen, they do not independently verify the project-level inputs supplied by the commissioning party, and they can overstate impact if applied to activity that would have occurred regardless — the same but-for problem discussed in Section 4. [39]

Ohio's official job-creation tax credit program — a separate but related state incentive — offers a useful point of comparison, because it is structured to track delivered rather than announced outcomes: companies must demonstrate an actual new job and its associated payroll before receiving the credit tied to it. [7] Section 5 describes what independent review of that program's actual compliance record has found.

4. The Attribution Problem: What Would Have Happened Anyway?

Economists refer to this as the "but-for" question: what portion of a project's jobs, payroll, and investment would not have occurred in Ohio but for JobsOhio's involvement? Research on state and local economic-development incentives generally — not specific to JobsOhio — has found that incentives frequently support activity that would have happened regardless. A widely cited literature review by economist Timothy Bartik of the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, covering 34 estimates from 30 studies, concluded that typical incentives shift only 2 to 25 percent of firms' location or expansion decisions — meaning that for at least 75 percent of incentivized firms, the same decision would likely have been made without the incentive. [36] This is general research on incentive programs nationally, not a finding about JobsOhio specifically; no comparable independent but-for study of JobsOhio's own projects has been published.

A rigorous taxpayer-return analysis would classify each project along a spectrum of causation rather than treating every incentivized project as fully attributable to the incentive:

Attribution category	Estimated JobsOhio causation
Project would clearly not have located in Ohio without the incentive	High (roughly 80–100%)
Incentive materially changed the project's location, scale, or timing	Moderate to high (roughly 50–80%)
Incentive accelerated or modestly expanded an already-likely project	Low to moderate (roughly 20–50%)
Company was already likely to choose Ohio for other reasons	Low (roughly 0–20%)
Incentive was offered after the company's location decision was effectively made	Minimal (near 0%)

Placing an actual project into one of these categories requires evidence most taxpayer-return commentary does not have access to: the company's internal site-selection documents, competing offers from other states, and the timing of JobsOhio's offer relative to the company's decision. JobsOhio has stated that it is the deciding factor in the large majority of the projects it counts as wins, but has not published the underlying evidence for that claim on a project-by-project basis. [11] Without an independent, project-level but-for estimate, aggregate figures like project counts, total capital investment, and gross projected payroll measure activity **associated with** JobsOhio rather than activity **caused by** JobsOhio.

5. What Independent Oversight Has Found

Several bodies produce information relevant to JobsOhio's performance, though they examine different, only partially overlapping parts of Ohio's economic-development system.

The Ohio Auditor of State's compliance reviews

A 2021 state law requires the Auditor of State's office to review, each year, whether companies receiving state economic-development loans and job-creation tax credits met the commitments tied to those awards, using data submitted by the Ohio Department of Development. This program is administered by the state, not by JobsOhio directly, but it covers many of the same companies and projects JobsOhio assists and is the closest thing available to an independent, outcomes-based check on whether promised jobs materialize. [6]

The report covering activity from July 1, 2024 through June 30, 2025, released in December 2025, found that of 55 companies that had received Job Creation Tax Credits, 36 had not met their job-creation commitments and 19 had met them; of five companies that received state loans, three were not compliant. In total, 39 of 60 companies reviewed were listed as noncompliant. The Auditor's office also found that in a substantial share of noncompliant cases, the state took either insufficient corrective action or none at all. [6][7][21]

The Ohio Department of Development, which administers the credit program, has described the audit as reflecting only "a snapshot in time" and noted that it has since recommended modifying or rescinding several of the tax-credit agreements identified as noncompliant. [7] The tax credits reviewed in that period were expected to cost the state approximately $117 million in fiscal year 2025 tax revenue that would otherwise have been collected. [7]

JobsOhio's own compliance-and-control review

Separately, state law requires an annual compliance-and-control review of JobsOhio itself, performed by an independent accounting firm in consultation with the Auditor of State. The fiscal year 2025 review, conducted by Deloitte & Touche, reported no material findings, consistent with each of the prior review cycles, though it noted several minor procedural exceptions. [10][19]

These two review processes answer different questions. The Auditor's compliance-and-control review of JobsOhio examines whether JobsOhio follows its own internal financial and procedural controls. The Job Creation Tax Credit compliance report examines whether the **companies** receiving state incentives actually created the jobs they promised. A clean compliance-and-control review of JobsOhio is not, by itself, evidence about whether the projects JobsOhio helped bring to Ohio deliver the jobs and payroll originally projected for them.

Third-party and JobsOhio-commissioned assessments

JobsOhio has also commissioned outside reviews of its own performance, including a 2018 organizational assessment by McKinsey & Company and the 2022 IMPLAN economic-impact study discussed in Section 3. [11][28] These studies were selected and paid for by JobsOhio, which does not make their findings incorrect, but does mean they were not produced through the same independent process as the Auditor's statutory reviews.

6. The Transparency Question

A taxpayer-return analysis depends on access to project-level information: subsidy amounts, job and payroll commitments, compliance histories, and the evidence behind but-for claims. JobsOhio's structure limits how much of that information is available to independent researchers.

Because JobsOhio is not subject to Ohio's public-records law, records requests about its internal deliberations, project negotiations, and — until requested through the Department of Development — even its own staff compensation are not obtainable the way they would be for a state agency. In one instance, a reporter seeking JobsOhio compensation data was directed to file a request with the Ohio Department of Development rather than JobsOhio directly; the resulting disclosure listed job titles and salary bands rather than employee names, took nineteen days to produce, and was not provided in a machine-readable format. [14][35]

Transparency has drawn renewed attention in 2026 following two incidents. First, JobsOhio acknowledged paying $60,000 to sponsor a podcast produced by a woman with whom then-Ohio State University President Ted Carter had a personal relationship; the podcast did not record enough episodes to fulfill its contract, and Carter resigned after the relationship was disclosed to OSU trustees. [15][16][37] Second, in June 2026 an Ohio attorney general candidate, John Kulewicz, filed a complaint with the state inspector general alleging that JobsOhio board chairman Josh Rubin has a conflict of interest connected to a $100 million JobsOhio fund supporting small modular nuclear reactor development. Rubin is chief executive of CJR Group, a lobbying firm whose clients include American Electric Power, a utility that has publicly expressed interest in small modular reactors and could be eligible for the fund. [26][37] JobsOhio has said no agreements to disburse funds from the program have been signed and that its board conducts itself to "the highest ethical standards"; an AEP spokesperson said Rubin does not personally work on the company's account. [26][37] The state inspector general has not determined whether the arrangement violated any standard.

These incidents prompted bipartisan legislation — introduced by state Representatives Justin Pizzulli and Tristan Rader — that would require JobsOhio to disclose corporate sponsorships annually, require a state audit every two years, require JobsOhio's chief investment officer to testify before legislative finance committees, and require General Assembly approval, rather than Controlling Board approval, for any future extension of the liquor-franchise agreement. [15][17] As of this report, that legislation remains pending. This report describes the proposal and the events that prompted it without taking a position on whether it should pass.

For a taxpayer-return model specifically, the practical consequence of JobsOhio's public-records exemption is that several of the inputs described in Section 7 — complete subsidy stacks, contemporaneous site-selection evidence, and detailed compliance histories for JobsOhio-specific (as opposed to state tax-credit) awards — are not uniformly available to outside researchers today.

7. A Framework for a Full Taxpayer-Return Model

The purpose of this framework is not to prove or disprove JobsOhio's value, but to identify the evidence required to evaluate that question using consistent and transparent criteria.

Bringing the preceding sections together, a taxpayer-return model for JobsOhio would need to compare total public cost against JobsOhio-caused public benefit, adjusted for risk and time. The diagram below moves from an announced project to a net taxpayer-return figure:

Announced project → Verified outcomes → But-for analysis → Public cost → Public benefit → Net taxpayer return

In simplified form, the relationship at the end of that sequence is:

The basic relationship

- **Net public benefit** = incremental public revenue and other quantifiable public benefits, minus total public cost, minus the opportunity cost of the liquor-franchise revenue, minus risk-adjusted losses.
- **Taxpayer return** = the present value of JobsOhio-caused public benefits, divided by the present value of total public costs. A ratio above 1.0 would indicate benefits exceeding costs under the model's assumptions; below 1.0 would indicate a shortfall.

Cost side

A complete accounting of cost would include JobsOhio grants and loans; state and local tax credits and abatements tied to JobsOhio-assisted projects; publicly funded infrastructure, workforce training, and site development; the administrative cost of operating JobsOhio and its regional-partner network; unrecovered funds when commitments are missed; and the opportunity cost of the liquor-franchise profits themselves, since those profits previously flowed to the state's general fund.

Benefit side

Only revenue and activity attributable to the incremental, JobsOhio-caused share of a project should count as a benefit — state and local income, sales, and property tax revenue from net-new workers and their spending, adjusted downward for displacement (jobs lost at unsubsidized Ohio competitors), leakage (spending or profit that leaves Ohio), and transfers (a worker moving from one Ohio employer to another is not a new job for the state as a whole).

Causation adjustment

Each project's benefits should be weighted by an estimated but-for causation factor, as described in Section 4, rather than counted at full value.

Risk and time

Because incentive commitments are paid out over years and depend on companies meeting job and investment targets that are sometimes missed (Section 5), benefits should be discounted to present value and weighted by the probability that a project is completed and sustained on schedule.

Four levels of analysis

- **Project-level return** — for individual, material deals: total subsidy, actual jobs and payroll, but-for estimate, net fiscal benefit, and compliance status.
- **Institutional return** — whether JobsOhio as an organization, net of its own staffing, marketing, financing, and failed-project costs, adds value after the liquor-franchise opportunity cost is included.
- **Statewide comparative performance** — how Ohio's employment growth, wage growth, and business formation compare with a set of similar states, both before and after JobsOhio's 2011 creation, as a reality check against project-level claims.
- **Distributional return** — whether benefits and costs are concentrated in particular counties, industries, or company sizes, or spread broadly across Ohio.

Applying this framework in full would require project-level data — complete subsidy stacks across all levels of government, contemporaneous site-selection evidence, verified annual employment figures, and detailed compliance histories — that is not uniformly public today, for the reasons described in Section 6.

8. Illustration: A Marquee Project Over Time

Intel's semiconductor campus in New Albany illustrates why "committed" and "delivered" figures can diverge, and why time matters in a return calculation. Announced in 2022 as a roughly $20 billion investment with production originally targeted for 2025, the project's timeline has been revised publicly several times: to late 2026, then to 2026–2027 construction with 2027–2028 operations, then to construction completing in 2030 and 2031 with production beginning in those same years, according to Intel's own filings with Ohio regulators and its public statements. Intel's total planned investment in the site has also grown, to as much as $28 billion in some public figures. [29][30][31][32][33][34][35]

None of this means the project will not eventually deliver the jobs and payroll originally projected — Intel has stated its long-term commitment to the site continues, and reporting indicates active hiring and construction-related economic activity at the site in the interim. [35] Public estimates of Intel's total planned investment in the site range from roughly $20 billion to $28 billion or more, reflecting different points in time and different scopes of what is counted as part of the project. It does mean that any taxpayer-return figure computed in 2022 or 2023 using the original announced timeline would, several years later, be measuring a project that has not yet reached the production phase on which much of its projected tax revenue depends. This example illustrates why long-term projects should be evaluated against actual milestones over time rather than against the terms of their original announcement — a general point made in Section 3, not a judgment about this project's eventual outcome.

9. What Can and Cannot Be Concluded Today

Applying the framework developed in the preceding sections leads to several conclusions that are well supported by the current public record — and several that cannot yet be reached with confidence. Enough is publicly available to build a first-generation taxpayer-return framework and to identify where the public record currently points in each direction. It is not enough to produce a single, independently verifiable statewide dollar figure.

What the public record supports

- JobsOhio reports substantial activity: hundreds of project wins annually, tens of billions of dollars in cumulative capital-investment commitments, and a JobsOhio-commissioned model estimating a large positive fiscal return.
- JobsOhio's own compliance-and-control reviews have found no material findings in recent years.
- Ohio's liquor-profit funding model gives JobsOhio a stable, multi-year funding source insulated from annual state budget cycles.

What the public record also supports

- A state audit covering the most recent reporting period found that a majority of companies receiving Job Creation Tax Credits had not met their job-creation commitments, with limited enforcement in many noncompliant cases.
- JobsOhio's headline return figures come from studies it commissioned and has not published the project-level, independently verifiable but-for evidence behind its causation claims.
- JobsOhio's exemption from public-records law limits outside verification of compensation, sponsorships, and individual deal terms, and has been the subject of renewed legislative attention in 2026.

The central finding of this report is therefore a finding about the state of the evidence rather than about JobsOhio's net effect: **Ohio currently publishes substantial information about JobsOhio's finances and announced projects, but not enough standardized, project-level, independently verifiable evidence to establish the net taxpayer return with confidence.** That gap — not a hidden number waiting to be revealed — is what currently separates the pro-JobsOhio case from the critical case. Closing it is a matter of data availability, not of resolving a factual dispute about numbers already in hand.

Key findings

- JobsOhio publishes substantial financial information and project summaries, updated annually.
- JobsOhio reports large announced economic outcomes, including cumulative capital-investment commitments and a JobsOhio-commissioned model estimating a large positive fiscal return.
- Independent review — the Ohio Auditor of State's compliance reporting — confirms that not all promised job-creation and payroll commitments tied to state economic-development awards are ultimately fulfilled, and that enforcement has been inconsistent.

- Existing public information does not permit an independent calculation of JobsOhio's taxpayer return, because essential project-level information — complete subsidy stacks, contemporaneous but-for evidence, and verified long-term employment outcomes — is not consistently available.
- Until that information exists, both strong supporters and strong critics of JobsOhio necessarily rely on assumptions that cannot be independently verified against a common evidentiary record.

10. What Would Constitute More Convincing Evidence

This report has focused on what cannot currently be concluded. It is equally useful to state, concretely, what kind of evidence — if it became public — would materially increase confidence in an answer, in either direction. Examples include:

- Audited employment figures by year, for a representative sample of JobsOhio-assisted projects, covering at least the first five years after a project's completion.
- Actual payroll data verified against the payroll originally projected at the time of the incentive award.
- A complete subsidy stack for each project, combining JobsOhio awards with state and local tax credits, abatements, and infrastructure spending tied to the same project.
- Project-level clawback and compliance-enforcement history, comparable to what the Auditor of State currently publishes for the Job Creation Tax Credit program, extended to JobsOhio's own award programs.
- Documented but-for analyses — contemporaneous site-selection evidence, competing-state offers, and the timing of incentive offers relative to company decisions — for a sample of large projects.
- Annual, standardized post-award compliance reports covering JobsOhio-specific grants and loans, not only the state tax-credit program.

None of these categories requires disclosing information that would compromise an active business negotiation; each concerns outcomes for projects that have already been publicly announced and, in many cases, completed.

11. Open Questions for Further Research

- What is the actual, audited job and payroll outcome — at one, three, five, and ten years — for a representative sample of JobsOhio-assisted projects, compared with what was originally projected?
- What contemporaneous evidence exists, project by project, that a company's location or expansion decision was actually contingent on JobsOhio's incentive, as opposed to being made independently?
- How does Ohio's post-2011 employment, wage, and business-formation growth compare with a set of demographically and economically similar states, before and after JobsOhio's creation?
- How are JobsOhio's costs and benefits distributed across Ohio's counties, industries, and company sizes — are they broadly shared or concentrated in a small number of large deals?
- What would a fully reconciled accounting of the liquor-franchise arrangement show, if the profits diverted to JobsOhio since 2013 were compared against what they would have contributed to the state general fund over the same period?

A follow-on OCG Research Center publication could pursue any of these questions individually, using project-level data as it becomes available through public records requests, legislative disclosure requirements, or future transparency legislation.

Sources & Notes

Bracketed numbers in the text correspond to the sources below, grouped here by type. This report relies on JobsOhio's own public reporting and methodology disclosures, the Ohio Auditor of State's statutory compliance reports, the Ohio Legislative Service Commission, and contemporaneous news reporting from outlets including Ohio Capital Journal, Signal Cleveland, WOSU/Statehouse News Bureau, and regional television and business news. Figures attributed to JobsOhio-commissioned studies (including the IMPLAN economic-impact analysis and the McKinsey performance assessment) are identified as such throughout; this report does not treat commissioned-study findings as independently verified.

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