

KONTUR

RUSSIAN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE:

Applications

Dependencies

Sanctions



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Introduction

Russia has designated the development of artificial intelligence as one of its strategic priorities — both in the civilian economy and in the military sphere. Under the pretext of a threat posed by Western technologies, it promotes the need for “sovereign artificial intelligence”, which must “be aligned with the security strategy of the Russian Federation”.¹

In reality, the use of the sector by the Russian Federation and by the structures it finances is **largely concentrated around the creation of military and dual-use products, or around tightening control and consolidating the power of the state** (through the tracking and recognition of individuals, internet censorship, covert mobilisation measures and so on).

This study presents a comprehensive analysis of the Russian artificial-intelligence industry: the concept of “sovereign AI”, the hardware base and the dependence on imported semiconductors, as well as the key areas of military and security application. Particular attention is paid to sanctions policy, to export-control measures and to their effect on Russia’s access to critical components and technologies.

This report focuses on the companies that supply algorithms, components or data, and that finance the creation of AI solutions for military purposes.

While working on the report, Kontur analysts compiled a register of Russian AI companies involved in military or other cooperation with the Russian Federation. The status of each company was analysed across four jurisdictions: Ukraine, the United States, the European Union and the United Kingdom. In total, 106 companies were identified (the list is not exhaustive). Nine entities are already under the sanctions of all four jurisdictions, while the remaining 97 companies — covered by sanctions only in part, or not at all — are grouped into six functional clusters:

CLUSTER I

developers of AI for UAVs, UGVs (unmanned ground vehicles) and weapon systems;

CLUSTER II

developers of computer-vision systems for video surveillance and biometric control;

CLUSTER III

text and image processing, censorship and control of the Internet

CLUSTER IV

manufacturers of components, microelectronics and hardware;

CLUSTER V

universities and research institutes;

CLUSTER VI

state funds, accelerators and administrative bodies.

All 97 companies of the active monitoring group are listed in the cluster tables below, including those already covered by the restrictions of three jurisdictions.

Given the large number of companies, those selected for detailed coverage in the report are primarily ones not subject to sanctions in at least two of the four mentioned jurisdictions—specifically, 79 out of the 97 companies.

The principal sources were public statements by Russian officials, publications in Russian media, technical analysis of captured samples and of the component base of military equipment, as well as corporate registers and public-procurement documentation. The data is current as of October 2026.

Key Findings

106 companies and institutions involved in the Russian AI industry have been identified. **Only nine of them are already under the sanctions of all four jurisdictions examined.**

Urban video-surveillance systems, whose declared purpose is to maintain law and order and to assist investigations by means of facial-recognition technology, **are used for covert mobilisation and to locate men liable for conscription.**

A number of companies that are not under sanctions, or that are sanctioned only in some jurisdictions, **develop software for the drones and unmanned ground vehicles** used in the war against Ukraine.

Russian state accelerators finance AI start-ups, including military ones. The key funds are: NTI, Skolkovo, the Military Innovative Technopolis ERA, the Moscow Innovation Cluster, the Industrial Development Fund (FRP), the Internet Initiatives Development Fund (FRII) and Rosnano.

The key areas of AI application in the development of unmanned systems are GPS-free navigation, the recognition of people and vehicle by means of computer vision, terminal guidance onto a target, and attempts to control drone “swarms”.

Companies within the state corporation **Rostec** develop **microelectronics, radar sensors and special cameras for UAVs**, and also conduct research in the field of artificial intelligence.

In Russia, **a number of state universities are involved in the development of military AI products** — both specialised military and civilian institutions.

Sanctions coverage is insufficient: **38 of the 106 companies (36%) are not under the sanctions of any of the four jurisdictions**; a further 27 appear on the sanctions lists of only one.

Russia's AI Policy. The Concept of Sovereign Artificial Intelligence

Russia combines light-touch regulation of artificial intelligence with strict centralisation of the key developments in the field. The government opts for phased experiments and controls their roll-out through selective restrictions, the certification of “trusted” technologies and access to data.

At the level of official policy, a consistent course towards a **largely military orientation of research** can be observed. At the national level, the presidential decree “On the National Development Goals of the Russian Federation for the Period to 2030 and for the Future to 2036”² **declares a goal entitled “Technological Leadership”**. Part of that leadership is “ensuring technological independence in such areas as (...) unmanned aviation systems, (...) artificial intelligence”.

To that end, Russia plans to enter the top ten countries in research and development, to raise domestic research spending to at least 2% of GDP and to double private-sector investment in innovation.

At the same time, Russia **soberly assesses its own capabilities and consciously declines to compete in advanced scientific research**. In the “National Strategy for the Development of Artificial Intelligence to 2030”³ (approved in October 2019, updated in February 2024), for example, the United States and China are recognised as the world leaders in the field. The strategy also notes Russia’s limited access to advanced computing technologies and to international scientific cooperation.

Russia’s principal strategy is a shift of focus from fundamental to applied research. In practice this means a bet **not on creating its own frontier models, but on adapting already-developed algorithms** to domestic conditions.

Overall, Russian policy in this field is based on the concept of so-called “**sovereign AI**”. The rationale is that the country needs its own AI as part of “technological sovereignty”. To a large extent, this is primarily a matter of forced adaptation to sanctions restrictions and of shifting technology

onto a “military footing”. Katerina Tikhonova — Putin’s daughter, who heads the artificial-intelligence faculty at the country’s leading university, Moscow State University — argues that the country has a “more pragmatic approach to the development of artificial intelligence”, “driven by the tasks and challenges facing Russia”, namely “**application in UAVs and in the oil and gas industry**”.⁴

This approach is also enshrined in the relevant national projects. “Unmanned Aviation Systems”, in particular, plans to build a domestic drone ecosystem by 2030, while the federal programme “Artificial Intelligence” provides for the development and integration of AI solutions into public administration and industry.



Russian President Vladimir Putin during a visit to the Samara research and production centre for unmanned aviation systems, created with funding from the “Unmanned Aviation Systems” national project

The budget of the federal project “Artificial Intelligence” (part of the “Data Economy” national project) is RUB 65.2 billion.⁵ The programme was initially designed to run until 2024, but by decision of the Russian government it was extended to 2030.⁶

The effect of these approaches on the defence sector is also telling. In April 2025, at a meeting of the Military-Industrial Commission, Putin stressed the need to integrate domestic “protected” AI into automated military command-and-control systems.⁷

An Overview of Key Technologies and Their Availability to Russia

The development of AI models (generative, predictive and so on) requires substantial investment as well as access to advanced technology. Before the full-scale invasion and the introduction of sanctions, the main drivers of these areas in Russia were large IT companies such as Yandex and Sber.

The companies purchased the components they needed for supercomputers and servers themselves. Processors, for instance, were ordered directly from Nvidia⁸ or Intel, while switching was provided through InfiniBand⁹ or Ethernet. As for software, the companies used their own architecture (Yandex) or borrowed American solutions (as in the case of Sber and Nvidia). Where computing capacity fell short, there was the option of renting more in Google or Microsoft Azure data centres. MTS, for example, sold Microsoft Azure Stack cloud services in its own data centres.¹⁰ Sber offered similar services, including access to facial-recognition technology.¹¹ In short, **Russia built supercomputers for its own needs on the basis of Western technology and with the technical support of the corresponding vendors.**



The Christofari supercomputer, built by Russia's Sberbank in collaboration with Nvidia

This collaboration took place in part because Russia **lacks its own sufficiently advanced production of processors and of the other key components** needed for the development of AI. The lag in this field

is structural and will not be made up in the coming years, even if sanctions are lifted and sufficient investment is available.¹²

The main reason is the economic unprofitability of production: the number of transistors on an integrated circuit — and hence computing power — doubles roughly every two years, whereas the cost of a semiconductor fabrication plant doubles every three to five years.¹³ Each successive generation of chips requires disproportionately larger capital investment, which pays off only through global sales.

The most advanced Russian enterprise in this field, **Mikron JSC** in Zelenograd, mainly produces chips for bank and transport cards and for RFID tags, and **the finest process node it has mastered is 65 nm** (not in series production). The official goal is to reach series production of 65-nanometre chips only by 2028. By various estimates, Russia's lag in this field is as much as 25 years.^{14 15}



Microchip production equipment at the Mikron JSC plant in Zelenograd

The key bottleneck for improving production technology is lithography. Lithography machines print ultra-fine patterns on silicon wafers and effectively determine the limit of the process node available to a country. Only three companies in the world make them — ASML¹⁶ (the Netherlands), Nikon and Canon (Japan). **ASML controls around 90% of the market overall and 100% of the EUV segment** (extreme ultraviolet lithography)¹⁷ — the technology that

makes series production of processors at the most advanced nodes, 5 nm and below, possible. Russia has no access to this equipment.

The so-called **“Russian” Baikal and Elbrus processors were also manufactured in Taiwan by TSMC**, which stopped filling Russian orders in 2022.¹⁸ Since 2022 Baikal Electronics has been trying to have chips made at alternative sites. It has, however, run into defective batches¹⁹ and an inability to cover demand even from state customers.²⁰


Specialised software for creating semiconductors and other sensitive electronics is concentrated mainly in Synopsys, Cadence and Siemens.

From 12 September 2024 the United States separately banned the supply of IT services to Russia, including “enterprise management software” and “design and manufacturing software”.²¹ At the same time, **the key AI libraries (PyTorch, TensorFlow) are open**, Nvidia drivers and CUDA are available free of charge, and local providers (Yandex Cloud,

Cloud.ru) are able to support and enable work with the chips already in place. In short, while specialised software for designing microelectronics is blocked, access to services for training and working with machine-learning models remains open.

At the level of personal access to services, international companies act at their own discretion, either restricting access or not prohibiting it. ChatGPT has blocked logins from Russian IP addresses and registration with a Russian phone number. Claude, while not allowing registration with a Russian mobile number, is available to already-registered users from a Russian IP address.

Paying for a subscription directly is also impossible because of sanctions. Workarounds do exist, however, and they are commonplace and inexpensive (VPNs, third-party API aggregators, resale via Telegram, payment with virtual cards), so a complete block at the service level is technically unattainable.



One of the Russian services offering payment for resources blocked in Russia by means of a virtual card

Microchip Supply: Main Channels and Dependencies

Autonomous drones need chips powerful enough to run neural networks in real time. The main source of sanctioned equipment for Russia is illegal imports, which mostly pass through “shell companies” — intermediaries between the foreign manufacturer and the end user.

The scale was shown by a New York Times investigation: since 2022 almost USD 4 billion worth of export-controlled chips has reached Russia from more than 6,000 companies, some of them registered at the same address.²²

Tracking the goods is difficult because of the sheer volume of components: 3.5 million Nvidia H100 graphics processors alone were produced in 2022–2025,²³ and general-purpose processors such as the Intel Xeon in even greater numbers.

Despite the possibility of smuggled purchases, this approach has a number of limitations. One is the delayed availability of technology (chips become widely available only once they are somewhat outdated, because the newest ones are reserved by large companies). Another is the quantitative limits caused by the unreliability of “grey” supplies and by their higher cost. According to C4ADS, Russia pays almost twice as much for semiconductors as it did before the war;²⁴ on the adjacent Chinese black market the premium for sanctioned AI accelerators is around 50%, and after controls were tightened in 2026 prices for older A100 servers tripled.²⁵

According to an estimate by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken (2021–2025), **around 90% of microelectronics imports transit through China (as of 2023).**^{26 27} The rest goes through the UAE, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Serbia, Kyrgyzstan and Türkiye.²⁸

In the course of 2024 Russia also sharply increased supplies of computing equipment from India. As Kontur analysts established, computers and servers worth more than USD 416 million

reached Russia in that period.²⁹ Most were supplied by the Indian company Shreya Life Sciences — a firm with long-standing ties to Russia: back in the 1990s Sujit Kumar Singh founded Shreya Corporation LLC in Moscow, and since the early 2000s Shreya Life Sciences LLC has also operated there. Before the full-scale invasion this network traded exclusively in medical products. After 2022, however, Shreya began supplying Russians with Dell PowerEdge servers carrying the latest Nvidia AI chips.³⁰

Because of the instability of Western supplies, Russia is also partly switching to Chinese chips: German Gref (head of Sberbank and a member of Yandex’s board of directors) announced the migration of GigaChat (Sberbank’s Russian neural network) to the Huawei Ascend 950, although the planned 750,000 units are being contracted by ByteDance, Alibaba and Tencent. The manufacturer, SMIC, produces them using outdated technology with a relatively high defect rate.³¹ At the same time, Russia is trying to cover the simplest positions itself: in February 2026 it announced the production of 200,000 domestic chips for engine controllers — analogues of the scarce STM32.³²

Any Russian technological solution, even a domestic one, remains heavily dependent on Western micro-electronics. According to CSIS data,³³ of 705 AI components taken from Russian drones, 69% of the memory, 57% of the processors and 38% of the sensors came from US firms, and less than 9% from China. This is confirmed by KSE research as well: of 174 components of the Shahed, Lancet and Orlan-10, 69% of the parts are of American origin, while 67% of the deliveries came through China.³⁴

The Use of Artificial Intelligence on the Battlefield

Unmanned systems are the main area of practical application of military AI in Russia. Although Russia has a fairly large number of UAVs with AI components on board, these devices are mostly not autonomous. Signal and data processing largely takes place remotely. One of the main tasks the Russian military leadership is working on is adapting drones **to process data directly on the device**. However, so-called edge computing (processing data on board without sending it to the cloud) requires powerful, light and energy-efficient chips such as the Nvidia Jetson Orin Nano, the Nvidia Jetson AGX Orin and the Qualcomm Flight RB5 5G.


Claims made by Russian manufacturers and government officials often do not correspond to reality. The Kronshtadt group of companies, for example, presents itself as the flagship of long-range UAVs and of “autonomous AI-based systems”. Yet its products, including the Orion system³⁵ and others, are not autonomous: the system only collects and partially analyses sensor data, while the decision is taken by an operator.

A promising area of UAV development is considered to be **target recognition and terminal guidance by means of computer vision**. This mostly involves modernising existing serial UAVs rather than creating new prototypes. The Lancet loitering munition, in particular, was modernised in 2023–2024. The updated version, designated Izdeliye-53 (Product-53), received a guidance system and the ability to recognise equipment.³⁶

In June 2025 a modification of the Geran UAV, the MS001, was shot down over Sumy. According to Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence (HUR), it carried an Nvidia Jetson Orin Nano AI module³⁷ that processed video from an onboard infrared camera and provided autonomous target recognition without satellite coordinates.

The AI-equipped modification was named Geran Seeker. According to an assessment by Serhii Beskrestnov (“Flash”), an adviser

to the President of Ukraine, the automatic recognition and lock-on system makes it possible to complete an attack even after the link with the operator is lost, and the “Seeker” option is being installed on various versions of the Geran, including the jet-powered Geran-4.³⁸



The object recognition and classification system on the Geran Seeker UAV. Identification of a dry-cargo vessel near Chornomorsk, July 2026

Another new development is the V2U kamikaze drone, which is able to **fly without a link to the operator**. Instead of a satellite signal, the aircraft navigates using an optical map — it compares the camera image with pre-loaded satellite imagery, where a convolutional network (CNN) recognises objects and a recurrent network (RNN) plots the route. The advantage of such a scheme for the adversary is that it requires neither GPS nor a link with the operator (including for the choice of target and the moment of attack), is relatively resistant to changes in the landscape and is not jammed by standard electronic-warfare equipment.

At the same time, the device’s autonomy is provided almost entirely by civilian foreign components. The computing core that performs the search for and selection of targets is the Chinese Leetop A203 mini-computer with an American Nvidia Jetson Orin module. Some drones have a backup control channel via an LTE modem³⁹ with a mobile operator’s SIM card. The rest of the critical base is likewise imported — a Chinese engine, GPS module and storage device, a Japanese Sony sensor and an Irish TE Connectivity relay.⁴⁰

BARRAGE MUNITION WITH ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE V2U



Specifications ×

Wingspan	1.2 m	Payload	3.5 kg
Flight time	1 h	Communication	LTE, two-way
Cruise speed	60 km/h	Battery capacity	34 ampere hours
Engine	electro	Additional information	detection and recognition of objects, automatic targeting is possible

Specifications of the V2U drone published on HUR’s “War & Sanctions” portal (original graphic in Ukrainian)

Much attention is paid to the concept of a **“drone swarm”**, but at the current stage of technological development fully autonomous UAV “swarms” remain unrealised in practice.

The main approaches are based on two models. The first is centralised, in which a “mother” drone acts as a server and transmits data to neighbouring UAVs, which copy its behaviour. The second is decentralised, with the aircraft coordinating “by neighbours”, like birds in a flock. So far no operational combat systems of this class have been recorded; only digital models under development exist. Controlling drone “swarms” requires advanced real-time AI models. This is a class of combat-management system along the lines of Palantir AI. The Russian state corporation Rostec is trying to create an analogue of its own.⁴¹

Russian Defence Minister Andrei Belousov announced on 16 July 2026 the launch of the “Vitrina Dannykh” (“Data Showcase”) platform.⁴² The platform’s purpose is to involve UAV manufacturers in the training of neural networks.

An **AI-based decision-making system for military commanders** is also being introduced. In August 2025 it became known that Russia was developing an artificial-intelligence system called SVOD. According to the Russian Defence Ministry, the system collects and combines various sources of intelligence data: satellite data, aerial photographs, reconnaissance reports and open-source information. The artificial intelligence analyses this data, models possible scenarios for the development of the combat situation and offers commanders the best courses of action.⁴³ The system was trialled by the “Centre” group of forces.⁴⁴

Companies Developing Artificial Intelligence in Russia

CLUSTER NO. 1: DEVELOPERS OF SOLUTIONS FOR UAVS AND UGVs

This list includes companies that work directly on the implementation of AI in unmanned ground, maritime and aerial drones. They develop guidance and terminal-guidance systems for FPV and loitering drones, autonomous navigation without satellite communications, machine vision for recognising enemy vehicles, and control and fire-management systems for unmanned ground vehicles.

A significant proportion of the firms receive direct orders from the Russian Defence Ministry or from structural subdivisions of defence-industry enterprises, and also cooperate with volunteer/government structures (for example the Kulibin Club project, organised by the Russian Popular Front movement), with the ERA military technopolis and with various state funds.

Of the 34 companies examined in this cluster, only six are simultaneously subject to the sanctions of three jurisdictions. At the same time, 15 companies are currently not under sanctions at all.

Arkodim LLC, for example — the developer of the Bratishka unmanned ground vehicle used by Russian forces in the war against Ukraine — has in parallel created a machine-vision system that

detects and tracks UAVs, as well as neural-network tracking algorithms for counter-drone turrets and small-calibre air-defence weapons. It is not under the sanctions of any jurisdiction.

Many other companies are sanctioned only in Ukraine. RoboAvia LLC, for instance, is the developer of the Sarych UAV, which can automatically search for objects and track a target using artificial intelligence, and of the Klin loitering munition.⁴⁵ The company is a resident of the ERA Military Innovation Complex — a Russian Defence Ministry project for developing the newest weaponry.



The Sarych-2 UAV with artificial-intelligence features, used by a Russian unit of the 7th Air Assault Division

COMPANIES IN THE CLUSTER I AND THEIR SANCTIONS STATUS

Company / INN	AI application	Sanctions Imposed
Technodron JSC АО «Технодрон» · INN 9704241986	UAV guidance / control	UA EU
Smart Birds LLC ООО «Умные птицы» · INN 1800020960	UAV guidance / control	UA
Sverkh LLC ООО «Сверх» · INN 9718238623	UAV guidance / control; Computer vision / recognition	NONE
Stratim JSC АО «Стратим» · INN 7720901379	UAV guidance / control	UA US EU
RoboAvia LLC ООО «РобоАвиа» · INN 9102166435	UAV guidance / control	UA
Aeroscript R&D Center LLC НИЦ «Аэроскрипт» · INN 7810750822	UAV guidance / control	UA
Ploshchad JSC (Area Systems) АО «Площадь» · INN 9723203841	UAV guidance / control; Computer vision / recognition	UA US EU
Autonomous Robotics LLC ООО «Автономная робототехника» · INN 7726482967	UAV guidance / control	NONE
Amalgama LLC ООО «Амальгама» · INN 7327058629	Logistics / planning	NONE
Arkodim LLC «Аркодим» · INN 1659101884	UAV guidance / control	NONE
Geoscan LLC Геоскан · INN 7801450808	UAV guidance / control; Computer vision / recognition	UA US EU
Vashi Roboty LLC ООО «Ваши Роботы» · INN 7722453683	UGV	NONE
Laboratory of Infocommunication Networks (LIS) LLC ООО «Лаборатория инфокоммуникационных сетей» · INN 7814396731	UAV guidance / control	NONE
Nova Labs JSC АО «Нова Лабс» · INN 9722025723	UAV guidance / control	NONE

Company / INN	AI application	Sanctions Imposed
Intellekt Mashin JSC АО «Интеллект Машин» · INN 7801711200	UGV	US
SPA Kaysant LLC НПО «КАЙСАНТ» · INN 7733393203	UGV	UA US
Kobak Lab LLC ООО «Кобак Лаб» · INN 7813661465	UAV guidance / control; Computer vision / recognition	NONE
Emergency Digital Solutions JSC АО «Эмердженси Диджитал Солюшенс» · INN 9715475552	Satellite imagery recognition; Computer vision / recognition; Logistics / planning	UA US EU
Design Bureau Atlas LLC ООО Конструкторское Бюро Атлас · INN 5258158376	UAV guidance / control	NONE
Institute of Telecommunications CJSC ЗАО «Институт телекоммуникаций» · INN 7802199182	UGV; UAV guidance / control; Microelectronics / hardware	NONE
SPA PKRV-Innopolis LLC ООО «НПО ПКРВ-Иннополис» · INN 1615014850	UAV guidance / control	UA
Turing Flying Machines LLC ООО «Летающие Машины Тюринга» · INN 7734445119	UAV guidance / control	UA
Computer Vision Laboratory LLC (VisRobo) ООО «Лаборатория компьютерного зрения» · INN 5258150017	UAV guidance / control	NONE
Severny Press JSC АО «Северный пресс» · INN 7806337732	UAV guidance / control; Weapons control	UA US EU
Ventura.AR LLC ООО «Вентура.АР» · INN 5050152329	Weapons control; UGV	NONE
Sibscience LLC ООО «Сибсайнс» (Sibscience) · INN 5473009802	UAV guidance / control	NONE
KT — Unmanned Systems JSC АО «КТ — Беспилотные Системы» · INN 7801572080	UAV guidance / control	UA US
Intel Dron LLC ООО «Интел Дрон» · INN 7448259249	UAV guidance / control	NONE

Company / INN	AI application	Sanctions Imposed
Dron Solutions LLC ООО «Дрон Солюшнс» · INN 7716892964	UAV guidance / control	UA
Zala Aero JSC АО «Зала Аэро» · INN 9715478507	UAV guidance / control; Weapons control	UA
Russian Air Transport Laboratory LLC ООО «Русская лаборатория воздушного транспорта» («РЛВТ») · INN 7100027464	UAV guidance / control; Weapons control	UA US EU
VR-Technologies LLC ООО «ВР-Технологии» · INN 5027172359	UAV guidance / control	UA US*
Hardberry Rusfaktor LLC ООО «Хардберри Русфактор» · INN 7728845817	UAV guidance / control; Computer vision / recognition	UA US
Design Bureau 3303 LLC ООО «КБ 3303» · INN 9701245333	UAV guidance / control; Weapons control	NONE

UA — Ukraine, US — United States, EU — European Union, UK — United Kingdom.

* marks companies that are subject to sanctions in the context of trade restrictions, but whose assets are not frozen.

CLUSTER NO. 2: DEVELOPERS OF COMPUTER-VISION SYSTEMS FOR VIDEO SURVEILLANCE AND BIOMETRIC CONTROL

There are a number of companies developing computer-vision and biometric systems. Some of these technologies are integrated into urban video-surveillance systems, into the Unified Biometric System and into “Smart City” services. These solutions perform a dual function: **they serve as an instrument of civil oversight and at the same time as a means of surveillance of citizens, of covert mobilisation and of searches conducted in the interests of the FSB and the Interior Ministry.**⁴⁶

Another common area of work is **the search for and detection of UAVs**. ELVEES-NeoTek JSC, a subsidiary of the state-owned Rosnano JSC

and part of the ELVEES group of companies, developed the ORWELL 2K platform for these tasks. The main customers for its products are the Russian Defence Ministry, other security agencies and critical information infrastructure facilities.⁴⁷ Some companies adapt the same recognition algorithms to search for people using UAVs.

This is one of the clusters in which the overwhelming majority of companies are not covered by consolidated sanctions. Nine companies are subject to no restrictive measures at all.

COMPANIES IN THE CLUSTER II AND THEIR SANCTIONS STATUS

Company / INN	AI application	Sanctions Imposed
VisionLabs LLC ООО «Вижнлабс» · INN 7701954054	Computer vision / recognition	NONE
VessoLink Group ГК «ВессоЛинк» · INN 9715259760	UAV guidance / control; Computer vision / recognition	NONE
Kaspersky Lab JSC АО «Лаборатория Касперского» · INN 7713140469	Computer vision / recognition	UA US*
Sivies (Computer Vision Software) LLC ООО «Сивиз» · INN 9731058193	Computer vision / recognition	NONE
NtechLab LLC ООО «НТех лаб» · INN 7710499161	Computer vision / recognition	NONE
Speech Technology Center (STC) LLC ООО «ЦРТ» · INN 7805093681	Computer vision / recognition	UA US
Video Analysis Technologies (Tevian) LLC ООО «Технологии видеоанализа» · INN 7729647374	Computer vision / recognition	US* EU
Skyeer IT LLC ООО «СКАЙЕР ИТ» · INN 7714762021	Computer vision / recognition	NONE
ELVEES-NeoTek JSC АО «Элвис-Неотек» · INN 7735575047	Computer vision / recognition; Microelectronics / hardware	NONE
Relevant Geoinformation Technologies (RGT) LLC ООО «РГТ» · INN 9709014842	Computer vision / recognition	UA
Center for Artificial Intelligence MVS LLC (MVS AI) ООО «Центр искусственного интеллекта МВС» · INN 9725021438	Computer vision / recognition	NONE
NVI Solutions LLC ООО «Нвиаи Солюшенс» · INN 9731001888	Computer vision / recognition	NONE
VideoMatrix LLC ООО «ВидеоМатрикс» · INN 7731486332	Computer vision / recognition	NONE

UA — Ukraine, US — United States, EU — European Union, UK — United Kingdom.

* marks companies that are subject to sanctions in the context of trade restrictions, but whose assets are not frozen.

CLUSTER NO. 3: TEXT AND IMAGE PROCESSING, CENSORSHIP AND CONTROL OF THE INTERNET

Among Russian developers of AI-based systems there are companies specialising in the monitoring of the media and the internet. Their NLP solutions, commissioned by Roskomnadzor, the FSB and related bodies, detect “prohibited content”, track anti-war narratives and serve as the basis for the judicial prosecution of citizens.

The tools are nominally aimed at unlawful content (including material about suicide and drug trafficking), but in practice they are applied first and foremost to political and military subject matter — posts against the war in Ukraine. The scale and purpose of these systems became known in large part thanks to a leak from the internal network of The General Radio Frequency Centre (FGUP GRChTs), which is subordinate to Roskomnadzor.

GRChTs’s largest project, “**Chistyy Internet**” (“**Clean Internet**”),⁴⁸ aims to monitor 100% of the Runet, relying no longer on keyword dictionaries but on neural networks. The data is collected through Yandex’s search API and a social-media crawler

supplied by Vector X LLC. The tool is meant to detect extremism, terrorism, calls to take part in mass gatherings, “propaganda of non-traditional relationships”, insults to state symbols and other categories.

The Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT) also cooperated with GRChTs: it won two tenders for the concepts of two systems — Oculus, for image and video analysis, and the broader Wild boar system.

Part of the cluster is directly linked to key figures in Russian IT: the Cribrum system is developed by the joint-stock company of the same name, which belongs to Igor Ashmanov and Natalya Kaspersky (co-founder of Kaspersky Lab and president of InfoWatch), while Ashmanov himself is a Putin proxy and a member of Roskomnadzor’s Public Council.

Of the 15 companies examined, five are not under any sanctions, and the rest are mostly subject to fragmentary restrictions imposed by Ukraine, the United States, the EU and the United Kingdom.

COMPANIES IN THE CLUSTER III AND THEIR SANCTIONS STATUS

Company / INN	AI application	Sanctions Imposed
Research and Production Centre BusinessAvtomatika LLC ООО «НПЦ «Бизнес Автоматика»» · INN 7729652455	Content monitoring and analysis	UA EU
Execution RDC LLC ООО «Эксикуйшн Эр Ди Си» · INN 7717783213	Content monitoring and analysis	US
Neobit LLC ООО «Необит» · INN 7804360292	Content monitoring and analysis	UA US
Vector X LLC ООО «Вектор икс» · INN 7731342796	Content monitoring and analysis	US
PalitrumLab LLC ООО «ПалитрумЛаб» · INN 7727796050	Content monitoring and analysis	US

Company / INN	AI application	Sanctions Imposed
Center for Studying and Network Monitoring of the Youth Environment (ANO TsISM) Автономная организация «Центр изучения сетевого мониторинга молодежной среды» (АНО «ЦИСМ») · INN 9709037529	Content monitoring and analysis	UK
Nanosemantics Lab LLC ООО «Лаборатория Наносемантика» · INN 7703761097	Content monitoring and analysis	NONE
InfoWatch JSC ООО «Инфовотч» · INN 7713515534	Content monitoring and analysis	UA
Positive Technologies JSC АО «Позитив Текнолоджиз» · INN 7718668887	Content monitoring and analysis	UA US EU
K-technologies JSC (formerly RTI JSC) АО «К-технологии» (formerly АО «РТИ») · INN 7713723559	Content monitoring and analysis	US EU
OKAS LLC ООО «ОКАС» («Объединение когнитивных ассоциативных систем») · INN 7203314414	Content monitoring and analysis	NONE
Ti Hunter LLC ООО «Ти Хантер» · INN 7810739096	Content monitoring and analysis	NONE
Cribrum JSC АО «Крибрум» · INN 7731661104	Content monitoring and analysis	US
Medialogiya LLC ООО «Медialogия» · INN 7713338638	Content monitoring and analysis	NONE
E.Soft LLC «Е.Софт» · INN 7728216470	Content monitoring and analysis	NONE

UA — Ukraine, US — United States, EU — European Union, UK — United Kingdom.

CLUSTER NO. 4: MANUFACTURERS OF COMPONENTS, MICROELECTRONICS AND HARDWARE

Although, as noted above, Russia lags considerably behind the West in AI hardware, it is able to manufacture some of the components needed to build devices that use algorithms. These include processors, photoelectronic devices, microchips, servers and network adapters, photosensitive matrices, infrared cameras and so on. Most enterprises in the cluster belong to Rostec holdings (more

precisely Ruselectronics, the Element group) and are for the most part included in sanctions lists. Some specialised microelectronics centres, however, remain outside sanctions. Only two of the twelve companies examined — SPC Atronik JSC and TsKB Deyton JSC — are not under the sanctions of any jurisdiction.

COMPANIES IN THE CLUSTER IV AND THEIR SANCTIONS STATUS

Company / INN	AI application	Sanctions Imposed
SPC ELVEES JSC АО НПЦ «ЭЛВИС» · INN 7735582816	Microelectronics / hardware	UA US EU
Central Research Institute Elektron JSC ЦНИИ «Электрон» · INN 7802144666	Microelectronics / hardware	UA
Scientific Research Center of Electronic Computer Technology (NICEVT) JSC АО «НИЦЭВТ» · INN 7726019325	Microelectronics / hardware	UA US EU
Rybinsk Instrument-Making Plant (RZP) JSC Рыбинский завод приборостроения (АО «РЗП») · INN 7610062970	Microelectronics / hardware	UA
SPE Almaz JSC АО «НПП «Алмаз» · INN 6453119615	Microelectronics / hardware	UA US EU
SPC Atronik JSC АО НПК «Атроник» · INN 7726444200	Microelectronics / hardware	NONE
Central Design Bureau Deyton (TsKB Deyton) JSC АО «ЦКБ «Дейтон» · INN 7735121290	Microelectronics / hardware	NONE
Research Institute of Microelectronic Equipment Progress (NIIMA Progress) JSC АО «НИИМА «Прогресс» · INN 7743869192	Microelectronics / hardware	UA US EU

Company / INN	AI application	Sanctions Imposed
SPE Pulsar JSC АО «НПП «Пульсар» · INN 7719846490	Microelectronics / hardware	UA US EU
SPE AME JSC (Aviation and Marine Electronics) АО НПП «АМЭ» · INN 7819029855	Microelectronics / hardware	UA US
Kaluga Research Institute of Telemechanical Devices (KNIITMU) JSC АО «КНИИТМУ» · INN 4027100480	UAV guidance / control; Microelectronics / hardware	UA US* EU
LEMZ-T LLC ООО «ЛЭМЗ-Т» · INN 7017341160	UAV guidance / control; Microelectronics / hardware	UA

UA — Ukraine, US — United States, EU — European Union, UK — United Kingdom.

* marks companies that are subject to sanctions in the context of trade restrictions, but whose assets are not frozen.


CLUSTER NO. 5: EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, UNIVERSITIES AND RESEARCH INSTITUTES

Universities have become important suppliers of developments and new solutions in the Russian AI field. Besides covert mobilisation measures and the UAV training centres they have set up, many higher-education institutions are working on neural networks intended to improve the control of drones at the front.

The Saint Petersburg State University of Aerospace Instrumentation, for example, has created a machine-learning model that automatically analyses terrain and recognises objects in real time using data from drones.⁴⁹ The university also cooperates directly with Russian defence-industry enterprises, in particular with the Arsenal Design Bureau JSC.

Saint Petersburg Electrotechnical University (LETI) develops autonomous navigation and computer vision for UAVs, takes part in the Army forum and works with NTC Rusich JSC (which produces turrets and maritime drones) and ChEAZ JSC (which supplies components for the production of Iskander-K missiles).

Russian Technological University (RTU MIREA) won a Russian Defence Ministry competition in 2014 to train personnel for the defence industry and continues to work in this area to this day. Together with the Istok Research and Production Enterprise named after A. I. Shokin, the university opened a technology park for training in counter-drone operations and developed the Vivaldi counter-UAV system and an acoustic neural network for detecting drones.



Representatives of Saint Petersburg Electrotechnical University working on a satellite-free UAV navigation system

Tula State University has a centre for unmanned systems that is creating a neural network for locating and identifying drones, and runs targeted training programmes for the army and the defence industry.

Despite their direct participation in military development, only three universities are subject to sanctions imposed by Ukraine, the US, and the EU.

INSTITUTIONS IN THE CLUSTER V AND THEIR SANCTIONS STATUS

Company / INN	AI application	Sanctions Imposed
Saint Petersburg State University of Aerospace Instrumentation ФГАОУ ВО «Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет аэрокосмического приборостроения» · INN 7812003110	UAV guidance / control; Funding / acceleration	NONE
St Petersburg Federal Research Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences СПб ФИЦ РАН (Санкт-Петербургский Федеральный исследовательский центр РАН) · INN 7801003920	UAV guidance / control; Computer vision / recognition; Funding / acceleration	NONE
Institute of Artificial Intelligence Problems Федеральное государственное бюджетное научное учреждение «Институт проблем искусственного интеллекта» · INN 9309021845	Funding / acceleration	US
Saint Petersburg Electrotechnical University (LETI) Санкт-Петербургский государственный электротехнический университет «ЛЭТИ» имени В. И. Ульянова · INN 7813045402	UAV guidance / control; Computer vision / recognition; Funding / acceleration	UA
MIREA — Russian Technological University (RTU MIREA) РТУ МИРЭА · INN 7729040491	UAV guidance / control; Funding / acceleration; Acoustic detection	NONE
National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) Национальный исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики» (НИУ ВШЭ) · INN 7714030726	Funding / acceleration	UA
Kharkevich Institute for Information Transmission Problems, RAS (IITP RAS) Институт проблем передачи информации имени А. А. Харкевича РАН (ИППИ РАН) · INN 7707020131	UAV guidance / control; Computer vision / recognition; Funding / acceleration	UA US EU
Tula State University ФГБОУ ВО «Тульский государственный университет» · INN 7106003011	Funding / acceleration	UA

Company / INN	AI application	Sanctions Imposed
Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology (Skoltech) Сколковский институт науки и технологий, Сколтех · INN 5032998454	Funding / acceleration	UA US EU
State Research Institute of Aviation Systems (GosNIIAS) Государственный научно-исследовательский институт авиационных систем (ГосНИИАС) · INN 7714482225	UAV guidance / control; Computer vision / recognition	UA US EU
ITMO National Research University Национальный исследовательский университет ИТМО · INN 7813045547	UAV guidance / control; Computer vision / recognition	UA
Samara National Research University named after Academician S. P. Korolev Самарский национальный исследовательский университет имени академика С.П.Королева · INN 6316000632	UAV guidance / control; Funding / acceleration; Simulators / training	UA

UA — Ukraine, US — United States, EU — European Union, UK — United Kingdom.

CLUSTER NO. 6: STATE FUNDS, ACCELERATORS AND OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES

The entities in this group consist of state funds, business accelerators and administrative structures. Their task is the selection, testing and financing of promising Russian scientific developments, including in the military field. Support is delivered through access to equipment, preferential lending terms, grants, fast-track access to the Defence Ministry, test ranges and the acquisition of a stake in the company. The Urban Air Mobility Management Center LLC, for example, owns a significant share of the companies that manufacture Russian UAVs.⁵⁰

Although these companies finance (or own) a significant number of Russian military start-ups, most of them are either not sanctioned at all or restricted

only by Ukraine — 6 out of 11. Such is the status, for instance, of **ANO “Center for Unmanned Systems and Technologies”** — an organisation founded by PSB (Promsvyazbank) and the “Nasha Pravda” foundation with the support of the Russian presidential administration, the State Duma, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, Rosgvardia and United Russia. The centre’s official task is the “accelerated launch and scaling of projects for the front and the rear of the SMO”. It brings together more than 200 enterprises and engineering teams, and with the fund’s assistance more than 45,000 drones have been delivered to the front by its residents.

ENTITIES IN THE CLUSTER VI AND THEIR SANCTIONS STATUS

Company / INN	AI application	Sanctions Imposed
ANO “Center for Artificial Intelligence Technologies NeiroLab” Автономная некоммерческая организация «Центр технологий искусственного интеллекта Нейролаб» · INN 9703197364	Funding / acceleration	UA
Military Innovative Technopolis ERA (federal state autonomous institution) Федеральное государственное автономное учреждение «Военный инновационный технополис ЭРА» · INN 2539025440	UAV guidance / control; Weapons control; Computer vision / recognition; Funding / acceleration	US EU
Moscow Innovation Cluster (MIK Fund) «Московский инновационный кластер» (ФОНД МИК) · INN 9710075695	Funding / acceleration	NONE
Southern Startup Factory (YuFS) LLC ООО «ЮФС» · INN 6168118892	Funding / acceleration	NONE
SK Capital LLC ООО «СК Капитал» (formerly Skolkovo Ventures) · INN 7731343493	Funding / acceleration	NONE
Rosnano Management Company LLC ООО «УК Роснано» · INN 7728864753	Funding / acceleration	NONE
Skolkovo Foundation Фонд «Сколково» · INN 7701058410	Funding / acceleration	UA US EU
Urban Air Mobility Management Center LLC (TsUGAM) ООО «ЦУГАМ» · INN 9731094770	Funding / acceleration	UA EU
Foundation for Advanced Research Projects (FPI) Фонд перспективных исследований · INN 7710480347	Funding / acceleration	UA US EU
ANO “Center for Unmanned Systems and Technologies” (CUST) АНО «Центр беспилотных систем и технологий (ЦБСТ)» · INN 9702064851	Funding / acceleration	UA
ANO “National Technological Initiative Platform” АНО «Платформа НТИ» (Национальная технологическая инициатива) · INN 7703469180	Funding / acceleration	UA

UA — Ukraine, US — United States, EU — European Union, UK — United Kingdom.

Sanctions Policy

Of the 106 companies identified, only nine are under sanctions in all jurisdictions. The remaining 97 companies of the active monitoring group, grouped

into six clusters, have been placed on sanctions lists extremely unevenly, and a considerable number of them remain free of any restrictions.


COVERAGE BY JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction	Companies under sanctions	Share
Ukraine	58 of 106	55%
United States	44 of 106	42%
European Union	33 of 106	31%
United Kingdom	10 of 106	9%

Ukraine has so far imposed restrictive measures on the largest number of companies — 58. US sanctions cover 44 companies and EU sanctions 33. **The United Kingdom has imposed sanctions on only 10 companies, nine of which are**

already under the sanctions of the other jurisdictions. The only exception is ANO “Center for Studying and Network Monitoring of the Youth Environment”, which was added to the British list alone on 11 May 2026.

LEVEL OF SANCTIONS COVERAGE BY NUMBER OF COMPANIES



38 companies (36%) have no sanctions in any jurisdiction, and a further 27 in only one. The sanctions of all four jurisdictions simultaneously cover only nine companies. These are mostly large, long-established

structures of the Russian defence industry (Rostec concerns, specialised research institutes, the State Development Corporation):

- 01.** TsNII Tsiklon (ЦНИИ «Циклон») · INN 7718159209
- 02.** Kalashnikov Concern (Концерн «Калашников») · INN 1832090230
- 03.** MIPT (Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology) · INN 5008006211
- 04.** Granit-Elektron Concern (Концерн «Гранит-Электрон») · INN 7842335610
- 05.** Kronshtadt Group («Кронштадт Групп») · INN 7808035536
- 06.** NII Vektor (НИИ «Вектор») · INN 7813491943
- 07.** Struktura Group (ГК «Структура») · INN 7703438908
- 08.** VEB.RF (State Development Corporation) · INN 7750004150
- 09.** STC LLC (ООО «СТЦ») · INN 7802170553

Sanctions against these companies have been imposed very unevenly. Of the 13 companies engaged in computer vision, nine are not under sanctions at all, three are covered in two jurisdictions and one in a single jurisdiction; none has been included on the lists of three or four countries. The situation is similar with state funds and accelerators: of 11 entities, four have no sanctions at all and a further three

are sanctioned in only one jurisdiction. Universities and research institutes have also faced almost no restrictive measures.

In absolute terms, the largest number of companies outside sanctions is among the developers of AI for drones, ground robots and weapon systems: 15 are not covered by the restrictions of any of the four countries — despite the fact that some of this output is used directly at the front.

Recommendations On The Sanctions Policy Of The Sanctions Coalition Countries

The highest priority is the listing of the 38 companies that are not under the sanctions of any of the four jurisdictions examined.

CLUSTER I. DEVELOPERS OF AI FOR UAVS, UGVs AND WEAPON SYSTEMS

- 01. Sverkh LLC** (ООО «Сверх»; INN 9718238623, OGRN 1237700795122)
- 02. Autonomous Robotics LLC** (ООО «Автономная робототехника»; INN 7726482967, OGRN 1217700433411)
- 03. Amalgama LLC** (ООО «Амальгама»; INN 7327058629, OGRN 1117327001021)
- 04. Arkodim LLC** («Аркодим»; INN 1659101884, OGRN 1101690020959)
- 05. Vashi Roboty LLC** (ООО «Ваши Роботы»; INN 7722453683, OGRN 1187746421158)
- 06. Laboratory of Infocommunication Networks (LIS) LLC** (ООО «Лаборатория инфокоммуникационных сетей»; INN 7814396731, OGRN 1089847030701)
- 07. Nova Labs JSC** (АО «Нова Лабс»; INN 9722025723, OGRN 1227700429780)
- 08. Kobak Lab LLC** (ООО «Кобак Лаб»; INN 7813661465, OGRN 1227800031491)
- 09. Design Bureau Atlas LLC** (ООО Конструкторское Бюро Атлас; INN 5258158376, OGRN 1245200024640)
- 10. Institute of Telecommunications CJSC** (ЗАО «Институт телекоммуникаций»; INN 7802199182, OGRN 1027801538600)
- 11. Computer Vision Laboratory LLC (VisRobo)** (ООО «Лаборатория компьютерного зрения»; INN 5258150017, OGRN 1215200001972)
- 12. Ventura.AR LLC** (ООО «Вентура.АР»; INN 5050152329, OGRN 1215000092560)
- 13. Sibscience LLC** (ООО «Сибсайнс» (Sibscience); INN 5473009802, OGRN 1235400021691)
- 14. Intel Dron LLC** (ООО «Интел Дрон»; INN 7448259249, OGRN 1247400026246)
- 15. Design Bureau 3303 LLC** (ООО «КБ 3303»; INN 9701245333, OGRN 1237700253174)

CLUSTER II. DEVELOPERS OF COMPUTER-VISION SYSTEMS FOR VIDEO SURVEILLANCE AND BIOMETRIC CONTROL

- 01. VisionLabs LLC** (ООО «Вижнлабс»; INN 7701954054, OGRN 1127746276470)
- 02. VessoLink Group** (ГК «ВессоЛинк»; INN 9715259760, OGRN 1167746483057)
- 03. Sivies (Computer Vision Software) LLC** (ООО «Сивизэс»; INN 9731058193, OGRN 1197746723680)
- 04. NtechLab LLC** (ООО «НТех лаб»; INN 7710499161, OGRN 1157746622109)

- 05. Skyeer IT LLC** (ООО «СКАЙЕР ИТ»; INN 7714762021, OGRN 5087746659666)
- 06. ELVEES-NeoTek JSC** (АО «Элвис-Неотек»; INN 7735575047, OGRN 1117746057714)
- 07. Center for Artificial Intelligence MVS LLC (MVS AI)** (ООО «Центр искусственного интеллекта МВС»; INN 9725021438, OGRN 1197746575146)
- 08. NVI Solutions LLC** (ООО «Нвиаи Солюшенс»; INN 9731001888, OGRN 1187746473320)
- 09. VideoMatrix LLC** (ООО «ВидеоМатрикс»; INN 7731486332, OGRN 5147746457161)

CLUSTER III. DEVELOPERS OF MEDIA-MONITORING, CENSORSHIP AND CYBER-OPERATIONS SYSTEMS

- 01. Nanosemantics Lab LLC** (ООО «Лаборатория Наносемантика»; INN 7703761097, OGRN 1127746015517)
- 02. OKAS LLC** (ООО «ОКАС» («Объединение когнитивных ассоциативных систем»); INN 7203314414, OGRN 1147232035741)
- 03. Ti Hunter LLC** (ООО «Ти Хантер»; INN 7810739096, OGRN 1187847269840)
- 04. Medialogiya LLC** (ООО «Медialogия»; INN 7713338638, OGRN 1037713009388)
- 05. E.Soft LLC** («Е.Софт»; INN 7728216470, OGRN 1037739088420)

CLUSTER IV. MANUFACTURERS OF COMPONENTS, MICROELECTRONICS AND HARDWARE

- 01. SPC Atronik JSC** (АО НПК «Атроник»; INN 7726444200, OGRN 1187746982059)
- 02. Central Design Bureau Deyton (TsKB Deyton) JSC** (АО «ЦКБ «Дейтон»; INN 7735121290, OGRN 1037735008520)

CLUSTER V. UNIVERSITIES AND RESEARCH INSTITUTES

- 01. Saint Petersburg State University of Aerospace Instrumentation** (ФГАОУ ВО «Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет аэрокосмического приборостроения»; INN 7812003110, OGRN 1027810232680)
- 02. St Petersburg Federal Research Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences** (СПб ФИЦ РАН (Санкт-Петербургский Федеральный исследовательский центр РАН); INN 7801003920, OGRN 1027800514411)
- 03. MIREA — Russian Technological University (RTU MIREA)** (ПТУ МИРЭА; INN 7729040491, OGRN 1037739552740)

CLUSTER VI. STATE FUNDS, ACCELERATORS AND ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES

- 01. Moscow Innovation Cluster (MIK Fund)** («Московский инновационный кластер» (ФОНД МИК); INN 9710075695, OGRN 1197700007141)
- 02. Southern Startup Factory (YuFS) LLC** (ООО «ЮФС»; INN 6168118892, OGRN 1226100032400)
- 03. SK Capital LLC** (ООО «СК Капитал» (formerly Skolkovo Ventures); INN 7731343493, OGRN 1177746048402)
- 04. Rosnano Management Company LLC** (ООО «УК Роснано»; INN 7728864753, OGRN 5137746180743)

Impose sanctions on companies whose products are used directly in military operations against Ukraine:

- 01.** Arkodim LLC (ООО «Аркодим») — INN 1659101884
- 02.** Zala Aero JSC (АО «Зала Аэро») — INN 9715478507
- 03.** ANO “Center for Unmanned Systems and Technologies” (АНО «ЦБСТ») — INN 9702064851
- 04.** Urban Air Mobility Management Center LLC (ООО «ЦУГАМ») — INN 9731094770
- 05.** SPA Kaysant LLC (ООО НПО «КАЙСАНТ») — INN 7733393203
- 06.** Russian Air Transport Laboratory LLC (ООО «РЛВТ») — INN 7100027464 (remains outside UK sanctions only)
- 07.** Hardberry Rusfaktor LLC (ООО «Хардберри Русфактор») — INN 7728845817
- 08.** KT — Unmanned Systems JSC (АО «КТ — Беспилотные системы») — INN 7801572080
- 09.** Ploshchad JSC (Area Systems) — INN 9723203841
- 10.** Stratim JSC (АО «Стратим») — INN 7720901379
- 11.** Emergency Digital Solutions JSC (АО «Эмердженси Диджитал Солюшенс») — INN 9715475552
- 12.** Severny Press JSC (АО «Северный пресс») — INN 7806337732
- 13.** Vashi Roboty LLC (ООО «Ваши Роботы») — INN 7722453683
- 14.** Ventura.AR LLC (ООО «Вентура.АР») — INN 5050152329
- 15.** Intel Dron LLC (ООО «Интел Дрон») — INN 7448259249
- 16.** Nova Labs JSC (АО «Нова Лабс») — INN 9722025723
- 17.** Design Bureau 3303 LLC (ООО «КБ 3303») — INN 9701245333
- 18.** Intellect Mashin JSC (АО «Интеллект Машин») — INN 7801711200
- 19.** Technodron JSC (АО «Технодрон») — INN 9704241986
- 20.** Dron Solutions LLC (ООО «Дрон Солюшнс») — INN 7716892964
- 21.** Smart Birds LLC (ООО «Умные птицы») — INN 1800020960

Apply sanctions to the financial and coordination centres of the industry.

Imposing restrictions on state funds and accelerators may have a negative effect on the entire industry of Russian military start-ups.

Implement “mirror” listing of companies that are already subject to restrictive measures in other jurisdictions.

Include in the sanctions lists the individuals who exercise decisive influence or play a key role in the activities of the companies concerned, namely: ultimate beneficial owners, senior management (directors) and chief developers.

Tighten export controls over AI components. Most of the equipment used in the AI field is already subject to sanctions restrictions; its export to Russia is prohibited. What matters, **therefore, is not the adoption of new acts but compliance with the existing ones**, as well as encouraging countries **to control the re-export of goods to Russia**. One effective mechanism could be secondary sanctions against the companies and countries that act as intermediaries in these operations. In April 2026, for example, the EU banned the supply of radio equipment and certain types of computer-numerical-control machine tools to Kyrgyzstan.

Oblige chip manufacturers to monitor where their products are physically operating. Modern accelerators are able to confirm their location — Nvidia developed such a function back in 2025,⁵¹ but its use is not currently mandatory. If the Chip Security Act⁵² is adopted in the United States, location verification for such equipment should become a mandatory condition of the export licence. The same requirement is worth introducing in parallel in the EU, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, and manufacturers should be obliged to retain verification data and to pass it to sanctions authorities.

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